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ABSTRACT 
While there has been much coverage of the influence of the British Commonwealth on the 
Chamberlain government's foreign policy, there has been little on the impact of European 
events on the dominions themselves, especially relating to the particular contexts in which 
they existed. Yet it is these contexts which were crucial in determining how they perceived 
events in Europe. This study therefore aims to consider the developing attitudes of the 
Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and South African governments towards the idea of war 
with Germany between the Munich Settlement and Canada's declaration of war on Germany 
on 10 September 1939. The Irish Free State is deliberately excluded from consideration, as 
its circumstances were sufficiently distinct from those of the other dominions to render its 
inclusion meaningless, and there was consequently never any realistic prospect that it would 
enter the war at Britain's side, as the others did. The first chapter of this thesis examines the 
underlying imperatives which defined the dominions' perspectives on Europe, while 
succeeding ones trace the effect of the key developments in the approach of war, such as 
Kris. .tallnacht and the march into Prague, on the Commonwealth's evolving views of the 
international situation during the eleven months after Munich. The methodology follows the 
Agents & Structures model laid down in M. G. Fry's 1999 article `The British Dominions & 
the Munich Crisis.' Sources for this study include dominion government records, the 
personal diaries of participants, their private correspondence & newspaper coverage of their 
activities, as well as the secondary literature dealing with the wider picture of the prelude to 
war and the Commonwealth's role within that, as outlined above. 
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As will be seen, much has been written about the prelude to war from the British 
perspective. Much has also been written about the influence of the British Commonwealth, 
on that viewpoint. This material is therefore fairly familiar. The aim of this thesis, however, 
is to look at this subject in a different way, by tracing the impact of European events on the 
thinking of the Commonwealth governments, between the Munich Agreement and the 
outbreak of war. This thesis does not purport to be the true history of relations between the 
periphery and centre of the Commonwealth in this period; it simply aims to be a true 
history.' In this, it is an unashamedly elite history; it focuses on the elite politicians who 
formed the `inner cabinets' that monopolised power in these political entities, and seeks to 
trace how developments in Europe affected their mindsets. In particular, no attempt is made 
at reconstructing public opinion. In New Zealand, any attempt to do so from the press would 
lead the reader to believe that the public was convinced of the intellectual bankruptcy of the 
Labour government's manifesto, and would throw them out of office in the general election 
on 15 October in 1938. In fact, Labour was returned with three fewer seats than in their 
landslide victory of 1935, and with an increased share of the vote.2 All this is not to say that 
such a project would be impossible, only very difficult, and it is not attempted here. 
The British Commonwealth in 1938 was something of an amorphous body. The term itself 
had originally been coined to apply to Britain and the self -governing dominions of Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and South Africa.3 Of the other dominions, Newfoundland had been 
placed under direct British rule, and Eire would demonstrate its independence by remaining 
aloof from the Second World War, so it is this original definition that will be used 
throughout this thesis.4 All except Eire were kingdoms ruled by a common crown. The latter, 
officially added to the group since 1922, had signified its independent tendencies by 
replacing the monarchy with an elected president in 1937. The legal question of the 
I John M. Mackenzie, `Review of The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the 
Boer War by Ronald Hyam; Peter Henshaw' in Africa: Journal of the International African Institute , 
Vol. 74, No. 3 (2004), pp. 472 -473. 
2 See Chapter One, below. 
3 D. C. Somervell, & H. Harvey, The British Empire and Commonwealth, (London, 1954), p. 346. 
4 P. N. S. Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of External Policy, 1931 - 
1939, (London, 1952) (hereafter Mansergh, Survey) p. 17; for a more detailed consideration of the 
nature of the British Commonwealth, see Chapter One, below. 
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divisibility of the crown that obsessed constitutional experts elsewhere therefore lacked 
relevance here. Politically, Eire was also unique in not containing any substantial 
constituency in favour of the British connection. While Irish trading links with Britain 
remained necessarily close, their political significance was overshadowed by the course of 
recent history. This effectively rendered fighting a war at Britain's side, except in self - 
defence, a political impossibility, even if the ruling party in Dublin had had any appetite to 
do so. Eire also remained an emigrant, rather than immigrant, nation, unlike the others. 
Dublin was moving far beyond what the other dominions had achieved and sought at this 
time. Other than its communication with London via the Dominions', rather than Foreign, 
Office, Eire therefore more closely resembled an independent state than an integral part of 
the British Commonwealth. Consequently it makes more sense to exclude it from an 
examination of this crucial stage in the development of these entities, with which it had little 
in common apart from its titular membership of their group. Newfoundland was also a 
dominion in name only, having being brought under London's direct rule due to fmancial 
difficulties. Attention will instead be focused on Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South 
Africa, each of which had a government capable of forming and expressing an opinion on 
their behalf. These governments, while still heavily reliant on British intelligence, 
nevertheless had their own independent mechanisms for collating and framing their opinions, 
quite distinct from those of the British Government. Each had a Department of External 
Affairs, responsible for originating policy with regard to the rest of the world, and each had a 
nascent diplomatic representation capable of putting their own gloss on developments. 
Historiography 
Early historical consideration of the prelude to war tended to overlook the Commonwealth. 
Mainstream opinion, as expressed by such authorities as Sir Lewis Namier and John 
Wheeler- Bennett, followed the `guilty men' thesis, blaming the pre -war British leadership 
5 
for not stopping Hitler soon enough. The primary focus was therefore on showing where 
British policy had gone wrong in its dealings with Hitler, leading to the `unnecessary war,' 
6 
as Churchill put it, and not on why Britain had pursued that policy. This appeared to have a 
s 
L. Namier Diplomatic Prelude, 1938 -1939, (London, 1948) and J. Wheeler- Bennett Munich: 
Prologue to Tragedy, (London, 1948); Foot, M., Howard, P., and Owen F., as `Cato', Guilty Men, 
(London, 1940) 
6 W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, (6 vols., 1948 -54) vol.l, p.14 as cited in D. Reynolds 
`Churchill's Writing of History: Appeasement, Autobiography and "The Gathering Storm "' in 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th Ser., Vol. 11 (2001), p.222 
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strong contemporary resonance for that particular period of the Cold War when Western 
statesmen saw themselves as once again confronting potential aggressors, as both David 
7 
Reynolds and Anthony D'Agostino indicate. This line of inquiry provided little incentive to 
examine the Commonwealth's involvement in the diplomatic antecedents of the war, as the 
crucial errors lay in Britain's central relationship with Germany, not its peripheral ones with 
the Commonwealth. Study of the Commonwealth was therefore irrelevant as it could not 
identify why the choices made were the wrong choices, even if it could explain why those 
choices were the ones made. All this was, however, based on the assumption that British 
policy had simply been wrong from start to finish. 
An emerging revisionist school of thought, however, sought to question this assumption. A 
plethora of memoirs from the survivors of the Chamberlain Cabinet, such as Halifax and 
Templewood, had suggested that concern for imperial unity had, in fact, been central to the 
8 
reasoning behind appeasement. Accordingly, D. C. Watt turned to this subject in his 1958 
essay `The Influence of the Commonwealth on British Foreign Policy: the Case of the 
9 
Munich Crisis.' This concluded that the dominions' attitude was `of great importance in 
explaining the rigidity of the British determination not to get involved in central Europe,' 
although he also acknowledged that this was `only one of the factors which went to make up 
to 
the policy of appeasement.' Additionally, Watt accepted that limitations were placed on 
this field of study by the paucity of official documents that had been released on this subject 
n 
matter up to that point. Further motivation for exploring this area was provided by A. J. P. 
Taylor's 1961 Origins of the Second World War and D. C. Watt's own 1965 article 
`Appeasement: The Rise of a Revisionist School ?.' Taylor did not himself mention the 
Commonwealth, but, his characterisation of Munich as `a triumph for all that was best and 
most enlightened in British Life' was not only provocative and controversial: but also by 
questioning the assumption that British policy had been wrong, it legitimised the re- 
12 
examination of the reasoning behind that policy. Watt then continued his engagement with 
7 Ibid., pp.246 -7; A. D'Agostino `The Revisionist Tradition in European Diplomatic History' in 
Journal of the Historical Society (2004) Vol. IV (2), pp. 257 -9 
8 See, for instance, Edward Wood, Earl of Halifax, Fulness [sic] of Days, (London, 1957) pp. 197 -198 
& 205; Samuel Hoare, Viscount Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, (London, 1954), pp. 323 -6 & 
353. 
9 D. C. Watt, `The Influence of the Commonwealth on British Foreign Policy: the Case of the Munich 
Crisis' reprinted in D. C. Watt, Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British 
Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1965), pp.159 -174 
1° Ibid., p.173 
11 Ibid., pp. 159 -160. 
12 A. J. P. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, (London, 1964) p.189. 
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the role of the dominions in 1963 with his article, `Imperial Defence and Imperial Foreign 
Policy, 1911 - 1939: The Substance and the Shadow', concluding (somewhat speculatively) 
that `in March 1939 Dominion opinion reacted as positively to Hitler's entry into Prague as 
did that of Britain itself.'13 He returned to this subject area in 1967 with his essay `South 
African Attempts to Mediate between Britain and Germany, 1935- 1938', in which he again 
concluded that dominion activity had `a considerable influence on the policy of attempting a 
new initiative to secure a general satisfaction of German claims in Eastern Europe' but that 
the South African attempts at mediation `were both futile in conception and perilous in 
practice.' 14 
Julian Campbell Doherty's `Die Dominions and die britische Aussenpolitik von München bis 
Kriegsausbruch' took advantage of the release of British (but not dominion) official 
documents under the thirty year rule at the end of the 1960s, which none of the preceding 
works had been able to do, and concluded not so much `that the dominions had influenced 
British policy as England was still able to strongly influence the far -flung countries of the 
Commonwealth,' although their behaviour was also `not as much determined by loyalty to 
the mother country, as by their own regional interests,' without elaborating on how this came 
to be so.15 Nor did he appraise different strands of opinion (such as the disparities between 
Mackenzie King and Skelton, for instance, who were given equal weight as the voice of 
Canada) within the dominions.'6 This article was followed by Ritchie Ovendale's 
Appeasement and the English Speaking World: Britain, the United States, the Dominions 
and the Policy of Appeasements (1975). This is a slightly odd book, as the bracketing of the 
United States with the self -governing dominions, simply because it was an English speaking 
country, feels somewhat artificial. It is true that a degree of isolationism pertained in all of 
these countries, except New Zealand, but the wealth, industrial might and population of the 
United States meant that the Anglo- American relationship was not only conducted through a 
different mechanism (the Foreign, as opposed to Dominions' Office), but was on a 
completely different level. More than 160 years of independence from Britain served only to 
13 D. C. Watt, `Imperial Defence and Imperial Foreign Policy, 1911 - 1939: The Substance and the 
Shadow' reprinted in Watt, Personalities and Policies, 139 - 158. 
14 D. C. Watt, `South African Attempts to Mediate between Britain and Germany, 1935 -1938' in K. 
Bourne and D. C. Watt (Eds.), Studies in International History: Essays presented to W. Norton 
Medlicott, Stevenson Professor of International History, (London, 1967) pp. 402 -422. 
15Doherty, J. C., `Die Dominions und die britische Aussenpolitik von München bis Kriegsausbruch' 
(tr. M. Klinker) in Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschicte, Vol.XX (1970), p.234. 
16 Ibid., p.219 & pp.209 - 234 
'7 Ovendale, R., `Appeasement' and the English Speaking World: Britain, the United States, the 
Dominions and the Policy of Appeasement', 1937 -1939, (Cardiff, 1975) 
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exacerbate this difference. The book remains a useful and in -depth examination of dominion 
influence on British policy, however. In the end the author absolves the dominions of 
responsibility for `appeasement' (even though all except New Zealand enthusiastically 
endorsed it) on the grounds that Chamberlain had already decided to proceed with this policy 
prior to the Imperial Conference of 1937 where Australia, Canada and South Africa lobbied 
for `appeasement' or something very like it. Ovendale returned to the subject in 1983 when 
he wrote `Britain, the Dominions and the Coming of the Second World War' in which he 
reached a similar conclusion, albeit one somewhat qualified by the stipulation that `over 
Czechoslovakia Chamberlain saw the reluctance of the dominions to fight and the 
consequent break -up of the Commonwealth as decisive.']$ He continued to argue that 
dominion influence declined after this, particularly with the occupation of Prague.19 
Reinhardt Meyers has similarly argued `the dominions' role was a subsidiary and supportive 
one rather than one of taking the initiative.'20 He further contended that appeasement had 
older origins than is usually thought, and that it was particularly driven by the insoluble 
dilemma of maintaining power in Europe and the Far East simultaneously.21 This is a 
position with which Paul Kennedy essentially concurred in his 1976 essay `The Tradition of 
Appeasement in British Foreign Policy 1865 - 1939.'22 D. Carlton retumed to the question of 
dominion influence in `The Dominions and the Gathering Storm', concluding that 
`British Ministers, in war no less than in peace, gave representations from the 
Dominions a high priority only when they agreed with them.'23 
More recently, R. A. C. Parker devoted a chapter to the United States and the dominions in 
Chamberlain and Appeasement (1993). Parker follows Ovendale in concluding `the 
Dominions had little or no influence on British policy except in supplying added justification 
18 Ovendale, R., `Britain, the Dominions and the Coming of the Second World War' in Mommsen, W. 
J. And Kettenacker, L. (eds.), The Fascist Challenge and The Policy of Appeasement (London, 1983), 
p.333 
19 ¡bid, p.335 
20 R. Meyers, `Die Dominions und die britische Europapolitik der dreissige Jahre ' in Hutter, J. et al 
(eds.) Tradition und Neubeginn, Internationale Forschungen zur deutschen Geschicte im 20. 
Jahrhundert, (Cologne, 1975), pp.173 -201, and `Britain, Europe and the Dominions in the 1930s. 
Some Aspects of British, European and Commonwealth Policies' Australian Journal of Politics and 
History Vo1.22 (1976) pp.36 -50, as cited in R. Meyers, `British Imperial Interests and the Policy of 
Appeasement' in Mommsen and Kettenacker, (eds.), Fascist Challenge, p. 339. 
21 ¡bid, p. 343. 
22 P. Kennedy, `The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy, 1865 - 1939', in British 
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 2 (1976), pp.195 - 215 
23D. Carlton, `The Dominions and the Gathering Storm' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, Vo1.6 (1977 -78) No.2, p.175 
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to policies that Chamberlain and his supporters would have wished to pursue anyway.'24 M. 
G. Fry's 1999 article, `Agents and Structures: The Dominions and the Munich Crisis, 
September 1938'25 criticised dominion complacency: `but to the self -delusion, the sheer 
wrong -headedness of dominion beliefs had been added, however briefly, utterly futile 
expectations of appeasement and the Munich agreement.'26The author, however, moved 
away from previous commentators by casting doubt on even South Africa's will to remain 
neutral in 1938.27 Even if Fry's latter argument is correct, this still leaves open the question 
of how dominion illusions fared down to September 1939. Although Andrew Stewart in 
Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War (2008) mentioned dominion 
disquiet over the change in British policy initiated after Prague, concluding the Canadian 
Prime Minister in particular was resentful over the lack of consultation involved (a position 
this thesis seeks to refute), the author did not otherwise seek to track the impact of European 
actions on dominion governments in this period.28 This work instead focused on the 
Dominions' Office effort to develop a policy document to deal with the possibility of one or 
more dominions remaining neutral in the event of war, and accordingly traced the 
development of this memorandum within Whitehall from December 1937 to May 1939, 
before turning to address the crisis over neutrality that arose in South Africa during the first 
four days of September 1939.29 The author returned to the latter in his article of August of 
the same year, `The British Government and the South African Neutrality Crisis,' which 
traces the origins of the crisis back to the Boer war, but fails to explain why a South African 
government consensus in favour of participation in a war against any further instance of 
German aggression in April 1939, should have transformed itself into a cabinet split over 
involvement in such a war in September of that year.3° 
Historians of the Commonwealth have looked on the advent of the Second World War from 
a different perspective. War had not even broken out by the time H. V. Hodson wrote 
`British Foreign Policy and the Dominions' for the July 1939 edition of Foreign Affairs. He 
concluded that Britain and the Dominions were `physically and morally' unprepared for war 
24 Ibid., p. 296. 
25 M. G. Fry `Agents and Structures: The Dominions and the Czechoslovak Crisis, September 1938' in 
Diplomacy and Statecraft Vol. 10: 2 &3 (1999) pp.293 -341 
26 Ibid., p. 334. 
27 Ibid, p. 328. 
28 
A. Stewart, Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War, (London, 2008), pp.19 
& 20. 
29/bid, pp. 15 -24. 
30A. Stewart, "The British Government and the South African Neutrality Crisis, 1938 -39," English 
Historical Review Vol. CXXIII No. 503 (August 2008), pp. 947 -72, 958 & 962. 
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in 1938, but that lessons had been learned, namely that the dominions needed to prepare both 
individually and collectively for war.31 Naturally enough, given the circumstances of the 
time, he did not elaborate on what steps were being taken as a result of these lessons learned. 
This was followed in 1943 by The British Commonwealth at War, edited by W.Y. Elliot and 
H. Duncan-Hall. This was supposed to be a response to pro -German propaganda in the 
United States, but appears to have been targeted at a rather specialist audience as it 
concentrates fairly heavily on the constitutional and economic organisation of the war effort. 
Beyond recognising (and criticising) Irish and Afrikaner reluctance to become involved, 
there is little of substance on pre -war politics.32 In 1947, G. Carter produced The British 
Commonwealth and International Security, which suffers from the paucity of documents 
then available, leading her to conclude that the 1937 Imperial Conference united the 
participants in an awareness of a common danger so that `for the first time in the inter -war 
period, the motive of self -preservation acted directly on the governments of the overseas 
Dominions to induce a common attitude.'33 This was a position which later releases of 
official documents were to undermine. 
P. N. S. Mansergh completed his Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of 
External Policy, 1931 -1939 in 1952, returning to the subject in The Commonwealth 
Experience in 1969 (with a revised two volume edition issued in 1982). When Professor 
Mansergh began his studies of the Commonwealth, it appeared that that institution might 
prove to be of continuing importance in world affairs.34 His first work therefore addressed 
the difficulties of devising an appropriate framework to reconcile British interests, the 
perpetuation of the Commonwealth, and dominion aspirations for their own external policies, 
which appeared to be of long -term significance, rather than examining the actual issues 
which required a Commonwealth response, which had already been dealt with at the time of 
writing, and consequently seemed of passing concern. His second work dealt with all aspects 
of Commonwealth development, not just external relations, but did address the question of 
responding to Hitler. On appeasement, he came to a similar conclusion to Ovendale that, 
while the dominions approved of the policy, they bore no responsibility for it.35 He also 
31 H. V. Hodson `British Foreign Policy and the Dominions' in Foreign Affairs, XVII (July 1939), P. 
159. 
32W. 
Y. Eliot `Introduction', pp.4 - 5 in W. Y. Eliot and H. Duncan -Hall (Eds.) The British 
Commonwealth at War, (New York, 1943, reprinted 1971); Ibid., pp.475 -483 and pp.426 -437. 
u Carter G., The British Commonwealth and International Security: The Role of the Dominions, 1919- 
1939, (Toronto, 1947), p.279. 
34D. 
K. Fieldhouse `Untitled Review' in The English Historical Review, Vol. 94, No. 372, (July, 
1979), p. 606. 
35P. N. S. Mansergh., The Commonwealth Experience, (London, 1982), p. 86. 
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noted `a new Commonwealth consensus on resistance.... following close upon the old 
Commonwealth consensus on appeasement,' but without explaining how or why that new 
consensus developed 36 In between Mansergh's books, in 1958 J.D.B. Miller brought out The 
Commonwealth and the World, which concluded that dominion responsibility for British 
policy `is a matter which need not be gone into here.'37 Further, while the author 
acknowledged Irish and South African dissent, he confined himself simply to noting that `by 
the time Britain declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, Dominion opinion was 
much more settled.'38 More recent entrants to the field, such as David McIntyre and Peter 
Lyon have been more interested in developments outside the self -governing dominions and 
the field of international relations on which this project focuses.39 
The national histories of the individual dominions (such as Canada, 1922 -1939: Decades of 
Discord, A History of South Africa, The History of New Zealand, and A History of Australia) 
naturally cover the pre -war period, but focus on their own viewpoints with no attempt to 
consider a comparative perspective.40 Nor, given the greater scope of their subject, do they 
have the luxury of being able to consider this period in any great depth. Similarly, 
biographies of the participants are concerned with all aspects of their subject's life over its 
entire course, of which this is but one episode of limited significance, which has necessarily 
to be considered primarily from a personal perspective. Thus, while the approach of war 
merited only a single sentence in Keith Sinclair's Walter Nash (1976), Lita -Rose 
Betcherman made it a central strand of three chapters of Ernest Lapointe: Mackenzie King's 
Great Quebec Lieutenant (2002)41 In neither case, however, did the authors need to refer to 
a Commonwealth dimension to adequately dispose of the matter in terms of their subjects' 
lives. 
More specialist works have tended to focus on a single aspect of the crises considered here, 
and often over a longer period than that under review. Thus, E. Andrews's Isolationism and 
36 Ibid., p. 90. 
37J. D. B. Miller The Commonwealth and the World, (London, 1958) p. 44. 
38 Idem. 
39W. D. McIntyre, The Commonwealth of Nations: Origins and Impact 1869 -1971, (Oxford, 1977) as 
cited in Fieldhouse D. K., `Untitled Review,' pp. 606- 608;P. Lyon, `Untitled Review' in International 
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs), VoL 59, No. 4. (Autumn, 1983), p. 725. 
40J 
H. Thompson with A. Seagar, Canada, 1922 -1939: Decades of Discord, (Toronto, 1985); L. 
Thompson, A History of South Africa, (Yale, 2004); T. Brooking, The History of New Zealand, 
(Westport, 2004); C. M. H. Clark A History of Australia, (Abridged Cathcart, M.), (London, 1995). 
41 Keith Sinclair, Walter Nash, (Dunedin, 1976), p. 189 (hereafter Sinclair, Nash); Lita -Rose 
Betcherman, Ernest Lapointe: Mackenzie Kings Great Quebec Lieutenant, (Toronto, 2002), 
(hereafter Betcherman, Lapointe). 
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Appeasement in Australia: Reactions to the European Crises, 1935 -1939 (1970) is 
concerned exclusively with how international developments were reported in the Australian 
press between Mussolini's assault on Abyssinia and the outbreak of the Second World 
War.42 Similarly, R. Citino's Germany and the Union of South Africa in the Nazi Period 
(1991) avoided South African sources, relying instead on the German Foreign Office files, 
thereby restricting the author in the insight he could provide on the Union perspective on 
events. As with the two preceding titles, such works are also usually confined to a single 
dominion rather than all of them. Alan Watt's The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy: 
1938 -1965 (1967) is therefore unusual in that it addressed the perspectives of all the 
dominions at the time of Munich, but even it does not examine how European events 
impacted on these thereafter.43 More typical in this respect was J. Crawford and J. Watson's 
2010 article `The Most Appeasing Line: New Zealand & Nazi Germany, 1935 -40' in dealing 
with a single country. The article itself, however, was unusual in arguing that Wellington 
could be found among the appeasers, at least in the case of Germany; the general consensus 
being that New Zealand consistently opposed appeasement.44 Likewise, works such as 
Canada in World Affairs: The Pre -War Years (1941), In Defence of Canada: Appeasement 
and Rearmament (1965), and the History of Canadian External Relations (1966) naturally 
focus on the Canadian context at the expense of the Commonwealth dimension.45 
Within the dominions, the approach of war has therefore attracted interest, both in terms of 
national development and more specialist areas. The evolving nature of dominion status 
within the Commonwealth also remained popular, as long as that body continued to appear 
relevant in terms of world politics. Likewise, since the initial suggestion that Britain only 
adopted appeasement to preserve the unity of the Commonwealth, substantial coverage has 
been given to assessing the extent of the influence of dominion views on British decision - 
making over Germany during Neville Chamberlain's premiership. The reverse question has, 
however, been relatively neglected. This thesis will therefore seek to examine how European 
events affected the evolution of dominion perspectives, in a Commonwealth, rather than 
national, context, between 1 October 1938 and 11 September 1939. 
42 E. Andrews, Isolationism and Appeasement in Australia: Reactions to the European Crises, 1935- 
1939, (Canberra, 1970). 
43 A. Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, (Cambridge, 1967), p. 27. 
44 
J. Crawford, & J. Watson, `The Most Appeasing Line: New Zealand & Nazi Germany, 1935 -40' 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vo1.38 (2010) No.1, pp. 75 -97. 
45 
F. H. Soward et al. Canada in World Affairs: The Pre -War Years, (London, 1941); J. Eayrs In 
Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament, (Toronto, 1965); G. P de T. Glazebrook, A 
History of Canadian External Relations, Vol. 2, `In the Empire and the World, 1914 -1939,' (Toronto, 
1966). 
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Sources and Structure 
Unfortunately none of the dominion governments kept cabinet minutes the way the 
British government did, so another way had to be found to determine how each of the 
governing elites reacted to events in Europe. Canada was run as virtually a 
partnership between the Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, and his deputy Ernest 
Lapointe.46 The most useful resource for what they were thinking is Mackenzie 
King's diary, in which he recorded what he saw as the most important events of the 
day, together with his interpretation of them, which has now been digitised. His diary 
was generally written up at the latest within a couple of days, and appears to be 
reasonably accurate as record of events. For instance, his descriptions of despatches 
received correspond with those held on file by the Canadian Department of External 
Affairs. His interpretations require a more critical approach, however, as he was 
often guilty of wishful thinking. For example, he convinced himself in January 1939 
that he had persuaded Lapointe of the merits of defining the government's position in 
advance on the question of war.47 This interpretation is challenged by the diary of Dr. 
Oliver Skelton, the permanent head of the Department of External Affairs, which is 
held with his papers at Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa, and which records a 
contemporary visit by Lapointe, during which Lapointe makes clear his disagreement 
with the Prime Minister.48 Regrettably, Lapointe kept no diary and this was the last 
entry in Skelton's rather sporadic record, but alternative sources, such as the British 
High Commissioner's reports home (held at the National Archives in Kew) provide a 
separate perspective on developments. 
Similarly, the two most important leaders in South Africa were the Prime Minister, 
General Hertzog, and his deputy, General Smuts.49 Neither of these kept a diary, but 
Smuts maintained a very revealing private correspondence with his friends, the 
Gilletts, which serves as a reasonable substitute, at least with regards to the way his 
mind was working. Hertzog, however, was less forthcoming, and his views had to be 
46 See Chapter One, below. 
47 See Chapter Four, below. 
48 Idem. 
49 See Chapter One, below. 
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reconstructed from his official correspondence with South Africa's representatives in 
Berlin and London, as well as the British government. All of these sources are held at 
the National Archives of South Africa in Pretoria. The biography of General Hertzog 
by Oswald Pirow, his Minister of Defence during this period, is extremely self - 
serving and needs to be treated with great caution. The papers of the British High 
Commissioner to South Africa, Sir William Clark, and the Governor General, Sir Patrick 
Duncan, provided a useful supplement to these records and are located at the University of 
Capetown. 
New Zealand was instead run by a triumvirate of politicians, the Prime Minister, Joe 
Savage, his deputy, Peter Fraser, and the Minister of Finance, Walter Nash. None of these 
were diarists or assiduous correspondents, so alternative sources had to be located. The most 
useful of these was the correspondence between the Prime Minister and Bill Jordan, New 
Zealand's High Commissioner in London. As Labour Party stalwarts, they shared 
confidences, which are absent from the government to government correspondence, which is 
nonetheless very helpful in indicating what was of concern to the New Zealand government. 
Both of these records are at the National Archives of New Zealand, in Wellington. Another 
valuable resource was the series of interviews of surviving contemporaries conducted by 
Mark King and Mark Bassett for their biography of Peter Fraser, in the National Library of 
New. Zealand, also in Wellington. 
Australia was beset by a leadership crisis during this period, and external affairs was one of 
the issues the leading politicians used to distinguish themselves from each other.50 Brief 
cabinet minutes were kept, indicating what had been discussed and what had been decided, 
but not what arguments had been used. These provided a starting point for at least seeing 
what subjects were of concern to the government. Further insight was also obtained from the 
correspondence between Canberra, the British government, the Australian High 
Commissioner, and the Australian Liaison Officer in London. All of these records are held at 
the National Archives in Canberra .The National Library of Australia stored the papers of the 
Prime Minister, Joe Lyons, his wife, Dame Enid Lyons, his temporary successor, Sir Earle 
Page, his ultimate successor, Bob Menzies, Lyons's Secretary for External Affairs, Billy 
Hughes, and Menzies's corresponding minister, Sir Henry Gullett, as well. Sadly, none of 
50 See Chapter One, below. 
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these preserved their diaries for this period, but some of the correspondence was very 
informative. 
The most useful work encountered early in the project was Fry's 1999 article on the 
dominions and appeasement. While it was primarily concerned with the influence the 
dominions had on Britain, rather than on the impact European events had on the former, it 
indicated that the dominion governments were under the control of small elite groups within 
their respective cabinets, and identified the membership of these for Australia, Canada and 
South Africa.51 An examination of the New Zealand Dictionary of National Biography 
online also showed this to be true of politics there, as we11.52 This implied that it could be 
profitable to initially consider the question of the impact of European developments on 
dominion policy from the personal viewpoints of the members of these factions, as this 
would help to elucidate the reasoning behind their decisions. The model used there, of active 
agents operating within a set of existing structures, is therefore also the one that has been 
used here. 
Chapter one therefore seeks to identify and analyse those structural elements which 
constrained the dominions in this period. The remainder of the thesis, chapters two to six, 
each identify a particular event, or series of events, and seeks to trace its impact on the 
thinking of the dominion elites. Chapter two examines the effect the Munich Agreement had 
on dominion attitudes, by looking at their treatment of the Czechs, their perception of a need 
for continuing investment in defence, and their willingness to be flexible over the former 
German colonies that they had acquired mandates over. Many Commentators consider that 
Kristallnacht marked a sea- change in British views of Germany, and chapter three extends 
this consideration to the dominions, focusing on their subsequent treatment of refugees and 
continuing defence requirements. Chapter four contemplates the internal debates inspired by 
`the war scare' of January 1939, which continued on into March of that year. Hitler's march 
into Prague and its repercussions; the British guarantee of Poland, the Italian seizure of 
Albania, and the consequent guarantees for Greece, Romania and Turkey are the subject of 
51 Fry, `Agents and Structures' pp. 296 - 8. 
52 See Gustafson, Barry. 'Savage, Michael Joseph 1872 - 1940.' Dictionary of New Zealand 
Biography, updated 22 June 2007 URL: http: / /www.dnzb.govt.nz/, Gustafson, Barry. 'Nash, Walter 
1882 - 1968.' Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, updated 22 June 2007 /URL: 
http: / /www.dnzb.govt.nz/, Beagleho le, Tim. 'Fraser, Peter 1884 - 1950.' Dictionary of New Zealand 
Biography, updated 22 June 2007 /URL: http: / /www.dnzb.govt.nz/, and Olssen, Erik. 'Lee, John 
Alfred Alexander 1891 - 1982.' Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, updated 22 June 2007 /URL: 
http://www.dnzb.govt.nz/ 
12 
chapter five. Chapter six focuses on the diplomatic attempts to co -opt Russia for the western 
powers and to fmd a peaceful solution to the Polish crisis. The conclusion then draws all 
these together to assess the influence of European events on the way the dominion leaders 
viewed the approach of war in this period. 
13 
1: UNDERLYING IMPERATIVES: 
THE CONSTRAINTS UNDERPINNING DOMINION 
BEHAVIOUR IN 1938 - 1939 
The British Commonwealth was neither properly an empire, a federation, nor an alliance. 
An empire implies central direction, and London had formally conceded this principle with 
regard to the dominions by the passage of the Statute of Westminster in 1931.' A federation 
would have required a central decision -making body to formulate policy reflecting the 
various interests of its constituent members, but Canada, Eire and South Africa were 
opposed to this as it would limit their sovereignty.2 An alliance would not require such a 
body, but it still would have necessitated a clear exposition of the rights and obligations of 
members with regard to one another, which would likewise have placed limitations on the 
freedom of dominion parliaments to decide their stance `in light of all the prevailing 
circumstances', as Mackenzie King liked to put it, and would therefore have proved equally 
unacceptable. 
Bill Jordan, the New Zealand representative to London and Geneva, provided a more 
intricate definition of the Commonwealth in a private conversation with the Yugoslav 
ambassador, which he then reported home on 26 May 1939: 
We are separate countries, except of course that we are bound together by ties of 
loyalty and in any difficulty we are absolutely together: but that in matters of detail, 
such as we were dealing with at Geneva, the Government of each country took the line 
of action it thought best.3 
Even this cumbersome description does not quite indicate the full complexity of the 
situation. Jordan was anxious to play up the basic unity of the Commonwealth, as he was 
firstly trying to explain the situation to a foreign representative (and hence would not have 
wanted to let the side down) and then using that explanation to provide his Prime Minister 
with ammunition against newspaper criticism that, as the High Commissioner put it later on 
1J. Darwin, `A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics' in The Oxford History 
of the British Empire: Vol. IV, The Twentieth Century, Brown, M. J. & Louis, R. (eds.) (Oxford, 
1999), p. 69. 
2 P. N. S. Mansergh Survey p. 63. 
3 National Archives of New Zealand, hereafter NANZ, PM/16/39 +correspondence /Jordan to Savage, 
26 May 1939. 
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in the same letter, `New Zealand is making it awkward for Great Britain.'4 In fact, all of his 
assertions need to be subjected to further qualification to give a more complete picture of the 
situation. The Statute of Westminster might support the contention that the dominions were 
separate countries, but Australia and New Zealand (desiring, as Carl Berendsen, the head of 
the Prime Minister's office in New Zealand, wrote in his unpublished memoirs, `no 
independence, either theoretical or practical') had as yet found no reason to implement it.5 
Imperialists also mounted a rearguard defence, arguing that the Statute did not apply to the 
Crown which remained indivisible, so that if the King was at war anywhere, he was at war 
everywhere, which would place a significant limitation on the practical extent of dominion 
independence.6 Their opponents refuted this view, arguing that the Statute of Westminster 
rendered the Crown divisible, and that the King could be simultaneously at war and at peace 
with a particular other party in regard to his different dominions.' This question remained 
open down to the outbreak of war, when the political imperatives at play in each dominion 
rather than constitutional niceties, determined the stance adopted by each government, as 
will be seen. Practical considerations, arising out of the disparity in resources available for 
diplomacy and defence, also placed restrictions on the extent to which the dominions could 
conduct policy independently. Nonetheless, they all possessed the basic mechanisms 
(cabinets, parliaments, and departments for external affairs) for formulating, determining, 
appróving and executing policy. Therefore, while not entirely separate, they were also far 
from being completely dependent, and the stances they adopted arose out of their own 
unique perspectives, rather than an uncritical acceptance of British pronouncements, hence 
providing an alternative viewpoint for the events of 1938 -1939. Likewise, the assertions 
that the Commonwealth was: `bound together by ties of loyalty', and `absolutely together' in 
facing `any difficulty' merit some qualification. As will become apparent, Afrikaners, 
Quebecois and the Irish, in Australia as much as in Eire, could scarcely be described as being 
over -burdened with sentimental ties to Britain, a consequent tendency to identify Britain's 
problems as their own, or any resultant sense of obligation to contribute towards the latters' 
resolution, and these groups often carried considerable political weight in their respective 
dominions. 
4 Idem. 
5 National Library ofNew Zealand, hereafter NLNZ, McIntosh Papers/MS- Papers -6759- 
456/Berendsen, C.A. Reminiscences of an Ambassador, (Unpublished Autobiography), Book II, p. 35; 
Mansergh, Survey, p. 18. 
6Ibid., p. 36. 
' Ibid., p. 37. 
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Jordan's analysis ties in with the contemporary convention of describing the 
Commonwealth as a family of nations.8 They were not quite separate (`a new species of the 
dependent state known as "the part- sovereign state ', as Loring Christie, of the Canadian 
Department of External Affairs, complained), but were rather tied to each other in a loose 
and ill -defined manner, and their mutual commitment was not as strong and clear -cut as 
Jordan wished to imply.9 As with many families, the rights and obligations of membership 
were not and (for reasons that will become apparent) could not be spelled out, as this would 
highlight the fault -lines that interested parties preferred to leave unexposed. Unfortunately 
for the dominions, `reason and co- operation were not the pass -words of the Third Reich' and 
Adolf Hitler cared nothing for this, with the result that his foreign policy would create a 
situation where the dominions would be forced to confront and resolve these issues.10 Their 
reactions would be determined by the interaction of imperatives drawn from the political 
landscape they inhabited together with the personal idiosyncrasies of their governing elites. 
Each dominion was affected in its approach to international relations both by factors that 
were common to all, and ones that were unique to their own particular circumstances. All 
were dependent on Britain, economically, politically and militarily, although to varying 
extents, and bore this dependence with equally varying degrees of good grace. By and large 
they shared a common attitude to the Versailles Settlement, and even, to some extent, what 
to do about it. All were implicitly (and in South Africa's case, explicitly) influenced by the 
issue of race. Furthermore, as Michael Fry points out, each was dominated by a small elite, 
although these elites displayed varying levels of cohesiveness; from the virtual unanimity of 
the triumvirate in New Zealand (although this unanimity was only displayed in the context of 
vigorous assaults from all directions) through the tensions of the Mackenzie King 
government in Canada, to the brittleness of the coalition in Australia and the Fusion 
experiment in South Africa, which would both tear themselves apart within the year." 
Products of different political landscapes, these elites each viewed events through unique, if 
often parochial, perspectives, and produced responses which were conditioned by the 
defining parameters of their domestic political realities 
8See, for instance, Meyers, `Britain, Europe and the Dominions,' p. 36. 
9 
L. Christie as cited in Christie Papers /Folder 107 as cited in J. A. Munro, `Loring Christie and 
Canadian External Relations, 1935 - 1939' in Journal of Canadian Studies, Vo1.7 (1972), pp. 32 -3. 
10 Glazebrook, Canadian External Affairs, p. 129. 
II Fry `Agents and Structures,' p. 296. 
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Unique Factors: New Zealand 
The New Zealand Government was presided over by a `triumvirate' of Labour politicians: 
Michael (Joe) Savage, Peter Fraser and Walter Nash.12 Between them, they controlled all the 
important portfolios and dominated their colleagues. Like most Dominion Prime Ministers, 
Savage combined the portfolio for External Affairs (as the dominions invariably styled their 
nascent Foreign Offices) with that of Prime Minister.13 Professional support for these roles 
was provided by Carl August Berendsen (the head of the Prime Minister's Office and the 
embryonic Department for External Affairs) assisted as deputy by Alister McIntosh in 
Wellington, and in London by Bill Jordan as High Commissioner, with Sir Cecil Day as 
Liaison Officer for External Affairs.14 The second member of the triumvirate, Peter Fraser, 
held a number of portfolios, most importantly those of Health, Education, Justice and Deputy 
Prime Minister, standing in for Savage as Acting Prime Minister during the latter's 
increasing absences due to the cancer that was killing him (leaving Fraser "the natural 
successor" on Savage's eventual death in March 1940).15 The last member, Walter Nash, 
dominated the finance function through the portfolios for Finance and Customs, which also 
gave him responsibility for immigration and housing.' He would have to wait for Fraser's 
death and the end of the National Party interregnum before becoming New Zealand's third 
Labour Prime Minister in his turn. Between them then, these three men were to preside over 
the Labour Party for three decades from 1933 to 1963." 
Labour's domestic priorities in 1938 -39 were firstly to implement a welfare state and 
secondly to maintain fiscal stability, hence this strategic allocation of responsibilities ensured 
the triumvirate could control the political agenda in cabinet.18 The triumvirate also ensured 
12 See, for instance, J. A., Lee, The John A, Lee Diaries 1936 -1940, (Christchurch, 1981), pp. 96 & 
112; NLNZ, Bassett Papers2(1MS000- 094 -05), folder 13, interview of Sir Carl Berendsen by Mark 
King, p. 1. 
13 B. Gustafson, Cradle to the Grave, (Auckland, 1988), p. 178 (Hereafter Gustafson, Cradle to 
Grave). 
14NLNZ, Bassett Papers /2000- 094 -02 /interview of Sir Alister McIntosh by Professor John Roberts 
20/3/78 (subsequently edited by McIntosh), p. 9; Templeton, Malcolm. 'Jordan, William Joseph 1879 
- 1959.' Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, updated 22 June 2007 /URL: 
http: / /www.dnzb.govt.nz/; Cambridge University Library /Royal Commonwealth Society Library 
Online /Scrapbooks of Sir Cecil Day 
http: / /janu s. l ib. cam.ac.uk/db/no de. x sp? id = E AD %2 FG B R %2 F0 115 %2 F RC M S +3 03 . 
15 Beagleho le, `Fraser,' URL: http: / /www.dnb.govt.nz/; Bassett, & King, Fraser, p. 162; NANZ, 
Nash/1177 /0351. 
16 Gustafson, `Nash,' URL: http: / /www.dnzb.govt.nz/. 
17 Respectively, Gustafson, `Savage,' URL: http: / /www.dnzb.govt.nzl.; Gustafson, `Nash,' URL: 
http://www.dnzb.govt.nz/. 
18See below, pp. 20 - 23. 
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that that body remained pliant by promoting yes -men to it, regardless of experience or 
ability, and sidelining or subordinating potential troublemakers. A good example of the 
former was Fred Jones at Defence. This was an acutely sensitive position because of the 
increasingly tense international situation, and because the triumvirate, due to their anti -war 
activities during the First World War, lacked credibility when dealing with it (as the veteran 
and war -hero Jack Lee was not slow to point out).19 Jones likewise had no first -hand 
knowledge of defence issues and was therefore unlikely to challenge the triumvirate on the 
issue, even if the downside to this cosy little arrangement was that defence did not receive 
adequate representation at cabinet level during a time of grave international danger - `a most 
irresponsible thing to have done', as McIntosh later recalled.20 Likewise, the triumvirate had 
relieved themselves of the problem of Bill Jordan, who was notoriously difficult to work 
with.21 As a member of the `Old Guard' he could not be entirely overlooked when it came to 
sharing out the spoils of victory after the 1935 election, but the triumvirate did not want him 
in cabinet, and overcame the problem by exiling him to London as High Commissioner, 
being, as McIntosh put it, when he was being interviewed by the historian Mark King for 
Fraser's biography, `prepared to pay a pretty high price to be rid of him.'22 Jack Lee, another 
Labour stalwart, was divisive in a different sense. Lee was the most important Labour 
politician outside the triumvirate itself. He was a charismatic and aggressive MP on the left 
of the Party who had built up a following through his writing and broadcasting and would 
use this to challenge the leadership after Labour's victory in the general election on 15 
October 1938. While Jordan's problems were purely personal, Lee's espousal of a more 
radical agenda coupled with his undoubted ability and appetite for confrontation, rendered 
him a more formidable opponent; one who would require careful handling. The triumvirate 
therefore sought to tame him by giving him the Housing portfolio, which provided him with 
the kind of role he craved, but denied him cabinet status and placed him under first Savage's, 
and then Nash's thumb -at least to the extent that Jack Lee could ever be under someone 
else's thumb.23 These twin strategies threatened to hand this small clique complete control 
over the machinery of government, something which grew less and less palatable to Jack Lee 
and Caucus (the term used to refer to the Parliamentary Labour Party meeting in 
19 J. A. Lee, Diaries., p. 92, & p. 104. 
20 Idem, p. 92; NLNZ, Bassett Papers /2000- 094 -02 /interview of Sir Alister McIntosh by Mark King 6 
April 1978, p. 11. 
21 See NLNZ, Bassett Papers /2000- 094 -13/ interview of Sir Carl Berendsen by Mark King, p. 13; 
Ibid., interview of Sir George Laking by Mark King 14 August 1986, p. 24 & interview of Sir Alister 
McIntosh by Mark King 6 April 1978, p. 4. 
22 Sir Alister McIntosh as cited in NLNZ, Bassett Papers /2000- 094 -02 /interview of Sir Alister 
McIntosh by Mark King 26 April 1978, p. 3. 
23 
J. A. Lee, Diaries., 1 October 1938, p. 93; Erík. Olssen, 'Lee,' URL: http: / /www.dnzb.govt.nz/. 
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committee).24 These divisions, however, did not emerge until after the October 1938 general 
election, and the concomitant need for public unity were safely in the past. In September 
1938, the triumvirate's strategies still seemed to be working and the party appeared relatively 
united behind its leadership. 
They were not, however, in politics just for the sake of achieving, and keeping, office. 
Office was simply a means to the end of implementing their objectives, chiefly the 
establishment of a system of social security in New Zealand. These aims were themselves 
products of the triumvirates' backgrounds, and it is worth looking at these in a little more 
detail, in order to have a fuller picture of the factors generating their reactions and responses 
to the news from Europe. They had all migrated to New Zealand prior to the First World 
War and had been involved in various degrees of opposition to that conflict. This allowed 
veterans (like Jack Lee) to dismiss them as "C.O.s" (Conscientious Objectors) and, as noted 
above, made defence something of a sensitive issue.25 Their socialism also informed their 
view of international affairs: ascribing the incidence of wars solely to economic tensions (as 
Savage put it in his home town newspaper: `a country did not go to war for the love of it, 
there were always economic problems as the cause') and producing a touching faith in the 
efficacy of international conferences for the dissipation of these.26 While a shared 
commitment to a common agenda united them, at least in public, they were from very 
different backgrounds and were, in many ways, a surprising group to fmd themselves in 
charge of New Zealand. 
Although Savage was an Australian of Ulster Catholic extraction, who had become a union 
activist, he found little difficulty in reconciling himself to the New Zealand custom of being 
`more English than the English.' He was later to declare that `when Britain is in trouble, we 
are in trouble.'27 He was already suffering from the cancer that would eventually kill him, 
and had refused treatment to enable him campaign for Labour in the 1938 election.28 
Berendsen considered that Savage `ruled his cabinet,'29 but McIntosh, instead saw Savage as 
both uninterested, at least with regard to External Affairs, participating little in discussions, 
and also inclined to `sweep [sic] whole thing [the international situation] under the carpet,' a 
24 
J. A. Lee, Diaries, 21 October 1938, pp. 95 -96. 
25 Ibid., p. 104. 
26 Savage, M. J., as cited in the Benalla Standard, 19 January 1939 as cited in Gustafson, Cradle to 
Grave, p. 250; see also section below on common factors. 
27 Gustafson, Cradle to Grave, p. 250. 
28 Gustafson, `Savage,' URL: http: / /www.dnzb.govt.nz. 
29 NLNZ, Bassett Papers /2000- 094 -05 /folder 13, interview of Sir Carl Berendsen by Mark King 8 
January 1971, p. 17. 
19 
view more in accord with Jack Lee's depiction of Savage as a `weakling' and `incompetent.' 
On balance, Berendsen's view seems more likely to be correct: he worked more closely with 
Savage than McIntosh, and therefore had greater opportunity for observing his methods and 
gauging their effectiveness, while Jack Lee had personal reason to seek to belittle Savage 
whenever he could. During the First World War, Savage had campaigned against 
conscription, on the grounds that wealth should be conscripted before men.30 This opposition 
to war was not merely doctrinal, but rooted in a deep aversion to the suffering and bloodshed 
it caused. When, for instance, in January 1940, he was asked to admire the view of the 
country's expeditionary force departing for Europe, a friend recalled, he declined, explaining 
that it had been hard enough having to participate in the recruitment campaign and then order 
them abroad, so that he could not bear now to watch them going to their deaths.3' He was 
not, however, an out and out pacifist, and therefore lay somewhere between Fraser and Nash 
on this issue.32 
Peter Fraser had been born in Scotland, and was also a trade unionist who had moved away 
from his religion (although in his case this had been Scottish Presbyterianism rather than 
Irish Catholicism), but he nevertheless retained a strong puritanical streak, as well as a 
fascination with funerals.33 Despite being Minister for Education, his own education had 
been somewhat limited, and this perhaps led to his aversion to conducting business in 
writing, as well as a resentment against those better educated than himself, and whom he 
suspected of believing themselves his superior, such as Berendsen, with whom he had a 
famously poor relationship.34 McIntosh, with his self -deprecating humour, was, when he 
succeeded Berendsen, during the war, however, able to establish a good working relationship 
with Fraser, then Prime Minister.35 The latter was also the closest of the triumvirate to Lee, 
the leader of the party's radical dissidents. This was based on a mutual respect between two 
hard men who had no sympathy for any kind of weakness, with matters only coming to a 
final breach between them in November 1939. Fraser had also expressed admiration for Lee 
as a writer, which undoubtedly appealed to the latter's extensive vanity.36 This may, 
30 Gustafson, `Savage,' URL: http: / /www.dnzb.govt.nz/.. 
31 Gustafson, Cradle to Grave, p. 254. 
32 Idem, pp. 90 & 204. 
33 Gustafson, Cradle to Grave p. 271. 
34 Beaglehole, `Fraser,' URL: http: / /www.dnb.govt.nz/; Sir Alister McIntosh, `Working with Peter 
Fraser in Wartime' in Peter Fraser: Master Politician, Clark, M., (Ed.) (Dunmore, 1998) p. 
160(hereafter Fraser, Clark (Ed.)); NLNZ, Bassett Papers /2000- 094 -02/ interview of Noel Pharazyn 
& Mister McIntosh by Mark King. 13 July 1978, p. 36. 
35 NLNZ, Bassett Papers /2000- 094 -13/ interview of Sir Carl Berendsen by Mark King 8 January 
1971, p. 15. 
36 M. Bassett, & M. King, Fraser, pp. 129 - 130. 
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however, have merely been an example of the skilful diplomacy Fraser was perfectly capable 
of, for example in his dealings with the British Medical Association over the introduction of 
maternity services (of which more below), where the doctors preferred to deal with this 
former sailor, rather than the impeccably middle -class Walter Nash, and also in his relations 
with the Maori (he quipped that they preferred no from him rather than a yes from his 
predecessor, Frank Langstone, an assertion which, rather surprisingly, appears to be borne 
out by the personal correspondence of one of the leading Maori, Princess Te Puea).37 Fraser 
had also been the most active campaigner of the three against participation in the First World 
War, being imprisoned in 1917.38 Despite this, his opposition to war was more pragmatic 
than the other two: he had opposed World War One as an imperialist war, nothing else, and 
had no difficulty with the idea of using force in a just war.39 
Nash was a very different sort, a middle -class accountant from Kidderminster whose 
Christian beliefs had attracted him to socialism 40 He opposed the First World War on 
pacifist principle and supported complete disarmament in its aftermath.41 Unlike Fraser, and 
even Savage, he had been a pacifist out of conviction, and only the threat Hitler presented 
reconciled him to the idea of going to war.42 As an accountant, his selection as Minister for 
Finance had been something of a foregone conclusion for a party that scarcely attracted `the 
brightest and best' from financial circles. His decision making skills, however, left even 
more to be desired than Fraser's, as the latter when tracked down could usually be relied on 
to make a decision, while Nash was just as inaccessible, and also inclined to procrastinate 
once he had finally been brought to ground, both in sharp contrast to Savage who was 
credited with being both professional and decisive in his methods 43 
There may have been tensions within the group (it has been reported that Savage took Fraser 
for granted, but lavished attention on Nash, while Fraser does not seem to have liked Nash 
particularly, and availed himself of an early opportunity to relieve the latter of the Finance 
37 Sinclair, Nash, pp. 162 - 3; Princess Te Kirihaehae Te Puea Herangi, (Te Puea) as cited in NLNZ, 
Bassett Papers /2000- 094 -02 /interview of Sir Mister McIntosh by Mark King 16 March 1978, p. 23. 
38D. Grant., `Anti -Conscription, Conscription & the Referendum' in Fraser, Clark, (Ed.) p. 132. 
39 McIntosh, Sir Alister, `Working with Fraser' in Fraser, Clark (Ed.), p. 165. 
40 Gustafson, `Nash,' URL: http: / /www.dnzb.govt.nz/. 
41 Sinclair, Nash, pp. 39 - 40; Gustafson, `Nash,' URL: http: / /www.dnzb.govt.nz/. 
42 Grant, `the Referendum' in Fraser, Clark (Ed.), p. 133; W. Nash, `Address to the Empire 
Parliamentary Association, Westminster; as cited in C. MacKenzie, Walter Nash: Pioneer & Prophet, 
(Palmerston North, 1975), p. 71. 
43 McIntosh, Sir Alister, `Peter Fraser - Warrior Prime Minister' in Fraser, Clark (Ed.), p. 162; 
NLNZ, Bassett Papers 2000 -94 -02 /interview of Sir Alister McIntosh by Mark King 13 July 1978, p. 
35; NLNZ, Bassett Papers /2000 -094 -13/ interview of Sir Carl Berendsen by Mark King 8 January 
1971, p. 17. 
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portfolio and exile him to Washington).44 Nevertheless, they presented a united front in this 
period against all corners and corners were scarcely lacking in 1938/39. 
The first problem they faced was being re- elected on the 15 October 1938, after Parliament 
had been dissolved on 16 September. There had been some concern that New Zealand's 
"Moral Foreign Policy" would prove to be an issue and Berendsen had drawn up a 
memorandum to defend the Government's record 45 Jordan had likewise provided a very 
defensive account of his activities in London and Geneva for the triumvirate's use.46 The 
basis of this policy might be summed up as the Covenant, the whole Covenant and nothing 
but the Covenant (of the League of Nations) as `unless the principles of the Covenant survive 
our civilization will perish, and will deserve to.'47 There was also an element of enlightened 
self -interest to this, as was publicly acknowledged: `New Zealand was a small and 
vulnerable country, said Savage, whose vulnerability and distance from Britain made 
collective security and world peace absolute necessities.'48 Collective security was therefore 
both an insurance against any limitations of British power as well a moral stance. Although 
New Zealand was famously `more English than the English' and, according to Berendsen, 
`wanted no independence, theoretical or practical,' this policy would, by creating a web of 
new obligations wholly outwith the Commonwealth, also have inevitably served to move 
New Zealand in that direction.49 This drift was only exacerbated by the fact that New 
Zealand's policy was quite obviously not the policy of the rest of the Commonwealth, and 
collective security had, even before Munich, put New Zealand at odds with Britain's 
attempts (with Australia's backing) to achieve an understanding with Mussolini, a 
happenstance which had previously attracted press criticism in New Zealand, as Jordan 
mentioned in the report referred to above.50 This letter and Berendsen's memorandum 
therefore seem likely to have been efforts to forestall any attempts by the opposition to 
depict the government as being disloyal to Britain during the election. In point of fact, 
however, the National Party, with the unanimous support of the press, had instead chosen to 
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45 NANZ, EA/1 /58.8.1 pt l a- ExtrnlRelGen/undated memo by Berendsen, pp. 5,7,8 & 9. 
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focus on the potential financial consequences of Labour's welfare reforms, so these 
documents were not much needed at the time. Ministers were, thus obliged to focus their 
attention on Southland, rather than the Sudetenland , and this, together with Jordan's absence 
on League of Nations business in Geneva, helps to explain why New Zealand provided 
London with rather less advice than the other dominions during the crisis.51 
In the end Labour won the election with a slightly reduced majority (down from 55 to 53 
seats) although with an increased share of the vote.52 The stage was now set for Jack Lee to 
deliver his onslaught on the triumvirate in what would become known as `the Jack Lee 
Affair.' The press had tried to make his Socialism in New Zealand, published during the 
election, an issue during the campaign, although ultimately to no avail.53 A former 
delinquent, he had been decorated and lost an arm during the First World War, giving him 
far greater credibility on defence matters than the conscientious objectors who ran the 
government. He also benefited from being a native New Zealander, in contrast to the 
triumvirate, who, as previously mentioned, were all immigrants (Savage, for instance, 
suffered from a persistent rumour that he was in fact Michael Josephus Savitchovich, a 
Czech who had not even been naturalised, an accusation which simply could not have been 
made against Lee).54 His entry in the Dictionary of National Biography indicates that he 
expected to be rewarded with the Defence portfolio, but his diary is careful to leave this 
implicit, rather than explicit, merely noting: `there are twenty returned men whose 
experience is at least equivalent to Cabinet, men whose intelligence is not necessarily 
inferior' and `[l] prefer housing if there is a job to do,' although later `defence would do.'55 
His complaints against the triumvirate were both personal (`Three years ago Savage did an 
unfair thing when he selected a Cabinet, a High Commissioner, a Speaker, a Chairman of 
Committees, two Whips, an Administrator of Samoa and left me in the cold') and political.56 
Politically, he seems to have been antagonised initially by his perception of Walter Nash as 
both timid and incompetent (`Nash's hopelessness and helplessness') in his handling of the 
financial aspects of government policy, and to have hit upon the idea of using Caucus, which 
he dominated, to elect Cabinet and thereby control policy, an approach which brought him 
politically as well as personally into conflict with Savage.57 Fraser is likewise castigated in 
51 Ibid., p. 1; See Ch. 2. 
52 Gustafson, 'Savage,' URL: http: / /www.dnzb.govt.nzJ. 
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Lee's diary for his timidity and obstructionism, but usually only in connection with the other 
two.58 
Accordingly, when Caucus met on 3 November 1938, Lee presented a motion that the 
former should elect Cabinet and after a stormy meeting this was passed by 26 to 23 59 Savage 
refused to accept this decision and referred the whole matter to Conference. The National 
Executive, fearing the damage this was doing Labour, intervened, forcing a compromise by 
which the leader would have to seek Caucus's endorsement of his team prior to an election, 
meaning that Savage would continue to be the sole arbiter of Cabinet membership for the 
next two years.60 In the meantime, exasperated with what he saw as the triumvirate's 
financial mismanagement, Lee had produced the infamous `Lee Letter', a trenchant criticism 
of the triumvirate (particularly Nash) and their policies, which emerged into the public 
domain, supposedly against its author's wishes, and exposed the extent of Labour's civil war 
to the light of day.61 Conference could not ignore this, but also compromised by first 
censuring Lee, and then electing him to the National Executive. This did nothing to resolve 
the underlying issues, and Lee almost immediately began to organise for the next conference, 
which he hoped would prove more amenable. The matter would only finally be resolved with 
his expulsion from the Labour Party in 1940, after the publication of `Psycho -pathology in 
Politics' (a vitriolic attack on Savage's leadership) and the response of the dying, bedridden 
Savage to Conference, citing Lee as the reason why `for about the last two years my life has 
been a living hell.'62 
Even if this was somewhat exaggerated for the purpose of emotionally manipulating 
Conference, as Barry Gustafson suggests, dealing with Jack Lee cost Savage and the other 
members of the triumvirate time and emotional resilience, resources of which they had only 
a fmite quantity.63 The Social Security Act, which passed into law on 13 September 1938,64 
but which, as an electoral ploy, was not due to come into force until 1 April 1939, would 
likewise draw on these resources.65 This was Labour's flagship legislation, providing a 
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comprehensive system of social welfare to the New Zealand public for the first time in its 
history. The doctors, however, had yet to agree to new contracts under the scheme, and 
negotiations between Labour, led by Fraser and Nash, and the New Zealand branch of the 
British Medical Association quickly bogged down over the issue of maternity services, with 
the result that less than 3% of doctors had signed contracts with the government for this 
service by the due date of 1 April 1939 .66 This led to an intemperate intervention by the 
terminally ill Savage, in which, with great insensitivity, he threatened to break what he 
characterised as industrial action by the B.M.A. through the importation of desperate refugee 
doctors from Germany and Austria.' This does appear, however, to have broken the log- 
jam, although negotiations over maternity services were only, in fact, concluded after Hitler 
had invaded Poland.ó8 Discussions then moved on to general practice services and it was not 
until 1941 that the provisions of the 1938 Act (that had been due on is April 1939) were 
actually finally implemented.69 
Finance was likewise to devour much of the triumvirate's time and effort in 1938 -39. New 
Zealand's sterling funds had been declining since Labour came to power, and began truly to 
haemorrhage during 19387° Nash (belatedly and reluctantly, according to Lee) introduced 
exchange controls as a remedy on 6 December 1938. Nash described these measures as being 
necessary to preserve New Zealand's sterling balances and indicated that they were only 
temporary, while Savage depicted them as being part of a broader, long -term strategy to 
promote secondary industry in New Zealand, and shield the economy from future 
fluctuations in the outside world. The reality is almost certainly that they were both trying to 
prevent panic, but had different audiences in mind: Savage's picture of a well -planned 
autarkic economy was meant to impress core socialist support that the government was in 
control of the situation; while Nash's characterisation of exchange controls as a temporary 
measure would have been intended to minimise adverse reaction among already jittery 
financial circles. Neither argument much impressed Malcolm MacDonald, the British 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs from 31 October 1938 to 29 January 1939, who 
warned Jordan (and which the latter duly reported to Wellington on 14 December 1938) that 
if New Zealand breached the Ottawa Accords, the United Kingdom Government was likely 
to come under pressure to retaliate against them, which they could ill- afford given their 
66 Ibid., p. 241. 
67 Ibid., p. 242. 
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overwhelming dependency on the United Kingdom market." Jordan was left desperately 
trying to square the circle to MacDonald, arguing that exchange controls would correct the 
problem of New Zealand's disappearing funds, without impacting on British exports to New 
Zealand. In the end, Britain did not retaliate, but much -needed goodwill had been eroded. 
Goodwill was required because New Zealand faced another fiscal problem: a series of 
government loans were due to mature over the coming years, commencing in 1939. The 
government, already committed to an expensive social security policy and with much 
reduced sterling funds, was clearly in no position to repay these and therefore needed to raise 
fresh loans. Walter Nash was accordingly despatched to London, leaving the desperately ill 
Savage in charge of Finance, as well as his own portfolios of Prime Minister and External 
Affairs.72 The market was not receptive. The Deputy Governor of the Bank of England had 
already informed Jordan that a fresh loan for New Zealand was `out of the question' even at 
high interest rates, which Jordan attributed to the active campaign he saw waged everywhere 
by vested interests to undermine the economic credibility of New Zealand and its 
government.73 In reality, there is no need to seek an explanation for the bleak prospects for 
fresh loans in any such campaign; the circumstances of 1938 -39 were quite sufficient to 
render New Zealand's position extremely difficult, if not impossible. First there was the 
international situation, where the prospect of war was depressing the markets, rendering it 
difficult for anyone to raise fresh funds (80% of a recent Australian issue had been left in the 
hands of the underwriters, for instance).74 Secondly, as noted by Sir Thomas Inskip, 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs from 29 January 1939, there was the policy of the 
British Government, which was trying to garner support for loans to potential allies, thereby 
increasing the competition chasing already scarce funds.75 Finally, there were New 
Zealand's domestic policies themselves. These flew in the face of prevailing orthodoxy, and 
the prevailingly orthodox, who controlled the funds available for investment, were 
unsurprisingly reluctant to back policies which they saw as unlikely to succeed, and whose 
only chance of success they deemed likely to be at the expense of the investors funding 
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them.76 This situation can scarcely have been helped by Jack Lee's implied threat to 
repudiate New Zealand's overseas debt.77 Walter Nash accordingly cooled his heels for 
several weeks, before being made the first of a series of loan offers that would prove 
unacceptable to him and his colleagues.78 Only after Chamberlain personally intervened did 
negotiations begin in earnest, and only after Montague Norman, the Governor of the Bank of 
England, employed much arm- twisting, did these eventually produce acceptable, if arduous, 
terms, allowing Nash to return to New Zealand on 5'" September 1939, more than four 
months after he had left.79 
Thus, distracted by intra -party dissent, financial woes and the efforts involved in 
implementing a social security system in the teeth of vociferous resistance from vested 
interests, the triumvirate had little time to devote to external affairs. Their `Moral Foreign 
Policy' was dead in the water. Its time might come again, but for the moment self - interest 
was to be the order of the day.80 This meant backing Britain. New Zealand's security was 
dependent on London's Singapore strategy, which, while failing to inspire complete 
confidence, was preferable to the alternative of an impossible self- defence.81 Furthermore, 
their need to raise new finance tied them even closer not just to Britain, but its government 
of the day, as ultimately the triumvirate's ability to implement their policies would rest not 
only on Britain's survival, but on the goodwill of the Chamberlain government in arm - 
twisting the City to let them have their loans. New Zealand therefore had little room for 
manoeuvre in 1938 -39. 
Unique Factors: Australia 
Australia began the period governed by a coalition between the United Australia Party 
(hereafter U.A.P.) and its junior partner, the Country Party. Michael Fry argued in his 1999 
article `Agents and Structures: The Dominions and the Czechoslovak Crisis, September 
1938' that the most significant members of this governing elite in September 1938 were the 
Prime Minister, Joe Lyons, the Treasurer, Richard Casey, the Country Party leader, Sir Earle 
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Page, the Attorney- General, Bob Menzies, and the Minister for External Affairs, Billy 
Hughes.82 There seems little reason to argue with this. Certainly, T. W. White, the only 
candidate from outside this inner circle to stand for the U.A.P. leadership after Lyons's death 
on 7 April 1939, resigned from the government on 8 November 1938 due to his exclusion 
from this `coterie.'83 They were assisted in their deliberations on external affairs by Stanley 
Bruce, the High Commissioner in London, whose role was supplemented by the appointment 
of Alfred Stirling (Menzies's former secretary) as Liaison Officer to provide Canberra with 
information on the European situation. His superior in Canberra, Colonel Hodgson, the 
permanent head of External Affairs, appears to have attracted little attention relative to his 
counterpart in New Zealand, but seems to have been just as important in the formulation of 
foreign policy, for instance delineating `the permanent bases' of Australian policy for Lyons 
in a way roughly analogous to what Berendsen had done with New Zealand's `Moral 
Foreign Policy' for the triumvirate's use in the 1938 election.84 
As in New Zealand, the government's flagship policy was social security, but their National 
Insurance Act had proved surprisingly unpopular with all sections of the public, and the 
government was now trying to fmd a way to walk away from it before it came into force on 1 
January 1939.85 The arguments over what should replace it, fed into the main question 
confronting the government, which was the issue of the leadership, as by now the U.A.P. 
was anything but united. Originally formed out of disparate groups opposed to the Scullin 
Labor Government, his long departure from the political scene, and Labor's subsequent lack 
of electoral success had increasingly removed the need for co- operation from the various 
U.A.P. factions. By October 1938, the latter were growing increasingly fractious, and the 
party's aging leader, Joe Lyons, was having increasing difficulty keeping them under control 
and the stress of this was only exacerbated by the international situation.86 Lyons loathed 
war, calling his wife during the Sudeten Crisis begging her to drop everything and come to 
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83 Sir Thomas Walter White as cited in John Rickard, 'White, Sir Thomas Walter (1888 - 1957)', 
Australian Dictionary of Biography Online, 
http://adbonline.anu.edu.au/biogs/A160636b.htm?hilite=White. 
84 
A. W. Martin, assisted by P. Hardy, Robert Menzies: A Life, Vol.], 1894 -1943, (Melbourne, 1993) 
(hereafter, Menzies), p. 225; NAA, CP103/17 /Bundle 7NN /Undated Memo from Colonel Hodgson: 
`Points on Foreign Policy'; NANZ, EA/ 1 /58.8.Iptla- ExtrnlRelGen/undated memo by Berendsen. 
85K. White, Joseph Lyons: Prime Minister of Australia, 1932 - 1939 (hereafter, Lyons), (Melbourne, 
2000), pp.174 -5 & 186; W. J. Hudson, Casey, (OUP, 1986), pp.104 - 5; & Sir Earle Page, Truant 
Surgeon: The Inside Story of Forty Years of Australian Political Life (hereafter, Truant Surgeon), 
Mozley, A. (Ed.), (Sydney, 1963), p. 268. 
86TNA, DO/121/46 /Sir Geoffrey Whiskard to Sir Thomas Inskip, 28 April 1939; see also Page, Truant 
Surgeon, p. 262; & W. J. Hudson, Casey, p. 104. 
28 
Canberra from Tasmania, `as it's war in the morning, and I can't face it alone.'$' The remark 
also indicated, however, that he would have brought Australia into the war at Britain's side 
in 1938, if events had turned out differently. Lyons's pacifist tendencies, however, made him 
an inveterate opponent of compulsory military training (hereafter C.M.T.) driving him into 
conflict with the cabinet hawks over the issue.88 The resulting compromise led to a voluntary 
recruitment drive which Lyons had difficulty putting his heart into because of his innate 
pacifism.89 His most recent biographer depicts him as undergoing a breakdown in 
consequence of the Sudeten Crisis, leading to a three week break from politics, which in turn 
gave rise to rumours that he was going to resign.90 hi his memoirs, Sir Earle Page, the leader 
of the Country Party, implied Bob Menzies, the Attorney -General, and one of the candidates 
for the succession, was particularly disappointed when these rumours proved to be 
unfounded and Lyons was flown in to lead the government delegation to the Premiers' 
Conference in October.91 
When this meeting failed to deliver significant results, Menzies gave a speech on leadership 
which he argued was aimed at the squabbling State Premiers, but which was instead widely 
seen as critical of Lyons.92 In a little over a week, Curtin, the Labor leader, had seized on the 
issue, the Minister for Trade and Customs, T. W. White, had resigned from cabinet, Keith 
Murdoch's newspapers had begun to speculate on the leadership question, and Sir Henry 
Gullett, White's predecessor, had raised the matter at an internal party meeting.93 An aura of 
crisis was beginning to develop. 
Lyons's response was to turn to Bruce, who had formerly been Prime Minister, in an 
attempt to reunify the party.94 The latter was increasingly seen as a potential successor to the 
Prime Minister and spent December 1938 to March 1939 in Australia in desultory 
discussions on the issue.95 In the absence of concrete developments, the sense of crisis began 
to wane and Menzies toyed with the idea of leaving politics permanently, only to be 
dissuaded by Page.96 Bruce also used the lull to attempt to persuade the Attorney -General 
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that Lyons remained an important electoral asset even if he had weaknesses.' In fact, 
Menzies did not resign until cabinet finally resolved to abandon the national insurance 
scheme on 14 March 1939, also citing disagreements over `important aspects of defence 
expenditure' in support of his decision.98 Bruce was still in the country and Lyons turned to 
him again, but they failed to agree on terms for a handover of power and the High 
Commissioner left to return to London via the United States." Billy Hughes, the pugnacious 
Minister for External Affairs, took over Menzies's post of Attorney -General.'°° 
At odds with both Lyons and Menzies, Hughes was not a particular fan of appeasement; 
successfully opposing almost alone in cabinet the hard -line appeasers' desire to advocate an 
even stronger line against the Czechs.101 His views on External Affairs were somewhat at 
variance with the rest of his colleagues, which had already led to his being excluded from the 
government.102 His return and appointment to the portfolio of External Affairs in 1937 can 
only have been due to a combination of a desire to keep his friends close and his enemies 
closer on the part of Lyons, together with the unrealistic hope that the responsibilities of 
office would somehow tame `the Little Digger' (a reference to his close bond with war 
veterans).103 Lyons was to be sorely disappointed in this latter respect, as Hughes embarked 
on a series of vocal disputes with the Germans and Italians. Keeping him in government did 
have its advantages, however, as Lyons was able to exercise some degree of control, leading 
Hughes to complain off the record to the press that the Minister for External Affairs was not 
allowed to express his opinion on external affairs.' 04 Another faux pas, about not trusting 
Hitler even if he was to swear on a stack of Bibles stretching from Canberra to Broken Hill, 
was likewise kept off the record.105 At least while he was a minister these things could be 
suppressed, whereas on the back benches he would be free to speak his mind, with all its 
attendant consequences. Lyons in fact confided in Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, the British High 
Commissioner in Canberra, who duly relayed this information to London, that he was not 
sure whether Hughes was more trouble in or out of government.106 Already in his seventies, 
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the latter never seemed to tire of finding someone to fall out with (Whiskard described 
Hughes as `a bitter enemy' of Menzies after the latter had become Prime Minister, `ready at 
any time to stab him in the back').107 Passionate and belligerent, he injected much needed 
drive into the government's recruitment campaign for the militia during 1938 -39 and he 
would eventually run Menzies a close second in the leadership race in April 1939.108 His 
impressive showing resulted in the award of the post of Deputy Prime Minister, but, perhaps 
wisely, Menzies would choose to hand External Affairs (despite an attempt by Hughes to 
bully him into leaving things as they were) over to the more diplomatic Sir Henry Gullet, 
who, however, does not appear to have carried much weight (`nobody pays any attention to 
Gullett', as Whiskard put it).109 
Lyons's sudden death on the 7 April 1939 failed to resolve anything. Hughes appears to 
have tried to exploit his new position as Attorney -General to have himself appointed Prime 
Minister, but when that gambit failed, advised Page to form an interim government while the 
U.A.P. selected a new leader.11° The Country Party leader and the Treasurer, Richard Casey, 
then attempted one final time to persuade Bruce to return and lead the party now that Lyons 
was gone, but, this proved as unattractive as when the latter had been alive." Casey had 
been, in many ways, the obvious successor to Lyons. Young, personable and well -connected, 
he seemed the ideal candidate. His mentor, Bruce, when Prime Minister, had sent Casey to 
London as the first Australian Liaison Officer in the 1920s, where he had come under the 
tutelage of Sir Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary and Secretary for the Committee of 
Imperial Defence (CID).12 Casey therefore had experience of working at the heart of 
government and direct personal knowledge of the major players in Westminster and 
Whitehall. His return to Australia had seen him venture into the political arena, where he 
now held the vital role of Treasurer, which had left him responsible for steering the 
government's flagship national insurance legislation into practice. However, while success 
might have crowned Casey's candidature, the government's decision to abandon it reflected 
poorly on the Treasurer.113 He was in any case perhaps a little too personable; with the 
suggestion that he faithfully supported Lyons over national insurance, C.M.T. and maybe 
even appeasement out of personal loyalty, rather than conviction, raising questions over his 
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leadership potential.14 His desperate attempts to persuade his mentor Bruce to return equally 
do not appear to have helped his candidacy.15 He lost out at the first ballot, but appears to 
have resented Menzies's success and to have tried to undermine the latter's leadership in 
cabinet, according to Whiskard.16 
After the final abortive attempt to lure Bruce back into federal politics, Page, at Hughes's 
instigation, then warned his coalition partners the Country Party would not serve under 
Menzies, if the latter was elected leader on 18 April 1939. The sheer effrontery of the junior 
partner trying to dictate to the senior one, after the excessive benefits it was perceived to 
have derived from coalition, seems to have been sufficient to persuade the U.A.P. to 
narrowly opt for Menzies over Hughes on the second ballot in the contest; Casey and White 
having been eliminated in the first round.'" Page thereupon launched a bitter, public attack 
on Menzies, citing both the latter's resignation from Lyons's cabinet and his decision not to 
volunteer for front -line action during the First World War as proof of his unsuitability to lead 
the country at the present time.18 The Country Party leader and his followers then left the 
coalition, leaving the U.A.P. to continue alone. 
If opposition to C.M.T. in the contemporary international climate had undermined Lyons's 
credibility as leader, in the way Keith Murdoch (proprietor of the Herald and Age 
newspapers in Melbourne) believed, clearly Menzies also had weaknesses.19 While 
considered pro -German by writers such as Lyons's biographer, Karen White, he actually 
appears to have been sceptical about the ultimately peaceful nature of Nazi intentions, and 
his advocacy of pressurising the Czechs therefore seems to be pragmatic rather than 
idealistic.120 Nevertheless, his vigorous defence of appeasement in the aftermath of Munich 
was supplemented by his role in the Daiam dispute, where, as Attorney -General, he took a 
hard -line stance with dockers who were refusing to load pig -iron on to the freighter Daifram 
for export to Japan, for putative use in the latter's war effort against China.121 Menzies's part 
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in this earned him the persistent nickname `Pig -Iron Bob' and made it hard to depict him as a 
heroic resister of aggression.122 While he had resigned over his differences with Lyons on 
defence (as well as national insurance, which was now put out for consultation, rather than 
reintroduced), he took no steps to implement C.M.T. prior to the outbreak of war, despite his 
previous support for the measure.123 He was, however, in a difficult position on all matters 
military, due to his record in the previous war. Certainly, his then colleague, T. W. White, 
had considered Menzies attendance at the unveiling of the Australian War Memorial at 
Villers -Bretonneux inappropriate the previous summer.124 Equally, his mother's explanation 
that his parents had forbidden him to go to war, as they had already given enough to the 
country by allowing his elder brothers to do so, scarcely added to his credibility as a 
potential war leader.125 This weakness was exacerbated by his feud with Page, which now 
left him with a minority administration; not even the largest party in the House, and 
dependent on winning support for his measures on a case by case basis; unable to bring 
himself to agree terms to revive the coalition even after war had broken out, and Page had 
stepped down.126 This naturally rendered the government's situation much more difficult in a 
time of international crisis, when decisive measures might be required. He was further 
hampered by having to retain both Casey and Hughes who each had grave difficulties 
reconciling themselves to the new leadership.127 His government was therefore in a weak 
position generally, and particularly on matters pertaining to defence and the international 
situation. 
The government in Australia therefore spent the period 1 October 1938 - 11 September 
1939 divided against itself. While Lyons gave the impression of being worn out and out of 
tune with political realities, in many ways Menzies's predicament was worse. Lyons was at 
least able to elicit lip- service in support of his leadership from both the U.A.P. and the 
Country Party, whereas Menzies had to contend with the open hostility of Page. The 
resulting minority government's legitimacy was undermined by not even being the largest 
party in the House of Representatives. Lyons's pacifism might be a weakness in the 
circumstances of the period, but it was at least one borne of his convictions, whereas 
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Menzies's support for C.M.T. was undermined by his military record. Lyons's star might 
have been waning, but he was still the established leader, while Menzies was hindered in 
establishing himself after his election by both Casey and Hughes. Both Menzies and Lyons 
therefore faced significant limitations in their ability to formulate Australia's response to 
developments in Europe. 
Unique Factors: South Africa 
Race was the fundamental issue for the Union of South Africa. It was the only dominion in 
which those classed as being of European descent were in a minority, and this had created 
something of a siege mentality not present in Australia, Canada and New Zealand.128 The 
situation was further complicated by tensions between the majority (c.60 %) Afrikaner and 
minority (c.40 %) English sections of this descent, which had produced political parties 
defined by their attitude to this divide.129 Although generally referred to at the time as the 
race problem, identification with a section was primarily thought of in linguistic terms.130 As 
in many countries, the Great Depression had brought about a realignment in domestic 
politics (the Fusion experiment): joining the overwhelming bulk of the Afrikaner -based 
National Party and the more pro- British South Africa Party in the new United National South 
Africa Party. In October 1938, the latter appeared to be master of all it surveyed. Led by 
General Hertzog, who had continuously been Prime Minister since 30 June, 1924, it had 
been returned in April 1938 with an only slightly less overpowering majority than it had 
previously held.131 His deputy, General Smuts, had been head of the South Africa Party, and 
was now recognised as the leader of the English tendency within the new Party, despite 
being himself an Afrikaner. 
Hertzog was distinctly more sensitive to the concerns of Afrikaners than the English. He 
was always keen, for instance, to assert the status of Die Stem van Suid-Afrika as an alternate 
national anthem to God save the King for the Union, despite the anxieties on the issue 
128 University of Capetown (hereafter UCT), Sir William Clark Papers (BC81), D60/ Misc. Letters 
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expressed by Smuts.132 In February 1938, Hertzog had reacted to these complaints with the 
note: 
Smuts has once again taken fright and now wants again - as usual - to pursue 
his dilatory political tactics, and therefore: legal issues should be left to the 
determination of the future, as if there were no Afrikaans- speaking followers 
whose rights and interests have to be defended; and as though there were no 
Malan opposition who would insist upon legal issues being determined 
now!133 
Ultimately, as this indicates, it was Afrikaans- speakers and the Malan opposition that held 
sway with the Prime Minister, not English -speakers and Colonel Stallard's Dominion Party. 
In a 1940 report on the racial situation for London, the British High Commissioner described 
how, at the time of Fusion in 1934, Dr. Malan had seceded from the General's National Party 
to form the `purified' nationalists, mirroring Stallard's defection from the South Africa 
Party 134 More of a leader who is followed than who leads, Hertzog had bitterly resented his 
former subordinate Malan's action as a personal betrayal, refusing to hold a civil 
conversation with him thereafter, as Clark explained. Hertzog had also spent his career 
promoting Afrikanerdom, therefore the insult implicit in Malan's appropriation of the term 
`purified' to apply solely to the doctor's brand of nationalism, stung the Prime Minister 
deeply. Consequently, although Hertzog was occasionally capable of a grand gesture in the 
direction of the English, such as switching from republicanism to monarchism, his 
absorption with his lost supporters encouraged his nationalist tendencies at the expense of 
any sympathy he might have developed with Anglo -Saxon susceptibilities.135 This fixation 
led him to attempt to promote the Union's sovereignty and independence at every available 
opportunity, as Clark had wearily reported to London in 1937.136 
He was therefore convinced South Africa must make its own decision as to involvement in 
any war, as his secretary informed a questioning party activist in 1939.137 Not only that, but, 
in Clark's view, Hertzog believed the Union should only participate in those wars in which it 
had a direct interest, lest others continue to mistake it for a British dependency.138 An attack 
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on another Commonwealth member, or even possibly on western Europe, would be 
justifiable grounds for war, as was noted by Charles Te Water, the South African High 
Commissioner in London, in a letter to his chief.139 With regard to the Sudeten Crisis, the 
General could see no South African interest in preventing German expansion into eastern 
Europe and charged his representative with making sure that the British government 
understood this.140 There was a contrary view. South Africa held expansionist ambitions: 
seeking greater involvement with Rhodesia; and the transfer of the protectorates of 
Basutoland (modern Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland from British to 
Union rule. According to this view, expressed by the former cabinet minister F. C. Sturrock 
to Clark, South African interests in fact demanded participation, as a British defeat would 
mean that the victor could treat South Africa as it wished regardless of whether it had been 
neutral or not, while a British victory would mean the Union could forget its ambitions, 
unless it had contributed to achieving that success.141 Hertzog, however, was too concerned 
about Afrikaner sensitivities to be swayed by such Realpolitik. His view, as he would 
indicate in a speech in September 1939, was that by entering such a war, his country would 
forever surrender its right to be considered a sovereign state.142 Participation was therefore 
not an option, as far as he was concerned, and he instructed the South African High 
Commissioner in London to advise the British government of his position.143 
This stance, however, left the General with the problem of the English supporters he had 
acquired with Fusion. They would tend to be as naturally alienated by neutrality as 
Afrikaners would tend to be by its opposite. Ideally, Britain would render this problem 
irrelevant by avoiding involvement in a war he felt unable to join in, and he consequently 
tried to steer London away from any acts that might draw them into conflict with 
Germany.144 As tensions spiralled over the summer of 1938, however, Hertzog came to the 
conclusion he might have to confront the English section of his party with the unpalatable 
prospect of remaining neutral, while Britain went to war. Believing that supporters should 
and would follow their leader, however, the Prime Minister sought to resolve this difficulty 
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by binding Smuts to the policy of neutrality, in the hope that his colleague would then ensure 
that his followers would remain loyal whatever happened. The device Hertzog sought to 
ensnare his deputy with was the Neutrality Pact. 145 
This pact itself provided firstly that, if war broke out between Britain and Germany over 
Czechoslovakia, South Africa's relations with the belligerents would remain unchanged, 
which Britain appeared better placed to take advantage of than Germany through its 
command of the seas. Secondly, the Union's `relations and obligations' would `remain 
unimpaired' in regard to Simonstown Naval Base, and its memberships of the League of 
Nations and Commonwealth. The allusion to Simonstown related to South Africa's 
responsibility for landward security for the Royal Navy's base near Capetown, an obligation 
which was difficult to reconcile with the requirements of neutrality. The reference to the 
League of Nations appeared to have little practical applicability, as it is difficult to see what 
obligations could arise out of participation in that body that would conflict with those arising 
out of neutrality. It did, however, provide an opportunity for the Union to assert its 
sovereignty by juxtaposing its membership of that organisation with its role in the 
Commonwealth. It also took some of the sting out of the idea of South African obligations to 
the Commonwealth for Afrikaners, by providing a context in which responsibilities arising 
out of membership of international bodies were generally, rather than uniquely, 
acknowledged. What its Commonwealth obligations amounted to was another matter. As 
Smuts would point out the following year, Hertzog was entering uncharted legal territory, 
and the vague terms employed may have provided the government with considerable scope 
for interpreting matters as they saw fit, but also provided significant potential for 
considerable friction with the belligerents, when this interpretation did not accord with the 
latters' views.146 Finally, no one would be permitted to use South African territory to impair 
such relations and obligations, which was likewise capable of a wide degree of 
interpretation, and unlikely to promote harmony with the warring parties.147 
The Neutrality Pact followed the course Oswald Pirow, the Minister of Defence and 
Transport, portrayed government decisions as taking.148 In his biography of Hertzog, he went 
into considerable detail as to how the pact became government policy.149 Firstly, it received 
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the approval of the inner cabinet of himself, General Hertzog, General Smuts and N. C. 
Havenga, the Minister of Finance, on 1 September 1938. Of the four ministers mentioned, 
only Smuts had been in the South Africa Party, so that constituency was under -represented at 
the highest level. In this case, Hertzog had shown a draft of the pact to Pirow and possibly 
Havenga before showing it to Smuts. The Prime Minister confided in Pirow that he regarded 
it as a test of his partner's commitment to Fusion, and that he would end the experiment if it 
was rejected. According to Pirow, Smuts was rather taken aback when presented with it, and 
asked for time to think it over, which Hertzog readily agreed to, before conceding without 
being asked that the agreement would only apply to conflicts arising in eastern Europe. With 
this manoeuvre, Hertzog had effectively trapped Smuts: either the latter committed himself 
to neutrality on the Sudeten question in advance, or he broke the Fusion experiment over the 
issue; at a time when it was still by no means certain that war would break out, or that he 
would be able to persuade Parliament to follow him, rather than Hertzog, if it did. Having 
considered his options, Smuts agreed to the Pact the following day. Smuts was now 
effectively bound to the policy, and Hertzog shelved the agreement for the moment. 
However, on 28 September, as the crisis progressed towards its conclusion, he felt the time 
had come to present it to the full cabinet, and, in the absence of a contrary steer from Smuts, 
they dutifully acquiesced in its provisions.'5o 
Of the other members of the inner cabinet described above, Havenga seems to have had 
little direct involvement with external affairs, beyond accepting the Neutrality Pact and 
subsequently defending the policy to the British High Commissioner, Sir William Clark in 
the Spring of 1940.151 Pirow's relatively easy access to the Prime Minister, however, did give 
rise to rumours that the latter was in Pirow's pocket, suggesting decisions may have been 
reached even before consultation with the Inner Cabinet, but, both Malcolm MacDonald, the 
then Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, and Clark, identified Dr. Helgard D. J. 
Bodenstein, the Permanent Secretary at the Prime Minister's Department and the Department 
for External Affairs, rather than Pirow, as the person exercising undue influence over 
Hertzog, with MacDonald even going so far as to state Bodenstein's `removal from his 
present post is one of the most important changes required in the British Commonwealth.'152 
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There is certainly some indirect evidence that Bodenstein was more of a nationalist than his 
chief, and that his relationship with the opposition Die Burger newspaper verged on being 
`improper,' which may suggest that he might have sought to push Hertzog beyond where the 
General would otherwise have gone.153 Yet, Bodenstein was enough of a pragmatist to 
continue serving under the far less congenial regime of General Smuts.154 Thus it is doubtful 
if he ever risked allowing his personal inclinations to impinge on his working relationship 
with Hertzog, particularly as the latter had a well earned reputation for being autocratic and 
aloof. Far from driving policy, `Body's' role appears to have been to provide legalistic 
arguments for the positions the General wanted to advance, and to occasionally act as cat's 
paw in situations where it would have been impolitic for Hertzog to intervene himself, as 
Clark reported home in March 1937.155 This can be seen in Bodenstein's various dealings 
with Clark, where only the latter's wishful thinking allowed him to believe the General's 
undoubted charm was evidence of discomfiture at his subordinate's activities, even when this 
supposed embarrassment led to no significant modification in the latter's future behaviour.'56 
The General was in fact deeply intolerant of presumption in his subordinates; coldly 
declining to inform Dr. Stefanus Gie, the South African Minister in Berlin and Stockholm, of 
government policy, when the latter had been impertinent enough to indicate he needed to 
know the government's current official stance on the question of returning Germany's 
colonies.' S7 The apparent absence of any form of rebuke for Bodenstein was therefore an 
indication that the latter's actions in fact met with the General's approval, not that Hertzog 
was in any sense an indulgent master, as Clark seems to have assumed.158 Hertzog was every 
inch the autocrat, given to taking decisions in isolation, and then presenting both inner and 
outer cabinets with these as virtual ultimata, as with the Neutrality Pact, above.'59 
Pirow, similarly, seems to have adopted a subordinate role in decision -making, at least with 
regard to external affairs. The son of a German missionary, who held the posts of Minister of 
Transport and Defence, he depicted himself as being entirely in accord with the General on 
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external affairs in his biography of Hertzog.160 The European situation therefore seemed both 
to provide Pirow with an opportunity to use his German background to advantage, and 
Hertzog with an opening to engage a trusted confidante in European diplomacy, hence the 
former's proposed trip to London in November 1938 to discuss defence matters, which had 
been in mind since a January 1938 meeting between Pirow and Clark, expanded to include 
talks in Lisbon, Burgos, Berlin, Brussels and Rome.161 Yet it seems questionable whether 
Pirow was truly at one with Hertzog on external affairs, as he struggled to explain the latter's 
stance on neutrality, arguing first that the government had to adopt its secret Neutrality Pact 
because of Afrikaner public opinion, but then that the government had to maintain Afrikaner 
public opinion in order to preserve its secret neutrality policy, all of which appeared 
pointless if the policy itself was only to be of transitory applicability, as Pirow apparently let 
slip to both Goering and Malcolm MacDonald, the then British Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs. According to his biography of Hertzog, Pirow told Goering in November 
1938 that the Fusion government would have remained neutral if war had broken out over 
the Sudeten issue, but that pressure would have brought the cabinet down within six months, 
while according to a report from Stirling to Canberra, the South African had told MacDonald 
that South Africa would not have joined the war for six months, but that no South African 
government could remain neutral and in power beyond that.162 While clearly the implied 
difference as to whether the Fusion regime would continue or not was simply to make his 
message more palatable to his different hosts, Pirow was consistent that pressure would force 
South Africa to participate within a time frame of six months. This is entirely at odds with 
Havenga's version of the government's (and hence Hertzog's) position, as explained to Clark 
in front of the General in the spring of 1940, without any correction or qualification by the 
latter. In the latter account, Union participation was not certain, but conditional on German 
actions, and without any reference to a time frame or pressure.' 63 Pirow's apparent confusion 
on these issues implies that neutrality was not his policy, contrary to what Clark thought, but 
that the minister simply went along with Hertzog's position out of loyalty or expediency, 
rather than understanding and agreement.164 
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It therefore seems unlikely that either Bodenstein or Pirow's influence ever extended 
beyond where Hertzog was already willing to go. Their roles were essentially subordinate, 
providing him with technical expertise, or acting as his mouthpiece. Smuts's role was 
different. As seen earlier, Hertzog appears to have been routinely dismissive of Smuts's 
concerns about the party's English support, but nonetheless, also seems to have expected his 
deputy would duly keep his followers in line. They were, however, as the British High 
Commissioner speculated, unlikely to meekly follow Smuts into neutrality in their 
entirety.165 The historian Michael Fry, following Robert Citino, goes further, arguing that a 
majority in Parliament opposed neutrality.166 Citino's account, however, is based on a report 
by the German minister, Leitner, which simply cites in support of this `a recent survey' that 
was supposedly inclining Hertzog towards proroguing Parliament to overcome this obstacle 
to his plans.167 It is doubtful Leitner's report is accurate. Hertzog appears, right up to the end, 
to have believed that he would achieve a majority in Parliament, confiding as much to the 
Governor -General on the eve of his eventual defeat.' 68 Such confidence would seem 
inexplicable if he had truly been convinced by a survey suggesting otherwise in 1938, as 
indicated here, and Hertzog had no obvious motive for misleading the king's representative. 
In any case, Afrikaners were in the majority, tended to be more politically active than the 
English, and more concentrated in rural constituencies, which had smaller electorates than 
their urban counterparts, as Clark explained to London in 1940.169 All this suggests an 
Afrikaner, and therefore inherently pro -neutral, majority in the House in 1938. This is 
implicitly supported by Clark, as he indicated Smuts needed Afrikaner support to attain his 
majority in September 1939 :7° It therefore seems unlikely that Parliament would have 
overturned neutrality in 1938 and it could also be expected that Smuts would have been able 
to hold on to some of his English supporters. Nonetheless, it does seem likely this would 
have been a step too far for many, triggering defections to the Dominion Party, and 
weakening Smuts's position in the United Party. 
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Smuts, however, seems to have been inclined towards neutrality in 1938, even before 
Hertzog presented him with the virtual ultimatum over the Neutrality Pact. The Deputy 
Prime Minister had written to Leo Amery, the former British Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, in the spring of 1938, casting doubt on whether any of the dominions would ever 
fight for `France and Belgium' again, let alone `in the Battles of Central and Eastern 
Europe.'171 Like Hertzog, Smuts was a long -term critic of Versailles, but, unlike the latter, 
had little sympathy for Germany's rulers, hoping as early as February 1938 in a letter to his 
friend Margaret Gillett, that `the revolt of the Christian conscience in Germany will yet 
prove the turning of the tide.'172 He did not, however, regard the Sudeten issue as one which 
justified war, let alone South African participation in it, as Sir William Clark reported to 
Eden the following year.13 Indeed, he confided to the Gilletts: `it is difficult to see what 
great interest could justify another world war today.'174 Smuts had invested at least as 
heavily in Fusion as Hertzog, putting up with the latter's autocratic ways, and giving way 
over contentious issues, so it was never likely that he would initiate a breach unless he was 
absolutely convinced there was no alternative. Given his views on the Sudetenland , there 
was therefore never any question that he would reject the proffered Neutrality Pact. Smuts 
also seems, however, to have persuaded himself that war could be avoided, writing to Sir 
John Power, the Westminster M.P. for Wimbledon, that he expected Chamberlain's face -to- 
face diplomacy to work `as no great power today wishes to get involved in a general war,' 
and to his biographer, Sarah Millin, that `it is almost inconceivable that the world would be 
launched once more into general war,' even if it was `trembling in the balance.'175 Should his 
views prove correct, he would never have to face the issue of convincing his supporters 
about the merits of neutrality or its consequences. 
Broadly in agreement with Hertzog and Smuts, the South African Governor -General, Sir 
Patrick Duncan, felt the dominions would be `hard put' to follow Britain into a war to 
maintain the existing situation over the Sudeten issue in a personal letter of 25 August 
1938.176 Sir Patrick's opinions mattered because it would be the responsibility of the 
Governor -General to determine any constitutional implications consequential on the demise 
of Fusion in the wake of an external crisis. Universally recognised as the first South African 
171 NASA, Smuts Papers(A1)NoL243 /Smuts to Amery, 28 March 1938, p. 2 
172NASA, Smuts Papers (A1)No1.243 /J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett 10 February 
173UCT, Sir William Clark Papers (BC81), Misc. Letters 1936+ /Clark to Eden, 
21 
174NASA, A1/243 /Smuts to M.C. Gillett 10 October 1938 
175 NASA, Smuts Papers(A1) /VoL243 /Smuts to Sir John Power, 15 September 
Papers(A1)NoL243 /Smuts to S. G. Millin, 14 September 1938 
176 UCT, Duncan Papers /BC294/A163 /Duncan to Brand, 25 August 1938 
42 
1938, p. 3 
15 September 1939, p. 
1938; NASA, Smuts 
to hold that post, Sir Patrick's appointment appeared to be a great success for Hertzog in his 
continuing efforts to assert the Union's status as a sovereign, independent entity; indicating 
South Africa was no longer reliant on a `Mother Country,' to which Afrikaners felt no 
emotional tie, to provide it graciously with its acting head of state." By selecting Sir 
Patrick, a member of cabinet who had long represented the English South African 
community, Hertzog appeared to have been particularly shrewd, as Sir William Clark, the 
British High Commissioner in South Africa, reported to London, because a South African 
was calculated to win over wavering Afrikaners to that institution, while a member of the 
English community was likely to sweeten the pill of reduced British ties for that section of 
the population.' 78 It therefore perfectly reflected Hertzog's concept of Fusion, by bringing 
both communities together into what the General had unilaterally concluded was an 
appropriate compromise for each. He was accordingly determined to have his way, meeting 
Palace objections to the candidacy of a politician unknown to the King, by having Duncan 
resign as an M.P. and present himself at Court.19 
According to Clark, however, the results were rather less than impressive from Hertzog's 
point of view; with Afrikaners remaining largely indifferent to the office and the English 
initially objecting that Duncan had `sold the pass.' 18° Moreover, Sir Patrick was no South 
African. Born and educated in Britain, he had come out to South Africa at the age of thirty as 
part of Milner's kindergarten, been involved with the Unionist Party before joining Smuts in 
Cabinet in 1921, and then following him into Fusion.' 81 Rather than a Royal appointee, with 
the dominant imperative to keep the throne out of controversy at all costs, and only a 
transient connection to the English community in the Union, Hertzog had therefore placed 
the interpretation of the constitution in the hands of a politician from Britain, who, whatever 
doubts he may have held about preserving the Eastern European status quo, had spent his 
career promoting the British connection with South Africa, and who was under an obligation 
as far as English opinion there was concerned.182 Hertzog's crowning success therefore 
always held the potential to prove his undoing in a constitutional crisis. 
17 See, for instance, UCT, Sir William Clark Papers (BC81), D60/ "Political Notes II - The 
Governor -Generalship ", p. 1, Fry M. G., `Agents and Structures' p. 298, Pirow, Hertzog, p. 207 
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His appointment of Charles Te Water as Union High Commissioner in London was a less 
spectacular but more effective success. Like Duncan, Te Water had been a career politician, 
but from the Afrikaner, rather than English, side.183 He displayed the unquestioning loyalty 
that Hertzog required and, in fair measure, seemed to inspire in his subordinates, going so far 
as to resign rather than continue to serve under Smuts after the Neutrality Crisis that would 
see the latter replace Hertzog as Prime Minister on 4 September 1939.184 He was an 
enthusiastic proponent of Hertzog's position that Britain should not involve itself in 
European adventures, and that, if it did, it had no right to expect South African to imperil its 
domestic unity by providing support.185 As early as 1936, his counterpart in Berlin (and 
Stockholm), Dr. Stefanus Gie, had expressed support for a policy of friendship with 
Germany in a private letter to Te Water, partly out of hostility to Italian actions in Africa, 
which amounted to allowing Hitler a free hand in Eastern Europe.186 The opportunity for 
reversing Mussolini's behaviour, if it had ever truly existed, had surely passed by the 
summer of 1938, but Gie's largely uncritical acceptance of German pronouncements in 
respect of the Czechs, indicated pro -German views continued to colour his judgement.187 hi 
contrast, Te Water was more inclined to exhibit a detached scepticism towards London's 
policy in his correspondence with Pretoria, despite the goodwill he undoubtedly harboured 
for Britain.188In large part, however, this simply reflected the different standings of the two 
legations. The British (particularly the Dominions Office) were keen to always at least give 
the impression that dominion opinion counted, so Te Water does not appear to have 
encountered any difficulty having South Africa's voice heard and treated seriously at the 
highest level, as with Hertzog's concerns over the colonial question.1S9 Conversely, South 
Africa could exercise little influence in Berlin, and, in a report home, Gie admitted the 
virtual impossibility of his obtaining appointments with Nazi leaders like Ribbentrop and 
183 See NASA, Te Water Papers (A78), VoL41 /Correspondence /Te Water to Stallard, 14 January 
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Goering.190 Effectively this disparity drove South African strategy; Gie (and indeed the other 
Union representatives such as Waterson in Paris and Van Broekhuizen in the Hague) being 
used to collect information (of whatever quality) to furnish Hertzog with arguments for use 
in London, as in March 1938, when he used Gie's report that the Germans would drop their 
complaints about the treatment of the Sudeten Germans, if the Czechs would only abandon 
their Franco -Russian alliance, to try to persuade Britain into pressurising Prague to realign 
itself.191 Given the absolute imperative of averting war so that domestic harmony could be 
preserved, this provided an additional reason for vigorously supporting appeasement; 
Berlin's demands, regardless of their merits, or lack thereof, were beyond South Africa's 
influence, but Britain might just be open to Union pressure to satisfy German claims, and 
hence the Union's need for peace. 
Given this overriding imperative, South Africa's diplomatic situation therefore simply 
reinforced the already overwhelming attractions of appeasement. Currents in favour of 
automatic participation and neutrality ran through the English and Afrikaner communities 
respectively, but Hertzog subscribed to neither of these polar positions. His neutral 
inclinations sprang from a romantic nationalism, but these were qualified by a desire to 
simultaneously maintain the imperial connection, which may have had a more than 
pragmatic foundation. Romantic nationalism defined his vision of South Africa as an 
independent entity which acted in accordance with its own interests and not at another's 
behest. Pragmatism and, quite possibly, solidarity drove him to accept the obligation to 
defend other Commonwealth countries if attacked, but, he would not move beyond 
benevolent neutrality otherwise. As far as he was concerned, unless South African interests 
were directly involved, any further step would effectively tie his country to another's policy 
and undermine its status as a sovereign, independent nation, which was unacceptable. In 
practice, due to his idiosyncratic governing style, he alone would be the arbiter of what those 
interests were. Bodenstein may have been unlikely to be content with Hertzog's stance on 
mutual defence, but could console himself that Hertzog was at least determined to assert the 
independence of South African policy from those of its Commonwealth partners. In any 
case, the doctor managed to reconcile himself to working for Smuts in the wake of the 
Neutrality Crisis, so he is unlikely to have encountered any insurmountable obstacles in 
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Inskip, pp. 1 -2 
191NASA, Te Water Papers (A78), Vo1.14 /Correspondence /Smuts to Te Water, 11 September 1939; 
NASA, Te Water Papers (A78), Vol.14 /Correspondence /Te Water to Van Broekhuizen, 12 January 
1935; NASA, Te Water Papers (A78), Vo1.13 /Correspondence /Hertzog to Te Water, 25 March 1938. 
45 
working for Hertzog. Havenga seems to have accepted and supported Hertzog's position 
throughout. Pirow does not appear to have understood the finer nuances of this policy, but 
unsurprisingly, given his ambitions and wing of the party, gave every indication of being 
prepared to go along with it. Smuts, having convinced himself war was unjustified and 
unlikely, likewise appears to have had little difficulty in accepting the Neutrality Pact. 
Presented with this united front the full Cabinet was never likely to consider resistance. Not 
required to intervene on this occasion, the Governor -General's views nonetheless appeared 
in accord with his government's, and the implications of his British sympathies remained 
untested. Despite this unanimity at the heart of government, Hertzog appeared uncertain of 
his ability to persuade the English community in this direction, and hid behind the 
prescription that parliament would decide on participation should the occasion ever arise. 
This obfuscation could only persist as long as Britain remained free of European 
entanglements, and hence drove Hertzog into urging appeasement on the acquiescent British 
government for his own domestic interests. 
Unique Factors: Canada 
Like South Africa, Canada was a racially divided society, but along rather different lines. 
The indigenous peoples were vastly out -numbered by those of European descent and 
therefore did not assume the off -stage presence they held in the former country. 
Anglophones made up the majority of those of European descent and dominated the 
government, finance and industry. The Francophone Quebecois were the largest minority 
group, and in many ways (apart from constituting a majority) their position resembled that of 
the Afrikaners.192 Brought into the empire against their will, they saw no reason to identify 
with its unifying symbols, and did not share their Anglophone compatriots' emotional ties to 
the Mother Country. Catholic and conservative, only their exclusion from the centres of 
power had driven them into a support of the governing Liberals which was sometimes 
uncomfortable for both parties. Other significant groups included the Germans who had 
largely settled in the Mid -West and contributed to that region's perceived disinterest in the 
imperial connection. 
192 This term is used here to describe Francophone inhabitants of Quebec, because the contemporary 
epithet French Canadian is somewhat imprecise. For instance, it would also cover the Francophone 
inhabitants of Prince Edward Island, who lacked the cohesion and influence of those within the larger 
province. Quebecois, while anachronistic, conveys a precision the other cannot. Similarly, Quebecker 
is used to describe an Anglophone inhabitant of the largely Francophone province. 
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It was the Quebecois, however, who were of greatest interest to the government. The 
watchword for Mackenzie King's government was unity, as he noted in his diary; `I took the 
view that in the last resort, the unity of Canada was the test by which we should meet all 
these things.'193 The unity he was concerned with was the unity of the English and 
Quebecois sections of society. Mackenzie King considered he had a good feel for the 
Anglophones and what they would, and would not, wear.194 He was much less sure of the 
Quebecois and what he did not understand he feared, and what he feared, true to the spirit of 
the times, he wished to appease, even though he was not actually dependent on Quebec for 
his majority (the Conservatives had 39 seats in Parliament as against the Liberals' 171 of 
which only 55 came from Quebec).195 The Quebecois members of his party had, however, 
been instrumental in raising him to the leadership of the Liberal Party and in keeping him 
there.196 Yet Mackenzie King's inability to speak French and his instinctive liberalism 
prevented him from relating to their concerns, and he therefore needed an intermediary to 
communicate these to him. This role was occupied by Ernest Lapointe, the Minister for 
Justice and Deputy Prime Minister, of whom Mackenzie King noted: `but for him I would 
never have been Prime Minister, nor would I have been able to hold office, as I had held it 
through the years.' 197 Yet, despite their long and successful political partnership, the two 
men do not appear to have been friends,198 or even to have mixed socially (Mackenzie 
King's diary only notes them dining once together apart from formal state occasions in 
autumn 1938, for instance199). The Prime Minister seems to have developed a need for 
Lapointe's counsel on Quebec, even when this was of questionable relevance. For instance, 
on 23 September 1938, it was falsely reported that fighting had broken out between the 
Czechs and Germans. Mackenzie King recorded his subsequent reaction in his diary. He felt 
that, if this news was confirmed, the government should issue a statement, `at once, or today' 
to the effect that `Canada will not sit idly by and see modern civilization destroyed.'206 He 
confirmed to a `greatly shocked' Dr. Oliver Skelton, the permanent head of the Department 
of External Affairs, that this would be before Parliament had had the opportunity to debate 
the issue, as `we would have to indicate long before Parliament met what our policy would 
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be.' The original report was, in fact, quickly disavowed, but the Canadian leader nevertheless 
decided that he should obtain the views of his colleagues on the question of issuing such a 
declaration, in case the circumstances envisaged subsequently arose, and so arranged to meet 
them that afternoon to discuss the matter, recording what transpired in his journal.201 At the 
meeting, Charles Power, the Quebecker Minister for Pensions and Health, informed him that 
Quebecois opinion was not as vehemently anti -war as had been feared. Despite this 
reassuring news, Mackenzie King still felt the need to despatch a cable to Lapointe in 
Geneva, where he was on League of Nations' business, even though Power had just been in 
Quebec and therefore the more likely of the two to be in touch with the rapidly changing 
tempo of events. The following day, however, the Prime Minister continued, the Minister of 
Justice responded urging nothing should be done prior to Parliament meeting. 2 °2 As war did 
not break out at this point, it is not clear what impact this stance would have had on 
Canadian policy, but the Prime Minister clearly now felt the need to have his Quebecois 
lieutenant at hand, recalling him on and recording in his diary that Lapointe should never 
have gone abroad that summer. 
In his article on the dominions and the Sudeten Crisis, Michael Fry also considered Charles 
Dunning, the Minister of Finance, and Ian Mackenzie, the Minister of Defence, should be 
included in the elite which ran Canada, however, it is apparent they lacked the influence of 
Lapointe and do not seem to have been kept particularly well informed.203 In fact, Mackenzie 
King does not seem to have valued Mackenzie's abilities, but this assessment never seems to 
have translated itself into a perception that he had a responsibility, as Prime Minister, to 
transfer Defence to a more capable pair of hands.204 Dunning does not appear to have been 
particularly influential either, unlike his counterparts in the other dominions, Nash, Casey 
and even, to some extent, Havenga. He was now sickly and would resign from cabinet on 5 
September 1939 on the grounds of ill- health, just under a week prior to the Canadian 
declaration of war.205 Having collapsed in the House in June 1938, he had yet to return to his 
post that October, amid considerable doubts about what workload he could sustain.206 
2 °1 Ibid., 23 September 1938. 
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Mackenzie King's detachment from all but Lapointe is supported by his future cabinet 
secretary Arnold Heeney's testimony that, in the wake of Munich, apart from Lapointe, 
`there was no sign of ministers and officials being marshalled for the systematic 
consideration and disposition of external issues.'207 Collectively, however, as will be seen 
over the Jewish question, cabinet was capable of facing down Mackenzie King, or at least 
encouraging his natural instincts `to never do by halves what he could do by quarters' and 
pull back from anything that smacked of decisiveness.208 Crerar, the minister responsible for 
immigration, and behind him his Director of Immigration, Blair, were important negative 
influences in this regard. Julian Doherty, in his 1970 article, `Die Dominions and die 
britische Aussenpolitik von München bis Kriegsausbruch' also emphasised the role of 
Skelton, the head of the Department of External Affairs. Heeney concurred, noting that `it 
seemed to me that he [Mackenzie King] consulted almost exclusively with Skelton.'209 Given 
the plethora of minutes, memoranda and policy documents produced in support of Canadian 
neutrality by not just Skelton, but his subordinates, Loring Christie and Hume Wrong of the 
Department of External Affairs, particularly in comparison to their counterparts in the other 
dominions, it seems churlish to overlook them. Nonetheless Mackenzie King dismissed their 
stance as appealing only to a narrow group of intellectuals, writing in his diary in January 
1939: `I knew what a handful they were compared to the country as a whole and that my 
business was to tell Canada of her dangers.'210 They did not speak for Canada and nor did 
Vincent Massey, the High Commissioner in London, who, much to his annoyance, was only 
allowed to attend meeting with the other High Commissioners at the Dominions Office in a 
personal capacity.21 
Mackenzie King was perhaps the least likely member of the Dominion elites to lead a 
country. He seems to have lived in a fantasy world where supernatural elements had selected 
him to play a central role in the unfolding drama, noting in his journal that `the unseen forces 
have unquestionably being working together in using me in this way toward helping in the 
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great purpose of the preservation of peace.'212 This was through what he went on to describe 
as his `close' personal connections with Hitler and Chamberlain, having met them both in 
1937 213 This was a remarkably persistent strand of his thought, and yet one which he seems 
to have managed to keep separate from practical politics, so that he was able to contemplate 
practical steps for preparing Canada for war with the `gangster nations' while continuing to 
fantasise about bringing Hitler in from the cold 214 His personal staff were certainly subjected 
to his unusual personal beliefs, but it is difficult to see how he could have preserved his 
political credibility if he had shared these with his professional colleagues. 
Mackenzie King often complained that Canada was a difficult country to govern and that 
outsiders did not appreciate his position, but this merely reflected his own inability to relate 
to others' situations.215 Financial woes in New Zealand, together with political disunity there, 
in Australia and South Africa made governing Canada seem child's play by comparison. The 
Quebecois might seem intransigent and incomprehensible to Mackenzie King, but he had 
Lapointe to mediate their concerns. Nonetheless, he was throughout this period extremely 
sensitive to anything which might play badly in Quebec, and this was the first hurdle any 
new proposal had to cross en route to acceptance. In particular, given their unhappiness with 
involvement in the previous war, he worried about how they would react if faced with 
another one. This had led him to adopt the stance at Geneva in 1936 that `the Canadian 
Parliament reserves to itself the right to declare, in the light of the circumstances existing at 
the time, to what extent, if at all, Canada will participate in conflicts in which other members 
of the Commonwealth may be engaged.'216 He would maintain this position down to the 
Canadian entry into the war on 10 September 1939. It did not, however, amount to a policy, 
as his then subordinate James Gibson (at the time an External Affairs Officer, but who would 
go on to have a distinguished career in academia, at Carleton and Brock universities in 
Canada) went on to explain, because it was not intended to `arouse and mobilise public 
opinion in Canada behind any constructive approach to problems of increasing complexity 
and anxiety.'217 In fact, it was an avoidance of policy as Mackenzie King was terrified that 
any such stance could only sow discord between the Anglophones and the Quebecois, which 
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was precisely what he wished to avoid, and, as will be seen, this formula was instead actually 
used as a smokescreen to conceal a succession of different foreign policies, which 
Mackenzie King was anxious not to share with the electorate. Gibson was also sceptical 
about Parliament's ability to make an informed decision on external affairs given that `the 
Standing Committee on Industry and International Affairs had not met in many years.'218 Of 
course, given Mackenzie King's determination to avoid letting the public in on the 
circumstances under which their government would recommend war to parliament (a 
commendation which, given the size of the government's majority and Parliament's own 
lack of expertise, Parliament was almost certain to accept, unless the government was 
determined on a policy which would amount to electoral suicide), it was scarcely in his 
interests to bring his stance under Parliamentary scrutiny. 
Despite these efforts to avoid consideration of her interests in connection with the question 
of war, Canada, had a direct, practical interest in entering a war involving Britain and any 
first -class power (excepting the United States, war against which was unwinnable).219 In 
1938, Newfoundland had been a dominion (1907- 1933), but was not yet part of Canada, 
being then under direct British rule, and hence a legitimate target for any power at war with 
Britain. Given its remote location, low population and lack of strategic interest to Britain, it 
was naturally a low priority for defence spending in an era when there were so many more 
pressing concerns, so much closer to home. Newfoundland was, however, of vital concern to 
Canada. Not only did it sit astride the Gulf of St. Lawrence, it included Bell Island, whose 
undersea mines were, in the opinion of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, as expressed in a 1938 
report for the government, `essential to the continued operation of the steel industry in 
Eastern Canada.'22° This report went on to dismiss British proposals for the defence of 
Newfoundland as `superficial.' Under the circumstances, it was unlikely the British would 
contemplate modifying their position, which would in any case have involved `consultation' 
and that was anathema to Mackenzie King.221 
The reason for this was his reliance on the prescription that it would be for Parliament to 
decide on war and peace. Consultation between parties implies a shared responsibility for the 
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decisions emerging from that process. Such a responsibility might even be considered to at 
least morally commit the participants in advance to partaking in courses of action consequent 
on that outcome. A government commitment, however, would restrict the options available 
to Parliament to choose from, despite the Prime Minister having repeatedly pledged that it 
would be for the latter body to make the decision, `in light of all the circumstances.'222 In this 
way the government could be seen to have pre -empted Parliament's decision. Mackenzie 
King was unalterably opposed to this, as Malcolm MacDonald, then Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs had advised Chamberlain in March 1938 223 This would not only leave the 
government open to accusations of misleading Parliament and the public, but also involve it 
in taking a public stance on the issue, which was precisely what the formula had been 
intended to avoid in the first place.224 Up to March 1938, MacDonald was able to comment 
that it was `a rare event' to receive an opinion on external affairs from Canada, but the 
historians James Eayrs and Charles Stacey point out that thereafter Mackenzie King was 
unequivocal in voicing his support for appeasement to London.225 No doubt this was in part 
due to the confidential nature of much inter -governmental communication, but the implied 
double standard is perhaps unfair: support for appeasement, unlike, say, an offer to 
supplement the defences of Newfoundland, would not seem to commit Canada on the issue 
of war and peace in advance of Parliament's decision. Mackenzie King's underlying position 
therefore remained consistent: he would do nothing which would prejudice the issue. 
This was not out of any sense of starry-eyed idealism, however. It was of course clear that 
the government would decide on involvement in any war, and Parliament would merely 
rubber -stamp the decision, given its composition and lack of experience in external affairs. 
Had the government wished Parliament to take a reasoned and responsible decision based on 
its own views, it would have provided the House with opportunities to develop expertise in 
this area, as Gibson points out.226 Mackenzie King's position was based on his insistence on 
unity. He was not prepared to take any step which might antagonise the Quebecois, and 
because of his lack of connection with them always aimed to err on the side of caution. He 
believed the majority would demand participation if war came, but feared the minority's 
reaction. Lapointe therefore had considerable influence and his apparent acceptance of the 
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inevitability of participation if war came simplified matters considerably. The rest of the 
Cabinet was of less significance, although if united they remained capable of facing 
Mackenzie King down, particularly if they could work on his excessive sense of prudence. 
External Affairs officials presented a remarkably cohesive perspective in favour of 
neutrality, but as this was neither shared by the cabinet nor the country at large, its impact on 
Mackenzie King was negligible. The latter's belief in the imperatives of participation in war, 
and satisfying the Quebecois drove him in different directions, creating an impression of 
irresolution. In fact, the Prime Minister was personally and politically committed to 
participation, if war broke out over the use of force, as appeared likely over the Sudetenland . 
The situation was further complicated, however, by Mackenzie King's rather unusual 
personal beliefs, which cast him in the role of heroic conciliator, using his connections with 
Hitler and Chamberlain to attain a lasting peace, under the spiritual guidance of `the unseen 
forces.' 
Common Factors 
Access to British markets was vital for the Dominions. Australia and New Zealand were 
permeated by a `sense of utter dependence on the British market.'227 Professor John Roberts 
noted that after the war, Britain still took ninety per cent of New Zealand's exports.228 The 
country's standard of living was therefore heavily reliant on trade with the Mother Country, 
and any sudden interruption would have catastrophic effects, as the New Zealand Chiefs of 
Staff recognised in a December 1938 report for their government.229 McIntosh went further 
than this, pointing out that the economic situation was `of paramount importance, Britain 
was our principal market, and she was too lightly dependent on us for foodstuffs and things 
like wool.'230 Australia exported a variety of items to the United Kingdom, including 
minerals and fruit, but mainly wheat and woo1.231 The Australian nationalist economic 
historian, Brian Fitzpatrick reported that in 1937 - 38, a total of 51.7% of Australian exports 
went to Britain and a further 13.18% went to British possessions, and that likewise, 40.9% 
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and 15.66% of imports derived from Britain and its overseas possessions respectively.232 
Given his views, Fitzpatrick was naturally keen to point out that these figures represented a 
decline from the imperial highpoint of the late nineteenth century, but nonetheless the figures 
remained high in absolute terms, and it would have been a courageous government which 
chose to ignore these salient facts. The interdiction or even disruption of trade flows with 
Britain would have a commensurate impact on the Australian standard of living, and a 
suddenly impoverished electorate might well prove a vengeful one. 
South Africa, with its dominant gold- mining industry, might have been expected to have 
achieved a greater independence, but exports to London were crucial to the electorally 
important agricultural sector.233 This gave access to the British market a political significance 
out of all proportion to its actual financial value for the economy as a whole, and the mining 
industry itself was also dependent on the City of London to fund its expansion.234 Likewise 
Canada, with the economic powerhouse of the United States beside it, might have been 
considered able to dispense with the British market, but the impact of the Great Depression 
on its southern neighbour reinforced the economic significance of metropolitan Britain as 
protectionist measures in the United States reduced the value of Canadian exports there from 
$150 million to just $17 million at the start of the 1930s.235 In these circumstances, Canada 
needed every market it could get and, by 1938, Canadian exports to Britain matched those to 
the United States.236 
Theoretically, the dominions provided Britain with primary products in return for finished 
goods under the Imperial Preference Scheme thrashed out at Ottawa.237 This was not an 
entirely satisfactory arrangement from the dominions' perspective, however, as it left them 
unduly exposed to fluctuations in the British economy, and in practice the picture was more 
complex than this. All the dominions, for instance, had trading arrangements with Germany, 
and other trading relationships were also of importance: in 1938, Canada was party to a three 
way deal between itself, Britain and the United States, while Australia supplied Japan with 
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pig -iron and woo1.238 While these external relationships complicated the developing pattern 
of trade, none actually served to eliminate the significance of the British market. Britain 
therefore remained of continuing economic importance to the dominions and access to this 
vital market would be jeopardised if the metropolitan country was occupied by a hostile 
power. 
Ties of sentiment also bound the dominions to Britain. While there was considerable anti - 
British sentiment among Afrikaners, Quebecois, and Australians of Irish descent and 
dominion nationalists often favoured a stance that was more neutral than pro- British, 
significant portions of their populations also remained deeply attached to the Mother 
Country.239 This attachment was often most strident in those countries where anti- British 
sentiment was strongest, as pro- British elements sought to assert their identity in the face of 
those they perceived to be threatening it. In Canada, the cry of `ready, aye, ready' was 
particularly associated with the opposition Conservative party, but it also found some 
support among Liberal ranks, as Mackenzie King recognised (for `the Government could 
not, without suffering immediate defeat, adopt any such policy [of neutrality]'), and even, to 
a certain extent, shared it himself (as his biographer, H. Blair Neatby, points out), for 
instance, writing in his diary of `the richer inheritance' of the British Commonwealth where 
Canada was `part of a great whole, with kindred aims, ideals and institutions' (although he 
would probably never have recognised himself as having anything in common with what he 
liked to call `jingoes and Tories').240 The Canadian leader was aware he could count on this 
constituency for support if the Quebecois proved intransigent, and his diary indicates how he 
used this to pressure the latter's representatives in Cabinet to go along with his policy: `I told 
him [Power, one of the Quebec Ministers] that the Cabinet Ministers should realise it would 
be the end of Quebec, if any attitude of that kind [some of the Quebec ministers leaving the 
government in the event of war] were adopted.'24' 
In South Africa, pro- British sentiment was divided between the extreme (in terms of the 
South African political landscape), if miniscule, opposition Dominion party, and one wing of 
the governing United Party. As it sought to preserve and promote the link with Britain, this 
sentiment ran counter to the ambitions of the prime minister, General Hertzog (who came 
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from the other wing of the party), to create a united, independent nation out of South 
Africa's Afrikaner and British tribes, as well as the lingering anti -British resentment he 
continued to harbour from the loss of the Boer republics.242 It did, however, provide a ready - 
made constituency for his deputy, General Smuts, to use against Hertzog's neutrality policy 
when the occasion arose (as it would in September 1939) and also restrained Hertzog from 
adopting a more explicitly neutral position.243 
In Australia, sentiment divided on, rather than across, party lines, with the governing 
coalition being more instinctively pro- British than the Labor opposition. Moreover, Labor's 
anti -British voice was divided against itself, springing, as it did, from Irish Catholic, 
Australian particularist, and Marxist sympathiser sources, which often could not agree 
among themselves on the issues of the day, such as the Spanish Civil War.244 In New 
Zealand, Anglophile sentiment was believed to be so strong, that government and opposition 
each vied to portray themselves as more pro- British than the other. Indeed, as late as August 
1939, the opposition still saw mileage in trying to depict the Savage government as critical 
of Munich, as the British High Commissioner reported to London 245 
British military and political power were also important for the dominions. Neatby notes 
that Mackenzie King was `ambivalent' about the United States and while he might seek to 
use every opportunity to demonstrate Canada's independence from Britain, he also saw the 
link with Britain as vital, because `were Britain to be worsted in a world struggle, the only 
future left for Canada would be absorption by the United States, if we were to be saved from 
an enemy aggressor' and `if we ever cease to depend on our reliance on the British fleet... 
and place our whole reliance on the United States, there would be no independent Canada 
left; if Canada was left at all it would be as one of the States of the American Republic.'246 
Australia and New Zealand, albeit with increasing misgivings, depended for their security on 
Britain's Singapore strategy to protect them from Japanese ambitions in the Southern Pacific. 
Together with South Africa, they had also received former German colonies as mandates 
from the League of Nations as part of the peace settlement. Only New Zealand appeared 
prepared to consider the return of its mandate to Germany, but added the caveat at the 1937 
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Imperial Conference that they would consider `the interests of the inhabitants as the first and 
primary consideration,' a proviso which, given the extreme racial policy of the Nazis, left the 
idea dead in the water.247 South Africa went even further and refused to contemplate the 
return of Tanganyika, a British, not South African, mandate. The dominions all appear to 
have taken a revival of German interest in their former colonies as an imminent and serious 
threat. General Smuts might have had an interest in building up the danger, but General 
Hertzog certainly did not, yet the latter backed Smuts over the despatch of South African 
security forces to forestall a supposed German coup in South West Africa on Hitler's 
birthday in 1939 248 Hertzog would scarcely have done this, had he not taken seriously the 
idea that Germany would act, as playing up the threat strengthened the argument for greater 
co- operation with Britain, to which he was vehemently opposed. Pirow's disappointment at 
his failure to secure a colonial deal on his German visit is palpable, and again only makes 
sense in a context where the threat to South West Africa was seen as rea1.249 Meanwhile, 
Billy Hughes took the trouble to declare publicly that Australia would never return New 
Guinea, and New Zealand, as has been seen, also made clear its intention to keep Samoa.25° 
None of this would have been necessary had they not taken seriously the view that Germany 
wished to repossess its former property. It was one thing, however, to refuse blithely to hand 
the mandates over; it was another thing to actually defend them. The German navy might be 
relatively weak compared to the Royal Navy, but it positively dwarfed even the combined 
navies of the Dominions, whose only substantial asset was a 10,000 ton Australian cruiser.25' 
South Africa was in this respect the most vulnerable of all, possessing no naval forces of its 
own whatsoever.252 In the security of their enjoyment of their mandates, the Dominions were 
reliant on `the surest shield' that was the Royal Navy, as Smuts put it in a speech to the 
public.253 
Additionally, concerns over `land and blood' permeated the Dominions. The governments 
were aware that their predecessors had seized the land their people now lived on from its 
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indigenous inhabitants, on the grounds that it was terra nullius, and now looked towards 
their wide, open spaces with anxiety, lest a new Volk ohne Raum sought to displace them in 
turn. In Australia, The Bulletin reflected these concerns in a cartoon depicting Labor as 
preaching isolation, while an indigenous person looks on with the comment `You pinchum 
OUR policy.'254 The implication is clear: an under -populated and isolated Australia was 
likely to be overrun by a more powerful nation with a surplus population, most probably 
Japan, although this was left to the imagination rather than openly stated. This was 
reinforced by secret government documents on strategy, which depicted Australia as empty 
and vulnerable, and specifically identified Japan as a likely potential aggressor.255 Similarly, 
across the Tasman, a New Zealand Herald cartoon depicted the Prime Minister in 
conversation with Bishop Cherrington. The bishop advocates Japanese immigration `to settle 
the country. '256 The then attorney -general in a confidential report for the government, who 
were considering legal action over the item, interpreted this to be a play on words: the 
immigrants would settle the country as in populating it, but they would also settle the 
question of its future as a `white man's country.'257 The underlying assumption is again 
clear: the country was empty and at risk of being overrun by an alien race which would 
impose its own values on the existing inhabitants. That this is also what had happened to the 
Maori cannot have been entirely lost on the audience. Canada, or at least Mackenzie King, 
also feared its emptiness, with the Prime Minister speaking in his diary of `the large 
available areas for settlement,' although it is not clear which he feared more, the `gangster 
nations' of Japan and Germany, who were `seeking to work up a case against Canada, so that 
in the event of war, there may be an excuse for action against this country', or, as has been 
seen, his powerful neighbour to the South.258 The South African situation was different from 
the rest. There was no obvious candidate from which an influx of surplus population might 
be expected but, it was the only dominion in which settlers of European descent formed a 
minority.259 The enemy without was replaced by the enemy within, exacerbating tensions. 
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The solution for all was to be, at least in times of prosperity, the encouragement of desirable 
immigrants to settle the land, under the implicit protection of the British fleet. 
The dominions also shared the view that the Versailles settlement was unsatisfactory. All 
except Billy Hughes, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, were united in seeing it as 
too harsh. He alone had been unapologetic about the punitive nature of the treaty, and saw no 
need for revision now.260 His colleagues viewed things differently. Casey and Menzies had 
separately urged that more pressure be placed on the Czechs, Page had argued for the 
outright cession of the Sudetenland and Lyons, with his pacifist sympathies simply opposed 
Hughes's bellicosity on principle.2ó1 For South Africa, General Smuts had seen flaws in the 
treaty from the start and had only signed it under protest, while General Hertzog identified 
the settlement with the treaty of Vereeniging at which the Boers had surrendered their 
independence and to which he had been a reluctant signatory.262 Mackenzie King likewise 
spoke in his diary of `the wrongs done the Germans by the Versailles Treaty.'263 Even New 
Zealand, while deploring the aggression of recent years, also acknowledged in an internal 
memorandum, produced in the wake of Munich, that some of the aggressors were `justifiably 
indignant because of grievances which should have been rectified long ago', suggesting that 
they, too, would support a revision of Versailles, just not at the end of a gun.264 This was all 
based on a conception of Hitler as a rational, if volatile, statesman with limited and 
intelligible ambitions. Hertzog and Smuts both perceived the German leader as being 
capricious, but characterised by aims arising from a standard contemporary definition of 
Germany's interests in terms of trade and influence in its natural hinterland .265 Mackenzie 
King had also believed a direct approach to Germany might `reach Hitler's heart' and lead to 
`a noble peace understanding', which, even if expressed in his diary in rather quixotic terms, 
still implicitly presumed that Hitler's aims were finite and compatible with Western 
260 NLA/Munro- Ferguson papers/Ms696 /548 -52 /Letter from W. M. Hughes to Sir Ronald Munro 
Ferguson, Governor- General, 17/5/19 as reproduced in Meaney, N., Australia and the World: A 
Documentary History from the 1870s to the 1970s, (Melbourne, 1985), 156, p. 285 
261 TNA, DO/35/554/F82 /100 /Acting High Commissioner Canberra to Dominions Office, 2 
September 1938; NLA/Menzies Papers (MS4936) /Menzies to Halifax, 6 August 1938, p. 2; see also 
chapter two below; Page, Sir Earle as cited in TNA, DO/35/554/82/69, Note of Meeting between 
Dominions Office, Lord Halifax, the Dominion High Commissioners and visiting Australian 
Ministers, 25 May 1938, p. 14; TNA, DO/35 /554 /82/96 /Acting UK High Commissioner in Canberra 
to Dominions Office, 31 August 1938. 
262 Smuts, J. C., J. C. Smuts, (London, 1952), p. 234; Oswald Pirow, Hertzog, p. 247 
263 King, Diary, 125/655, Entry 5 September 1938 
264 NANZ, EA/1 /58.8.1.1 pt.la/External Relations - General/Explanation of New Zealand Foreign 
Policy, p. 2 
265 See, for instance, NASA, Te Water Papers (A78), Vol 13 /Correspondence /Hertzog to Te Water, 21 
April 1939, p. 2 & NASA, Smuts Papers(A1) /Vo 1.243 /Smuts to M. C. Gillett 22/7/38, p. 2 
59 
security.266 In Australia, Lyons publicly avowed `that the powers represented at Munich are 
united in their desire for peace and are determined to spare the world the horrors of another 
war,' an opinion in which he was supported to some extent at one time or another by Casey, 
Menzies and Page, but not, of course, Hughes.267 Lyons's stance was built on the assumption 
that Hitler, as well as the other leaders, was essentially peaceful, that his aims did not require 
war, and that they were limited to issues which did not imperil Western security. In contrast, 
New Zealand's focus on the need for opening up the German economy to world trade did not 
depend on Hitler's reasonableness per se, but instead assumed that improving the German 
standard of living through `fairer' access to world resources would dissipate the pressures 
driving Germany's aggressive behaviour, restoring a harmonious international climate.268 
They thus reached the same end as the others, but by slightly different means and with the 
assumption that it was underlying German economic needs, rather than Hitler's political 
ones, which needed to be addressed. Accordingly, the dominions, while not quite united in 
their beliefs, nonetheless shared a perception that war could be avoided safely by satisfying 
Germany's reasonable requirements. 
There was, however, less agreement how all outstanding grievances could be resolved. 
General Hertzog, with the backing of General Smuts, favoured a conference to draw up a 
general settlement including colonial matters, but they preferred to proceed in tandem with 
Great Britain on this subject, and they continued to envisage resolution of the colonial 
question through financial compensation as regards their own position in South West Africa, 
as Hertzog advised Chamberlain in October 1938 2G9 Lyons likewise expressed the hope that 
Munich would lead to a general settlement of outstanding grievances.270 In New Zealand, 
Berendsen deprecated the idea of a conference in a memorandum for his government at this 
point: `Unless the present situation should lead (which would appear to be highly 
improbable) to a successful international conference for the solution of all international 
disputes present or potential.i271 He disliked conferences on principle, considering them 
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prone to endless, futile discussions on the exact semantics of the proposals before them as he 
explained in his unpublished memoirs.272 Yet, in a rare divergence of opinion on foreign 
policy, his masters do not appear to have agreed with him on this issue.273 Savage had called 
for a world conference twice at the Imperial Conference of 1937, and returned to the charge 
in March 1939, maintaining `His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have always 
desired the holding of an international conference in the widest sphere and with the widest 
possible agenda.'274 It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that if they had supported one 
in 1937, and `always' had done so in March 1939, that they would also have broadly 
supported one as envisaged by Hertzog in the autumn of 1938. That they themselves did not 
propose one at this point was probably more down to the exigencies of the New Zealand 
general election, than any temporary conversion to Berendsen's position. Of the heads of 
government, Mackenzie King alone seems to have agreed with Berendsen, preferring the 
direct approach of face -to -face meetings, as he noted in his diary.275 
Overview 
The Statute of Westminster had left dominion status open to interpretation. On the one hand 
they appeared to be sovereign, independent states, but they were presided over by a single 
crown, whose divisibility had never been authoritatively addressed. This anomalous state of 
affairs allowed London and the dominion elites to place their own individual interpretations 
on their constitutional status, each according to their own inclinations. This theoretical limbo 
could only persist, however, so long as no circumstances arose which would require a 
definitive stance to be adopted. Another world conflict would expose any irreconcilable 
differences in understanding and force the Commonwealth to assume unambiguous positions 
on the issue. 
In the meantime ambiguity suited all parties. An undefined theoretical position allowed all 
parties to assert their own preferred stance as the correct one, without having to reconcile the 
incompatible aspects of their individual viewpoints. Different positions therefore did not 
arise out of diverse interpretations of dominion legal status: these disparate appreciations 
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arose out of divergent views of the political and economic imperatives facing the dominions. 
Hertzog, via Pirow, Bodenstein and Havenga, and with the acquiescence of Smuts, sought to 
`fuse' English and Afrikaner elements into a single South African identity. External affairs 
contributed to this scheme by providing an opportunity to create a Union perspective distinct 
from that of the Empire. Hertzog was aware that attempts to drive this forward without due 
consideration carried grave risks, but his inherent inability to empathise with his English 
fellow -citizens greatly complicated matters. His personal inclinations led him to conceal his 
true position behind the ploy that Parliament would decide, rather than risk failure by 
seeking to convert his English followers to his view. Superficially similar, but actually quite 
different, Mackenzie King likewise used the formula of Parliament deciding to conceal his 
real intent. However, the unity he sought was less all- embracing than Hertzog's "Fusion ", 
but that is not the fundamental difference between them. Like Hertzog, he lacked empathy 
with his minority, but he sought to placate rather than cajole them, and engage with them to 
win them for participation, rather than to expect their unsolicited obedience for neutrality. 
Lurking in the background, his fantasies of saving the world through his connections, both 
living and dead, were, at the very least, in creative tension with the more practical aspects of 
his policy. New Zealand's `moral foreign policy' was overturned by the new realities arising 
out of Munich, but its viability in the face of the need for Chamberlain's goodwill to solve 
their financial difficulties, and the distractions offered by internal dissent and the 
introduction of social security, was in any case highly questionable. Bereft of alternatives, 
the triumvirate would have to follow Britain more closely than previously. As with other 
aspects of policy, the leadership issue undermined attempts to develop an agreed stance on 
external affairs in Australia. Nonetheless, an emerging consensus can be discerned. All 
except Hughes expressed varying degrees of support for appeasement, and if any alternatives 
to participation in the event of its failure attracted support, evidence of this has yet to 
emerge. 
The dominions had more than the uniqueness of their perspectives in common. All were 
dependent to a greater or lesser extent on access to British markets, even if this situation was 
complicated by trade with other nations. All contained elements who saw no contradiction in 
allegiance to the Empire and allegiance to their own country. All relied on Britain and its 
navy for their security. Canada, Australia and New Zealand feared that their relatively low 
population densities would attract the attention of more crowded aggressors. South Africa 
instead feared its internal non -European majority, rather than an external enemy. Australia, 
New Zealand and South Africa would also require British support to retain their former 
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German colonies if Hitler decided to move on these, while Canada needed the British 
connection to keep the United States at arm's length. None of them particularly liked the 
Versailles Settlement, but in the circumstances of October '38, had yet to come up with a 
plausible and mutually acceptable strategy for resolving outstanding grievances and 
eliminating international tensions. If the ambiguous nature of dominion status permitted a 
burgeoning independence as expressed through their diverging perspectives, then these 
common factors served to counter this development, by reinforcing dominion dependence on 
Britain. 
Christie was, however, wrong in his assessment mentioned at the start of this chapter: the 
dominions were not "part-sovereign"; the ambiguities of the situation left them as 
theoretically sovereign as they chose to be. That this theoretical sovereignty was restricted 
by the practical political and economic realities of their situation was neither particularly 
new nor particularly unique. Both Britain and France found their sovereignty impaired by 
external factors at this time: Britain, through its strategic interest in French integrity, found 
its fate bound up with Czechoslovakia, a country it had scrupulously avoided entering into 
any engagements with; while France, through its requirement for British support, found its 
ability to honour a commitment it had solemnly entered into constrained by British 
reluctance to confront Germany. The dominions apparently had yet to learn that legal form 
did not necessarily translate into political substance. They were far more constrained by the 
concrete imperatives of their position than their ambiguous rights and obligations as 
members of the Commonwealth. 
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2: PRAGMATISM PREVAILS: 
THE DOMINIONS AND THE `SPIRIT OF MUNICH' 
The Sudeten Crisis had forced the dominions to confront the imminence of war. None of 
them had welcomed this prospect. As tension rose between Berlin and Prague following the 
Anschluss of Austria on 13 March 1938, South Africa had indicated that they would not join 
in any war breaking out over Czechoslovakia, but, as non -participation would threaten their 
domestic harmony, they had also encouraged the British to seek a solution that would avoid 
hostilities.' The Australians had also been reluctant to support the Czechs but did not go as 
far as committing themselves to neutrality, as Te Water advised his government.2 Despite the 
best efforts of Billy Hughes, Canberra had likewise argued in favour of pushing Prague into 
ever greater concessions in the search for a diplomatic solution.3 All the dominions had 
welcomed Chamberlain's efforts to seek a negotiated solution by meeting Hitler at 
Berchtesgaden on 15 September.4 When their second meeting at Bad Godesberg, the 
following week, had seemed likely to lead to the abandonment of appeasement, Bruce and 
Te Water had orchestrated a campaign to both pressure and support Chamberlain in the 
continuation of his efforts, which the British Prime Minister had used to help persuade his 
cabinet to acquiesce in his perseverance with the policy.5 Massey had encouraged this 
endeavoúr, but had remained in the background because of the sensitivity of his position, as 
outlined in the preceding chapter.6 Back home in Ottawa, Mackenzie King, had recorded in 
his diary his support for both Chamberlain and, in the event of war, Britain, but did not make 
the former information public until 27 September and kept the latter sentiment strictly to his 
cabinet and himself.' The New Zealand government was in the midst of a general election 
and Jordan had also been away in Geneva on League of Nations' business until 27 
September, so they had contributed comparatively little to dominion discussions with 
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' See, for instance, King, Diary, 31 August 1938, 23 September 1938 & 27 September 1938 
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London.8 Like the others, however, they had congratulated Chamberlain on the outcome of 
the Munich conference.9 
The settlement reached there had removed the imminent prospect of war. It seemed that 
Europe's grievances could be solved through the `wise statesmanship' of the great powers, 
after all, leading to a revival in confidence. This `spirit of Munich' allowed optimists to look 
forward to an enduring new era of peace.10 In his 1999 article on the dominions and Munich, 
M.G. Fry implied the dominions had succumbed to this spirit, concluding the settlement had 
led, `however briefly', to a continuation of their delusions about Hitler and the efficacy of 
appeasement." Going forward, dominion attitudes to international relations would be shaped 
by their perception of this agreement, both as a resolution of the crisis itself, and its success 
in restoring the prospects for long -term peace. The extent to which they yielded to this spirit 
therefore matters. Their commitment to it can be assessed by reference to a number of 
matters. Such a `spirit' was not compatible with the sense of shame which rapidly replaced 
relief at the avoidance of war for many contemporaries.12 The settlement could not be 
viewed as both the triumph of reason over irrationality which had not happened in 1914, and 
the shameful abandonment of a small, friendly country, at one and the same time. The 
idealism implicit in the term `spirit' also seemed to suggest that the beneficiaries of the 
Czechs' forbearance should now, in their turn, recompense the latter by assisting them in 
their hour of need. In addition, the expected improvement in international tension would 
seem to reduce the need for defence expenditure on the part of governments everywhere. 
Finally, this spirit seemed to indicate that those who held disputed territories should be 
prepared to renounce these in the interests of world peace, just as the Czechs had so nobly 
done. It is therefore worth examining the behaviour of the dominion governments in relation 
to these issues to assess how far they had indeed succumbed to this `spirit of Munich.' 
8 See previous chapter and below as well as TNA, DO/114/94, Czechoslovakia: Memoranda, 
Correspondence and Records of Meeting, March -October 1938, p. 3. 
9lbid., pp. 54 -5. 
1° Charles Te Water, the South African High Commissioner was particularly fond of the phrase, see, 
for instance, NASA, Te Water Papers (A78), Vol.13 /Correspondence /C. Te Water to J. B. M. 
Hertzog, 22 November 1938. 
11 TNA, DO/114/94, Czechoslovakia: Memoranda, Correspondence and Records of Meeting, March - 
October 1938, p. 3 
12 See, for instance, Ian, Kershaw, Hitler: 1936 -1945 Nemesis, p. 91. 
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The dominions and the notion of shame 
While Donald Cameron Watt uses an anecdote about his then headmaster to demonstrate 
Chamberlain's hold over Britain at the time, it can also be used to demonstrate a certain 
amount of disquiet with what had transpired. Watt wrote: `People would tell us, he [Watt's 
headmaster] said, that what Mr. Chamberlain had done was dishonourable and wrong. We 
were not to believe them. He had been sent by God to preserve the peace of the world.'13 By 
dignifying the idea that Munich was `dishonourable and wrong' with a response, the 
headmaster implicitly accords it a certain amount of credibility, and suggests that he was not 
altogether comfortable with what had happened. The dominion governments proved resistant 
to any idea of shame, however. New Zealand came closest, but private outrage, coupled with 
public reticence was the order of the day. Berendsen indicated in 1978 that their private 
reaction had been one of fury, tempered by relief at the avoidance of conflict.14 His analysis, 
though, came at a time when association with appeasement had strong negative overtones, 
and this may have coloured the relative emphases he placed on relief at, and hostility to, the 
agreement. Certainly at the time the Dominions Office chose to interpret the New Zealand 
attitude as generally supportive, if comparatively silent, on the crisis and its resolution, 
noting that an official telegram had been received from Wellington `expressing their 
thankfulness that war had been averted and their hopes that the Munich Agreement might 
lead to a lasting peace.''' 
As previously mentioned, New Zealand contributed relatively little to discussions during 
the crisis. Jordan spent from 12 to 27 September in Geneva as President of the Council of the 
League of Nations, and his deputy, Sandford, seems to have had little to say in his absence, 
beyond agreeing that in the event of an emergency, his chief would be able to return to 
London for consultation.16 As seen in the preceding chapter, Jordan was a notoriously 
difficult individual who guarded the prerogatives of his position jealously, so in the absence 
of definite instructions from his government, Sandford's reticence is perfectly 
understandable.17 Wellington was preoccupied at the time with the general election that 
would take place on 15 October 1938 and, in any case, was reluctant to offer guidance to 
13 Watt, How War Came, p. 76 
14 NLNZ, Bassett Papers /2000- 094 /13 /Interview with Sir Carl Berendsen, January 1978, p. 8 
15 TNA, DO/ 114/94, p. 5 
16 TNA, DO/114/94, pp. 3 & 22 
17 See previous chapter. 
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those more closely involved, as Joe Savage indicated to Lord Galway, the Governor -General, 
over the contemporary British proposal to revise the League of Nations' Covenant.18 
As regards New Zealand being supportive, the Dominions Office cited statements from 
Savage and Peter Fraser on the 15t1i and 28`' September respectively which, however, were 
relatively anodyne and were in any case delivered before the actual terms of the Munich 
Settlement had been agreed.19 Jordan advised his government against sending a 
congratulatory telegram to Chamberlain on his success in brokering peace, as the High 
Commissioner considered this would be used for party political purposes, but his cable 
arrived too late to prevent this happening.20 Thereafter (whether out of objection to the terms 
of Munich, solidarity with their fellow socialists in the British Opposition, or because `Party 
Capital' could be made elsewhere than London, and New Zealand ministers had a general 
election at home to take into account), there was a marked cooling in the Savage 
government's comments on Munich.21 Peter Fraser, for instance, rather than praising the 
settlement itself, confined himself to remarking on 2 October that `all were grateful to Mr. 
Chamberlain for saving the world from worldwide bloodshed.'72 This had the merit of 
sounding positive, but fell somewhat short of endorsing the actual conditions agreed, which 
development was noted and criticised in the press.23 There was, however, no actual public 
criticism of Munich by the government at the time and disapproval can only be inferred from 
the absence of any concrete endorsement of its terms. 
In Canada, there was no suggestion of Munich being in any way dishonourable. Not only 
did Mackenzie King wax lyrical in his diary about Munich being `the completion of the 
effort for which so many millions gave their lives in the Great War', he changed the names 
of the statues of Victory and Liberty for the still incomplete Canadian War Memorial to 
Peace and Freedom (as the latter were, in his view, `finer concepts'), and arranged to have 
them placed in the Memorial Arch on the same date as the agreement `for symbolic 
reasons.'24 It was not just his ability to tie himself in verbal knots, however, that convinced 
MacKenzie King that Munich was an honourable arrangement that would usher in a new age 
18 NANZ, EA/1 /114/1/11 /Part 3, Savage to Galway, 10 September 1938 
19 TNA, DO/35/114/94, pp. 3 - 4 
20 NANZ, PM/16 /1/ Pre -1939 Savage, Fraser and Jordan Correspondence /Jordan to Savage ]October 
1938 
21 
See, for instance, National Party advert in The Evening Post, 5October 1938, p. 5; NANZ, 
PM/16 /1/ Pre -1939 Savage, Fraser and Jordan Correspondence /Jordan to Savage I October 1938 
22 
P. Fraser, as cited in The Evening Post, 3 October 1938, p. 10 
23 
D. M. Fell, as cited in The New Zealand Herald, 5 October 1938, Letters to the Editor, p. 17 
24 King, Diary, 29 September 1938, 30 September 1938 & 4October 1938. 
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of peace, his personal vanity played a part as well. Reviewing his correspondence with 
Chamberlain, he allowed himself to believe, as he put it in his diary, that he had seen `the 
whole problem in its true perspective from the start.'25 He felt his letters had been `truly 
remarkable and prophetic.' He only lamented that the British had not joined him in 
contacting Hitler earlier, which he was sure would have prevented the unpalatably aggressive 
aspects of the Anschluss and the Sudeten Crisis. He then proceeded to go on holiday, with 
his chief official, Skelton, and if his diary indicates he turned somewhat against the Nazis 
(but not Hitler, who he continued to view as redeemable), it appears that this was due more 
to the book he was reading than anything to do with Munich.26 Certainly, after his return he 
confided in his private record on 23 November 1938 his abiding belief that `Chamberlain 
had saved the day.'27 
The South African elite likewise gave no indication of any sense of shame over 
Czechoslovakia's treatment. As has previously been seen, Hertzog had already expressed a 
complete lack of interest in the fate of the Czechs and other Eastern European peoples and 
there is nothing to suggest that Munich had done anything to change his mind.28 On the 
contrary, in a letter dated 10 October 1938 to Chamberlain on the international situation, he 
avoided mentioning the Czechs at al1.29 It might be thought that this is evidence of a certain 
discomfort over their treatment, but the tone of the letter, in sharp contrast to the 
defensiveness of Watt's headmaster, was sufficiently bullish to suggest otherwise. Not only 
did he praise Chamberlain's efforts in achieving agreement at Munich, he also urged the 
latter to continue in this vein in an effort to achieve a general settlement, thereby cementing 
world peace and, implicitly, South African domestic harmony. Pirow likewise relegated the 
Czechs to an off -stage presence, meriting no attention in his 1958 biography of his Prime 
Minister. As previously mentioned, he described the latter's eastern European thinking as 
being characterised by `a conception of a resurrected Germany as a bulwark against 
Russia.'30 Pirow clearly approved of this stance, going on to describe the consequences of 
the West's rejection of this policy with the remark: `today, we are in a position to judge the 
result the destruction of Germany for the world and that of Fusion for South Africa. In other 
25Ibid., 7October 1938 
26 ¡bid, 8 October 1938; See, for instance, Ibid, 26 January 1939, 29 January 1939 and 1 February 
1939; Eva Lips, Savage Symphony : A Personal Record Of The Third Reich, tr. Caroline Newton, 
(Random House, 1938) as cited in King, Diary, 19 October 1938 
27 King, Diary, 23 November 1938 
28 See previous chapter. 
29 NASA, Hertzog Papers(A32), Vo1.48 /Correspondence /J. B. M. Hertzog to N. Chamberlain 10 
October 1938 
so Pirow, Hertzog, p. 222 
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words history has proved on the 4'h of September 1939 Hertzog was right.'31 Clearly, he was 
addressing here the circumstances of the Cold War under which he was writing, rather than 
those of the 1930s. Nonetheless, the 1950s was when the `Guilty Men' thesis held sway, so it 
is telling that he made no attempt to distance Hertzog from the policy of appeasement, but 
instead sought to repackage it in a form palatable for a contemporary audience. Pirow clearly 
saw no reason to condemn appeasement then, and if he felt that way in 1958, it is unlikely he 
would have felt differently in 1938. Likewise Smuts does not seem to have felt the 
settlement to be in any way dishonourable at the time. He certainly felt sorry for the Czechs, 
but, as he indicated in a private letter to Margaret Gillett, on 1 October 1938, for him also, 
`world peace rank(s) above all territorial issues.'32 There was only regret here, no sense of 
guilt, as he concluded in a letter to her ten days later: `I do not think a world war was 
justified over Czechoslovakia.'33 
In a speech to the Chamber of Manufacturers on 3 October, Bob Menzies indicated that the 
Australian Government was united in its appreciation of Chamberlain, not just because he 
had preserved world peace, but because he had left British honour `unsullied.'34 It would 
hardly have done for a member of the Australian administration to have publicly criticised 
the British Prime Minister, but Menzies could have confined himself to an expression of 
gratitude for the avoidance of war, without any mention of honour (as Peter Fraser had done 
in New Zealand the previous day), had he disapproved of what had transpired. Menzies, 
however, was extremely unlikely to do this, as he had been a vigorous advocate of 
pressurising the Czechs to make concessions: a stance he now attributed to the whole 
government.35 Whether it was as united as Menzies made out is rather more open to 
question: Page certainly mouthed the customary platitudes, describing it as `a satisfactory 
compromise between widely conflicting points of view' (again, it would have been unlikely 
for him to do otherwise, as he had already argued for cession of the Sudetenland in the 
interests of Australian trade), but Billy Hughes, who could scarcely be expected to go along 
willingly with something as non -confrontational as appeasement, was ominously silent on 
the matter of honour, confining himself to ominous prognostications on the temporary nature 
31 Ibid., p. 248 
32 NASA, Smuts Papers (A 1), Vo1.243 /Smuts to M.C. 
33 NASA, Smuts Papers(A1), Vol.243 /Smuts to M.C. 
34 The Argus, (Melbourne) 4 October 1938, p. 12. 
35 
See for instance, NLA, Menzies Papers (MS4936), 
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of the relief from the `dark clouds' threatening peace.36 Lyons himself publicly expressed 
profound satisfaction with the agreement and hoped that it would lead on to a general 
settlement that would peacefully resolve all outstanding problems, before `going gaily off to 
golf' and then a three week break from politics.37 The strain of the previous weeks seemed 
to have brought him close to the edge, although there is no hint of this in the press coverage. 
It is therefore doubtful that he fully appreciated the terms of the agreement when making his 
comments. Given his pacifist inclinations and his previous urging for Chamberlain to go the 
extra mile, however, it is difficult to believe he would not approve of what had transpired. 
Shame could also be rationalised away. Many depicted Czechoslovakia as Christ crucified 
in the wake of Munich, echoing the words used by the Czechs to signify their capitulation: 
correspondents to the editors of the Argus and the Advertiser in Australia, for instance, 
considered `Czechoslovakia's Crown of Thorns signifies the worthiness of the crowned'; and 
referred to `the Czechs willingness to be crucified.'38 The accusations of bad faith, the doubts 
as to the probity of keeping Germans Czech, the horror at fighting over how, not if or which, 
German areas should be integrated into Germany, were all forgotten in a sanctimonious 
eulogising of the Czechs and their noble sacrifice. The imagery was telling: Christ was the 
saviour, not the victim, of Christendom. No mention was made of Pilate. Depicting the 
Czechs in this way therefore created a guilt -free version of events: they had nobly sacrificed 
themselves to save the peace of the world, not been abandoned by others. Unsurprisingly, 
dissenting voices, such as the Sydney Morning Herald and The Press in New Zealand did not 
pursue this imagery: instead remarking sourly that: `not all the heartfelt rejoicings over the 
avoidance of war will be able to banish a sense of resentment and misgiving' and "the 
manner in which the settlement has been made is as repugnant as some of its terms.'39 Such 
limited criticisms, however, were lonely protests amidst a widespread consensus of euphoria 
at the averting of hostilities. Some, of course hedged their bets: The Advertiser warned of the 
future prospects for peace that `Germany's past campaigns of abuse and hatred against the 
democracies do not encourage the wildest optimism', before noting that these were avowedly 
36 Page, as cited in The Herald, (Melbourne), 5 October 1938, p. 3; Page, as cited in TNA, 
DO/35/554/82/69, Note of Meeting between Dominions Office, Lord Halifax, the Dominion High 
Commissioners and visiting Australian Ministers, 25 May 1938, p. 14; W. M. Hughes, as cited in The 
Advertiser, (Adelaide), 6 October 1938, p. 11. 
37 
The Daily Telegraph, (Sydney) lOctober 1938, p. 2; The Argus, (Melbourne) 4October 1938, p. 3 
38 A. W. Martin,., assisted by Hardy P. , Robert Menzies: A Life, Vol.', 1894 - 1943, (Melbourne, 
1993), p. 237; J. J. W. Caulfield. as cited in The Argus, (Melbourne), 5 October 1938, Letters to the 
Editor, p. 4; K. R., Lang, as cited in The Advertiser, (Adelaide), 13 October 1938, Letters to the 
Editor, p. 22. 
39 Sydney Morning Herald, 1 October 1938, p. 10; The Press, 1 October 1938, p. 16. 
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tactics to obtain ends in Europe which were now declared accomplished, and that `if that is 
so', then `it is a wonderful prospect to dwell upon with hope.'4° 
Munich 's legacy of obligation 
The image of noble sacrifice did raise problems of its own. If the Czechs had saved world 
peace through their renunciation of the Sudetenland , was the world not under a 
commensurate obligation to do something for the Czechs? Such was indeed acknowledged: 
the New Zealand Herald considered the guaranteeing of the new Czech frontiers a `vital' 
aspect of the Munich Agreement, an aspect which The Press of Christchurch argued 
rendered it necessary for Britain to take the lead in the economic reconstruction of 
Czechoslovakia.41 In South Africa, General Smuts grudgingly conceded `I dare say some 
such quid pro quo [the guarantee] was demanded by France and the occasion.'42 In Australia, 
Lyons believed `public opinion will require adequate assurances for the future of 
Czechoslovakia', while, in Canada, Mackenzie King considered `that they should be dealt 
with very chivalrously and generously by other nations.'43 Clearly by `other nations', 
Mackenzie King meant nations other than the Czechs, but a cynic might argue that this 
actually turned out to mean nations other than Canada. Certainly an obligation spread so 
widely would fall so lightly on each as to be indistinguishable from nothing, and nothing was 
very close to what the dominions actually delivered, for all the rhetoric that was outpoured. 
Munich had left the Czechs with three outstanding needs: security, finance, and a permanent 
home for those displaced by the German annexation of the Sudetenland . London had already 
conceded, in a meeting with the High Commissioners on 19 September 1938, that the 
proposed British guarantee of the rump of Czechoslovakia, like Locarno, placed no 
obligation on the dominions, and the minutes record that obligingly `none of the dominion 
representatives expressed any criticism.'44 Only Australia's Bruce spoke in favour of the 
dominions joining in the guarantee and Te Water made it clear South Africa would not 
countenance such a move.45 MacDonald recognised the impossibility of Bruce's proposal (as 
40 The Advertiser, (Adelaide) 1 October 1938, p. 22. 
41 New Zealand Herald, (Auckland), 3 October 1938, p. 10; The Press, (Christchurch), 5 October 
1938, p. 10. 
42 NASA, Smuts Papers(A1), Vo1.243/J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett 1 October 1938. 
43 TNA, DO/114/94, Lyons to Chamberlain, 26 September 1938; King, Diary, 126/746 - 7, Entry 30 
September 1938. 




did Bruce) but tried to get Lyons via Bruce to express Australia's `warm approval' of British 
actions.46 Whether Lyons proved amenable or not is not clear, as he cancelled the statement 
he had been due to make in the House on international relations on the 20`h September on the 
grounds `that a premature statement or even a loose word, might well imperil the peace of 
the world.'47 The Cabinet minutes of the same date merely refer to a `general discussion' of 
the situation in Europe without reference to any decision being taken.48 The one dominion 
which had appeared most supportive of the British stance in private, therefore could not be 
brought (for whatever reason) to endorse (let alone subscribe to) it in public. 
The problem for the dominions was that this theoretical lack of obligation was largely 
cosmetic. The guarantee appeared to oblige Britain to go to war to defend the integrity of the 
remainder of Czechoslovakia. Such a war would mean the end of the Fusion regime in South 
Africa. General Hertzog, as has been seen, did not see any South African interest in such a 
war and was determined to keep his country neutral in those circumstances.49 The guarantee, 
therefore, could only be reconciled with his interests in as much as it was necessary to avoid 
a conflict now, albeit at the expense of a possible war later. His colleague, Smuts, also did 
not like the guarantee, describing it in a private letter to Margaret Gillett as `a very risky 
departure,' although wondering (correctly) whether anything would come of it, albeit as a 
consequence of Poland and Hungary's imminent depredations, rather than a renewal of 
Germany's appetite six months down the line.50 Obligations in Eastern Europe also left 
Britain less able to fulfil the Singapore strategy on which Australian security depended. They 
further raised the spectre of a confrontation with Italy (through the latter's German 
connection), to which Canberra remained fundamentally opposed (as the Italian navy and 
empire lay firmly astride Australia's communications with the mother country, and also 
promised to divert British naval priorities from Singapore to the Mediterranean).51 Again the 
guarantee was not in Australian interests (as identified by the principal participants) except 
in so far as it contributed to the avoidance of confrontation now, even at the increased risk of 
a possible hostilities later. Meanwhile, New Zealand may not have liked appeasement, but, 
this did not mean that they welcomed war. Berendsen recalled long afterwards `I shared the 
government's anger over Munich, but we were also very relieved that there was some hope 
46 TNA, DO/35/114/94 Note of Meeting between MacDonald & Bruce 19 September 1938. 
47 J. A. Lyons, as cited in Sydney Morning Herald, 22 September 1938, p. 12. 
48 NAA, A2694 /Vol. 18 /Part 5 /Minutes, 20 September 1938. 
49 See previous chapter. 
50 NASA, Smuts Papers(A1), 243 /Smuts to M.C. Gillett 1 October 1938; NASA, Smuts Papers(AI), 
243 /Smuts to M.C. Gillett 11 October 1938. 
51 See previous chapter. 
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that war would be avoided after all.'52 The triumvirates' instinctive anti -war inclinations 
practically ensured this would be their view. There was also a pragmatic reason for being 
relieved. The failure of collective security left them as reliant on the Singapore strategy as 
Australia, even though they were less concerned about antagonising Italy. This new 
guarantee would therefore leave them as exposed as their neighbours. Only Canada benefited 
and then only cosmetically. The avoidance of technical obligations meant Mackenzie King 
could still maintain the polite fiction that Parliament would decide on Canada's neutrality or 
otherwise in the event of war. This did not, however, change the fundamental realities. The 
Canadian leader had acknowledged his government would have fallen if he had not 
supported Britain in any war over the Sudetenland and that in any case, he would have 
resigned rather than remain neutral in such a situation.53 It is difficult to envisage under what 
circumstances the guarantee would be put into operation, where these two factors would not 
also apply, and therefore, in practical terms, the British had just extended Canadian 
obligations, but without consulting them or obtaining their consent. The guarantee did 
therefore adversely affect the dominions, but there was little they could do about it, as the 
British only informed the High Commissioners after the guarantee had been decided on.54 
The latters' general lack of enthusiasm for this measure, however, served to demonstrate that 
were distinct limits to the goodwill that the Czechs' anticipated `noble sacrifice' might be 
expected to generate. 
After Munich Czechoslovakia urgently needed fmancial support. The loss of economically 
important areas in the Sudetenland, together with the displacement of refugees from the 
Nazis placed an added burden on the rump Czech state. Certainly a plethora of popular 
appeals was inaugurated to raise funds for the Czechs, but, as E. M. Andrews points out, 
their success in Australia contrasted unfavourably with that of a purely local one for a war 
veterans' home.55 The dominion governments proved even less generous than the public. 
New Zealand's silence when the others pressed for the Czechs to be pushed into concessions 
meant that it was perhaps under less of a moral obligation to contribute than the others. In 
any case, its dire financial situation ruled out any such assistance.56 Australia also faced 
straitened financial circumstances. As early as 1937, Lyons had been fretting about National 
Insurance and defence and the tremendous burden they were likely to impose on the nation's 
52 NLNZ, Bassett Papers (MS2000 -094), 13, Interview with Sir Carl Berendsen, January 1978, p. 8. 
53 See previous chapter. 
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finances over the coming years, and correspondents were already urging him to drop the 
former in favour of the latter.57 South Africa's position was better (Havenga, the Minister of 
Finance, had to worry about the size of his surpluses, rather than deficits, when it came to 
preparing the budget), but it was not itself a fmancial centre, depending instead on the City 
of London to fund its industrial expansion.S8 Canada lay outside the Sterling area based on 
the City of London, but was equally not a centre of finance in the way the latter was. In any 
case, it does not appear to have occurred to Mackenzie King that `other nations' dealing 
`chivalrously and generously' with the Czechs might go so far as to involve Canada in 
actually incurring expenses on their behalf. The British and French therefore sought to 
remedy the Czech situation themselves by together providing a loan of approximately £16 
million.59 The dominions were neither asked, nor did they offer, to provide any assistance in 
connection with this. 
The refugees created not only a financial burden for the Czechs, but also a physical one as 
they would have to be permanently re- settled somewhere. These unfortunates were identified 
as belonging to two groups: ethnic Czechs unwanted by the Third Reich; and dissident 
Germans who might prove all too wanted. The Czechs soon dropped out of international 
consideration, as the Anglo- French loan was at least in part to be utilised to alleviate their 
plight.ó0 The Germans were a different matter. It was recognised that they would be 
unwelcome in Czechoslovakia: as a potential fifth column which might be used to destabilise 
it in future; as a source of anti -Nazi agitation which might aggravate future relations with the 
Reich; and as an exacerbation of the unemployment issue.61 It might also be thought that 
their membership of the nation which had just humiliated their host country would likewise 
render their position somewhat precarious. With the introduction of the Option Agreement 
between Berlin and Prague on 24 November 1938, this became even more so, as it stipulated 
that Sudeten Germans could not opt to become Czech citizens, meaning they were liable to 
be deported to the Reich, even if the Czechs had no immediate intentions of doing so.62 
Estimates varied as to their numbers. Jordan wrote of an army of 100,000 German 
Sudetenlanders who had been organised to resist Hitler in a report to Wellington, but this 
57 NAA, CP290/5/3 /Lyons to Page, 29/5/37; see, for instance, NLA/Lyons Papers 
(MS4851)/2/12 /Laverty, J. W., to Lyons, 27October 1938 
58 NASA, Hertzog Papers (A32) /VoL 123 /Cape Times, 2 August 1939. 
s9 NAA, A981/Ref/8 /Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Circular Telegram No. B.27, 27 January 
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60 LAC, RG25/Vo1.1871 /327 /3 /Blair, F. C. to Skelton, O. D. S., 9 December 1939; NAA, 
A981/4/Ref/8/Devonshire to Bruce, 1 November 1938 
61 NAA, A981 /4 /Ref/8 /Hood, J. D. L., to Hodgson, 14 October 1938 
62 NAA, A981/4 /Ref /8 /Devonshire to Bruce 
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was clearly a gross exaggeration and was not repeated.63 Official estimates initially 
suggested 15,000, but this was quickly revised to 3,000 - 3,500, amounting to some 1,500 
families.ó4 Of the urgent cases, Britain, due to pressure from the Czechs, agreed temporarily 
to take 350; France, 200; Norway, 500; Finland, 100; and Belgium, 300.65 
Here was something the dominions, with their wide, open spaces could be expected to help 
with and Bruce, Massey, Te Water and Jordan were duly asked by the Duke of Devonshire 
(Undersecretary of State at the Dominions Office) if there was anything their governments 
could do 66 Massey reported to Ottawa on 25 November 1938 that in response Te Water had 
emphasised his government had already done a great deal in receiving refugees 
and stated that special consideration to the above German Social Democrats 
could only be given on the ground that they constituted an immediate and urgent 
problem to solve which special action would be necessary.67 
At first glance, this appears quite positive, seeming to suggest that the Union was prepared 
to give `special consideration' to the Sudeten German refugees as part of a `special action' to 
resolve this `immediate and urgent problem.' Actually all Te Water had indicated was that 
treating the Sudeten Germans as a special case could only be justified if it was held that these 
were exceptional circumstances requiring extraordinary measures. As the `great deal' that 
the Union had previously done for refugees included being the only dominion to send an 
observer rather than a delegate to the Evian Conference (which had met at the instigation of 
Roosevelt to try to co- ordinate an international response to the ever -increasing number of 
Jews fleeing persecution in Germany), the chances of Pretoria treating the situation as one 
requiring exceptional action on their part were not good. There in fact appeared to be no 
appetite to regard the situation as `immediate and urgent' requiring `special action' or 
`special consideration.' When a group of Sudeten Jewish families tried to apply as a group 
to enter the Union, for instance, they were told that they must apply individually, that each 
case would be treated on its merits, and no indication was given in the internal 
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correspondence between departments in Pretoria that any attempt would be made to note, let 
alone take account of the special circumstances of the Sudeten case.68 
The other dominions at least appeared interested in the refugees, but seemed more concerned 
with what the latter could bring to their adoptive country than in their plight. In New 
Zealand, Walter Nash was provided with a suggestion by his private secretary (the 
economist, Dr. W. B. Sutch) that the situation provided an ideal opportunity to acquire 
workers who would be of use in developing secondary industries.ó9 It is not clear whether the 
former agreed, but the government did decide to accept up to 207 `German Democrats' with 
skills in the building trade, of which there was then a shortage in New Zealand.70 In 
Australia, compassion was not a primary concern, as the minister responsible declared in the 
House: `it is not the intention of the government to issue permits for entry influenced by the 
necessity of individual cases.'71 Instead the government saw it as an opportunity to acquire 
`valuable citizens,' who could be absorbed in trades or occupations without detriment to 
Australian workers.72 Like Dr. Sutch in New Zealand, Australia was also interested in 
migrants who had either, or both, the capital and experience to establish new industries in the 
country.73 Additionally Lyons was concerned that communists be identified, together with an 
appreciation as to whether such an individual was likely to advocate the overthrow of the 
government and why the Soviets would not take them, which at least suggests he would have 
been prepared to accept some types of communist.74 Duncan (Acting High Commissioner, in 
Bruce's absence) collected assurances from Whitehall that the `Sudeten Aryan German 
Democrats' were `almost certainly' not communists and that the reason the Soviet Union 
was declining to accept any refugees was its paranoia about foreigners, particularly 
Germans.75 The Canadians were also open to admitting these refugees, explicitly 
acknowledging a debt to the Czechs, as King described in his diary (although only in the 
68 NASA, SAB /BNS /I /1 /386 /212 /74C /Jewish and Other Refugees/Political Secretary, South African 
High Commission, to UK Passport Control Office, Prague, 21 October 1938; NASA, 
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privacy of cabinet deliberations).76 In practice, however, they too seemed to be mainly 
interested in recruiting useful future citizens, rather than in alleviating their plight. Massey 
informed Devonshire that Canada was particularly interested in farm labourers and 
glassworkers.77 Crerar, the Canadian minister responsible for immigration was likewise 
interested in the glassworkers provided they could obtain sufficient capital to establish 
themselves.78 On learning that others were also expressing an interest in the glassworkers, 
Pearson of the High Commissioner's office in London wrote to Skelton urging that Ottawa 
move quickly to secure their services, as `there does seem to be a chance here of not only 
helping the refugees, but helping ourselves in the process.'79 The latter point appears to be 
the key one, as there is no suggestion of any urgent need for action in connection with the 
other Sudeten German refugees.80 While it transpired that only about fifty -three of the 
refugees were experienced glassworkers, a meeting with the Sudeten German leaders in 
Ottawa indicated that the other refugees included, as Blair advised Skelton, `highly skilled 
craftsmen in industries that are practically unknown in this country.'81 
The dominions were not only interested in acquiring valuable new citizens with as little cost 
to themselves as possible, they were also anxious to square the circle by being seen to 
contribute to the solution of the international refugee problem, while simultaneously not 
appearing to be `soft' on large -scale immigration lest this antagonise their electorates. As 
previously seen, even South Africa had been embarrassed into attending Evian, even if only 
in an `observer' capacity. When confronted with the issue in a letter from a member of the 
public, Walter Nash replied agreeing that New Zealand should `make a contribution at least 
as great, relatively to its capacity, as any other country' in absorbing refugees, while hedging 
this responsibility with qualifications in regard to housing, employment and `other practical 
considerations.'82 In an exchange with the St. Vincent de Paul Society in Ireland, Lyons was 
also keen to pass Australia's actions off as playing `her part amongst the nations of the 
world, in absorbing her reasonable quota of these people' without actually doing anything 
which in practice might jeopardise her domestic harmony, such as admitting those who 
might compete with Australian labour, reduce the capacity of the country to absorb those of 
76 King, Diary, 129/1032, Entry 21 December 1939. 
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8° Idem. 
81 LAC, RG25 /Vol.1871 /Evian/327 /2 /Massey to Mackenzie King, 11 November 1938; LAC, 
RG25/Vo1.1871/Evian/327 /3 /Blair to Skelton, 14 December 1939. 
82 NANZ, Nash/1311/Nash, W, to Belshaw, Dr. H., 27 March 1939. 
77 
British descent who might wish to migrate, or prove 'undesirable.'83 Meanwhile, the 
Canadian Department of External Affairs commissioned a report on what other countries 
were doing about the refugee problem (largely culled from press sources), suggesting that it 
wished to have a context in which to consider Canadian actions, presumably with a view as 
to how these would appear, both to international opinion as well as to the electorate.84 Yet, as 
Mackenzie King told Skelton, cabinet took the view that the public was likely to be strongly 
opposed to any large, sudden influx of people who might find difficulty in assimilating 
socially and economically, although there was some, but far from unanimous, support for 
doing something for the Sudeten refugees and `we have to keep our own position in mind.'85 
The various schemes advanced to resolve the issue therefore had to be capable of satisfying 
these inherently irreconcilable criteria and, unsurprisingly, proved largely disappointing in 
application. In New Zealand, Walter Nash arranged for the Secretary of the Labour Party to 
organise the reception of the 207 Sudeten German Democrat builders that the government 
had agreed to accept. His letter was dated 27 March 1939, however, and he was unable to 
provide any more definite information, suggesting that it may have been superseded by 
events.86 However, he assured Wilson that Jordan would write when `any party of Sudeten 
Germans leave England for New Zealand.'87 There is no indication that any ever did so. The 
final absurdity was the cabinet decision on the 16 of May 1939 to advise Sir Herbert 
Emerson, the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, that it had `no 
observations' to offer the (by then non -existent) Government of Czechoslovakia on the 
refugee problem.88 Lyons informed Duncan that Australia could perhaps take 500 refugees 
over the next twelve months, depending on the capacity of the voluntary organisations then 
being set up to look after their welfare on arrival.89 This was later changed to a figure of 
15,000 refugees from all sources (which would of course include the Sudeten Germans) over 
a period of three years, as Lyons advised the St. Vincent de Paul Society.90 The Prime 
Minister further emphasised to the Acting High Commissioner that such refugees could only 
be accepted to the extent that they could be absorbed in trades or occupations without 
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detriment to Australian workers and that each must make a normal application to migrate.91 
The High Commission's request to process applications in London was rejected, but it was 
conceded that applications could be forwarded by airmail to Canberra rather than surface 
mail. It was further conceded that the `Sudeten Aryan German Democrats' should clearly 
label their applications as such, but there is no indication that any record was kept of their 
relative success in obtaining permission to migrate. The only proposal for a large -scale 
settlement on file, for a colony of Sudeten Germans outside Perth, appears to have fallen foul 
of a combination of government ideological opposition to group settlements and apathy on 
the part of the state government involved.92 Canada originally envisaged transplanting the 
glass and porcelain worker refugees as `highly skilled manufacturing units' to develop these 
infant industries in their new homeland, as Blair explained to Skelton in December 1938.93 
This proposal appears to have been abandoned by the end of the month, however, 
presumably because even with the availability of financial capital, the absence of physical 
capital rendered the scheme impractical, and the authorities appear to have proceeded 
thereafter on the basis that all the refugees would be settled on the land.94 Although it was 
never intended the agricultural settlers should arrive before spring due to the requirements of 
the agricultural cycle, quibbling about finance lasted for most of the winter and it was not 
until this was resolved that arrangements for examining the applicants (which also took a 
substantial amount of time) came into consideration, so that the first group was not ready to 
sail until 8 April, by which time Hitler was already in Prague.95 The question of enquiring 
about the half of "their" refugees who had remained in Czechoslovakia was raised internally, 
but there is no indication that any such approach was made, which makes it very unlikely 
any of them ever made it to Canada.96 The remainder were settled in two colonies which 
seem to have eventually prospered after some initial difficulties.97 
Despite the rhetoric, overall the dominions cannot be said to have covered themselves in 
glory when it came to recognising and discharging obligations in respect of the Czechs. In 
spite of appearances the British guarantee did involve them, but it had been made over their 
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heads, and even if the unenthusiastic dominion representatives in London did not enjoy the 
full confidence of their masters back home, there is no evidence of any overwhelming 
enthusiasm for the arrangement there either. They may not have been in a position to finance 
the Czechs themselves, but they made no effort to enquire whether they could provide 
anything by way of assistance. Their treatment of the refugees was shabby, involving self - 
interested attempts to cherry-pick immigrants who would be of practical use to their 
dominion, while seeking to avoid any obligation in respect of the rest. The eventual delays in 
this process appear to have resulted in about half of the refugees falling into Hitler's hands 
with the march into Prague. The cynical interpretation of Mackenzie King's words, that 
when he called for the Czechs to be dealt with chivalrously and generously by other nations, 
he meant nations other than his own, could easily be extended to the other dominions as 
well. 
The dominions' sense of security after Munich 
It might therefore first appear that the Munich Agreement meant a reversion to business as 
usual as far as the dominions were concerned. This was actually far from being the case. In 
New Zealand, Berendsen acknowledged in a 14 October 1938 memorandum for the 
government that their `Moral Foreign Policy' was dead in the water, and, while 
circumstances might develop that would allow its eventual resurrection, for the moment they 
would have to bring their foreign policy more into line with that of Britain, despite their 
dislike of Munich.98 Their Organisation for National Security, galvanised by the crisis, 
continued its preparations apace. Indeed its secretary, Colonel Stevens, wrote to General 
Ismay in London that he had long maintained `that the only thing that would really produce 
results in National Defence in New Zealand would be a war scare - and now we have had our 
scare and duly produced our results.'99 Among other things that had been achieved, a War 
Book had been drafted and was then under revision; direct liaison with Australia had been 
initiated between Stevens and Shedden, the permanent head of the Australian Department of 
Defence, (with the blessing of their respective governments) continuing to work on the best 
method of accomplishing this; and a National Supply Committee had been established. 1°° 
The Chiefs of Staff also saw fit to prepare an up -to -date report on threats to New Zealand's 
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interests citing `disturbing,' but unspecified, evidence that Germany had planned to embark 
on a commerce raiding campaign in the Pacific, and noting `the increasingly threatening 
aspect of international affairs.' 101 The continuing nature of these preparations, and Stevens's 
implication that they were at long last receiving their due attention (in the form of a full -time 
assistant for himself and part-time assistance from the various departments of state), indicate 
that defence remained a priority, even though the immediate crisis had been peacefully 
resolved, and the Savage government scarcely lacked alternative concerns.1°2 
Savage had previously mooted the idea of a conference to discuss the strategic significance 
of the Pacific islands, but this had foundered on British and Australian inertia.103 Lyons now 
undertook in a letter to Savage to take this up `at once' with the Minister for Defence and to 
respond `as soon as practicable.i104 The Australians, however, do not appear to have 
regarded this as of particular importance, at least pending the British response, and no further 
action is recorded in the file beyond a note that the memorandum had been copied to the 
Department of Defence.105 It is of course true that nothing concrete could have been done 
about the conference itself until the British view was obtained, but a brief outline of 
Australia's position with regard to the Pacific islands would undoubtedly have been helpful, 
as well as courteous (particularly as New Zealand had already provided Canberra with an 
outline of Wellington's concerns).106 The lack of any further such response can therefore be 
taken as an indication of the low importance Canberra attached to the question at this stage. 
Even if unprepared to reach out across the Tasman at this point, Canberra was at least 
prepared to reach out to its own state governments. Page (as acting Prime Minister, in 
Lyons's absence) summoned a meeting of the Loans Council, which consisted of members 
of the Commonwealth (federal) and state governments, in order to try to co- ordinate 
defensive measures.107 Menzies appears to have expected Lyons to take no part in this and to 
have been most disconcerted to discover that the Prime Minister intended to lead the central 
government delegation at the conference.108 Lyons's attendance implies that he had 
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determined that it was important to take steps, or at least to be seen to take steps, on the 
defence question, however out of sympathy he might personally be with the measures to be 
undertaken. 
The conference minutes are even more revealing in regard to the elite's thinking in the wake 
of Munich.109 Lyons stated that `the sobering experiences of September have bitten deeply 
into Australian life, and there is an insistent call that Australia shall leave no stone unturned 
in respect of national security.' 11 ° No doubt this was mostly a tactical ploy designed to make 
it more difficult for the states to reject Canberra's proposals, but, it is still evidence of how 
the government were thinking at the time. There would be no point in such a tactic unless the 
government felt that the states were susceptible to such an approach. 
Canberra's proposals were likewise justified in terms of their contribution to defence. 
Firstly, Lyons acknowledged Canberra's sole responsibility for all matters of a purely 
defensive nature, and continued `we propose to accelerate our defence programme, the 
details of which we shall announce at an early date, but that need not concern us here.' He 
then went on to consider expenditure which contained both civil and defence aspects, 
expressing the hope that the states would be prepared to divert their loan- funded public 
works programmes into these areas and therefore away from projects which had no defensive 
value. To,this end, he proposed the establishment of a committee of Commonwealth 
(national) and state experts to prioritise the various projects proposed by Canberra and the 
states in terms of their defensive value for the consideration of the Loan Council at a 
subsequent meeting. This drawn out approach suggests that, although the government 
considered further defensive measures important in the wake of Munich, it did not as yet 
regard them as urgent (or at least was unsure of its ability to convince the states that they 
were urgent). Arguing that the country's population, development and wealth were integral 
to planning the successful defence of the country, the Prime Minister further advised that an 
advisory committee, comprising representatives of the central government, the states and 
industry, be established to consider all the issues involved, including `the vulnerability of 
industry.' 
Lyons's reference to `the insistent call' for improved national security worked, but only to 
the limited extent that it forced the states to pay lip- service to it. Stevens of New South 
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Wales assured Lyons that the states would `not shirk that obligation." Dunstan of Victoria 
acknowledged `the importance of national security and the Government of Victoria is 
prepared to co- operate with the Commonwealth Government in any national plan designed 
to improve Australia's defences.' Forgan -Smith of Queensland considered that it was `a 
request that no good citizen of the Commonwealth would respond to in the negative.' 12 Troy 
for Western Australia thought that his government would `co- operate on the committee 
which has been suggested. Indeed I cannot see how it could do otherwise, since the matters 
to be dealt with will be of such great importance to Australia.' 13 Ogilvie for Tasmania 
appreciated `the necessity for the co- ordination of Commonwealth and state activities in 
respect of national defence and development.' 14 Even Butler of South Australia, who 
appeared somewhat sceptical about the necessity for increased defence expenditure (having 
castigated its wastefulness and expressed the hope that appeasement would succeed so that 
`this huge expenditure may be avoided in the future'), was prepared to `accept your 
statement that the expenditure proposed by your government is necessary.' 15 
Lip -service having duly being paid at the shrine of national security, the states proceeded to 
raise their objections to Canberra's proposals. These were threefold: employment, sensitivity 
about existing projects, and sovereignty. Dunstan of Victoria noted `the need to absorb the 
greatest possible number of unemployed persons' and pointed out that Canberra's projects 
were unlikely to satisfy that requirement as they would require skilled workers whereas most 
of the unemployed were unskilled.16 Spooner for New South Wales likewise expressed 
concern over who would look after unskilled workers if his government agreed to reallocate 
funds to a project which would not require them.'' Troy made the absorption into the new 
projects of those employed on existing state projects a condition of Western Australia's co- 
operation.'" The states also disliked the implication that the works currently being 
undertaken had no defensive value, indicating that they too considered the issue of national 
security to be one of the utmost sensitivity at this juncture. Forgan -Smith, backed by 
Dunstan, argued that the current projects did have a defensive value as they were 
contributing to the development of the country and demanded that the wording of the 
resolution be changed to avoid any imputation that this was not the case. The states were 
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equally concerned about their sovereignty. Butler and Troy were insistent the committee 
should not prioritise proposed projects on their defensive value, but that the Loan Council 
itself should determine the order in which they be executed. Forgan -Smith likewise declared 
he could not accept the idea that the states should hand over authority over their public 
works projects to the Department of Defence, while continuing to finance such undertakings 
out of their own funds, and complained of Canberra's centralising tendencies over finance. 119 
He raised the example of a case where a state might decline to substitute one project for 
another on employment grounds, and voiced the concern that this could instantly be used 
against them to indicate that they were refusing to co- operate with Canberra on defence 
matters, in spite of having just agreed to do so.120 The states were therefore clearly more 
concerned with public opinion than security. They wished to depict themselves as co- 
operating with Canberra on defence, while actually preserving their distance and continuing 
to prioritise employment. Their resistance to moving towards defence related projects, 
coupled with their desire to avoid being perceived as resistant, suggests they saw the post - 
Munich international situation as continuing to be of concern to their voters, without actually 
providing a real, imminent threat requiring a decisive response. 
Each of the state delegations also brought their own agenda to the discussion. Stevens of 
New South Wales appeared to be making a bid to establish his credentials as a potential 
successor to Lyons: demonstrating the steps his state had already taken, speaking wherever 
possible on behalf of all the states, and not just his own; and taking the opportunity to muscle 
in on Canberra's territory by advancing an expansionist economic policy.121 Meanwhile, 
Victoria pointed out that it was working with a reduced allocation of loan funds, and that it 
was faced with increased responsibilities because of the drought affecting that state, which 
would impact on its ability to reallocate resources in the direction of projects with a 
defensive aspect to them.122 Queensland observed `its essential vulnerability' to attack, 
mandated an interest in defence, and argued that its northern inhabitants were as entitled to 
protection as `the more favoured parts of Australia.' 123 South Australia (in a clear bid to 
induce industrial investment in its territory), noted that it was said to be secure from assault, 
complained that voters in the non -industrial states had not profited from the location of 
industries in exposed places (by inference, in the industrial states), and that the former were 
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unhappy at now being required to contribute more in taxes to defend the latter from attack.124 
Western Australia (having previously tried to secede in 1933) feared its interests would be 
subordinated to those of the larger states, citing its previous experience on the Loan Council 
as precedent.125 Tasmania, represented by its Minister for Education, made a bid for 
increased funding for technical education, `which is vital from every point of view, including 
that of defence.' 126 This fractious promotion of their own interests indicates the state 
delegations saw no need to cooperate in the national interest at this time, which again 
suggests they did not yet take the external threat very seriously, except as a public relations 
issue. 
The conference eventually accepted a watered -down resolution on the first proposal that the 
states would divert expenditure into defence- related projects. Crucially the states had 
rejected the suggestion that the proposed committee of experts should prioritise potential 
projects on their defensive value and no mention of this was made in the resolution. By 
doing this, they were certainly reserving to themselves the right to decide how their loan 
funds should be spent, but, by implication, they were denying themselves expert insight into 
the relative defensive merits of each project, which was likely to reduce the quality of 
decisions made from a purely defence perspective. Quite evidently, the states did not 
consider themselves to be in any imminent danger, or they would have reacted differently. If, 
nevertheless, the governments were at least able to agree a diluted resolution on the defence 
proposal, the same could not be said of the one concerned with development. As with 
defence, the states vigorously objected to an advisory committee that would prioritise 
proposed projects. In this case, however, Canberra proved unwilling to accommodate their 
objection, and the matter was held over to the next meeting of the Loan Council. 127 
The conference therefore indicates that national security was a sensitive issue for the 
political elite in Australia in the wake of Munich, but not a serious or urgent one. Canberra's 
proposals indicate a belief that something needed to be done, or seen to be done, but the 
proposed timescale suggests that these steps were not designed to counter an imminent threat 
of any magnitude. Likewise the states did not wish to be seen to be uncooperative with the 
central government, which indicates that they also felt the issue to be electorally significant, 
but their objections over employment and sovereignty indicate where their priorities lay (and 
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where they presumed those of their voters lay, too). This suggests they equally did not regard 
the country's plight as pressing at this point. 
Yet, as Lyons had mentioned in his opening speech at the conference, Canberra also 
intended to take more direct action with regard to defence. Defence had first been discussed 
at Cabinet in the context of the crisis on the 13 September. The minutes suggest there had 
been a certain level of urgency to the discussion as it was decided that Thorby, the Minister 
of Defence, `should confer with the Defence Committee with a view to expediting works and 
organisation in case of emergency.' 128 Further discussions on the specifics of air defences 
appear in the minutes on the 19`", on Nauru (a former German colony, held under a League 
of Nations mandate in co- trusteeship with Britain and New Zealand, and important for its 
phosphate deposits, but largely indefensible because of its size and proximity to Japanese 
holdings) where the matter was referred to the Departments of Defence and External Affairs 
on the 27th, and on Home Defence arrangements on the 28111.129 With the crisis over and in 
Lyons's absence, Cabinet also agreed the acquisition of a squadron of seaplanes for 
`northern waters' was desirable at its meeting on 5 October.130 On the 13`h, Thorby publicly 
announced that, in addition to increases advised in April, the present strength of the militia 
would be roughly doubled, and that a report on the state of the armed forces would be 
produced for Cabinet by the end of the year.131 He did not mention that on the 11111 Cabinet 
had debated the thorny question of conscription, but that a decision had been deferred while 
he sought further information from the Military Board.132 Conscription was contentious for 
two reasons: it left the government open to demands that capital should be conscripted as 
well as men, a step which the financially orthodox Lyons Government was most unlikely to 
welcome; and, as with Joe Savage in New Zealand, it ran contrary to the Prime Minister's 
own deeply -rooted anti -war sentiments. Nonetheless, the Cabinet, albeit in Lyons's absence, 
clearly continued to view defence as a significant issue, even though the immediate crisis 
had passed. 
In South Africa, defence also remained a concern. The defences of Simonstown naval base 
(a British base whose landward security was a South African responsibility) were to be 
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upgraded, and coastal defences generally improved.133 The government had previously 
decided to send Pirow to London to discuss defence matters, and organisation for this 
continued unabated, in spite of Munich.'34 Pirow brought with him two experts from the 
Department of Defence, who remained in London to complete their task after he had 
departed for the Continent.135 Agreement was subsequently reached for the acquisition of 
additional military materials, some of which would be supplied by Britain and some of 
which would be produced by the South Africans themselves under licence.'36 All this did, 
nevertheless, presume an ongoing requirement for additional armaments. This contrasted 
sharply with the government's public stance that Munich had guaranteed peace for many 
years to come, for instance, as depicted by Hertzog in an appeal to voters for a by- election 
his government was facing.137 Given the sensitivity of the question of war for the United 
Party, it is scarcely surprising they took every opportunity to play down the likelihood of its 
occurrence. Still, it might be thought that, with the Neutrality Pact in his pocket, Hertzog 
could have afforded to let defence slide a little. Part of the reason he did not was 
undoubtedly because he wished to hold as strong a hand as possible over any negotiations 
that might develop on the colonial question generally, and on South West Africa in 
particular. As will be seen, though, negotiations over this were envisaged as taking place 
within a Commonwealth context (where the crucial question would be British, not South 
African strength), and only becoming direct between Germany and South Africa if British 
negotiators failed to deliver the desired result. Even in the latter case, South Africa would be 
entirely dependent on British backing, as, lacking a navy of its own, it would be completely 
reliant on the Royal Navy to counterbalance the Kriegsmarine.138 It therefore seems likely 
the government had other motives for its defence measures. Te Water was certainly 
pessimistic about the outlook, warning that even these steps might prove insufficient under 
current international conditions.139 The continued emphasis on defence therefore suggests 
that Hertzog was less sanguine than he appeared about the prospects of an outbreak of war in 
Europe. 
133 NASA, Te Water Papers (A78), Vol.13 /Correspondence /C. Te Water to J. B. M. Hertzog, 22 
November 1938. 
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NASA, Te Water Papers (A78), Vol.14 /Correspondence /J. B. M. Hertzog to N. Chamberlain 10 
October 1938. 
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Of all the dominions, only Canada appeared to be convinced of Munich's transformative 
powers. When the French Consul and his wife expressed concerns that Germany, having 
scented weakness, might return with greater demands, Mackenzie King dismissed these 
fears, recording his response in his diary, that `as the inwardness of the situation had been so 
completely disclosed that anything of this kind was not probable. That the crisis had passed 
and a new order of things would begin to come into being.' 14° This somewhat opaque 
statement suggests he believed that, through face -to -face contact, Munich had allowed the 
great powers to develop such a mutual understanding that future issues would be resolved 
without having to resort to confrontation. Indeed, he later recorded on 7 October that `had 
the British government intervened at the time I did, with Hitler, they might have settled the 
question of Austria and Czechoslovakia without any relation to force.' 141 Mackenzie King 
continued that there was therefore no need to go on with strengthening the country's 
defences, and so, Canada, alone of all the dominions, sought to backtrack on the military 
provisions it had made, reversing a decision to order additional planes from the U. S. A. 
under warrant from the Governor -General. Of his colleagues, only Lapointe had sufficient 
influence to change the Prime Minister's mind, but the former was just as glad of 
appeasement's apparent triumph and just as willing to believe in its efficacy, as the Prime 
Minister noted in his diary for 4 October.142 The rest appeared ready to acquiesce in what 
these two agreed on the subject. As previously seen, when Power, the Quebecker Minister of 
Pensions and National Health, had advised Mackenzie King to proceed with a pro- British 
broadcast during the September crisis, neither he nor his colleagues complained when the 
Prime Minster reversed this decision after Lapointe urged him to, for fear of how it would 
play in his province, despite Lapointe being in Geneva, and Power just back from Quebec.'43 
The Colonial Question 
Defence was not the only issue which confronted the dominions after Munich. The colonial 
question, which had been discussed at the 1937 Imperial Conference and been the subject of 
communication between Germany and Britain (on its own and South Africa's behalf) prior to 
14° King, Diary, 30 September 1938 
141 Ibid., 7 October 1938 
142 Ibid., 4 October 1938 
143 See Chapter One, above. 
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the Anschluss, was reopened in a 10 October letter from General Hertzog to Chamberlain. 144 
The origins of its revival seem to lie in a rather over -literal (given how reliable the statement 
itself proved to be) interpretation of Hitler's remark in his Sportspalast speech of 26 
September that he had `no further territorial demands to make of Europe', and that therefore 
his next move might be an attempt to regain Germany's former colonies.145 Canada was not 
concerned in this as it held no mandates over former German colonies. Theoretically New 
Zealand were prepared to consider a discussion of the return of Western Samoa, but only as 
part of a general settlement, and only subject to terms and conditions which would guarantee 
the welfare of the natives as they had made clear at the Imperial Conference in 1937.146 It 
was reported in a paper prepared for the Pacific Defence Conference held in April 1939 that 
the native population was strongly resistant to the idea of being returned to German rule.147 
This paper also cautioned that the territory might be converted into a base of operations 
which could subsequently be used against New Zealand trade in time of war so `any transfer 
from New Zealand control should therefore be strongly resisted.' 148 Given the racial attitudes 
of the Nazis (even pre- Kristallnacht), the reservations New Zealand had about the Nazi 
regime, and the apparent opposition of the natives to a restoration of German rule, the 
triumvirate were effectively maintaining a veto over the return of their mandate, without in 
any way appearing to be obstructive.149 
Never one to shy away from being, let alone appearing, obstructive, Billy Hughes reiterated 
for Australia in a radio broadcast that New Guinea was not for return, citing a number of 
reasons in support of this stance.150 Firstly he argued that the mandate was a trust, and that 
therefore any surrender of it would be dishonourable. This may have been a less than subtle 
dig at London, and it certainly seemed designed to make it more difficult for either London 
or Canberra to backslide on the issue. Unlike other occasions when his bellicosity earned 
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him a rebuke, this assertiveness seems to have provoked no adverse reaction from his 
colleagues, particularly Lyons (who must have come to regret that unlike other dominion 
Prime Ministers, he had not made External Affairs his own). Probably they agreed with 
Hughes's next point that having `a hostile power' so close `would be a pistol aimed at the 
heart of Australia.' Hughes's choice of words was also significant: Hertzog, for instance, 
would never have implied that Germany could be seen as seen as hostile, despite Pretoria's 
equal determination that neither South West Africa nor Tanganyika (which was not even a 
South African mandate) should be returned. Te Water, apparently relying on his ideological 
belief in racial solidarity, even thought that Germany's return would help counter Japan.'51 
Canberra certainly does not appear to have shared these views, or at least no public steps 
were taken to soften or dilute Hughes's message. The latter did not draw attention to it, but 
Germany and Japan's actual burgeoning friendship, rather than potential rivalry, probably 
weighed more with the Australians. A German New Guinea, backed by Japan, would have 
been much more dangerous than its isolated condition had permitted it to be during the First 
World War. It would also, in its turn, have enabled Japanese operations even further south 
than were currently possible, rendering such a return still less in Australian interests. 
Additionally, in his broadcast Hughes contrasted the benefits of Australian rule for the 
natives with the previous regime in his broadcast, noting that their population, which had 
been in decline, was now increasing.152 It is not particularly clear how this could have been 
known with any certainty, given the lack of European penetration of the interior at the time. 
However if self -respect, security and philanthropy were not enough, Hughes went on to draw 
attention to the territory's rich mineral resources, of which only gold had so far been 
developed. He carefully juxtaposed this with the losses in men, materials and currency which 
Australia had incurred during the war, noting that for this she had even been `denied such 
poor recompense as was provided by reparations.' He rhetorically demanded whether 
Australia did not therefore have a right to `peace and security', and vowed that she would do 
everything in her powers to assert this right. It was clearly an impressive performance. He 
had made it quite evident Australia would only surrender New Guinea if forced to do so, 
and, by going public, had made clear that any surrender would have come about only as the 
result of pressure applied from outside. Such pressure could only be applied if Britain either 
stood by or applied it herself, and the uncompromising tone of Hughes's stance indicated 
that any such betrayal would poison relations for years to come. Interestingly, this suggests 
151 NASA, SAB /BTS /1/4/4 /Memorandum of Meeting between C. Te Water & Count van Limburg 
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he did not altogether trust the British at this time, and that his colleagues either shared his 
mistrust or were at the least prepared to let him run with it. 
Tensions between the Union and German communities in South West Africa also seemed to 
take on a new significance in light of the Sudeten issue, and Hertzog, as noted above, 
reopened the idea of a negotiated solution of the colonial question with the British in a 
personal letter to Neville Chamberlain on the 10 October 1938.153 Under the impression that 
the latter intended to call a conference to resolve all outstanding international tensions, he 
advised the British Prime Minister that the South African Government was still prepared to 
offer Germany financial compensation in return for a permanent renunciation of any interest 
in South West Africa.154 There was, of course, no mention of returning South West Africa. 
He had previously indicated in a letter to Te Water on 2 March 1938, that South Africa 
recognised no German claims on the territory, except those arising out of being a party to the 
agreement which had established the system of mandates.' 55 This legalistic pedantry seems 
rather uncharacteristic for Hertzog, and can most likely be laid at "Body's" door, probably 
galvanised by the fear that if they did not acknowledge Germany's precise rights, this would 
somehow undermine the Union's own case. The Hertzog government had no intention of 
surrendering South Africa's mandate, they simply wished to make the German problem go 
away, and were in the fortunate position of being able (and prepared) to pay them to do so. 
In his letter to Chamberlain, the General also restated his preference that negotiations should 
take place in association with the British and should form part of a general settlement of the 
colonial question in the same letter. It is not hard to see why. South Africa on its own, 
lacking any semblance of a navy (as previously seen), was scarcely in a strong bargaining 
position. It was much better to allow the British to negotiate on its behalf, and, if it was done 
as part of a general settlement, this would wipe away all the festering grievances which had 
been racheting up international tension in one fell swoop. This would have the happy 
consequence of reducing to insignificance one of the major fault -lines dividing the Afrikaner 
and English wings of the United Party, thereby denying the Opposition one of its favourite 
avenues of attack.156 Therefore it can only have come as something of a disappointment to 
Hertzog when Chamberlain indicated such an initiative would have to wait for a more 
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opportune moment and that they must instead work towards creating the necessary 
favourable conditions for the proposal to succeed.157 
Hertzog viewed the stability of South West Africa as an important concern, however, and 
had already discussed with Te Water the idea of bilateral negotiations with the Germans if 
his preferred option of using the British did not deliver the desired results in his 2 March 
1938 letter.158 Pirow's visit to Europe provided an opportunity to use a trusted confidante to 
open negotiations. The General had already referred to Pirow's visit in connection with the 
colonial question in his letter to Chamberlain of 10 October: `Minister Pirow is going to the 
United Kingdom one of these days. He is fully conversant with our views and, should you 
wish to see him, he will probably be in a position to give you any information you may 
require.' 159 This trip expanded to encompass Berlin, Brussels, Burgos, Lisbon and Rome as 
well as his original destination of London.160 Te Water now indicated to Gie in a letter of 19 
October 1938, that Pirow's `talks here will be on somewhat wider lines than you have read 
about "161 The exact `width' of these lines has been the subject of much conjecture, then and 
since. Press speculation was so rife that the Belgian and Portuguese governments felt 
compelled officially to deny that they were prepared to surrender, in return for financial 
compensation, any of their colonial territories in place of the mandated territories.162 Pirow 
himself steadfastly denied any such intentions, but it is difficult to see what other reason he 
had, as his own explanations do not quite ring true. There is, for example, nothing to support 
his contention that the sole purpose of his political mission to Germany was to bring about 
an Anglo- German rapprochement. It therefore seems most likely the political aspect of his 
German visit had its origins in the colonial question, and it does not seem plausible that 
Pirow would have undertaken this without the belief that he could bring something new to 
the table. This in turn suggests he did indeed expect the Belgians and Portuguese to 
compensate Germany by giving up their colonies in Africa, and was roundly disillusioned of 
this presumption by Lisbon and Brussels. There is, however, no reason to believe 
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MacDonald's impression (as communicated to Stirling, who in turn passed it on to Canberra) 
that Pirow had offered to hand over South West Africa.' 63 It is possible Hitler might not have 
accepted such an offer had it been made, as it would have provided something of a hostage 
to fortune, but, Pirow would then have known Hitler was not interested in the territory. 
While he would still have failed to deliver a headline grabbing deal, he would, however, 
have been in a position to tell Hertzog that they need no longer concern themselves with the 
matter, which would have been a significant consolation prize. 
Overview 
As evidenced by Pirow's brazen actions, shame played no part in the dominions' actions. 
This did not mean, however, that they simply subscribed to `the spirit of Munich.' Their 
behaviour in the aftermath of the settlement was almost entirely driven by pragmatic 
considerations. Only New Zealand tried to distance itself from the agreement, the rest 
enthusiastically endorsed it, in public and in private. They were all only prepared to assist 
those disadvantaged by the settlement either to the extent that it was in their own interests to 
do so, or they were unable to prevent themselves from being drawn into doing so. The 
cynical interpretation of Mackenzie King's words, that when he called for the Czechs to be 
dealt with chivalrously and generously by other nations, he meant nations other than his 
own, could easily be extended to the other dominions as well. The `spirit of Munich' only 
seemed to apply to the need for others to make sacrifices. Certainly, the renewal of the 
colonial question revealed all three mandate -holding dominions to be unwilling to make 
territorial concessions on their own behalf, in the interests of appeasing a troubled world. 
Only Canada seemed to be under the impression that a new era of peace had been 
inaugurated, and the rest resolved to press ahead with steps to strengthen their defences. 
Australia might not have recognised a pressing need to co- ordinate its activities internally or 
across the Tasman, but it did press ahead with a doubling of its militia, in spite of straitened 
imancial conditions. New Zealand likewise faced serious financial constraints, but 
nonetheless continued to invest in defence, even though the crisis had passed. Although 
South Africa was sufficiently wealthy to be largely immune to such concerns, defence was 
politically contentious there, but the government continued to invest in this area, albeit 
discreetly. All three therefore clearly did not accept that Munich had fundamentally 
transformed international conditions for the better. With the exception of the Canadian 
163 MacDonald, Malcolm, as cited in NAA, A981 /4GER 41 /Memorandum on Pirow's Visit to Europe 
by Stirling, 21 December 1939., p. 2 
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stance on this latter point, the dominions do not appear to have succumbed to any `spirit of 
Munich.' Their response to the new international situation was essentially practical; seeking 
to minimise their obligations, boost their defences, and assert their territorial claims. 
Pragmatism, rather than idealism, prevailed. 
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3: GERMANY REVEALED? 
KRISTALLNACHT AND THE SPIRIT OF MUNICH 
Charles Te Water noted in a 22 November 1938 report to his Prime Minister that 
Kristallnacht had had a dramatic impact on British attitudes to Germany `so that, at the 
moment, little of the spirit of Munich is discernible.' He went on to predict that this would 
have unforeseeable consequences for the colonial issue.2 A number of historians have gone 
further, suggesting that the pogrom marked a permanent transformation in the way Britain 
viewed Germany. R. Douglas argued that it dispelled `the Munich euphoria.'3 Certainly, as 
has been seen, the dominions, apart from Canada, had exhibited little evidence of 
unrestrained optimism in the immediate aftermath of Munich: strengthening their defences 
and quietly, or in Billy Hughes's case, not so quietly, ensuring their interests in the mandate 
system would not be ignored. Andrew Crozier instead considered Kristallnacht one of the 
main reasons why it became `clear that Germany could not be contained within any rational 
international system' in November 1938 and that it drove Halifax into taking a tougher 
stance on Germany, which position is supported by Donald Cameron Watt.4 Paul Kennedy 
and Talbot Imlay likewise referred to `the anger and disgust' the pogrom engendered, while 
Richard Overy judged it `contributed powerfully to the revulsion against Hitlerism.'5 C. 
MacDonald even went so far as to assert that it `blocked' any prospect of a European 
settlement.6 As previously seen, Ovendale also considered that `Hitler with his anti -Semitic 
purges' (although admittedly in conjunction with demonstrations of his untrustworthiness as 
well as his barbarity) `probably' was as influential in respect of the dominions as any acts of 
their own or British leaders.' These views therefore assign Kristallnacht a pivotal role in 
2 Idem. 
3 Douglas, R., `Chamberlain and Appeasement' in Fascist Challenge, Mommsen & Kettenacker 
Eds.), p.87 
Crozier, A., The Causes of the Second World War, (Oxford, 1998), pp.147 & 244; Watt, D. C., How 
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driving London to see the forces it confronted in a different light, and it is worth considering 
to what extent this was also true of the dominions. 
If Kristallnacht created a different perception of Germany on the British side, then it also 
appeared that a different view of `the spirit of Munich' prevailed in Berlin than in London, 
and one that was quite at odds with what the dominions might have hoped would be the case. 
As has been seen, the dominions were united in desiring a peaceful resolution to escalating 
international tensions, and what differences arose between them were focused on the best 
method of achieving this. Hitler, however, did not appear to have been in any way assuaged 
by the settlement, even if his speeches and press did not become `definitely hostile' until 
after the pogrom, when the former had privately told a meeting of journalists that he no 
longer considered an understanding with Britain to be practical politics, because of Britain's 
intensifying rearmament, as Sir Cecil Day informed his government on 23 November 1938.8 
Alfred Stirling similarly drew attention to the anti- British aspects of Hitler's Burgerbrau 
Keller speech of 81h November in his report to Canberra, highlighting Hitler's use of British 
Opposition appeals on behalf of political prisoners to demonise the latter as tools of the 
foreigner, and the dictator's use of Churchill to justify continuing German armament. 
Massey also advised Ottawa that events since Munich demonstrated that `real friendship' 
between Hitler and Britain was `hardly possible.'10 However, he continued to hope for an 
`agreement based on self -interest.' Even South Africa seemed to pick up on the hostility 
emanating from Berlin, with Dr. Gie noting on 1 December 1938 in a report to Pretoria, the 
curious fact that `a crime committed in Paris is not allowed to disturb relations with France, 
but is used to stir up feeling against England here.'11 He wondered if Hitler in fact continued 
to set any store by good relations with London. Te Water likewise described it as `puzzling' 
that Berlin since Munich had `deliberately' sought to widen `the gap between Great Britain 
and Germany.'12 Incomprehensibly to the High Commissioner, Hitler instead seemed to be 
set on a `rapprochement with France,' who had been Pretoria's villains of the piece during 
the recent crises. 
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Reinterpreting Germany in the Wake of Kristallnacht 
It was one thing to identify this antagonism however; it was another to fit it into an 
analytical framework which could be used to make sense of prevailing international 
conditions. In this regard, it was important to distinguish between Nazism, Hitler and 
Germany. So long as undesirable developments could be attributed to elements within the 
movement or the Party, then the hope remained that more restrained elements, or Hitler 
himself, could be persuaded to intervene to stabilise the situation. Thus when the New 
Zealand newspaper The Press attributed Kristallnacht to the `young Nazis' and explained 
that these must be allowed from time to time to blow off steam by going on the rampage, so 
that they were diverted from activities more directly harmful to the regime, it was actually 
reassuring its readership.13 It was only the `young Nazis' who were depicted as being 
inherently prone to violence, the leadership, implicitly immune to any such tendencies, 
merely pandered to them to maintain its control. The audience could therefore comfort itself 
that even if those in control were depressingly amoral, they were at least motivated by 
concerns which seemed rational to the readers, and were to that extent, rendered safe. 
Stirling confined himself to informing Canberra on 16 November 1938 that `anti- Jewish 
rioting on an unprecedented scale broke out' and (citing Sir George Ogilvie- Forbes) that the 
police had just stood by, except in the case of a store part owned by British Jews.14 As 
always, Stirling sought to avoid an explicit analysis, but while his report superficially 
inferred the disturbances were spontaneous, as they just `broke out', his account of police 
behaviour suggested central direction and foreknowledge of what was to transpire, as it was 
unlikely the police would otherwise have differentiated, or been in a position to differentiate, 
between German and British Jewish property. In many ways, Stirling's account is the most 
frightening of all, as his refusal to address the issue of responsibility leaves the reader 
unclear as to how far up the state hierarchy this permeates. That this must have been quite far 
is of course inherent in the implied co- ordination of police and public, but Stirling made no 
attempt to assess the unity of the leadership, or the position of Hitler himself. In contrast, a 
week later Sir Cecil Day was clear in communicating Goebbels's responsibility to 
Wellington, recording that the latter `exhibits the revolting spectacle of glorying in the recent 
German display of brutality.'15 Day noted, however, that Hitler had so far held his counsel on 
the matter. While this interpretation does implicate the leadership in the chaotic violence, it 
still leaves open the possibility that Hitler was somehow aloof', and therefore in some way 
remained approachable. Gie, on the other hand, in his 1 December 1938 report to Pretoria, 
13 
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assumed Hitler's full support for the `latest developments.' 16 The South African's account 
also rationalised the danger away, though, by placing the pogrom in the context of a `step by 
step programme.' This would see Hitler establish Germany's position in the East to his 
satisfaction without interference `from simultaneous negotiations with England.' He could 
then take up the question of a final Anglo -German settlement afterwards. This reading goes 
further than others in assuming Hitler's support for the pogrom, but again renders this 
involvement safe by depicting it as a single aspect of a master -plan, that will ultimately 
deliver the Holy Grail of the peaceful resolution of all outstanding Anglo -German 
grievances. 
If instead it became accepted that Hitler himself was the impediment to better relations, 
however, then a satisfactory solution would require more drastic measures. In his diary on 21 
November Mackenzie King condemned German behaviour as `appalling' in that they `have 
allowed their younger [blank] to destroy Jewish property.' 17 He continued in the same vein, 
noting that there had been a collaboration `with the government to deal with Jews in higher 
position.' This all led him to conclude that `with the Germans and the Japs we are facing an 
era of barbarism.' This meant `there is tremendous danger of this country being attacked.' 
The only hope was if `these two countries can be converted to the Christian attitude and 
outlook on life.' This version accepts a dangerous and irrational mindset has taken hold in 
Germany, that the government by implication is in its grasp, and that the German people are 
prepared to go along with it, although without themselves being converted to that viewpoint, 
but that war may yet be averted by a reversion to former values. Mackenzie King was 
therefore not yet ready to concede that war was inevitable, only that there was `tremendous 
danger' it would occur, and was left clutching at the straw that it would take a change of 
heart on behalf of the Germans to prevent it, without any real indication how this might itself 
be brought about. Finally, if it appeared that the difficulties arose out of the German 
condition itself, then the problem expanded exponentially, leading to reflections such as 
Churchill's wartime musing on whether, to assuage their neighbours' concerns about 
Germany's future conduct, the German population could be permanently reduced through 
the segregation of German menfolk from their women.18 
16 NASA/SAB /BTS /1/4 December 19German Foreign Policy /Dr. Gie to Department of External 
Affairs, 1 December 1938 
17 King, Diary, 127/849, Entry 12 November 1938 
18 Churchill, W. S. C., as cited in Rothwell, V., War Aims in the Second World War, (Edinburgh, 
2005), p.70 
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Immediate Dominion Reactions to the Pogrom 
While dominion analysis of the implications of Kristallnacht for Berlin's future behaviour 
therefore varied considerably, the range of emotional reactions was much more homogenous. 
Sir Cecil Day's use of the terms `brutal cruelty', `revolting spectacle' and `display of 
brutality' leave the reader in no doubt as to how he felt about German actions.19 Massey 
confined himself to observing to Ottawa that `recent events' in Germany precluded any 
possibility of friendship between the governments in London and Berlin while still hoping a 
mutually acceptable modus vivendi could be reached, but, as previously noted, Mackenzie 
King described German behaviour in his diary as `appalling', and heralding `a new era of 
barbarism' while `the sorrows which the Jews have to bear at this time is almost beyond 
comprehension.'20 Stirling's reservation about providing direct personal input in his reports 
to Canberra, complicates the picture, but not greatly. While there is no explicit condemnation 
of German actions, his choice of material for his report home of 16 November 1938 cannot 
be used to construct a support for them.21 He cited Sir George Ogilvie- Forbes report of 
looting in contradiction of Goebbels's denial that any such events took place, and the lack of 
police action in support of law and order except in the case of a part British owned store. He 
also noted that Goebbels tried to explain German actions to the foreign press, but clearly did 
not consider these explanations sufficiently credible to warrant any exposition, however, in 
contrast, he reported in detail Lord Halifax's complaint at the attribution of responsibility for 
the murder to British statesmen by certain elements of the German press. The facts may not 
speak for themselves, but their selection does. Even Pirow, whose agenda, as has been seen, 
could only benefit from a sympathetic depiction of Germany, condemned the pogrom as 
`primitive' in his biography of Hertzog, although he was writing some 20 years after the 
events he was describing.22 At the time, however, Pretoria generally responded 
sympathetically to complaints from the dictatorships about criticism of their activities in the 
South African Press, and would even go on to contemplate a Press Law which would limit 
still further the rights of newspapers on this issue, but, when faced with German complaints 
about their treatment over Kristallnacht, Bodenstein, the head of External Affairs, came up 
with the robust retort that on this, the Germans had only themselves to blame, in which he 
'9 NANZ W2619/108/3/6, Notes by Sir Cecil Day, 23 November 1938, p.1 
20 LAC EA/RG25NoL767 /319 -1, Reports from Canada House, Massey to Mackenzie King; King, 
Diary, 127/849, Entry 12 November 1938 
21 NAA A981/4 /Ger /8, Stirling to Canberra, 16 November 1938, p.4 
22 Pirow, Hertzog, p.234; see also Chapter One, above. 
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was backed by Hertzog, as Clark reported to London.23 The immediate dominion reaction to 
the pogrom can therefore only be characterised as hostile. There was no suggestion of any 
sympathy for Germany on the issue, condemnation was universal. This was important 
because it demonstrated the gulf that existed between the German viewpoint on the one 
hand, and the dominion (as well as British) one on the other. Their immediate revulsion in 
the pogrom's aftermath meant Germany could currently expect little by way of sympathetic 
treatment (as evidenced by the South African rejection of German complaints, noted above), 
whatever the dominions' assessment of its impact on the future prospects for peace might be. 
Dominion Attitudes to Immigration in the Wake of Kristallnacht 
These, however, only represented the dominions immediate reactions to events in Germany. 
Of more significance was how Kristallnacht impacted on views of Nazism, Hitler and 
Germany in the longer term, when the immediate emotional impact had had a chance to fade. 
Unfortunately, none of the dominions left a record tracing this development, so it has instead 
to be inferred from their subsequent actions, particularly in regard to immigration which was 
the policy area most gravely impacted by the pogrom, but also with regard to other areas, 
such as maintaining a dialogue with Germany, where these are applicable (as with Pirow's 
visit to Germany). Latent anti -Semitism certainly played a part in this. Sometime after the 
outbreak of war, Savage stated in a broadcast that `more blood must come into this country, 
for if we don't fill it, we shall not hold it.'24 However, only 111 persons of German origin 
entered the country between January 1939 and December 1945 in contrast to 135 Greeks in 
the same period, a time when German Jewish emigration was reaching new heights in the 
wake of Kristallnacht.25 Walter Nash who had ultimate responsibility for immigration in that 
country, likewise explained in a letter to a concerned citizen that assimilability was a key 
concern in deciding who should be admitted, that `for the sake of the refugees themselves 
this must be a prior consideration.'26 Therefore `we must never create a situation where there 
is any antagonism whatsoever in our country to refugees who have come to our shores.'27 
While not explicit, this does have anti- Semitic overtones in that the assimilability of the 
refugees, the bulk of whom would have been, and been expected to be, Jewish, is called into 
question, without reference to any discernible criteria which could be addressed or refuted. It 
23 TNA DO 35, 540/C87/26, Clark to Harding, 30 November 1938, p.3; NASA Hertzog 
Papers /A32 /VoL 108, Cuttings, Freedom of the Press, Rand Daily Mail, 18 August 1939; TNA DO 
35, 540/C87/26, Clark to Harding, 30 November 1938, pp.2 - 3 
24 NANZ Nash/1177 /0319 - 0430, Notes for broadcast by Savage 
25 NANZ L/25.3/Record of Entry Permits 
26 NANZ Nash/1311, Nash to Mrs. John Hall, 21/3/39 
27 Idem 
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also scare -mongered that a more generous admission policy would provoke a backlash that 
would create conditions worse than the refugees already had to cope with (as otherwise it 
would scarcely be in their interest for assimilability to be as key a concern as Nash claims). 
Pirow likewise was coy about his stance on the Jewish question, merely stating in his 
biography of Hertzog that his views were `well- known.'28 However, his description of 
Kristallnacht depicted the Jewish community as powerful enough to force Chamberlain to 
recall the British Ambassador, such presumptions about Jewish power being something he 
seemed to share with the Nazis.29 Hertzog is rather more difficult to place. Certainly the 
South African Jewish community was fulsome in its praise of him, but this seems not to have 
been for any positive achievement of his own but rather because he was opposed to Dr. 
Malan at this point, and Dr. Malan (via Eric Louw, the former South African minister in 
Paris) was then dabbling in populist anti- Semitism.30 Hertzog did, however, accept an 
invitation to dinner at the home of the German minister (admittedly while rejecting one for a 
cocktail party for the 30`" November) at a time when other governments were publicly 
displaying their disapproval of German actions by withdrawing their representatives for 
consultation.31 This is all the more noteworthy as Hertzog routinely rejected most invitations 
which came his way, even on occasion from the Governor -General, possibly because of his 
wife's ill -health, although this rarely seemed to interfere with occasions of personal interest 
to the General, such as engagements which promoted the Dutch connection.32 In fairness, in 
a very unusual happenstance, he appears to have actually managed to double -book himself 
on this occasion, so it is not entirely clear which, if either, of the events he in fact attended.33 
Nevertheless, it remains significant that he would even contemplate gracing with his 
presence an event organised by the German representative at this delicate time. Smuts, on the 
other hand, was a Zionist, but a Zionist who felt that with Jews forming around 5 - 6% of the 
population, South Africa could scarcely be expected to accept more, which demonstrated the 
28 Pirow, Hertzog, p.238 
29 Ibid., pp.234 - 5 
30 See, for instance, NASAIHertzog Papers /A32 /Vol. I /South African Jewish Times, 7 July 1939, 
Ibid., South African Jewish Board of Deputies to Hertzog, 18 July 1939; for contemporary Malanite 
anti -Semitism, see for instance, NASA/Hertzog Papers /A32 /Vol. 123 / "Die Jode -Debat ", Die Burger, 
22 February 1939 
31 NASA Hertzog Papers (A32), Vol.5, Korrespondie, Hertzog to Leitner `Cocktail Party', 26 
November 1938; NASA Hertzog Papers (A32), Vol.5, Korrespondie, Hertzog to Leitner `Dinner', 26 
November 1938 
32 NASA Hertzog Papers (A32), Vol.5, Korrespondie, Hertzog to Duncan, 5 December 1938; UCT 
Sir William Clark Papers (BC81), Personal Miscellaneous Letters 1936 +, Clark to Eden, 13 
September 1939, p.2; See, for instance, NASA/Hertzog Papers /A32 /Vol.5 /Hertzog to Mayor of 
Capetown, 2 September 1938 
33 NASA Hertzog Papers (A32), Vol.5, Korrespondie, Hertzog to Mrs. Stuttaford, 29 November 
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limitations on practical support that the Jews could expect at this time, even from those who 
were ostensibly their friends.34 
In Canada, Mackenzie King was sympathetic but his cabinet and particularly his Quebecois 
lieutenant, Ernest Lapointe, were more inclined to pander to anti -Semitism, especially as 
regards Quebec, as King noted in his diary.35 In the civil service, Skelton commented in an 
internal paper `that refugees (and their friends) should be treated like criminals merely 
because they tell lies in their efforts to fmd sanctuary.'36 He therefore appeared to be 
reasonably compassionate in regard to the plight of Jewish refugees, but Blair, the 
formidable Director of Immigration, was anything but, opining in a report as early as 25 
March 1938 that `because the Jew can organise his affairs better than others, he has managed 
to fill most of the [U.S.] quotas from certain countries.'37 The Canadian Governor -General in 
expressing a desire `to be in on' any scheme for Jewish immigration, based on his previous 
experience in Palestine, likewise reflected popular prejudice in believing `it was amazing the 
amounts that they [the Jews] have, secreted away.'38 Massey also clearly preferred admission 
of the non -Jewish Sudeten German refugees, writing to his Prime Minister on 29 November 
1938: `these appear to be more desirable settlers than any other refugees and if we could take 
a substantial number of them it would place us in a much stronger position in relation to 
appeals from and on behalf of non- Aryans.'39 
Mackenzie King, however, was more compassionate, writing in his diary on 12 November 
that `something will have to be done by our country to assist in this phase of the world 
situation.'40 The next day he likewise recorded that `Canada must do her part in admitting 
some of the Jewish refugees.'41 However, he continued prophetically `I may not be able to 
get the Cabinet to consent, but will fight for it as right and just and Christian.' This defeatist 
attitude reflected his own inherent impulse to avoid decisive action. For the moment, 
however, his quixotic tendencies still dominated his instinctive caution, noting in his diary of 
a case brought to his attention `I felt it was inhuman of our Department of Immigration to 
allow that child to be returned.'42 He still did not raise the question in Cabinet until the 22nd 
34 NASA Hertzog Papers (A32), Vol.123, Cape Times, 19 May 1939; NASA Smuts Papers (Al), 
VoL243, Smuts to M. Gillett, 10 June 1939 
35 King, Diary, 128/937, Entry 29 November 1938 & 128/944, Entry 1 December 1938 
36 LAC EA/RG25/Vo1.1871 /327/5, Evian, Skelton, O. D. S., "Comments on Mr. McPherson's 
Memorandum re Refugees ", 6 March 1940, p.2 
37 LAC EA/RG25/Vol.1870/327/1, Evian, Memorandum by F. C. Blair, 25/3/38, p.1 
38 Buchan, J., Lord Tweedsmuir, as cited in King, Diary, 127/856, Entry 14 November 1938 
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November, and even then very indirectly, excusing himself in his diary that `I saw it was not 
opportune.'43 He then retreated somewhat, deciding that `the whole question will have to be 
carefully studied.' This seemed to indicate a weakening of his previous resolve to act 
decisively, although he did manage to obtain agreement for treatment similar to the U.S. for 
passport- holders already in Canada. 
In a meeting with Jewish representatives, who were pressing (very reasonably, both in 
manner and objective, even in Mackenzie King's own opinion as he described in his diary) 
for the admission of 10 thousand refugees, he backpedalled further, citing unemployment, 
the danger of provoking anti -Semitism, the problems of the constituencies and government 
supporters, and avoided any kind of commitment by stressing the need for `the utmost care' 
in dealing with the issue.44 He attempted an emotive appeal to Cabinet on the 20, but this 
foundered somewhat according to his journal (I did not get any real response'), although he 
did obtain the concession that if necessary' they might `put through a vote which would 
help to find homes for refugees in some land other than our own.'45 This led him to 
(somewhat forlornly) reposition himself: `I did not wish to press the matter, but to get the 
point across at this meeting.' Five days later Mackenzie King recorded that cabinet had at 
least agreed to representation at the continuation of the Evian Conference on refugees that 
was to meet in London, but Lapointe, while carefully distancing himself from association 
with his constituents, privately informed his Prime Minister, who duly recorded it in his 
diary, that `the Jewish question was anathema' as far as Quebec was concerned.46 The issue 
returned to Cabinet on the 15' December, when King noted that Crerar, the minister 
responsible for immigration, argued in favour of admitting 10,000 refugees (as had been 
requested by the Jewish representatives, above). 47 The Canadian Prime Minister 
despondently continued that cabinet remained generally opposed to quotas and the Quebec 
ministers remained `strongly against any admission.' 
Mackenzie King therefore sought to avoid responsibility for the matter by using the British 
North America Act to shift liability for any move onto the provinces, a position he and 
cabinet reiterated at a meeting with a delegation on refugees the following week, thereby 
avoiding antagonising the Quebecois but also providing the other provinces with the 
opportunity to avoid acceptance of refugees.48 This naturally made it harder to accomplish 
43 ¡bid., 22 November 1938 
44 Ibid., 23 November 1938 
45 ¡bid, 24 November 1938 
46 Ibid., 29 November 1938 
47 ¡bid, 1 December 1938 
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Mackenzie King's stated objective of doing something concrete for the latter, but, as 
previously noted, as he told Skelton, `we have to keep our own position in mind.'49 He was 
however successful in this time getting Cabinet to commit in writing to not returning 
refugees already in Canada to countries where they faced persecution.50 Nevertheless, he 
effectively accepted defeat in his diary on the general issue on the 21S`, with Cabinet's 
decision not to change Canada's immigration laws, albeit with the meaningless concession of 
`agreeing to have humanitarian considerations in mind in interpreting regulations regarding 
Jews.'51 He conceded cabinet, while confirming its previous concession regarding the status 
of Jews already in Canada, was opposed to admitting any more lest this engender anti - 
Semitism, but was more generously inclined towards the Sudeten refugees. 
This effectively spelled the end of Mackenzie King's quixotic effort to come to the aid of 
the Jews in the wake of Kristallnacht. Cabinet had worn down his idealistic aspirations with 
their pragmatic arguments, mainly, but not exclusively, based on the perceived inclinations 
of the Quebecois electorate; thereby allowing his naturally excessive sense of caution to 
reassert itself. `The something which will have to be done by our country' had turned out to 
be disappointingly small in practice.52 Those already in the country might be allowed to stay, 
but these would include few whose emigration had not already been at least in progress at 
the time of Kristallnacht, and the laws would not be changed to aid the plight of more recent 
refugees. Those whose danger had been revealed by the pogrom would have to look 
elsewhere, except to the extent that `humanitarian considerations' might be applied, which 
would largely be down to the staff of the Department of Immigration and the unsympathetic 
Blair, rather than the relatively well- disposed Mackenzie King. In fairness, it should be 
pointed out that the Spanish and Catalan refugees faced an even more united opposition to 
any consideration of their admission at this time as indicated in the government file on the 
subject.53 
Australia could not contemplate accepting more than `a small proportion of the thousands of 
applications received' from European Jews, because of its `limited absorptive capacity' (a 
July 1939 memorandum placed Australia's optimum population as between 10 and 100 
million, with Menzies and Page advocating 20 and 30 million, respectively; at a time when 
49 LAC EA/RG25 /Vol 1871, Evian, 327/3, File note by Skelton, 1 December 1938 
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the actual population was c. 6 million).54 At this time it was subsidising the migration of 
British officials from India and considering encouraging Danish, Dutch and Swiss migration 
(specifically excluding Jews), although Hodgson did consider that the current impetus to 
migrate, including migration for `racial' reasons, provided Australia with a perhaps final 
opportunity to acquire `a good type of migrant.'55 The government also ran a general assisted 
migration scheme for any `White British Subject in the United Kingdom' nominated by an 
approved person or body.56 
In light of this, Canberra undertook to accept 15,000 refugees from all sources in a clear 
effort to pre-empt any external pressure being applied to accept greater numbers of refugees, 
which, on 31 January 1939, the government privately allocated on an annual basis as 4,000 
places to be awarded to Jews and 1,000 to `Aryans and non -Aryan Christians.'57 However, 
cabinet gave permission for the quota to be breached in respect of the latter, so their seeming 
generosity toward the Jewish community was rather less than it first appeared. In an 
uncharacteristically compassionate moment, the administration did nonetheless decide on 14 
February that applications by up to five hundred parents of persons already living in 
Australia would not count against this quota, providing the father was 55 or older, as `the 
parents may be generally regarded as non -competitive in the labour market.'58 The next day, 
however, a proposed Jewish colony in New Guinea was `not agreed to.'59 
Immigration policy was equally not an area where the Savage government in New Zealand 
displayed exemplary leadership. Assurances were given that matters were under 
consideration, but no record remains of any such deliberations, and no policy decisions were 
ever announced. Nor, despite their perennial hostility to Labour, did the newspapers seem 
much inclined to push them on this issue. With the exception of The PressG0, which produced 
an editorial sharply condemning the government's supine inactivity on this front after 
54 NAA A981 /MIG /52 /Part 11, Dept. of Interior to Dept. of Exterior, 29 June 1938; NAA 
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Kristallnacht, the universal condemnatory coverage of Germany did not translate into calls 
either for greater generosity in the admission of refugees, or even greater clarification by the 
government as to what its immigration policy actually might be. Where the press failed, the 
opposition might have been expected to take up the mantle. Parliament was not sitting, but 
the National Party could have either publicly stated what their own position was, thereby 
pressurising the government into also making their stance clear, or directly demanded the 
government take action. Instead, Hamilton, Coates and company kept their own counsel. 
Press and opposition singularly failed to hold the government to account, and it was left to 
other bodies, such as the North Canterbury Methodist Synod, which as reported in The Press 
for 17 November 1938, appealed to the government to actively encourage the immigration of 
refugees.61 `Don't ask, don't tell' would seem to have been the order of the day for all 
concerned. 
There was one case, however, which Cabinet's fingerprints were all over. The New Zealand 
government's predilection for cherry-picking refugees whose immigration would benefit 
their new hosts, was not confined to the Sudeten Germans. As previously seen, Savage 
would threaten to permit the entry of refugee doctors to break what he saw as the industrial 
action of the B.M.A. in attempting to resist the implementation of the government's national 
health legislation. Similarly, Sullivan, the Minister for Scientific and Industrial Research, 
jumped at the opportunity to acquire the services of a Dr. Rosa Stern of Vienna for the 
Wheat Research Institute, proposing to cabinet that the government approve the appointment 
and grant entry permits to Dr. Stern and her mother.G2 Cabinet approved the former proposal, 
but rejected the latter, scoring a line through that part of the proposition with Joe Savage's 
initials as authority, thereby leaving the pair to the vagaries of the immigration system. There 
was never, of course, any suggestion that Dr. Stern's application would encounter any 
difficulty, given Cabinet's approval for her appointment, but her mother was a different 
matter, and she would need to demonstrate her ability to avoid becoming a burden on the 
public purse, not an easy task for a 76 year old widowed housewife.63 Fortunately, Dr. Stern, 
however, was evidently able to demonstrate her ability to provide for her mother, as both 
were granted entry permits on the 4" April, 1939, but only arriving in Auckland on the I 
St 
August 1939 and acquiring New Zealand nationality after the war.ó4 In truth, Dr. Stern's 
mother was probably never at risk, because of the former's presumed earning capacity and 
consequent capability to look after her mother financially, but the incident is nevertheless 
61 The Press, 17 November 1938, p.4 
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extremely revealing about Cabinet's attitude towards the refugees post- Kristallnacht and its 
consequences for those unfortunates. Clearly Dr. Stern could not take up her position without 
an entry permit, and the terms offered were evidently sufficient to convince the authorities 
that she would be able to financially support her mother, but Cabinet was nonetheless not 
prepared to authorise this, despite the presence of the ministers who would ultimately make 
the decision, ensuring that Dr. Stern and her mother would have to wait another month 
before receiving exactly the same decision as that originally proposed.65 Jack Lee castigated 
the triumvirate and its adherents as petty- minded union officials, and it is hard not to extend 
that judgement here. It was not for Cabinet to make such decisions (even though the minister 
making the decision was present), the proper channels had to be followed and the rules 
observed, even though this would provide exactly the same outcome, but at a later date, and 
at a commensurately greater risk to the applicants. 66 Skelton in Canada, as noted above, 
might understand the necessity of relaxing the strict letter of the law in face of the 
extraordinary circumstances with which the dominions were faced, but Joe Savage and his 
colleagues appear to have been incapable of appreciating this bigger picture. The lack of 
urgency displayed here, reiterated the government's inability to empathise with the plight of 
the refugees, previously seen in Savage's intemperate threat to admit large numbers of 
refugee medical practitioners to break the doctors' resistance to his policies. The proposal 
about the Sterns had been placed before Cabinet at the end of February, but clearly would 
have had to be in progress for some time to reach this stage, so it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that Dr. Stern began seeking a safe haven in the immediate aftermath of the pogrom. 
It took a further month to acquire entry permits, and eventually the Sterns managed to arrive 
in New Zealand with just over a month to spare before the outbreak of war. It would not 
have taken much to go wrong for this to have had fatal consequences, and it is hard not to 
conclude that at least part of the reason for the paltry figure of 1 l 1 refugees from Germany 
and Austria received between the wake of Kristallnacht and the end of the war, noted above, 
was because of the pedantic bureaucracy involved in the application process. 
It is therefore hard not to concur with Goldman, the historian of the Jewish community in 
New Zealand, that while `the Government of New Zealand expressed a great deal of 
sympathy... it was prepared to do very little to grant refugees relief.'G7 F. A. de la Mare, `an 
ardent supporter of the League of Nations' and member of the University of New Zealand 
Senate, wrote to Nash at the time castigating the Government's position as being: `for 
6s NANZ Nash/2044, Cabinet Schedule 28 February 1939 
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practical reasons, we must let these human beings suffer and die while we can help them.'68 
De la Mare continued that New Zealand should instead be prepared to accept the test implicit 
in the risk that a more generous immigration policy would provoke anti -Semitism, and that it 
was wrong in principle to seek guarantors for refugees as it effectively created `one law for 
the rich and another for the poor.' He cited the case of a skilled worker who had been 
excluded on these grounds, despite having obtained employment, but Nash's deputy, Fagan, 
while recognising the slightness of the risk to the public purse, saw no way to reopen the 
case. Nash did not appear to dispute any of these points, merely indicating that the document 
should be filed in a `special "Refugees" File.' 
The situation was further complicated by New Zealand's refusal to officially acknowledge 
the existence of the Jews for the purposes of immigration 69 While this might at first seem 
like high- minded principle in refusing to distinguish Jews from their non -Jewish fellow 
citizens, in practice it made a bad situation worse. Firstly, it made it impossible to identify 
how many Jews were being admitted. Undoubtedly, many of the 1,700 Germans admitted 
between the resumption of immigration and the outbreak of war in September were Jews, but 
it will never be clear how many. Secondly, arising from this, as no track was been kept of the 
admission or exclusion of Jews, it was not possible to identify whether disproportionate 
numbers of Jews were being excluded. If such residual anti -Semitism as might exist could 
not be identified, then steps could not be taken to counter it. Finally, the non -identification of 
Jews meant that no provision could be made for the more generous treatment of their cases 
in view of the special circumstances that they faced within Germany. Kristallnacht changed 
none of this. 
Dominion Attitudes to Defence in the Wake of Kristallnacht 
If Kristallnacht did not change the New Zealand government's attitude towards 
immigration, it, at least indirectly, appears to have given renewed impetus to efforts for 
Antipodean co- operation over defence. Savage now revived the idea of a conference between 
Britain, Australia and New Zealand, writing again to Lyons and this time meeting with more 
encouragement.70 Although New Zealand's reaction to Kristallnacht itself had been 
restricted to little more than sympathetic noises, coupled with a determination to minimise its 
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responsibilities, the timing of this communication is unlikely to have been coincidental, if for 
no other reason than the sharp deterioration in Anglo- German relations that emerged in the 
wake of the pogrom, as noted above. This latter development could only make war more 
likely, thereby increasing the risks faced by the antipodean dominions, in so doing 
reinforcing the attractions of a conference for New Zealand, and equally weakening 
Australian resistance to such a measure. It is therefore scarcely surprising that, after 
addressing the distractions provided by Caucus's attempt to take control of the election of 
Cabinet and the Lee Letter, Savage chose this point to revisit his proposal. The New Zealand 
Chiefs of Staff also feared that, as Australia's defences took shape, `so will an enemy be 
driven more and more to concentrate against New Zealand's trade.'71 New Zealand therefore 
wanted a broad conference between Britain, New Zealand and Australia, which would 
consider all aspects of political, military and economic strategy in the region.72 
This agenda was the reason for Australia's previous lack of enthusiasm and, even now, they 
wished to confine it to purely military matters. Their concern was that any conference would 
provoke the Japanese, encourage American isolationism and antagonise American 
interventionists. Colonel Hodgson, the permanent head of the Department of External 
Affairs, produced a memorandum for the government that expounded these fears.73 The 
Japanese would conclude that such a conference was primarily directed against them, and 
would turn unwelcome attention towards the Southern Pacific. American isolationists would 
cite it as evidence that the Commonwealth was drawing together to counter Japan, and hence 
there was no longer any need for America to concern itself with the matter. American 
interventionists would therefore lose a strand of their argument in favour of action, but also 
might interpret the exclusion of the United States as evidence that the Commonwealth was 
displaying an unwelcome assertiveness in the region at a time when America was 
swallowing up small islands of questionable title across the area. Such an eventuality would 
not only hamper future prospects of co- operation against Japan, should these prove 
necessary, it might also inhibit collaboration in the development of the region, an enterprise 
in which the Americans were already proving tougher negotiators than the Australians would 
have preferred. Antagonising them needlessly therefore seemed like neither good politics, 
nor good business. Nonetheless, the Australians were now at least prepared to unbend 
sufficiently to contemplate a conference restricted to military matters. 
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As has been seen, like New Zealand, there is little evidence that Kristallnacht directly 
impacted government attitudes in Australia, and it seems more likely that in Canberra, as in 
Wellington, that it was actually the evident deterioration of Anglo -German relations in the 
wake of the pogrom, that proved decisive in changing the prevailing mind -set even to this 
limited extent. Further than this they were not prepared to go and accordingly they 
telegraphed Wellington for clarification on the proposed scope of the conference, to which 
New Zealand responded that they wished the discussions to cover `all those political, 
economic and geographical considerations which would arise in a simultaneous war in 
Europe and the Far East.'74 This was more or less precisely what the Australians did not 
want. While consensus on the agenda could therefore not yet be achieved, the principle of 
the desirability of a conference had been accepted and discussions continued without 
actually reaching impasse. 
The South African Minister of Defence's reaction to Kristallnacht, as he described it in his 
biography of Hertzog, was telling.75 Pirow acknowledged its significance for the German 
Jewish community and castigated German behaviour as `primitive', albeit while attributing 
the hostile worldwide reaction to `International Jewry.' His frustration with the situation, and 
the impact it was likely to have on his mission to Germany boiled over when considering the 
origins of the episode: it was `silly' and `idiotic'; while the people involved were `unknown' 
and `unimportant.' It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Pirow felt it was awfully 
inconsiderate of these insignificant, inconsequential people to jeopardise his extremely 
important mission, by their involvement in their inane and ridiculous drama. Pirow was, of 
course, writing some twenty years after the events he was describing, but managed to 
overlook some of the more salient features of the episode, implying that the demonstrations 
were spontaneous rather than engineered by the Nazi hierarchy. 
Pirow, building on his coyness about his evident anti -Semitism (see above), was also keen 
to distance himself from the brutality of the incident, describing German behaviour as 
`primitive,' as has been seen, and depicting himself as standing up to Ribbentrop, when the 
latter tried to defend what had transpired. In contrast, Goering was depicted as entirely 
pragmatic about the situation, dismissing the incident as a `stupidity' which he had had to 
clear up. All of these points were designed to promote Pirow's agenda, namely that Nazi 
Germany was an entity the West could and should have done business with. Kristallnacht, 
because of its timing in connection with Pirow's mission could not be ignored, and he duly 
74 NAA A981 /PAC /1, Lyons to Savage & Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 11 January 1939; 
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paid attention to it. In so doing taking care to establish himself as one who would never 
condone this sort of behaviour, however he felt about the Jews, but its significance was 
downplayed by the implication it was spontaneous, rather than government- inspired, and by 
associating support for it with Ribbentrop, whose incompetence was trumpeted by Pirow, not 
least because the latter chose to blame the German Foreign Minister for the failure of his 
mission. This was in contrast to Goering, who Pirow saw as supportive and who was 
therefore depicted in a positive light. By emphasising Goering's pragmatism, and implied 
competence, in contrast to Ribbentrop's implied shortcomings in these areas, Pirow appears 
to be implying that Germany continued to be an acceptable partner, on the assumption that 
the supposed pragmatic competence of a Goering was always likely to trump the undoubted 
fanatical incompetence of a Ribbentrop. 
Pirow also tried to depict himself as a disinterested observer, by expressing himself as 
`disappointed' in Hitler and contrasting the latter's 1938 self with the `John the Baptist in 
jack- boots' of 1933, when they had previously met, thus giving more weight to the idea that 
Pirow was in fact a shrewd observer of the Nazi state, rather than a naive and uncritical 
admirer. He could therefore be trusted to form a responsible judgement as to whether the 
West should confront or conciliate Berlin. By doing this, Pirow was keeping alive the central 
idea of his biography of Hertzog; that the West had been wrong to engage Hitler in conflict, 
and that the General had been right to try to keep South Africa out of the war. 
In point of fact, without Kristallnacht, Pirow would have had little to discuss in Berlin. It is 
true that the episode precluded the possibility of British involvement in the Colonial 
question, but it was always unlikely they would have chosen Pirow as a conduit for such 
discussions, given the presence of their own embassy in Berlin and their responsibilities to 
Australia and New Zealand on the issue. Pirow could only have expected to play a pivotal 
role in bilateral negotiations involving Germany and South Africa alone. Unfortunately for 
him, as previously seen, his experiences in Brussels and Lisbon prevented him from bringing 
any new proposals to the table; he was forced to admit that the colonies themselves would 
not be returned, and all he could do was offer financial compensation, which had been tried 
previously without any success, and which Hitler dismissed with the words that the issue 
could `just as well wait another five or six years.' As Pirow indicated, this did not actually 
amount to an outright rejection of the proposal, but in reality indicated Hitler's lack of 
interest. Andrew Crozier suggested Hitler was sincere in his demands for the return of the 
Colonies, but has to resort to Hitler's second book to support this argument. In reality, there 
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is little evidence that this was the case, particularly as the colonies were liable to prove as 
indefensible in the event of the war Hitler was now considering, as on the previous occasion. 
Kristallnacht, however, provided Pirow with a last chance to pull his mission out of the fire. 
Even a bilateral Colonial settlement might be beyond him, but if he could lay the foundation 
for a new Anglo -German understanding in the wake of the pogrom, he would be able to 
return home in triumph, and it is clear from his correspondence after the event that he was 
desperate to elicit some kind of success from the episode. For instance he wrote on 4 
February 1939 to his friend, Te Water, suggesting the latter plant a story in the Times to `the 
effect that my visit assisted in eliminating some of the then existing misunderstanding.'76 
This was to try and offset the criticism provided by the South African press, which `has been 
as hostile as the English Press.' Somewhat paradoxically, however, Te Water was not to `go 
to any trouble,' as `I would rather be cursed than praised as far as our local press is 
concerned.' Te Water seems also to have been keen to read something positive into the 
negotiations, as he had written to Gie on 14 December 1938 `the news about the Jews is 
interesting - "for thou shalt find it after many days ". Has the little seed taken root ?' 77 While 
it is not clear what `news' Te Water is talking about, the comments immediately follow 
mention of Pirow, and suggests Te Water is briefly optimistic that Pirow's talks may have 
borne fruit after all. 
It is therefore unsurprising that no consideration seems to have been given to postponing the 
trip, even under the adverse circumstances it now progressed under. According to his 
account in Hertzog, Pirow was approached in London by Captain Victor Cazalet with a view 
to sounding out the German government on a proposal that the German Jews be allowed to 
depart Germany with half their wealth (and that the British and American Jews would then 
reimburse the refugees for the half that had been forfeited) for Tanganyika, Madagascar, or 
Guiana.78 Then, at a second meeting with Chamberlain, Pirow interpreted the British Prime 
Minister's apparent willingness to co- operate with this scheme, together with some pious 
platitudes regarding German interests in Eastern Europe, as evidence `that if Hitler would 
appease British public opinion on the Jewish question, he might well be granted a free hand 
in Eastern Europe.' This the South African forlornly repeated to the German Chancellor, 
when his proposals foundered on the latter's objection to the use of Tanganyika as a new 
homeland for the Jews (Te Water had earlier reported Chamberlain as being prepared to 
76 NASA Te Water Papers (A78), Vol.14, Correspondence, Pirow to Te Water 4 February 1939, pp.2 
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offer Germany Tanganyika prior to the Anschluss), and German curiosity as to France's 
attitude on the use of Madagascar, which Pirow had not troubled to discover before offering 
it up as a destination.79 Guiana does not appear to have been mentioned. It is unclear what 
influence this exchange actually had, but it can only have served to confirm Hitler, however 
slightly, in his opinions both of British disinterest in Eastern Europe and the all- pervasive 
nature of Jewish influence. That Pirow reiterated this position in Rome can only have 
compounded the problem. 
Pirow had in any event (he does not explain how) become convinced that all the military 
preparations he had witnessed (which he had not previously mentioned) were due to 
complete in the Spring, and `that unless there was a complete change of heart in international 
affairs', that war would then break out.80 This view reflected Charles Te Water's and may, in 
fact, have originated there, which would explain Pirow's curious lack of detail on the 
subject. The South African High Commissioner in London reiterated this point to Hertzog on 
13 December 1938, stating `that my own view has always been that the moment of supreme 
danger' would come when `the peak of armaments is reached by the Great Powers.'81 This 
analysis was not particularly helpful, however, as it was always likely armaments would 
reach an unintentional peak immediately prior to the outbreak of war, as the latter would 
inevitably lead to the consumption and attrition of the former (particularly munitions), rather 
than their continued stockpiling. In retrospect then, armaments would be seen to have peaked 
just prior to war, but observers could not use this to predict when such an outbreak would 
actually take place. Pirow came close to acknowledging this by admitting that war `did not in 
fact break out because the Allies were not yet ready: but at the time Germany annexed 
Bohemia and Moravia, an incident which ordinarily would have led to a general 
conflagration.'82 Pirow went on to describe how when he returned home he found Smuts 
already convinced of this analysis.83 In fact, as previously seen, the South African 
government, whatever it might say in public, had not been particularly behaving as if it was 
truly convinced that peace had been firmly established by the Munich Settlement, and it is 
probably more accurate to say that the pogrom and its aftermath simply confirmed them in 
this view. 
79 NASA Te Water Papers (A78), Vol. 
October 1938; Pirow, Hertzog, p.238 
8° Ibid,p.240 
81 NASA Te Water Papers (A78), Vol. 
December 1938, pp.2 - 3 
82 Pirow, Hertzog, p.240 
83 Ibid,p.242 
13, Correspondence /C. Te Water to J. B. 
13, Correspondence /C. Te Water to J. B. 
113 
M. Hertzog 10 
M. Hertzog 13 
Mackenzie King had, however, been convinced, even if only temporarily, of the efficacy of 
Munich, deliberately scaling back on armaments approved during the crisis, when it became 
clear that war was to be averted after all. The impact of his change in attitude described 
above can be detected in his reception of the Defence estimates on 14tß November, when he 
approved a doubling of defence expenditure because, as he explained in his diary of that 
date, `up to the present we had been keeping up a nominal defence so as to preserve 
organisation, and to be in a state of semi -preparedness, but in reality our defence was wholly 
inadequate and ineffective.'84 Although he had been Prime Minister since 1935, and 
previously through most of the 1920s, there is no indication that Mackenzie King in any way 
considered himself responsible for this remarkable state of affairs, nor to have considered 
that he, as well as his defence minister should know, as he put it in his journal, `where the 
hundred millions appropriated since we came into office had gone.'85 His previous 
incarnation, as the careful keeper of the public purse who denounced the spendthrift forces 
trying to slip through additional expenditure as an emergency measure (which admittedly 
would have kept the matter outside Parliamentary scrutiny) was both gone and forgotten.86 
He now privately viewed increasing the expenditure and pace of re- armament as `reasonable 
and almost necessary.'87 This was because, he continued, `we are dealing with gangster 
nations, especially in the case of Germany and Japan.' Typically, he fretted `I doubt if 
Cabinet will so view it.' In this regard, he singled out Dunning and Lapointe as the likely 
centres of opposition to his stance. 
In fact, Lapointe accepted that increased defence expenditure was necessary, but worried 
how this would play in Quebec, as King reported in his diary for 29 November.88 Cabinet 
itself proved initially reluctant, in the Prime Minister's view, as expressed in his journal, `to 
come to full grip with situation [sic].' 89 Mackenzie King felt they were trying to foist full 
responsibility for the decision onto him, as he complained in his diary, a situation he was 
temperamentally incapable of accepting, so the discussion was carried over to the following 
Cabinet, where it took up most of the day, but still without reaching a final decision.90 His 
diary indicates that consensus was finally reached on 16 December, with the proposed 
doubling of expenditure cut back to $54 million, with an additional $6 million assigned to 
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train pilots.91 Emphasis was to be placed on naval and air expenditure rather than the militia, 
as it was felt that this was where Canada was most vulnerable and could do most to protect 
itself. Cabinet was unanimous on the danger presented by the current world situation and the 
Prime Minister noted that even the `Quebec members felt that considerable increase in 
estimates were necessary and would be approved.' Mackenzie King was absolutely clear 
about the centrality of Kristallnacht to this changed perception, having previously noted on 
14 November 1938: `the treatment of the Jews by the Germans discloses how quickly feeling 
may come to the point where war against these forces will be irresistible.'92 
Overview 
Unlike London, Kristallnacht seems to have had only a limited impact on perceptions of 
Germany in Canberra, Pretoria and Wellington. New Zealand was simply confirmed in its 
distaste for the Nazi regime; as previously seen, Hitler had never been popular there and the 
pogrom certainly provided no reason to revise this opinion.93 Australia likewise disliked 
Kristallnacht, but only cautiously, to paper over the divisions within its ruling elite. Lyons 
might have abhorred the persecution of the Jews before the pogrom, but this was no reason 
to abandon his pacifism and endorse Billy Hughes's bellicosity afterwards. South Africa was 
likewise forthright in its condemnation, but only initially, before reverting to the position that 
Germany was a necessary, even if not ideal, partner in resolving the European situation. 
Only Ottawa appears to have changed its perception of Berlin as a result of this episode, 
coming to regard Germany as a threat which would have to be addressed. 
Condemnation did not however translate into practical support for the new wave of refugees 
created by the persecution. The dominions outdid each other in efforts to avoid accepting any 
responsibility for attempting to resolve the issue. New Zealand refused to disclose its 
immigration policy, insisting each case would be treated on its own merits, apparently 
terrified lest the 111 people of German origin accepted into the country in the seven years 
succeeding Kristallnacht incite a storm of anti- Semitic protest. Australia likewise only 
offered to accept 15,000 refugees over the next 3 years in an attempt to forestall any pressure 
for a more generous policy. Pirow proved as generous with other people's land over the 
Jewish question as the Colonial one, but when it came to South African territory, even the 
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`Zionist' Smuts made clear that further Jewish immigration would not be accepted. Only in 
Canada did Mackenzie King attempt to do something constructive for the Jews, and he was 
overcome by the pragmatic opposition of his Cabinet, as well as his own natural inertia. 
Kristallnacht was not without its effects, however. As has already been seen, it 
revolutionised Ottawa's view of Germany, leading directly to a reappraisal of Canada's 
defence and a consequent commitment to renewed rearmament. The pogrom also injected 
fresh vigour into Savage's proposal for a Pacific Defence Conference, but probably more for 
its perceived effect on London, rather than its actual impact in Canberra and Wellington. 
South African defence preparations likewise continued unabated and Pirow returned to South 
Africa apparently convinced that war was more likely than ever in the wake of his failed 
European tour, with all the consequences this was likely to have for the Union's domestic 
harmony. 
The pogrom was therefore significant in its impact on the dominions. It may only have 
changed perceptions of Germany in Canada, but it briefly united the dominions in 
condemnation of its barbarity. This condemnation did not translate into anything much more 
practical for the newly created wave of refugees than expressions of sympathy, but it created 
a consensus that war was more, rather than less, likely. This development sparked unique 
reactions in each dominion, based on their own perceptions of their situation. Canada 
therefore suddenly turned to rearmament. New Zealand, while continuing its own 
preparations, took the opportunity to revive Savage's idea of a Pacific Defence Conference. 
Australian resistance to the idea proved to have reduced to the level where it had become 
acceptable, provided it could be confined to purely military matters to avoid antagonising the 
United States and Japan. South Africa likewise continued its defence preparations in the 
shadow of the Neutrality Pact. Kristallnacht confirmed the pre- existing trend for the 
dominions to regard war as increasingly probable in the wake of Munich, this time 
embracing even Canada. 
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4: AN UNHAPPY NEW YEAR: 
THE DOMINIONS, HITLER'S 30TH JANUARY SPEECH AND 
INTERNATIONAL TENSION 
Someone (it is generally thought Colonel Hans Oster) apparently inspired a co- ordinated 
series of leaks to British representatives through the period December 1938 to January 1939.1 
These suggested that Hitler was about to move West, perhaps with a surprise air attack on 
London, or a sudden descent on the Netherlands, possibly as early as the end of February.2 
The panic that this induced in Whitehall does not seem to have engulfed Halifax, 
Chamberlain or the rest of the Cabinet, even if it did cause them to revise British war plans.3 
Any such scepticism was, however, entirely absent from the telegram addressed to the 
dominion governments by the Dominions Office on the 256' January.4 This three page cable 
did indeed admit that to attribute such aggressive intentions to Hitler might `seem fanciful 
and fantastic.' Nevertheless, London countered this view with the observation that there was 
a remarkable unity to the reports that had been received, which came from diverse sources, 
whose character and integrity had proved consistently reliable in the past. The missive then 
went on to describe Hitler's `mental condition, his insensate rage against Great Britain and 
his megalomania' as being `entirely consistent with the execution of a desperate coup against 
the Western Powers.' Such a coup could serve both as a way out of his domestic economic 
difficulties and as a distraction for any wavering support among his armed forces. The 
telegram went on to emphasise that Hitler's annual 30 January speech (to commemorate the 
anniversary of his assumption of power) was therefore more important than usual, as it 
appeared he might use the occasion to telegraph his intentions to the German people. The 
Dominions Office was, however, unable to say in what terms, if at all, Chamberlain would 
warn the German Chancellor in the speech the British Prime Minister was scheduled to give 
two days before Hitler's, to deter the latter from taking any irrevocable steps. 
Four days after the first cable, on Sunday 29 January, the same day Sir Thomas lnskip 
replaced Malcolm MacDonald as Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London sent a 
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supplementary telegram to the dominions.5 This cable was short and to the point: His 
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had been considering what their position 
would be in the event of an unprovoked German attack on the Netherlands, as per their 
previous telegram of 25 January, and they had now come to the provisional conclusion such 
an attack had to be regarded as a casus belli for Britain. London did soften the blow by 
indicating they were discussing their position with Paris and Brussels and would reconsider 
the situation in light of these conversations. This message was followed eight days later, on 7 
February, by a further communication advising that the previously provisional decision to 
regard the integrity of the Netherlands as a fundamental British interest could now be 
regarded as final and that this had been extended to cover Switzerland as well.6 Staff talks 
with the French were furthermore now to be reinvigorated under conditions of the utmost 
secrecy. The French had also raised the question of Italian aggression, and the British 
government had since confirmed that talks `should proceed on the basis of a war against 
Germany and Italy in combination and should be extended in scope to include all likely 
fields of operations.' Disappointingly, from London's perspective, Belgium had in the 
meantime taken the opportunity given to reaffirm its commitment to neutrality, as the only 
option for maintaining its independence whatever the circumstances. The Dutch had, 
however, confirmed they would resist any attempt at aggression and expected to be able to 
hold out for 3 -4 days, although foreign observers considered a period of less than 24 hours 
more likely. London did not feel able to comment definitively on this latter point. The 
Foreign Secretary hoped to hold direct discussions with the Dutch Foreign Minister on 14 
February when the latter would be in London for cultural reasons. 
To reinforce the seriousness of the situation, a further telegram of the same date reported the 
substance of a conversation between President Roosevelt and the Dutch Ambassador to 
Washington which underlined the sense of danger.' There was evidence `Germany and Italy 
had signed an offensive and defensive alliance.' It was also believed `Germany had decided 
to turn westwards.' It might have been expected the dominions would assume that Roosevelt 
would have received this information from London and Paris, as well as perhaps 
independently from the source the latter pair had obtained it from. This was particularly so, 
as the dominions had already been informed that London had itself shared the contents of the 
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original cable of 25 January to them with Washington. Nonetheless, Whitehall duly ratcheted 
up the sense of tension by relaying without comment the advice that these indications had 
come from `three different and reliable sources.' The Senate Foreign Affairs Committee 
Chairman had further advised the Dutch Minister that, even if any aid to victims was likely 
to be purely economic in nature, `public opinion in the United States was coming round to 
the formal denunciation of aggressors.' It was evident that the Dominions Office did not 
wish its charges to be lulled into any sense of security, whether false or otherwise. It was not 
until two days later, on Wednesday 9 February, that London eventually found time to advise 
the dominions that several European countries, including France and Italy, appeared after all 
to have found grounds for reassurance in Hitler's speech of the previous week, but qualified 
this with the caveat: `it will be realised it is difficult to summarise accurately owing to cross- 
currents of opinion.'8 Britain was therefore not quite ready to let the matter drop, even if 
supportive evidence was proving rather thin on the ground. 
However, the next week, on Thursday 17 February, Lord Halifax, the British Foreign 
Secretary, was rather more equivocal in a meeting with the dominion High Commissioners in 
London. On the one hand, he let them know that he had come to believe the danger had 
either been exaggerated or that the dictators had simply been trying to intimidate the West.9 
On the other hand, he did not entirely rule out the possibility that an act of aggression might 
still transpire, as `he always said to himself that it was necessary to remember that the exact 
opposite to what he anticipated might happen on the following morning.' As things stood, it 
was best `to remain as calm as possible and not allow ourselves be stampeded.' It was not in 
fact until 8 March, nearly three weeks later, that the Dominions Office fmally brought the 
episode to an official close with Circular Telegram No.86, which informed the dominion 
governments that `we are now inclined to think that Hitler has for the time being abandoned 
the idea of precipitating an immediate crisis such as he seemed to be contemplating at the 
beginning of the year.'1° A week later, Hitler was in Prague. 
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Disarray and disillusion in Ottawa 
The language employed in the original telegram of 25 January was scarcely calculated to 
induce calm, and Ottawa's response was certainly anything but. Mackenzie King recorded 
his reactions to the developing situation in his diary." He had already been displaying signs 
of nervousness there, noting the parallels between contemporary conditions and the climax 
of the previous crisis in September 1938, with an imminent German test mobilisation, and 
the return of Dr. Windels, the German Consul, to his homeland.12 All of which left the 
Canadian Prime Minister to conclude `the whole situation looks very ominous.' This was 
even before he had laid eyes on the Dominions Secretary's initial despatch. His diary reveals 
his first reaction to that cable was that things were `extremely serious.' 13 This anxiety was 
only reinforced by reports of the fall of Barcelona and the imminent transformation of the 
Anti- Comintern Pact into a defensive alliance against any power. This all led him to 
conclude that `the world has not looked as bad at any time.' 
He immediately arranged for the Governor -General (Lord Tweedsmuir; the author, John 
Buchan) and Ian Mackenzie to be informed of the telegram and called a special meeting of 
cabinet for 11 a.m. the following morning, without explaining why to avoid the risk of `talk.' 
In an about turn from his previous stance Mackenzie King now authorised the Minister of 
Defence to see if it would after all be possible to obtain the additional planes from the United 
States which had previously been cancelled in the aftermath of Munich. He then met with the 
Governor -General, where they agreed that `the whole conflict was one between forces of 
good and those of evil.' It was evident that it was the latter of these which now held sway 
over the mystical Hitler. Mackenzie King considered Canadian participation to be inevitable 
in the event of war, as `we were liable to be attacked if Britain was at war.' As he explained 
in his journal, this was what had led him to echo his mentor, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, in 
Parliament on 16 January that `when Britain is at war, Canada is at war, and liable to 
attack.i14 In doing this Mackenzie King had been trying to highlight the continuity between 
his own stance and that of his Francophone predecessor. Unfortunately, his remark also 
suggested that Canada's position remained essentially what it had been in 1910, despite 
everything that had occurred in the interim. It also appeared to give the lie to his oft -repeated 
statement that it would be for Parliament to decide on the question of war and peace, `in light 
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of all the circumstances.' This had proved too much for the Francophone press and the 
isolationists in the Department of External Affairs who he complained were vigorously 
critical of his stance. ' 5 Clearly their criticism had stung the ever -sensitive Prime Minister, 
who, his diary indicates, thereupon proceeded to depict himself self -pityingly to Tweedsmuir 
as a lonely, isolated figure without whom the whole edifice would undoubtedly come 
crashing down.16 He bitterly denounced what he portrayed as the unrealistically theoretical 
posturing of his critics, contrasting this with what he saw as his own realism in believing in 
Canada's vulnerability in the event of war. He clearly felt the cable from London vindicated 
his stance by confirming his pessimism about the international situation. 
In the following day's entry, he recounted how he presented the news from London to his 
cabinet. 17 Mackenzie King convinced himself that ministers were `deeply impressed by all 
that it conveyed.' He then returned to his recent repetition of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's remark. 
He proceeded to qualify this by reaffirming that `our participation or neutrality would 
depend on what Parliament decided.' He reminded his colleagues that he had brought this up 
at cabinet previously and had `thought we were all agreed. That I had gathered, at the time, 
that such was the case.' This seemed to be rather at variance with the recollection of his 
Quebecois ally Lapointe, but Mackenzie King offered the compromise that the former had 
perhaps not realised the significance of what his chief had intended to say. The Prime 
Minister then went on to elaborate his position. The first part of the remark was simply `a 
statement of fact.' If war broke out, did anyone imagine `our shipping would not 
immediately be attacked, that every effort would be made to stop vessels carrying grain, 
munitions or anything else from Canada, and that, if possible, our harbours might not be 
attacked.' To his evident satisfaction, `all present agreed to that.' He then went on to explain 
that, subject to this, it would still be for Parliament to decide the extent of Canadian 
participation or otherwise in such a conflict, `in light of all the circumstances.' At the current 
time, these circumstances included `the threat to freedom the world over which we could not 
possibly hope to escape, did they make any headway in Europe, whatever views we might 
hold of obligations arising out of imperial connections.' The Prime Minister feared that if 
they did not correct the false impression that neutrality remained a viable option under 
contemporary conditions, the party could `be crushed in the face of what might happen 
within the next four weeks.' 
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Such a view was anathema to Lapointe. Ever anxious about the Quebecois electorate, he had 
witnessed how poorly Mackenzie King's words had played in the Francophone press, 
leading him to try to prevent the Prime Minister from going any further than he already had, 
as he would explain to Dr. Skelton the following week.18 Careful to choose his battles, 
however, Lapointe did not confront his leader directly. Instead, as Mackenzie King noted in 
his diary that evening, and echoing his stance the previous September, the Minister of Justice 
argued that there was no need to make a statement of policy immediately.19 The Prime 
Minister at once agreed to this, but nevertheless countered that now was the time to decide 
what was necessary, while everyone was still calm. Lapointe, however, continued to argue in 
favour of deferring a decision as long as possible, whereupon Mackenzie King embarked on 
a piece of emotional blackmail, referring openly to his illness during the previous crisis, and 
explicitly warning that he might not be available to lead them during another one. This was 
of course vital for Lapointe, who was as dependent on Mackenzie King for exercising 
Quebec's influence at the heart of government, as Mackenzie King was on Lapointe to 
deliver Quebec's support. The latter hastily agreed that Canada would naturally have to enter 
any war such as cabinet was currently contemplating. Dunning, the Treasurer, concurred, 
predicting that a wave of emotion would sweep Canada into the war in spite of all `theories, 
doctrines and statements.' 
Lapointe, having recovered his balance, was not now above a bit of emotional blackmail of 
his own, wondering aloud if `it might be necessary for some of them to consider whether 
they could do better in the way of steadying people in their own parts, by being out of the 
Cabinet, rather than in it.' Mackenzie King swiftly countered that they should all work 
together within cabinet, building a consensus, as otherwise there would be inexorable 
pressure for a National Government, which `might lead to anything, conscription and all the 
rest.' He noted with satisfaction that that `seemed to make an impression.' At this point 
Gardiner, the Minister for Agriculture, helpfully interjected that he had it on good authority 
that plans were already afoot to bring a coalition about. The Prime Minister confided in his 
cabinet that he believed his entire staff were against him and regarded his recent reference to 
Sir Wilfrid Laurier as `appalling.' He was therefore deeply pessimistic as to what help he 
could look for from there in defining the government's position. He was dismissive of `the 
18 These were the words he would use the following week to ask Dr. Skelton, the permanent head of 
the Department for External Affairs, to use his influence to try to push the Prime Minister back into a 
neutral stance, see LAC Skelton Papers, Skelton, O.D., Diary, 2 February 1939 
19 King, Diary, 27 January 1939; for Lapointe's position in September, see Chapter One, above. 
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intelligentsia.' His duty `was to tell Canada of her dangers. Not of theories that could not 
save the lives of the people.' 
Cabinet therefore sought to fmd a way to define the government position itself. Surprisingly, 
Lapointe favoured using the argument of the indivisibility of the Crown as `that meant the 
loyalty of all to the Crown, and that French Canadians would be more ready to fight for the 
Crown for that reason.' In reality he was clutching at straws, trying to find a more palatable 
formula than `when England is at war, Canada is at war', which was playing so badly among 
his fellow Quebecois. Mackenzie King attempted to clear matters up but only succeeded in 
muddying the waters still further by declaring 
the only way was to make clear, as I had said before, while we had worked out our 
equality of status with regard to internal affairs, we had not yet come to the point 
where, in international relations, we were able to state the theoretical position which 
had been the one which had been achieved in practice. 
Even if they failed to come up with a satisfactory formula, the Prime Minister was relieved 
that there had been no acrimony and that cabinet was united on participating in the event of 
war. This was in fact far from true. Lapointe remained hostile, telling Dr. Skelton, the 
permanent head of the Department of External Affairs, the following week he `thought the 
P.M. was fooling himself if he thought he and Canada agreed.'20 
As cabinet could not come up with an acceptable statement of the government position, 
Mackenzie King was left with no alternative but to turn to the experts in the Department of 
External Affairs after all. He met with Skelton after cabinet had risen. It was clearly not a 
meeting he was looking forward to, introducing his account of the occasion in his diary, with 
the words: `it was the first I have spoken to S. of my speech knowing what his attitude would 
be.'21 He evidently expected a confrontation, but his advisor, like Lapointe, knew his chief 
too well to meet him head -on. Skelton allowed Mackenzie King to finish uninterrupted a 
long exposition of what had just transpired in cabinet and `what was a statement of fact in 
the face of a reality and what was policy.' The doctor did not attack this stance overtly, but 
instead sought to undermine it indirectly by suggesting: that it was inconsistent with the 
Prime Minister's previous remarks; that he should emulate his predecessor by steering a 
middle course between nationalism and imperialism; that there was no need to rush into a 
decision; that the younger generation felt no bond with Britain; and that Ireland and South 
2° LAC Skelton Papers, Skelton, O.D., Diary, Entry 2 February 1939 
21 King, Diary, 27 January 1939. 
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Africa were distancing themselves from London. Mackenzie King was having none of it. His 
current remarks addressed Canada's strategic reality not her theoretical constitutional 
position as his previous remarks had done. He was steering a middle course by addressing 
both issues rather than solely focusing on one to the exclusion of the other. The electorate 
would never forgive the Party if he did not clarify the position in advance of an actual crisis. 
He sympathised with the youth of Canada and would make clear the country was not 
automatically tied to Britain. The Irish and South African cases lacked relevance because 
each country had to decide for itself, based on its own conditions. The Prime Minister then 
took the opportunity to instruct his Permanent Secretary to devise `a formula which would 
express exactly what we have in mind.' The Permanent Secretary later conceded defeat on 
this issue, but remained privately committed to trying to wean his chief away from this 
stance.22 Looking back on the day, Mackenzie King congratulated himself in his diary for the 
strength of character he considered he had displayed in adopting such firm stances on what 
he saw as the real and theoretical aspects of external affairs. 23 
Doubts about the actual gravity of the situation began to emerge early for Mackenzie King, 
however; even before Hitler spoke. Up to the 27`11, he had depicted the situation in his diary 
as being variously `alarming', `very ominous', `extremely serious', and `perfectly 
appalling.'24 The entry for the next day indicates the Prime Minister's view was changing.25 
Meeting with Sir Gerald Campbell, the British High Commissioner in Ottawa, the next day, 
the Canadian Prime Minister noted how worried the British representative seemed about 
international relations generally and the prospects of a sudden attack on Britain in particular. 
Mackenzie King had indeed himself expressed similar sentiments in cabinet just the previous 
day. Nonetheless, some strands of optimism, at least with regard to the British situation, 
began to emerge in the Prime Minister's thinking, although still qualified by a general 
pessimism. It now seemed impossible to him that Hitler would launch a surprise attack on 
Britain, although he did not rule out the idea that war itself might still be imminent. Later the 
same day, listening admiringly to Chamberlain's speech in Birmingham, he acknowledged 
the situation to be `appallingly critical.' Even still, he could not bring himself `to believe that 
war will come between Germany and England.' By Sunday, his diary revealed this had 
become `a strong conviction.'26 He resolved to write to Hitler, believing that the power of 
22 LAC Skelton Papers, Skelton, O.D., Diary, Entry 2 February 1939 
23 King, Diary, 27 January 1939 
24 Ibid., 17 January 1939, 19 January 1939, 26 January 1939, & 27 January 1939 
25 ¡bid, 28 January 1939 
26 ¡bid, 29 January 1939 
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God's love would prevent war `at least with England.' He went on to describe a great feeling 
of calm descending on him, despite the sense of crisis and saw in his amicable social 
relations with the German Consul in Ottawa, `a sort of symbol of the powers exerting 
themselves in the beyond.' 
The next day, anxiety reared its head again before Hitler spoke. Mackenzie King wrote in 
his diary of seeing `subterfuge' in Japan's apparent refusal to sign a military agreement with 
Germany and Italy.27 His account continued how, after a meeting between the Cabinet Sub - 
Committee on defence and the heads of the armed forces, he came away positive `that we are 
hopelessly inadequate in each of the branches because of essentials.' This led him to even 
consider talking with Manion, the Leader of the Opposition, about placing orders for 
armaments before the appropriations for these had passed through Parliament. Hitler's 
speech, however, soothed the tensions which had been mounting through the day. His diary 
recorded that the Prime Minister did not listen to this in full, instead deciding to rest before 
going to the House, having heard the opening part. He was relieved to note that it seemed 
moderate in tone and considered Hitler sounded older and much less excitable. His early 
optimistic reaction was bolstered by reports he received later in the day emphasising the 
mildness of Hitler's speech, particularly in relation to what had been expected. He 
discounted the support Hitler had given Italy, considering it to be no more than the 
counterpart to what Britain was providing France with. The effect of all this was to seriously 
undermine the credibility of Whitehall as far as the Canadian Prime Minister was concerned. 
Their concern that Hitler would go to extremes in his speech had proved to be `mistaken.' 
Other elements of their despatch had been `unduly alarming.' The new despatch of the same 
date, confirming that Britain would regard any violation of Dutch neutrality as a casus belli, 
consequently did not concern Mackenzie King much, leading him to dismiss it in his diary 
with: `I simply cannot believe Germany has any such intention.' He went on to describe 
meeting Lapointe later, when the pair agreed that there would be no war, although 
Mackenzie King continued to fear `a year of frightful uncertainty.' 
The following day, the Prime Minister met with Dr. Windels, the German Consul, recording 
the substance of their talk in his diary.28 When Mackenzie King expressed his intention of 
writing Hitler a personal letter, the latter naturally enthused, saying `it might do great good.' 
The Canadian leader also took the opportunity to warn the German representative that if 
27 ¡bid, 30 January 1939 
28 ¡bid, 31 January 1939 
125 
Britain were attacked, Canada would inevitably enter such a war at her side. Windels did not 
have to comment on this, so it is perhaps surprising he concurred. Even more surprisingly, 
when Mackenzie King commented he believed the United States would do the same, the 
German Consul not only agreed, but confided that this was also the opinion of the German 
Ambassador in Washington. The Canadian Prime Minister was undoubtedly deeply flattered 
by these confidences, but even more so by the enthusiasm Windels demonstrated for 
Mackenzie King's idea of sending Hitler a personal letter. Canada's leader had now become 
even more sceptical about the British Foreign Office. Not only had they allowed themselves 
to become overly concerned by the situation, they had been shown up by Hitler, who 
Mackenzie King described in his diary as referring to `attacking Holland being next to 
seizing the Moon.' This convinced Mackenzie King that the German leader was much better 
versed than Whitehall in what was going on and much more adept at using this to his 
advantage. The Canadian Prime Minister did, however, record some slight concern about the 
Mediterranean, but was relieved to note that Chamberlain had swiftly responded to Hitler's 
speech by declaring that Britain was prepared to `help in appeasement where others are 
ready to join in disarmament.' The next day, 1 February 1939, he described in his diary how 
sending his letter to Hitler filled him with great expectations as to the impact it might have.29 
He remained concerned about the international situation, however. Despite his doubts about 
the Foreign Office, when London's cable, describing the ever closer arrangements they were 
contemplating with the French, arrived the following week, still inspired the diary entry that 
things were `very serious.'30 Nonetheless, in contrast to the near panic he had displayed 
during the final week of January, he went on to describe the most significant aspect of this 
development as being the parallel between the co- operation between Britain and France on 
one side of the Atlantic, and Quebec and Ontario on the other. In January, the Prime Minister 
had been too worried about the imminent prospect of war to involve himself in such 
digressions. At the end of the month, his diary for 28 February indicates how his new found 
scepticism played its part in his decision to let Lapointe veto Canadian support for British 
repudiation of `the General Act and Optional Clause', an arbitration process which might 
prove embarrassing in imposing a blockade in the event of war. 31 The entry continues by 
describing how the Prime Minister found his doubts about the Foreign Office reinforced by 
Lascelles, the King's secretary, but could not quite bring himself to believe the latter's 
explanation that it was all about manipulating stock market movements to obtain foreign 
29 ¡bid., 1 February 1939 
30 Ibid., 9 February 1939 
31 Ibid., 28 February 1939 
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exchange for Germany. By now far from convinced that war was inevitable, Mackenzie King 
nonetheless recorded in his journal on 2 March his belief that if it came, it would do so 
during 1939.32 This led him to decide not to place orders for planes in the United States, as 
these could not be ready in time for such a war; instead taking the more politically palatable 
course of ordering them from Canadian firms, although this would be more costly and take 
longer. When London finally indicated that it no longer appeared likely Hitler would move 
west, the Prime Minister described himself in his diary as being relieved to report this to 
cabinet, but he also noted he took the opportunity to stand by everything he had previously 
said 33 
Clearly this qualification referred to his reiteration of Laurier's remark that when England 
was at war, Canada was at war. This more bellicose stance can be traced back to 
Kristallnacht rather than the January cables from London, as he had already taken the first 
steps towards Canadian rearmament.34 He had also independently become distinctly 
pessimistic about the international outlook by the time the telegrams arrived. These latter had 
not only provided him with corroboration for his forebodings, but appear to have pushed him 
into a state of near panic; leading to urgent discussions with the Minister of Defence and the 
Governor -General, followed by an emergency cabinet meeting the next day, all of which 
generated more heat than light. This initial sense of alarm quickly subsided, though, to be 
replaced by a growing sense of scepticism towards London. In this, he was encouraged by 
both Lapointe and Skelton, who were both, for their own different reasons, anxious to turn 
the Prime Minister from the course he had embarked on. This endeavour was successful with 
regard to the relatively minor affair of the General Act and Optional Clause, where doubts 
about the Foreign Office's judgement played a part in Mackenzie King's decision to let 
Lapointe have his way. The Prime Minister's deep- rooted belief that he could transform the 
situation through personal intervention, because of the connection he believed he had 
established with Hitler on his visit to Germany, also resurfaced. This had lain dormant since 
Kristallnacht had led him to view the Nazi regime through less rose -tinted spectacles, but 
now re- emerged with his decision to contact Hitler directly in order to soothe international 
tensions. There were limits to the flexibility the Prime Minister was prepared to display, 
however. He remained intransigent in defence of his earlier reprise of Laurier's remark, 
whether addressing the relatively sympathetic Governor -General, his divided cabinet 
colleagues and party caucus, or his distinctly hostile professional advisors, in spite of all the 
32Ibid., 
2 March 1939 
33 Ibid., 7 March 1939 
34 See previous chapter. 
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efforts of those who opposed this line to have him moderate his position. To this extent his 
words had trapped him and because it was his own personal status as leader that was at stake, 
his reduced confidence in London's competence had no impact on his resolution on the 
matter. 
South African divisions deepen 
Dr. Gie had clearly not been subjected to the influences which had inspired the British `war 
scare' cable of 25 January. On the 16th, he had produced a resolutely cheerful forecast for 
Pretoria on the outlook for Europe for the rest of the year: Russian isolation meant Germany 
could proceed less aggressively in Eastern Europe; fears of German action against the 
Ukraine had subsided; German- Polish talks appeared to have gone well; Memel might revert 
to Germany, but there would be no crisis over this; the Germans were bound to be pleased 
that Chamberlain was continuing to play a central part in bringing about appeasement 
between the Axis and the western powers through his visit to Italy; and Germany was 
exercising great restraint in its support of Italy in its resistance to France.35 Gie conceded the 
increased pace of German armaments was concerning, but, not as alarming as the pace the 
rest of the world was rearming at and, besides, any increased risk could be more than offset 
by the continued diplomatic resolution of problems. Gie was clearly taken aback by the 
dismissal of Dr. Schacht as President of the Reichsbank on 19 January, but apart from 
expressing concern at the direction financial policy might take in respect of armaments and 
that this probably heralded the return of Dr. Goebbels to prominence, he did not take the 
opportunity to revise his forecasts for a quiet 1939 in his 23 January report on the episode for 
Pretoria.36 There was nothing here to challenge his Prime Minister's preconceptions that 
Germany continued to be a country Britain could and should be prepared to conciliate. 
Like Mackenzie King in Canada, General Smuts was clearly worried by developments even 
before seeing the telegram from London. Pirow, the South African Minister of Defence, later 
expressed the view in Hertzog that Smuts then believed that war was inevitable.37 Smuts's 
letters to his friends, the Gilletts, do not in fact indicate this, but nevertheless display some 
anxiety as to what the future held, for instance writing on 26 January that: `a period of grave 
35 NASA SAB BTS /1/4/12 /German Foreign Policy, Gie to Hertzog, 16 January 1939 
36 NASA SAB GG /1082 /22 /203 /Diplomatic Matters - General- Germany, Gie to Hertzog, 23 January 
1939 
37 Pirow, Hertzog, p.242 
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tension may therefore lie ahead of us.'38 In the same letter, he placed greater emphasis than 
Gie on the dismissal of Dr. Schacht as a blow for moderate influence in the Nazi regime, 
considering that it could only herald greater activity on Hitler's part, where Gie had left the 
issue open. He continued that Ribbentrop's Polish visit, and the despatch of a mission to 
open trade negotiations in Moscow, were not evidence of a calmer atmosphere, but rather 
attempts to clear the decks in Eastern Europe, ahead of an Axis initiative on the colonial 
question or in the Mediterranean area, which Gie had not addressed. The General's described 
his greatest concern, however, as being Spain, although he did not entirely rule out Hitler 
precipitating another crisis elsewhere beforehand. The end of the Civil War was at hand and 
then `the fat will be in the fire.' The French and British would demand the withdrawal of 
Italian troops from Spain and Smuts believed Mussolini had no intention of complying. This 
would then prove `the real test of Chamberlain's policy.' A test, however, meant that it 
might still succeed, so even though Smuts was clearly deeply pessimistic, he had equally 
evidently not come to the point where he saw war as inevitable. 
Also pessimistic was Charles Te Water. On 29 January, as London cabled Pretoria advising 
a German attack on the Netherlands would mean war, he produced a report that was 
significantly more negative than Gie's, as `observation of the obscure but consistent 
deterioration in Anglo -German relations has led me to the contrary conclusion.'39 Te Water 
therefore viewed the previous Dominions Office missive of 25 January with no very great 
surprise. He was, however, careful to recount the rather more reassuring news (from General 
Hertzog's perspective) that Halifax had let slip that German domestic difficulties might just 
as easily prevent as encourage another adventure on Hitler's part. Nonetheless, Te Water did 
not himself share this more comfortable view. He had been reluctant previously to impart 
his views to the General but `while these [the direction of events] still remain incalculable, to 
continue to take refuge in wishful thinking as an alternative method of reason and deduction 
seems to be to me sheer cowardice.' The pace of the arms race represented a `creeping 
paralysis.' This and every less sure test indicated that Europe was `entering upon the last 
phase.' All of which was in sharp contrast to Gie, who had argued that the arms race, while a 
disturbing element, was containable and that all other factors militated for a more peaceful 
prospect.4° 
38 NASA Smuts Papers (Al) Vol.246 /Correspondence, Smuts to Margaret Gillett, 26 January 1939 
39 NASA SAB BTS /1/4/10 /Anglo- German Relations, Te Water to Hertzog, 29 January 1939 
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The same day Smuts wrote again to the Gilletts and by then had clearly seen at least the first 
Dominions Office telegram, as he explained, `shortly after writing this [his previous letter] 
the cables began to warn us of trouble coming in Europe.'41 Unlike Te Water, he considered 
Chamberlain's speech had shown greater firmness than heretofore and `Hitler is expected to 
explode a new bombshell tomorrow etc. etc.' All this led Smuts to believe that `we may be 
on the eve of a crisis even worse than last Sep.' Returning to his concern that this would be 
in the Mediterranean, he emphasised the latter's importance to the Commonwealth, 
compared with Eastern Europe, and its proximity to United States' interests in the Atlantic 
`which is their English Channel.' This led him to believe `the dangers of a general 
conflagration are therefore much greater.' He thought it `madness' that Hitler and Mussolini 
would stake all on such a gamble `but there has been madness before and we are not 
immune.' His greatest fear, however, was that the ratcheting up of international tension was 
actually just a ruse, because he believed this could not succeed again `and it is more likely to 
create a situation from which honourable retreat is impossible.' All this was, nevertheless, 
still some way short of saying war had become inevitable. 
The next day, 30 January, Dr. Gie sent Hertzog a briefing in advance of Hitler's speech the 
same day.42 He made no reference to the cables from London and there is no reason to 
believe they had been shown to him. Overall, he continued to display an optimistic view on 
the prospects for 1939 in his report. Unlike Smuts, he was not greatly distressed by the 
dismissal of Schacht, as it simply showed `one should continue to expect the unexpected.' 
This was no reason for pessimism, as `forecasts, whether they are gloomy or optimistic, 
should be based on surer foundations than that.' Gie refused to be negative. There were 
indeed `signs and rumours, more rumours than signs, which might be interpreted as pointing 
to disturbing developments in 1939.' Economically and fmancially, however, he still did not 
have `tragic expectations for 1939.' He conceded that Hitler `would continue his "strong 
policies ".' These were simply inherent in the Nazi regime. Gie did not address this further, 
implying that this was something that simply had to be accepted. It was also clear that any 
brakes Schacht had managed to apply to the colossal state expenditure particularly on 
armaments, had been removed, which `might be interpreted as indications the regime is 
preparing to make or meet trouble in the international field at an early date.' However, Gie 
was also keen to reiterate that `Germany's acceleration in armaments production was only a 
part of the universal armaments race.' It therefore could not be taken as definitive proof that 
41 NASA Smuts Papers (Al) Vol.246 /Correspondence, Smuts to Margaret Gillett, 29 January 1939 
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Hitler was necessarily preparing for another crisis in 1939. Gie was also dismissive of 
rumours of an imminent mobilisation as this had been denied and the consensus was that this 
denial was trustworthy. There were indeed dangers inherent in the situation, `but given time 
they may be overcome by wise statesmanship, which fortunately remains active.' Alarming 
rumours could not be trusted as these often vanished quickly, as the recent ones concerning 
Eastern Europe had done. Gie believed that the key in this case had been the improvements 
he saw in the German- Polish relationship, judging from the visit of Beck, the Polish Foreign 
Minister, to Berchtesgaden and Ribbentrop's swift counter visit to Warsaw. Superficially he 
shared Smuts's concern about the Mediterranean, but he had heard from Coulondre, the 
French Ambassador, that the Führer was urging restraint on his Axis partner, and that this 
information had been obtained `on the best authority.' Hitler would undoubtedly attack 
Roosevelt, but this was only to be expected given the latter's interference in European 
matters to improve his domestic electoral chances. Gie therefore felt `still prepared to stand 
by the optimistic expectations for 1939, which I expressed in my first despatch of the New 
Year.' 
Three days later, Gie reported on the actual contents of Hitler's 30 January speech, noting 
that in a few instances these had departed from what had originally been expected.43 Hitler 
had not mentioned Roosevelt and had been extraordinarily moderate in his comments on the 
United States, in spite of what Gie saw as the President's exploitation of the Jewish question. 
On this, Gie admitted: `dis 'n verskriklike gedagte, maar dit moet as moontlik beskou word, 
dat die Jode in Duitsland uitgemoor sal word, as 'n oorlog hier uitbreek' [it is a terrible 
thought, but it must be regarded as possible, that the Jews in Germany will be massacred if a 
war breaks out here]. Hitler's declaration of unconditional support for Mussolini had also 
been surprising, but the South African sought to explain away the disturbing aspects of this 
development, relying on the assurances Coulondre had received, that, whatever Hitler might 
state in public, he was working assiduously to reduce tensions behind the scenes. In any 
case, Gie found it hard to believe that Mussolini was really prepared to confront British and 
French forces, so Hitler's undertaking was perfectly compatible with his declaration that he 
believed in a long peace. The minister again saw no reason in Hitler's speech to change his 
earlier predictions for a quiet 1939. 
In the longer term, the doctor felt less optimistic, as it was now apparent that Germany and 
Italy `in `n oorlog skouer- aan- skouer sal veg, en ons moet aanneem, (1) dat hierdie enge 
43 NASA SAB BTS 1/4/12, German Foreign Policy, Gie to Hertzog, 2 February 1939 
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verbond geruime tyd sal duur, en (2) dat dit potensiëel aggressief is' [would enter a war 
shoulder to shoulder, and we must assume that (1) this covenant will last some time, and (2) 
that it is potentially aggressive]. However, he reassured his government that Hitler's only 
remaining claim on Britain and France was for the return of colonies, which was not 
considered grounds for war. Pretoria could therefore apparently continue to enjoy its 
mandate in South -West Africa without concern that this might be taken from it without its 
consent. Nonetheless, the pledge to Mussolini did seem to imply a change in Germany's 
position. If, for instance, Mussolini were to demand Tunis from France and France resolved 
to go to war to prevent this, then Germany now would be drawn in. Also, if the German - 
Italian bloc meant a redistribution of territories by their claim for a redistribution of goods, 
then a war in the longer term was inevitable. 
Still, Gie saw no reason to concern himself now with such a grim prospect as Hitler's 
speech would undoubtedly inspire efforts to resolve the underlying issues. The main 
practical part of the speech was a long exposition of the German economic situation and 
what it was tied to. Gie undertook to analyse this in greater depth in his next report, and 
confined himself for the moment to saying that the English response to that explanation 
seemed favourable and the Germans were very appreciative of this. Funk, the Minister of 
Economics (and now President of the Reichsbank), had personally reassured the South 
African that steps were already in hand for serious Anglo -German negotiations to commence 
imminently. The Union could therefore hope that the discussions would lead to positive 
economic results, which would in themselves be very valuable, but could also lead to even 
greater benefits, such as arms limitation, and hence create a favourable atmosphere for 
political negotiations. Gie's account of the speech, like his earlier reports, was again unlikely 
to contain anything disturbing to Hertzog. Hitler's aggressive support of Mussolini could be 
offset by the presumption that he was working in the background to reduce tension. The 
colonial question would never be grounds for war, so the Union could continue to enjoy its 
mandate in South -West Africa in security. The German- Italian bloc might appear aggressive, 
but this very aggression would invite efforts to resolve the underlying problems. Germany's 
economic difficulties were to be addressed through negotiations with Britain, thereby easing 
international tension further. This gloss suggested the prospects for peace, and therefore 
South African domestic unity, were far from hopeless. 
Smuts took a less favourable view of the position than Gie. Writing to the Gilletts the day 
after Gie's report, he admitted that the speech had been more moderate than expected and 
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that Hitler had failed to deliver his much anticipated 'bombshell.'44 Nevertheless, he saw 
areas of immediate concern in what had been said. Mindful of South West Africa, he felt 
Hitler's insistence on the return of the former German colonies outwith the terms of a 
general settlement of outstanding grievances `should fill us with alarm.' Unlike Gie, he 
clearly took no comfort in the Führer's caveat that this would never be a cause for war, as 
this did not even merit a mention. However, he regarded the promise of support for 
Mussolini against France as being `the most ominous point in his speech.' Smuts remained 
convinced that the end of the Spanish Civil War was likely to trigger an international crisis, 
through Mussolini's expected refusal to then withdraw Italian forces from Spain. 
Consequently Hitler's declaration of support for Italy would commit Germany to joining in a 
confrontation with the West, leading the South African to conclude `it looks as if these two 
dictators think the time is ripe to pick a quarrel.' 
Smuts's greater pessimism can be inferred from his changed attitude to the Munich 
Settlement. Only the previous week he had dismissed the Czech crisis in his letter to the 
Gilletts, as something in which `the British Commonwealth did not feel itself very directly 
concerned.'45 He had indeed previously expressed some reservations about the agreement in 
this private correspondence, such as his 10 October 1938 comment that `the lion has tasted 
blood and his appetite may continue.'46 However, he had balanced these concerns with the 
view that war had not been justified over the issue, writing the next day that it was `a price 
the world ought not to be called upon to pay.'47 Now, in February 1939, he described to his 
friends that Munich was both a `defeat' and a 'capitulation.'48 This appeared to move beyond 
a recognition that the lion's appetite might indeed be continuing. He had identified that 
possibility at the time of Munich, and had not then considered such an eventuality would 
fatally undermine the settlement. Whereas previously he had been a cautious supporter of 
Munich, with some reservations about its consequences, he now appeared to view it in 
entirely condemnatory terms, and if he continued to see any redeeming features in the 
settlement, he did not give expression to them. In a supplementary letter to Arthur Gillett on 
11 February, he restated his continuing concerns about the international situation, noting that 
while the publicly available news did not appear particularly disturbing, `the fuller cable 
44 NASA Smuts Papers (Al) VoL 246 /Correspondence, Smuts to Margaret Gillett, 3 February 1939 
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news which reached us was very alarming.'49 Smuts now considered peace could only be 
preserved if `we once more surrender to force.' This only reinforced his pessimism as `I 
doubt whether the democracies will do that again.' Whereas the previous autumn, even after 
Godesberg, but before Munich, he had written to Arthur that `these are anxious times but we 
need not yet despair of peace.'50 Clearly, he continued to be far more concerned than he had 
been the previous autumn. 
On 14 February Te Water returned to the subject in a letter to General Hertzog.51 He 
observed that much of the contents of the Dominions' Office telegrams of 25 and 29 
January, had been contradicted by subsequent information received from the London 
government. He worried that `the Chamberlain policy, so lately accused by its critics of 
isolationism, has been moving to "the left" with a rapidity which must be alarming to those 
who, like the Dominions [sic], have long desired Great Britain to be free of embarrassing 
continental commitments.' He considered that the extension of British commitments to 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland, together with the extended scope of the staff talks 
with France would naturally have implications for his government. He thought the Canadians 
were also disturbed `at the rapid increase in power and prestige of the Vansittart school of 
thought in the Foreign Office.' He could not reconcile the Dominions Office cables with 
Chamberlain's response to Hitler's speech and was unsure which represented the true voice 
of London. Overall, Te Water considered that while the situation seemed to be superficially 
improving, what could be glimpsed beneath the surface `is not and cannot be reassuring.' He 
remained convinced the only reliable test of international tension continued to be the 
armaments race, when it slowed things would improve, and not before. On 17 February, 
however, he was able to inform Hertzog that Halifax now appeared more relaxed about the 
issue but that London had informed Berlin that there could be no discussion of the colonial 
issue in the present climate.52 
Smuts was still clearly deeply concerned when he returned to the topic of international 
relations in a letter to Margaret Gillett on the next day. 53 He feared from the news he 
49 NASA Smuts Papers (Al) Vol. 246 /Correspondence, Smuts to Arthur Gillett, 11 February 1939. 
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received in the cables `that Italy is really backing out of her undertaking to evacuate [Spain] 
(as I had predicted).' Then, Smuts reiterated, `the fat would be in the fire.' By 25 February he 
was writing to her that he had observed `the swing toward France has intensified.' 54 This 
was evident from `recent speeches by high quarters.' Smuts therefore concluded `that 
Chamberlain realises the true state of affairs.' The South African Deputy Prime Minister 
clearly no longer had any faith in `the spirit of Munich': `peace pacts look funny in the 
atmosphere of present happenings both on the continent and in England.' His mood had not 
improved by 5 March when, again writing to Margaret, having touched on Franco's victory 
and the Grand Mufti's campaign in Palestine, he rhetorically demanded `when will the rot be 
stopped ?'55 On 10 March, despite London's intimation that the worst now appeared to be 
over, in a letter to Arthur, he condemned the temptation of pacifism: predicting that `if we do 
not go all out - by political action and if needs be by fighting for our democratic principles, 
the totalitarians are certain to win and reduce our civilisation to a confirmed servitude.'56 He 
continued to be convinced that `Nazism is a form of what is called Anti -Christ.' Naturally, 
he was `prepared to fight against that.' He now dismissed Munich `as a truce - and a very 
poor one at that.' He pointed to the armaments race and asked `what does it mean if not 
business, or a bluff which may very likely lead to business ?' The same day, to Margaret 
Gillett, he noted that the cables now `on the whole are optimistic, but I remain pessimistic.'57 
In this context, the cable most particularly referred to was that of 8 March, in which the 
Dominions' Office finally grudgingly conceded that Hitler either never had planned to 
launch a sudden spring offensive against the West, or at least no longer intended doing so. 
Te Water's analysis of this, in a letter to Hertzog on 7 March, was that this view `in so far as 
it reflects a present state of relieved tension is in my opinion a just estimate.' 58 He believed, 
however, that the British government was not at this point looking ahead more than a few 
months at a time and remained distinctly cautious about future developments. His Prime 
Minister had hitherto kept his own counsel on the `alarming speculations' from London, 
responding to communications from neither Gie, Te Water nor the Dominions' Office.59 The 
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8 March cable however, encouraged him to take the opportunity to boost party morale by 
downplaying the probability of a politically divisive war breaking out in Europe. 
Accordingly, his speech to the Burger Commando officers' annual conference two days later 
was made available for public consumption, while the other addresses were delivered, as 
noted by The Cape Times, `behind closed doors.'60 The paper reported Hertzog's 
acknowledgement that the international situation had indeed appeared difficult three months 
earlier, but that he declared the position much improved since then. He denounced the view 
that war in Europe was now inevitable as `irresponsible and foolish.' He admitted that the 
armaments race continued, but noted that `British armament is being carried on only so that 
if anyone is determined on war Britain will be prepared for her enemies.' Likewise, it would 
be unwise for South Africa to ignore its own defences under the circumstances. The 
durability of peace would not depend on the actions of one nation, but of several, however 
for his own part he declared: `I am convinced that there will be no general war for a 
considerable time.' He supplemented this with the remark `that the cause of peace in Europe 
would be maintained, not only for today and tomorrow, but for all time.' Clearly Hertzog 
hoped that the worst was over. 
Up to this point, however, the South African elite had at least shared a consensus about 
developments in Europe. The Sudeten crisis had not been worth a war, but its peaceful 
resolution had not meant perpetual peace could be taken for granted. Investment in defence 
had therefore continued unabated and even been expanded. South-West Africa was not for 
return, but in the interests of stability, it was preferable to satisfy German grievances about 
this, whether financially or with other people's territory. Kristallnacht had been inexcusable 
and the Germans had no one but themselves to blame for the international reaction, but 
engagement with the regime remained preferable to the alternatives. Beyond this point, 
however, consensus fell apart. Pirow, the Minister for Defence, returned from his European 
summits depressed by his failure to achieve a dramatic coup, but more importantly 
convinced that war was now inevitable. Te Water had come to a similar conclusion from his 
scrutiny of the accelerating arms race. Unwilling to accept this, but unable to provide an 
alternative vision, Hertzog had fallen silent until the news from London allowed him to once 
General's prophetic statesmanship. In reality, Hertzog's silence on the subject of external affairs when 
the international situation appeared tense throughout this episode, combined with his readiness to leap 
on any apparent relaxation as evidence of the durability of peace, suggests a mindset that could not 
bring itself to accept the view that war was unavoidable. Pirow's version therefore appears unlikely, 
and if Hertzog confided his views on the subject in any of his other cabinet colleagues during this 
period, evidence of such uncharacteristic volubility has yet to emerge. 
° NASA Herizog Papers (A32) Vol. I23 /Cuttings Cape To Times, 11 March 1939 
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again credibly proclaim his belief in the durability of peace. Smuts, in contrast, had been 
convinced by Hitler's speech that war was all but unavoidable, and his view did not change 
with the tone of the cables. Gie alone remained relentlessly optimistic, at least about the short- 
term prospects for peace, although his prognosis for the longer term was more gloomy. 
The Australian Reaction 
In Australia, Cabinet did not sit from 13 December 1938 until 6 February 1939 and 
Parliament did not meet until 19 April.G1 As the British High Commission in Canberra had 
pointed out, such periods led to inevitable difficulties in formulating policy if a crisis 
erupted, since ministers would disperse to their various constituencies across the country, 
rendering informed collective decision- making all but impossible.62 On this occasion, 
Colonel Hodgson even appealed to his minister, Billy Hughes, to intercede with the Prime 
Minister, to relocate the next cabinet meeting from Hobart on 6 February to `a place where 
ministers can be available in time of emergency.'63 While this did not happen, Lyons did 
arrange for John Curtin, the leader of the Opposition, to be shown copies of the telegrams 
from London.64 Despite his party's difficulties on the subject, Curtin had already requested 
that Parliament be summoned due to the `grave national danger.'65 He replied to the Prime 
Minister on 31 January, insisting the cables required he `repeat emphatically my request 
Parliament should meet immediately. Consider there is no alternative.'66 Lyons, however, 
demurred. This was after both Hitler's speech and the statement Chamberlain had 
subsequently made on it. The Australian Prime Minister found nothing in either of these 
declarations to suggest a critical situation was developing and therefore cabled the leader of 
the Opposition that he saw no need for Parliament to meet.67 Moreover, he continued, he 
considered that to do as Curtin suggested could be harmful, as it `would create undue upset 
in the minds of people of Australia leading perhaps to economic and other upsets.' He did 
nevertheless provide Curtin with the polite but meaningless reassurance that Parliament 
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would of course be recalled should the government decide that developments required such a 
step. 
Although Cabinet met on 6 February in Hobart, the minute s of the proceedings indicate it 
did not directly discuss the international situation.68 It did, however, consider the question of 
conducting a national survey of manpower availability as urged by Brigadier Street, the new 
Minister of Defence. It agreed to do so, albeit on a voluntary basis. Much of the political 
`sting' of this measure was also dispersed by the subsequent decision to also set up a 
National Women's Register. It also agreed to set up a committee to consider the benefits of 
amalgamating the territories of Papua and New Guinea, another clear indication that it had 
no intention of surrendering the mandate over the latter, despite Germany's apparent 
intention to recover its former territory. Both of these developments can be viewed as 
victories for a `hawkish' perspective, and it is clear that Billy Hughes, the aggressive 
Minister for External Affairs, was no longer as isolated as he had been the previous 
September.69 It was also clear that while `hawks' might be in the ascendant for the moment, 
the `doves' led by Lyons had not entirely abandoned their stance, as the manpower survey's 
voluntary nature could severely restrict its usefulness in the event the government sought to 
adopt compulsory military training (CMT), as the `hawks' desired. Cabinet's divisions over 
the issue were exacerbated by the continuing leadership crisis. Casey wanted Lyons's 
blessing to succeed him and would do nothing to cross him, while Billy Hughes's instincts 
always favoured the more aggressive course, and Menzies's actions the previous autumn had 
already placed him in opposition to the Prime Minister. 
Cabinet continued its deliberations the following day, deciding that military recruitment 
should be stepped up and that `every volunteer offering in areas where units be established 
be accepted regardless of numbers.'70 The practical consequences of this change from the 
previous policy of only accepting recruits in areas where numbers were considered 
sufficiently large to justify the step, might be slight, but it reflected the heightened anxiety 
consequent on the telegrams from London. Cabinet also considered the British government's 
communication that it was considering repudiating the General Act for the Pacific Settlement 
of International Disputes by 15 February 1939. Here Billy Hughes was uncharacteristically 
cautious, urging that Cabinet should cable London expressing concern that this would only 
exacerbate international tensions in the current circumstances and recommending that no 
6s NAA A2694 VoL19, Parts I & II, Cabinet Minutes, 6 February 1939 
69 See Chapter One. 
7° NAA A2694 Vo1.19, Parts I& II, Cabinet Minutes, 6 February 1939 
138 
such step should be taken, particularly as Italy continued to adhere to the General Act, again 
evidence that Canberra was deeply concerned by the reports it was receiving. On the same 
date, Cabinet Sub -Committee No.1 also acquiesced in the proposal that the Covenant of the 
League of Nations be separated from the Peace Settlement in the hopes that this might 
reduce international tensions and this was subsequently approved by the full Cabinet on 14 
February 1939. 
Billy Hughes later reported on the worsening international situation for ministers on the 10`h, 
although this was not discussed at cabinet." By this time, Canberra had not only received the 
Dominions' Office original cable, but the supplementary ones announcing London's decision 
to regard the integrity of the Netherlands and Switzerland as casi belli, the direction of 
Anglo -French talks against a German- Italian combination, Roosevelt's seemingly 
independent confirmation of the emerging threat, and the apparently relieved reaction to 
Hitler's speech in European capitals. Stirling, the External Affairs Liaison Officer in 
London, had also sent a description of a relatively optimistic conversation he had had with 
Sir Edward Bridges, the Cabinet Secretary in London, on the international situation on 20 
January. This report, however, was apparently for completeness's sake as by the time of 
writing Stirling had seen the version of London's cable of 25 January sent to Washington 
and acknowledged that his account `must be regarded in light of the later views set out 
there.'72 
Hughes seems to have agreed, as nothing was done to downplay the threat in the paper he 
had prepared for ministers.73 This opened with the concession that it had seemed for some 
time after Munich that appeasement might succeed in dissipating potential sources of 
conflict before these ever developed into full -blown crises. It had to be acknowledged, 
however, that these hopes had failed to come to fruition and `we must now reckon with the 
possibility of a sudden crisis involving immediately the four great powers.' The period since 
Munich had in fact been characterised by two major trends: the increasing assertion of Italian 
claims against France coupled with continued German restlessness despite the expectation 
that this would have ceased with the settlement of their grievances over the Sudetenland . 
These trends were exacerbated by the increasingly close relationship that seemed to be 
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developing between these two potential aggressors. It had seemed that if Germany had acted 
in September, she would have acted alone, but this could no longer be counted on as being 
the case. Hitler's speech had shown that Germany would be at Italy's side if the latter 
became embroiled in war, while both London and Washington advised that Berlin and Rome 
either had entered, or were on the verge of entering, into a defensive and offensive 
arrangement, into which they were also trying to entice the Japanese. The paper used 
Roosevelt's citation of three separate, trustworthy sources in support of the threat to 
reinforce its credibility, never considering that these might have been London, Paris and the 
informant these latter had themselves been enlightened by. 
Hughes continued, noting the Australians had no information as to whether Italian claims 
had been the subject of detailed discussion during Chamberlain and Halifax's visit to Rome 
but understood that Britain was prepared to mediate between Italy and France, should this 
prove acceptable to both parties. The Rome talks appeared to have been `cordial.' However, 
subsequently doubts had emerged as to Italy's real intentions in Spain, due to statements by 
Sr. Gayda, an Italian publicist, although these had been disavowed by Ciano, the Italian 
Foreign Minister. This did not appear to have resolved the issue, and French suspicions that 
Italy intended to exercise the influence it had achieved over the Nationalists in Spain 
remained a significant destabilising factor. Duncan, the Acting High Commissioner in 
London, had reported that he had discussed Italian moves with Sir Thomas Inskip, the new 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, but the latter had been sceptical about Mussolini's 
appetite for a confrontation, given the vulnerability of Italy's communication with its East 
African possessions through the Suez Canal. 
The Minister for External Affairs considered that London had more in mind than Italy's 
ambitions, however, and it was German intentions on which real interest was focused. The 
cable of 25 January had identified three potential avenues; an attack on the Netherlands, a 
surprise air attack on Britain followed by a general offensive against the Western Powers, 
and a renewal of Germany's colonial claims. The possibility of an attack on Holland had 
been initially supported by a report from the Australian Counsellor in Washington, but he 
now reported the State Department was considering the possibility that these rumours had 
been circulated by the Germans themselves with a view to generating an offer for the return 
of their former colonies. Hughes considered that Hitler had not clarified German intentions 
on 30 January, despite the prior expectations that he would do so. Apart from the 
commitment to Italy, Hughes reported the German leader as focusing primarily on the 
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colonial question in substantially similar terms to previously. While conceding that tensions 
had reduced somewhat in the wake of the speech, the Minister for External Affairs noted that 
Stirling reported from London that `the Foreign Office saw no grounds to suppose that Hitler 
had abandoned any of his aspirations or that anything he had said lessened the need for 
vigilance.' Indeed, Hughes observed that on 1 February the British Government had 
confirmed its provisional decision to regard a move against the Netherlands as a casus belli 
and had extended this to cover Switzerland as well. He further advised his colleagues that 
this decision had been communicated to the French and the British had also proposed to 
broaden the scope of the Anglo -French Staff talks to include war against Germany and Italy 
in combination. Belgium, it was added, had reaffirmed its commitment to neutrality in 
response to a query from London. These were the main issues affecting Europe, with others 
being of lesser import. After the fall of Barcelona, the government position in Spain 
appeared on the verge of collapse and it was reported that they were seeking terms from the 
Nationalists. The Czechs had granted the Germans right of free passage across their frontiers 
and these had now been drawn so that `purely Czech areas have been taken over whenever it 
suited the German interests to do so, and vital Czech lines of communication had been cut.' 
German influence and economic activity was expanding relentlessly in eastern and central 
Europe. Polish policy was considered to be `somewhat ambiguous.' They had renewed ties 
with the Soviets in November, but it now appeared that they were moving back into the 
German orbit with the visit of Colonel Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, to Hitler in 
January, and it was presumed this reflected a German intention to draw Poland into the 
Rome -Berlin axis. The question of a German corridor across the Polish Corridor also 
appeared `to be under consideration.' 
Hughes noted that Russian participation in a putative war in September had been dismissed 
as being of questionable value because of the impact of the purges on their armed forces. 
This conclusion could only be reinforced by the likelihood of increased domestic discontent 
from the cut in wage rates and rise in output targets ordered in early January, while the 
Japanese continued to tie down substantial Soviet forces in Siberia. The Yugoslav 
government had fallen and it remained to be seen whether its successor would be as 
successful in striking a balance between the Axis and the West. In the Far East, Japan had 
published its proposals for a solution in China. The Japanese had also indicated an interest in 
resolving British grievances in China, but complained that this was difficult while British 
policy remained essentially anti- Japanese. Britain had responded that without resolution of 
their grievances, progress toward a better relationship was difficult, and could not, in any 
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case, be at the expense of the Chinese. It might be thought that the fall of the Konoye 
government in Japan would strengthen the hand of the service ministers seeking closer ties 
with Germany and Italy, but there was no recent information on this. Developments in the 
Far East therefore could not be separated from those in Europe and the report concluded that 
it was apparent that `for the moment, the dominant issues are in Europe.' 
Hughes did not return to the subject of external affairs until 28 February, although on 15 
February, Cabinet approved a cable to Wellington on the proposed agenda for the Pacific 
Defence Conference, a day on which the minutes indicate discussions had been dominated 
by Casey's proposal for a new scheme to replace the government's flagship National 
Insurance Scheme on which no agreement could be reached.74 On the 16`h Cabinet accepted 
the respective ministers' recommendations on a dry dock for a capital ship and a 
memorandum by the Chairman of the National Manpower Committee on the proposed 
National Register.75 On the 27th Cabinet deferred consideration of the report by the 
Inspector -General of Armed Forces into the expansion of Australia's permanent forces, 
ordered the reconsideration of the circularisation list for the war book and agreed the 
establishment of a National Women's Register.76 On the 28th, Cabinet was again unable to 
reach a decision on the Inspector -General's report and Hughes briefed ministers on the 
international situation, although this was only `for information.'77 Since the Minister for 
External Affairs last report for ministers, Stirling, had forwarded a number of reports 
containing a mixture of reassuring and disturbing news. He had advised that the Hungarians 
discounted aggressive intentions on the part of Germany.78 However, the independence of 
their view was rather undermined by their adherence to the Anti- Comintern Pact.79 More 
comfortingly, the Swiss discounted any immediate threat to their independence, but were 
less sanguine about the prospects of Germany attacking France through Swiss territory in the 
event of war.ß0 There was widespread relief, however, at the perceived moderation of 
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Hitler's speech on 30 January.81 The German press had concentrated on these generally 
favourable responses, but, less comfortingly, had studiously avoided mentioning any 
qualifications that accompanied them, such as Chamberlain's caveat that progress depended 
on German recognition of the necessity for a limitation on armaments.82 Germany itself 
faced economic difficulties, but this could equally be interpreted as either a stabilising factor 
inhibiting foreign adventures, or a destabilising one provoking them as a distraction from 
domestic woes.83 More unambiguously disturbing was the evidence that Berlin was depicting 
Munich as a victory for German might, apparently in order to impress on the people the need 
to make further sacrifices for their country's strength, which appeared to indicate what tack 
the regime was likely to take.84 If they wished to challenge London, it seemed they would 
need to do so sooner rather than later on economic grounds, although it had been previously 
reported that the army would be reluctant to consider any action before June.85 Evidence of 
the continuing level of tension in Britain could also be discerned from the news that a paper, 
not circulated to the dominions, written by an anonymous `German expert' and which had 
reached Whitehall by the circuitous route of Rennie Smith, a former Labour M.P., and 
Vansittart, the former Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, was taken sufficiently 
seriously to be placed before Cabinet, rather to Stirling's surprise.86 The paper itself depicted 
Germany as being primarily interested in eastern expansion, but needing to render the West 
impotent prior to embarking on any such project, due to concerns over the durability of 
agreements reached with democratic forms of government, which scarcely made comforting 
reading.87 As well as these reports from Stirling, Halifax had also taken the opportunity 
offered by his meeting with the dominion High Commissioners on 17 February, to provide 
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the rather opaque opinion that he now believed the reports emanating from Germany at the 
start of the year had either been exaggerated or designed to intimidate the West, although the 
exact opposite might just as easily turn out to be true.88 These diverse messages from London 
therefore suggested the only real positive that could be taken from the situation was that 
nothing had actually happened yet. Whether or not it would, remained to be seen. 
Billy Hughes had no doubt where responsibility lay, writing in a 28 February draft for 
cabinet: `the present international tension derives chiefly from uncertainty as to the 
intentions of two powers, Germany and Italy.'89 He discounted Japan as, despite its perennial 
interest to Australia, concern had faded into the background once more, on the assumption it 
would not strike unless Britain already found itself engaged with the former pair. It 
appeared, moreover, that Tokyo was proving resistant to pressure from its partners to 
formalise the Anti -Comintern Pact into a regular alliance, even if the fall of Hainan was an 
important strategic development and the prospects for non- Japanese interests in Japanese - 
controlled China continued to be bleak. With regard to Germany and Italy, there was as yet 
insufficient evidence to draw a firm conclusion as to their aims, and what evidence there 
was, was unfortunately contradictory in its nature. Referring to the messages from London, 
Hughes noted there had been reports of German plans for aggression since the beginning of 
the year but so far these appeared to be no more than rumours. Other concerns arose from the 
accelerated pace of the arms race since September, the dismissal of Dr. Schacht and 
Germany's economic difficulties, which last Hitler had specifically referred to in his recent 
speech. These combined with the continuing hostility shown to Britain and the United States 
since Kristallnacht indicated `there has been no ground for assuming German policy during 
the present year would be quiescent.' It now seemed less likely that German ambitions were 
directed towards establishing a puppet Ukrainian state as Poland, with its large Ukrainian 
minority, did not appear particularly concerned, having apparently been reassured by the 
recent summit between Colonel Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, and Hitler. Germany 
seemed to be preoccupied with absorbing Czechoslovakia into its economic sphere and the 
political and economic penetration of the Balkan region, although it had to be admitted that 
German trade arrangements bore little resemblance to traditional economic treaties and 
`seem more designed to divert business, no matter at what immediate cost, into German 
channels.' Italy had mounted a series of claims against France, although these had yet to 
88 Halifax as cited in TNA DO 121/5 Minute of Meeting between Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs and Dominion High Commissioners, 17 February 1939 
89 NAA A981/4 /Exte /184 External Affairs Department, Cabinet Statements, Draft Statement for 
Members, 28 February, 1939, p.1 
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achieve official status. The Italian government had, however, unilaterally disavowed the 
Mussolini -Laval Pact of 1935 and informed the French government it `would formulate its 
claims "in due course and due form. "' The French Foreign Minister had responded by 
publicly stating that `any attempt to enforce such a demand could only lead to war.' Fears of 
joint German- Italian action had been inspired by backing for Italy's claims in the German 
press combined with Hitler's undertaking to be found at Italy's side if the latter became 
involved in war. Hughes here chose to ignore the qualification contained in Stirling's report 
on the British analysis of Hitler's speech, that the German Propaganda Ministry had 
subsequently restricted Germany's commitment to ideological wars and that even the 
original German text `also implies provocation.' The Minister for External Affairs went on 
to describe the consequent expression of shared aims from Britain and France in response to 
this perceived threat as `remarkably outspoken.' He considered the most worrying aspect 
currently to be the strengthening of Italian forces in Africa, with a presumed view to pressing 
their claims over Tunis and Djibouti, while noting that the French had also just reviewed 
their position in North Africa. He thought, however, that matters would turn on how the 
Italians framed their claims and to what extent these turned out to affect France's `vital 
interest.' Hughes also pointed out that Hitler on 30 January had looked forward to `a long 
period of peace.' The Minister for External Affairs drew comfort from the fact that this 
undoubtedly reflected the profound wishes of the German people and that preliminary 
economic contacts had already commenced between the German and British sides, following 
the opening Hitler had provided in his Reichstag speech. Hughes was also impressed by the 
apparently firmer stance emanating from Washington in recent weeks, concluding that this 
significantly improved the prospects for the international situation. 
Hughes was not present at the next meeting of Cabinet in Sydney on 2 March.9° According 
to the minutes, discussion of the contentious issue of National Insurance again continued 
without conclusion. Cabinet also took the opportunity to exclude the Minister for External 
Affairs from a committee set up to consider a response to a communication from the 
Japanese Consul, although this committee contained the other `big beasts'; Lyons, Page, 
Menzies and Casey. Stirling's next report from London was a lengthy one and paved the way 
for the Dominions Office telegram of 8 March.91 Although dated 22 February, it had been 
sent by air mail and was not due to arrive in Canberra until 4 March, too late for inclusion in 
Billy Hughes's statement above. In his letter, Stirling covered the return of Sir Nevile 
9° NAA A2694 Vo1.19, Part II, Cabinet Minutes, 2 March 1939 
91 NAA A981 /4 /GER 83 Pt. 2, Stirling to Hodgson, `Germany', 20 December 1938 (via air mail - due 
9 January 1939) 
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Henderson, the British Ambassador to Berlin, to his post after extended leave on health 
grounds. Stirling had already uncharacteristically expressed a marked preference for the 
Ambassador's reports over those of his stand -in, Sir George Ogilvie- Forbes, as the 
Australian liaison officer considered the former had more contacts and a better feel for what 
was really going on in Germany, while the latter lacked `the keen mind and cool judgement 
of Sir N. Henderson.'92 The latest missive certainly differed significantly from the earlier 
ones, with their cautious pessimism replaced by a more confident optimism. Henderson had 
discounted the recent concerns over German intentions, believing instead that Hitler, 
impressed by the enthusiasm of the German people for Chamberlain, was determined to 
maintain the peace, although he had acknowledged more realistically that `Germany is not 
going to be a lamb with which in the future it will be comfortable to lie down.'93 In support 
he had cited a recent conversation with Goering where the latter had announced his 
imminent departure for a long -term rest in San Remo. Henderson had believed Goering to be 
quite sincere in his professions for peace, noting their consistency with similar remarks made 
by Ribbentrop and concluding that it was in fact Hitler who was behind this changed 
outlook. It was also worthy of note that Weizsäcker, the permanent head of the German 
Foreign Office, had forecast that nothing would disturb Anglo- German relations during 1939 
in the way they had been disturbed during 1938. This comforting news was then followed by 
the Dominions Office cable of 8 March that it appeared that if there had been any danger of a 
sudden German strike westwards that that danger had now passed. 
Cabinet met the same day, but the minutes indicate the meeting was an unusually lengthy 
one, dominated by the question of National Insurance, although Hughes did take the 
opportunity to raise the issue of the strategic importance of oil, both within and outwith 
Australian territory.94 Cabinet also agreed that Page, Casey, Menzies and Thorby should 
report back on the co- ordination of development and defence, which was to be discussed at 
the next conference with the state premiers on 31 March, and finally managed to approve the 
Inspector -General's recommendations that military formations be grouped into commands 
and the establishment of a staff corps with defined roles. At this point, Page, the main 
sponsor of the concept of co- ordinating defence and development, disillusioned by his 
experience of the October conference with the premiers, envisaged proceeding without them 
92 NAA A981 /4 /GER 83 Pt. 2, Stirling to Hodgson, `Germany', 20 December 1938 (via air mail - due 
9 January 1939) 
93 NAA A981 /4 /GER 83 Pt. 2, Stirling to Hodgson, `Germany - United Kingdom', 22 February 1939 
(via air mail - due 4 March 1939) 
94 NAA A2694 Vo1.19, Part II, Cabinet Minutes, 8 March 1939, p.1 
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and using a specially appointed `co- ordination Czar' to cajole them into co- operation 
retrospectively. Cabinet met again the next day and agreed a further raft of recommendations 
from the Inspector -General's report.95 Permission was however refused for the Tasmanian 
Premier to have free use of a land -line to broadcast on the issue of defence. A decision on 
representation at the Pacific Defence Conference in Wellington was also deferred despite the 
imminence of that event, while vitally ministers continued to be unable to reach a decision 
on the crucial issue of National Insurance. In this charged situation, the cable from London 
announcing it considered the `war scare' episode to be at an end did not even merit an 
official mention. 
On 10 March, Cabinet fmally agreed that a new National Insurance scheme was required.96 
This session, with just four other items on the agenda (the rubber -stamping of ministers' 
decisions on the National Register and trade negotiations with the U.S.A., the decision not to 
assist education for refugees and the deferral of consideration of alterations to Sydney Post 
Office to their next meeting) lasted from 9.45 a.m. to 4.15 p.m., indicating the 
contentiousness of the issue. Cabinet had not been due to meet until Tuesday the 14`h, but 
met again on the Monday, when the issue was again raised and deferred.97 Cabinet also 
revisited its decision on the committee for the amalgamation of the administrations of the 
territories of Papua and New Guinea. Federal funding for roads was reconsidered as well 
`with special reference to Defence (sic) requirements.' The smouldering issues of social 
security and Lyons's leadership finally erupted into full -blown crisis the following day, 14 
March 1939, when Menzies resigned from Cabinet, citing differences with the Prime 
Minister over National Insurance and Defence.98 He was replaced with immediate effect as 
Attorney -General by Billy Hughes, who combined this role with his pre -existing one as 
Minister for External Affairs. 
In Australia, the `war scare' played out against a background dominated by the twin issues 
of the succession and National Insurance. The perception that Lyons was on his way out 
undermined his ability to lead his colleagues and sharpened their disputes as they jockeyed 
to place themselves in pole position for when he departed. The government's National 
Insurance measures were due to come fully into force on 4 September 1939, but doubts as to 
9s NAA A2694 Vo1.19, Part II, Cabinet Minutes, 9 March 1939, pp.11 - 2 
96 NAA A2694 Vo1.19, Part II, Cabinet Minutes, 10 March 1939 
97 NAA A2694 VoL l9, Part I1, Cabinet Minutes, 13 March 1939 
98 NLA Menzies Papers (MS4936) Box 579, Menzies to Lyons, 14 March 1939 & Lyons to Menzies, 
14 March 1939 
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its affordability led to a desperate search for a replacement scheme that could command 
support. This quest was vastly complicated by the conflicting ambitions of the leading 
personalities in cabinet. In the end only Menzies resigned, but the issue had come to 
command cabinet's attention to the detriment of other matters. In terms of external affairs, 
Menzies had been moving towards a more `hawkish' position, so that his departure 
weakened that voice within cabinet, but his replacement by Billy Hughes, who also 
continued to hold the office of Minister for External Affairs, greatly increased the 
importance of the most implacable `hawk' in the government. While Lyons had managed to 
fairly easily deflect Curtin's demands to recall Parliament at the outset of this episode, he 
had had to accept his colleagues' wishes to implement a national register of manpower 
availability, albeit with the concession that this would be on a voluntary basis. The `war 
scare' provided Billy Hughes with the opportunity to boost his profile in the succession 
stakes, however. The Minister for External Affairs had been drafted in to add some much 
needed drive to the lack -lustre recruitment campaign for the militia prior to Christmas and 
emphasising the gravity of the international situation would reinforce the importance of both 
that role and his ministerial one.99 Brigadier Street had only replaced Thorby as Minister of 
Defence in November and as such a new entrant to cabinet was a relatively negligible 
element politically.'oo 
While the opportunity existed, Hughes therefore spared no effort to accentuate international 
tensions. In his report of 10 February, he noted that European issues continued to dominate 
the international situation, raising the spectre of a sudden crisis developing between the four 
powers. He drew attention to Italy and Germany's increased restiveness and co- operation 
together with their approaches to Japan since Munich, while emphasising German 
ruthlessness in the implementation of that settlement. He considered that Hitler had failed to 
clarify his intentions in his 30 January speech, but had placed a great deal of weight on the 
Colonial Question. The obvious implications of this for Australia's position in the Mandated 
Territory of New Guinea were left unstated. Hughes's report of the 28th went further, 
explicitly blaming Germany and Italy for the sense of crisis. He did, however, have to admit: 
that the threats reported to be stalking Europe had yet to materialise; that the Franco- Italian 
situation might be capable of peaceful resolution; and that Hitler had referred to a long 
period of peace, which undoubtedly reflected the wishes of his people. Hughes nonetheless 
saw no grounds for complacency. The increased pace of German armaments, the departure 
99 
See Chapter Three, above. 
ioo Idem. 
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of Schacht and Germany's ongoing economic problems all gave continuing cause for 
concern. Britain and France had demonstrated considerable resolution and he discerned a 
new firmer stance in Washington which was also to be welcomed. The implication Australia 
should likewise display determination in external affairs was left unspoken. That this 
uncompromising view of international tensions coincided with his own instinctive 
interpretation of the situation need not be doubted. Billy Hughes brought his bellicosity with 
him to external affairs; external affairs did not make him bellicose.101 After the 281h his 
opportunity to promote the importance of external affairs faded rapidly, though, as the crisis 
over what to do about National Insurance peaked, exacerbated by the internecine feuding of 
cabinet over the question of the succession. Hughes, however, did relatively well from this, 
coming away as both Attorney -General and Minister for External Affairs, emphasising his 
increased stature in Lyons's post- Menzies government. 
Apathy in Wellington 
In the period immediately prior to the despatch of the Dominions Office telegram which 
generated all this anxiety elsewhere, Jordan was distracted by the need both for his presence 
in Geneva and to counter what he saw as the latest move by the forces he believed were 
conducting a co- ordinated campaign to discredit New Zealand and its government in 
London.102 He did not, in fact, formally comment on the 25 January message from London 
until 24 March, when, in a letter to Savage, he finally acknowledged the existence of `the 
interesting cable, No.20, concerning Holland.' He justified his previous silence on the 
grounds that `the information given therein was shortly after contradicted and I know you 
prefer to have something defmite, leaving the confusion to square itself up.' This may have 
been a face- saving device to explain away his preceding neglect of the matter, but had his 
government actually been particularly concerned to obtain his views on the subject, they 
could have asked him for them directly. No doubt they shared his sense of priority on the 
issue. New Zealand's financial position remained dire and everything had to be done to shore 
up their image in London, so countering any negative comment there was vital. Savage had 
indeed previously written to Jordan on 3 March warmly praising his efforts in doing so, 
without taking the opportunity to enquire about the European situation or how it had 
1 °1 See Chapter One, above. 
102 NANZ/PM/10 /1939+ Correspondence /Jordan to Savage, 13 January 1939; in this case, a talk by 
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developed since telegram No.20.103 Politically, the presidency of the Council of the League 
of Nations also remained a prestigious role which equally could not be neglected. Set against 
this, it was clear a German invasion of the Low Countries meant war and Wellington could 
not hope to prevent, or even influence, Hitler's actions in this regard. They were already 
doing everything they could to prepare for the worst; reaching out to Britain and Australia 
through the proposed Pacific Defence Conference, while bolstering their defences through 
the work of Colonel Stevens, the Secretary of the Organisation for National Security, and the 
Chiefs of Staff.104 At the same time, Savage had taken to his bed during one of his bad 
periods, while Labour's internal difficulties emerged into the public domain with the leaking 
of the infamous `Jack Lee Letter.'105 The triumvirates' silence on the `interesting telegram, 
No.20' of the 25 January, is therefore as readily understandable as Jordan's.106 There was 
nothing they could do about it, and they scarcely lacked alternative issues requiring their 
urgent attention. 
Overview 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this episode was the degree of passivity exhibited by 
the dominions in contrast to their interventionist behaviour the previous September.107 The 
situation was, however, completely different. Then, there had been a problem that was 
sufficiently well -defined that a solution, however unattractive, presented itself and Australia, 
Canada and South Africa had all urged this course on London. New Zealand, it is true, 
distracted by domestic events and their responsibilities in Geneva, had remained relatively 
quiet then, confining themselves to a few anodyne messages expressing a fairly general 
support for Britain, without any particular commitment to specific British government 
policies. All the dominions had, however, congratulated Chamberlain on the fact of a 
settlement, even if the terms came to enjoy a less unanimous support. This time around it 
was clearly impossible, though, to advise Chamberlain to offer his services as mediator. He 
could not arbitrate a problem which the Germans steadfastly denied existed and, in any case, 
which had not even been defined sufficiently clearly to indicate how it might be resolved. 
103 NANZ/PM /16/1939+ Correspondence /Savage to Jordan, 3 March 1939 
104 See above, Chapters Three & Four. 
105 See Chapter One, above. 
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In light of these conditions, discussions with London held no attractions for any of the 
dominions. New Zealand was anyway again preoccupied with domestic difficulties and its 
role at the League of Nations. Likewise, Canberra's attention was increasingly drawn to the 
domestic arena. Lyons remained as averse to war as ever, but the situation provided him with 
nothing to say and his cabinet was imploding over the issues of National Insurance and the 
succession. Billy Hughes might have been temporarily able to use the international tension to 
boost his standing in cabinet, but there was equally nothing for him to suggest to London. He 
would, in any case, have needed Lyons's support for any such approach and this was never 
likely to be forthcoming, given the disparity in their outlooks on external affairs. Canada had 
simply reverted to previous practice. Advising London was only desirable if there was a 
peaceful course to encourage, otherwise it might be taken for consultation, which could in 
turn be seen as creating commitments that would infringe on `Parliament's right to decide.' 
Mackenzie King had not, however, entirely abandoned the idea of personal intervention and 
wrote to Hitler in the belief that a reminder of their encounter in 1937 would prove 
beneficial. 
More surprising was South Africa's reaction. Hertzog had never felt troubled by the ethical 
consideration that exercising influence created an obligation that would restrict Parliament's 
future freedom of action. He had unashamedly sought to cajole the British into avoiding 
European entanglements, bombarded his representatives with requests for information and 
never given the slightest indication that he saw this as involving any commitment on his part. 
This time, he remained enigmatically silent. Previously he had vigorously denounced any 
increased involvement with Paris. Now he allowed the news that staff talks with the French 
were being expanded to pass without comment. Similarly, where he had previously 
unambiguously stated the Union had no interest in a war where Britain joined France if the 
conflict arose out of a German attack on the Czechs, the news that Britain had decided the 
integrity of Switzerland and the Netherlands were casi belli excited no response. Even when 
Te Water referred specifically to these `two new and vital commitments', the General did not 
see fit to comment. While he had warned the British that his government saw no South 
African interest in eastern European entanglements, he had never extended this to western 
Europe. Likewise, he had had confined the secret cabinet neutrality pact to conflicts 
originating in eastern Europe. He took no steps now to change either of these conditions. 
Naturally secretive and aloof, the reasons for his silence are hard to discern. Pirow took 
credit for convincing the General that war was inevitable on the former's return from Europe 
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and claimed that the latter thereafter began to take all possible steps to keep South Africa 
neutral. The problem with this view is that Hertzog appeared to take no steps at all at this 
time. If conflict was really unavoidable and Hertzog was determined on neutrality as Pirow 
supposed, British policy might indeed be left to develop unhindered, whether this involved 
committing themselves to supporting the integrity of small, independent countries or 
entering into ever closer arrangements with the French. Steps, however, would have had to 
be taken to prepare the South African cabinet for an extension of the Neutrality Pact to cover 
western, as well as eastern, Europe. Hertzog had regarded it as essential the previous 
September that agreement was reached in advance, so that the government was not left 
floundering when the moment of crisis was upon them. Yet he took no such steps at this 
time. The only possible explanations are that Hertzog himself saw no need for South African 
neutrality in such circumstances; that he did not yet accept that war was inevitable; or both. 
Hertzog had previously convinced himself of Hitler's essential peacefulness, once 
Germany's Versailles grievances were satisfied, and the General's behaviour during this 
episode appears consistent with this view. Unlike the summer of 1938, he had no material, of 
whatever quality, to counter the gloomy messages from London. Even Gie's reports from 
Berlin were only optimistic with regard to the short and not the long term. The very nature of 
the `war scare' was also imprecise and vague, inviting little by way of response. There was 
no specific grievance to satisfy and no definite threat to ward off. He therefore had little 
option but to remain silent. Once, however, the news from London seemed to improve, 
Hertzog lost no time in reaffirming his belief in peace in Europe `for all time.'108 In the 
u n I ikely, from his perspective, event he was proved wrong, he had no objection to 
participating in a conflict originating in western Europe, as, from his point of view, this 
would be a `necessary war.'109 This was certainly not Te Water's view, as indicated in his 
reports to the Prime Minister, but Hertzog does not appear to have ever felt any necessity to 
explain himself to his subordinates.110 A war originating with an unprovoked attack on the 
Netherlands was also less likely to provoke Afrikaner sentiment. 
Likewise, Italian involvement would also make a conflict more acceptable. While his 
government were prepared to subsidise Italian shipping in an effort to diversify the economy 
away from its dependence on Britain, it had also resolutely opposed Mussolini's Abyssinian 
1°8 NASA Hertzog Papers (A32) VoL 123 /Cuttings Cape To Times, 11 March 1939 
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adventure.111 This stance was not just due to an attachment to collective security both on its 
own merits and as an alternative to reliance on the British navy; the Italian policy of raising 
units from the native inhabitants of their conquests deeply disturbed the South African mind- 
set.112 As Gie had indicated in 1936 to Te Water, Italy was not a welcome neighbour, even as 
far away as the Horn of Africa.113 He also saw the Mediterranean, with its importance for 
communications, to be more clearly a South African concern than the eastern European 
status quo. It therefore seems likely General Hertzog did not warn the British this time, 
because, unlike with the Sudeten Crisis, he saw no need to do so in the prevailing 
circumstances. He might have faced difficulties from his more isolationist Afrikaner 
supporters, even with respect to the Netherlands, but Hertzog was never one to shy away 
from riding roughshod over those who had the temerity to disagree with what, in his infinite 
wisdom, he had decided on for their benefit. There was therefore no reason to say anything 
until the episode was over, and so he remained silent. 
While the dominions did not seek to influence London, the episode was not without its 
effects on them. Australia and New Zealand were admittedly too wound up in their own 
domestic problems to pay much attention to something they could not hope to influence. In 
Canada, however, resolve faltered. Mackenzie King had been pressing ahead with 
rearmament and trying to prepare cabinet and country for the possibility of war. While the 
criticism he received for this undoubtedly played a part in undermining his resolution, a part 
was also played by the panicked nature of the messages from Whitehall, which critically 
undermined the Canadian Prime Minister's faith in London's judgement. His previous 
reiteration of Laurier's remark considerably diminished the impact of this development, 
however. He could not qualify or walk away from this without appearing weak, which he 
was not prepared to do, but standing by it significantly reduced the options available to him. 
The result was that he was left feeling isolated and vulnerable, at a time when he was already 
stressed over perceived slights to his prospective role during the forthcoming Royal Visit to 
North America. In South Africa, Hertzog was able to use the end of the episode to boost 
party morale by publicly reasserting his faith in peace. The most significant development, 
however, was his colleague Smuts move in the opposite direction. Smuts became convinced 
that the imminent end of the Spanish Civil War would lead Italy, either acting on its own 
volition or at Germany's behest, to repudiate its obligation to leave Spain, leading to a 
111 NASA Te Water Papers (A78) VoL 14 /Correspondence, Smuts to Te Water, 24 July 1936 
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confrontation with the West. He believed that the democracies had no appetite for backing 
down a second time. The news of Hitler's backing for Mussolini in his 30 January speech 
was therefore critical for Smuts. The latter feared this made war all but inevitable, whether as 
an act of deliberate aggression or misplaced bluff. London's embarrassing climb -down over 
Hitler's supposed intentions for an unprovoked and unheralded westward strike left him 
unmoved. He held that the real issue lay in the German commitment to Italy and that nothing 
had happened to reduce the significance of this. He therefore remained deeply pessimistic 
about the prospects for peace, going forward. 
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5: THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN: 
THE MARCH INTO PRAGUE AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS 
On 15 March 1939, to the astonishment of the world, the Germans walked into Czecho- 
Slovakia unopposed.' As noted in the previous chapter, the Dominions Office had finally 
conceded only the previous week that it seemed Hitler was not, after all, about to make an 
immediate move.2 This rapidly changed. On Saturday, 11 March, Inskip cabled the dominion 
Prime Ministers with the news of a new crisis in Czecho -Slovakia, and that German 
intentions toward that country were unclear, but that Sir Nevile Henderson believed Berlin 
intended to eliminate the rump state.3 Previously, it had been anticipated that Prague would 
drift gradually and peacefully into the German orbit and this was what had appeared to be 
happening.4 The following Monday, a cable from London reported the apparent resolution of 
the internal Czecho- Slovak crisis, coupled with the ominous switch by the German press to 
protesting about the treatment of the remaining Germans in Czecho- Slovakia.5 On Tuesday, 
Whitehall reported German troop movements in the direction of Bohemia, the Slovak 
declaration of independence and that the Czech President and Minister for Foreign Affairs 
had left for Berlin. The next day, the dominion governments were informed by Inskip in 
neutral tones of the establishment of the German protectorate and the subsequent occupation 
of Bohemia and Moravia.' 
Chamberlain initially appears to have gone into shock over these developments, until 
Halifax and the rest of the cabinet forced him to recognise that a watershed had been 
I The republic's new official name after the post- Munich constitutional rearrangements, see Kershaw, 
Nemesis, p.164 
2 NASA SAB BTS 1/4/12 /German Foreign Policy, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to 
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4 Newton (British Minister at Prague) as cited in NAA A981(4) /Cze /6 /Czechoslovakia - Admin. 
Govt. /Stirling to Hodgson, 23 December 1938; later, the Czechs indeed agreed, for instance, to 
harmonise their economic and Jewish policies with the Germans; permit Wehrmacht rail transit across 
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reached. 8 This resulted in his 17 March Birmingham speech, which publicly condemned 
recent German actions.9 A succinct cable of the same day to the dominions, merely noted 
that the British Ambassador in Berlin `had been ordered to return to London to report at his 
earliest convenience.'10 The following day, British anger was more evident. The Dominions 
Office advised dominion prime ministers that Sir Nevile Henderson had been instructed to 
inform the Germans that the British regarded `events of the past few days as a complete 
repudiation of the Munich Agreement.' 11 The Germans were also to be told that London 
considered their military action in Czecho -Slovakia was `devoid of any basis of legality.' 
On 19 March, the dominions were informed by cable that two days previously Bucharest's 
Minister in the United Kingdom had appealed to Lord Halifax for assistance, wrongly 
asserting that a German ultimatum had been received, and that without British support his 
country would be forced to capitulate.12 On 21 March 1939, London again cabled the 
dominions with their response to this request. The British had firstly conducted a survey of 
European capitals as to how they would react to a threat to Romanian independence.13 The 
results of this had proved to be disappointing, and they therefore now proposed that they, 
together with France, Russia and Poland, should make a public declaration that they would 
immediately consult each other in the event of any threatening action taking place. Unknown 
to the dominions, however, the Poles were proving reluctant to engage with the Soviets 
because of the potential German reaction.14 After some heated discussion, Chamberlain 
persuaded his cabinet that Poland, rather than Russia, was crucial as the cornerstone for a 
coalition against aggression.15 The French had come, by their own circuitous route, to the 
same conclusion.16 In the meantime, the German seizure of Memel on 23`d March aroused 
surprisingly little outrage, given the level of feeling that Prague had generated. However, the 
region was ethnically predominantly German and its cession had long been discounted.17 
8 Watt, How War Came, pp.167 -68 
9 Idem. 
10 NAA A981(4) /Ger /83 /Part 2 /German Foreign Policy /Inskip to Dominion Prime Ministers, 17 
March 1939 
11 NAA A981(4) /Ger /83 /Part 2 /German Foreign Policy /Inskip to Dominion Prime Ministers, 18 
March 1939 
12 NASA SAB PM 1/20/1, UK Foreign Policy, Inskip to Dominion Prime Ministers, 19 March 1939; 
see also Watt, How War Came, p.170 
13 NAA A981(4) /Ger /83 /Part 2 /German Foreign Policy /Inskip to Dominion Prime Ministers, 21 
March 1939. 
14 Watt, How War Came, pp. 176 & 179 
15 Ibid., p.181 
161bid, pp.178 -9 
17NASA SAB BTS /1/4/12 /German Foreign Policy, Gie to Hertzog, 16 January 1939; Rothwell, 
Origins, p.100 
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The British shared the full force of their concern with the dominions in a telegram on the 28 
March.18 Prague had `clearly revealed Germany's intentions.' These were plainly to 
subjugate Eastern Europe so that Germany could move west, without the risk of `a war on 
two fronts.' Warsaw, however, had proved reluctant to take up their assigned role in this 
design by undertaking to stand by Bucharest and there matters rested for the moment. 
Subsequently intelligence reports suddenly suggested Germany was about to make an 
immediate move against the Poles, rather than the Romanians, but London did not 
immediately pass this on to its Commonwealth partners.19 The British did, however, hastily 
shift their focus from Romania to Poland. On 30 March, telegrams were sent to Warsaw and 
Paris for consultation, proposing that Chamberlain guarantee Polish independence and, at 
that point, the dominions were informed, but not consulted, about this step by a cable of the 
same date.20 At the same time, Inskip explained away the lack of consultation to the 
dominion High Commissioners by saying that there had not been time for such a step, and 
that indeed the dominions `would not have wished that the United Kingdom should invite 
them to share in the responsibility.'21 
Those consulted had assented by the morning of the 31' and the dominions were duly 
informed of this in another telegram.22 Chamberlain appears to have thought the terms of the 
guarantee would retain the diplomatic initiative for London.23 Inskip, however, had admitted 
to the dominion High Commissioners in his meeting with them on 30 March, that it would be 
up to the Poles to decide whether an attack on Danzig constituted a threat to their 
independence, implying that Britain's fate was now in Warsaw's hands.24 Nevertheless, the 
British government anticipated at this time that the rest of the blocks of this `peace front' 
would fall into line in due course. All this was thrown into turmoil by the Italian move 
against Albania. The Italians resented that they had been left in the dark by the Germans over 
Czecho - Slovakia and they resolved to demonstrate their independence by a move of their 
18 NASA SAB BTS 1/4/12 /German Foreign Policy, Inskip to Dominion Prime Ministers, Circular 
Telegram B No. 122, 28 March 1939 
19 Rothwell, Origins, p.103 
20 Watt, How War Came, pp. 176 & 179; NAA A981(4) /GER 67 Part 1 /Germany - Relations with 
Poland, SSFDA to dominion Prime Ministers, 30 March 1939 
21 lnskip, Sir Thomas, SSFDA, as cited in TNA DO 121/5, Meetings between Secretary of State and 
dominion High Commissioners, January- August 1939, 30 March 1939, p.8 
22 NAA A981(4) /GER 67 Part 1 /Germany- Relations with Poland, Inskip to dominion Prime 
Ministers, 31 March 1939 
23 Chamberlain papers, NC 18/1/1092 as cited in Watt, How War Came, p.186 
24 Chamberlain, Neville as cited in NAA A981(4) /GER 67 Part 1 /Germany - Relations with Poland, 
SSFDA to dominion Prime Ministers, 1 April 1939; lnskip, Sir Thomas, SSFDA, as cited in TNA DO 
121/5, Meetings between Secretary of State and dominion High Commissioners, January - August 
1939, 30 March 1939, p.3 
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own.25 Italian forces therefore occupied Albania on Good Friday, 7 April 1939.26 As a 
consequence, the British cabinet decided, as Duncan reported to Lyons on 12 April 1939, 
that `it was urgent we made clear that any interference with Greece or Turkey would not be 
tolerated.'27 The French had become equally determined on a guarantee for Romania, to 
which the British also subscribed rather than let a division appear between the two western 
powers.28 As Donald Cameron Watt has pointed out, western strategy had descended into 
confusion.29 Rather than the originally contemplated system of mutually supportive 
diplomatic arrangements, Britain and France had created a set of trilateral pacts, where each 
beneficiary no longer had any incentive to extend their obligations to their counterparts in 
the other agreements. With this development, attempts to build a `peace front' effectively 
ground to a halt. Desultory talks took place with the Yugoslays, to little overall effect.3° 
Hungarian and Bulgarian territorial claims on their neighbours, together with Hungary's 
adherence to the Anti -Comintern Pact, made them difficult negotiating partners. The `peace 
front' was, for all practical purposes, dead. 
Australia 
In Australia, cabinet was meeting as German troops marched into Czecho- Slovakia.31 News 
of the capitulation had been spread across the front pages of the press that morning, opposite 
details of the resignation of Bob Menzies, the Attorney- General.32 The minutes indicate 
ministers in fact spent the day clearing the backlog of issues that had built up during the 
deadlock over National Insurance, whose resolution had triggered the latter event.33 
Although matters covered included items such as a report on recruitment, these were long- 
standing questions, rather than evidence of a spontaneous reaction to events in Europe. There 
does not appear to have been any formal discussion of the international situation at this 
point. Of more import was the decision to establish a committee to consider the 
amalgamation of the administrations of the Australian territory of Papua with that of the 
former German colony of New Guinea. While, again, this was a question which had been 
25 Watt, How War Came, p.209. The Italian action in Albania was counter- productive in this regard. 
For instance, Te Water, the South African High Commissioner in London, linked it to the Anglo- 
Polish agreement, thereby depicting Italy as effectively acting in the German interest, rather than 
demonstrating its independence from Germany, as Ciano intended. See, NASA SAB PM 1/20/1, 
United Kingdom Foreign Policy, Te Water to Hertzog, 12 April 1939 
26 Watt, How War Came, p.208 
27 NAA A981(4) /GREA 8 Part 4 /Great Britain - Foreign Policy, Duncan to Lyons, 12 April 1939 
28 Rothwell, Origins, p.104 
29 Watt, How War Came, pp.213 & 214 
30 ¡bid., pp.292 -4 
31 NAA A2694 VoL19, Part 11, Cabinet Minutes, 15 March 1939 
32 See, for instance, The Argus, (Melbourne), 15 March 1939, p.1 
33 NAA A2694 Vol 19, Part II, Cabinet Minutes, 15 March 1939 
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under consideration for some time, the announcement of this decision to the press, at this 
time, sent a very clear, public message that Australia remained adamantly opposed to 
surrendering its mandate to Germany.34 
The sudden apparent threat to Romania only increased the tension. Lyons felt compelled to 
make a statement to the press on Monday, 20 March: that Australia would support Britain in 
whatever might occur; he remained directly in touch with Chamberlain by telephone; cabinet 
would meet to discuss the situation the following day; but that while ministers were 
concerned, there was no reason for panic; and there was no need to recall Parliament before 
the due date of 19 Apri1.35 The following day, ministers agreed a measure to develop the 
manufacture of military aircraft for Britain in Australia and a suitably worded statement on 
international relations for the press.36 London had in the meantime informed Canberra of the 
disappointing results of its survey of foreign capitals and its intention of inviting the Poles, 
French and Russians to make a public declaration that they would hold joint consultations 
over any further aggressive moves.37 The Australian government now echoed the British 
view releasing a public statement on 22 March that German actions had completely undone 
the `Spirit of Munich' and undermined the credibility of Hitler's word.38 They noted the 
increased tension concerning Romania and expressed support for the steps Britain was now 
taking to preserve `peace and security... from further encroachments by force on the freedom 
and independence of other nations.' Up to this point, the cabinet hawks, like Hughes, had 
been able to carry the day, delivering a very public snub to Germany by publicising their 
plans for Papua and New Guinea; raising doubts about Hitler's credibility and expressing 
support not just for Britain's quest for peace, but also for security and the preservation of 
`the freedom and independence of other nations.' This represented a material departure from 
the `Spirit of Munich' where the pursuit of peace had been paramount. The doves had been 
held back by the political impossibility of allowing any distance being seen to develop 
between London and Canberra, so when the British government adopted a new, more 
assertive stance, they were obliged to follow suit. When, however, the hawks attempted to go 
one step further and transform the proposed voluntary national register of manpower into a 
compulsory one at cabinet on 22 March, the doves rallied and prevented this from 
34 See, for instance, The Argus, (Melbourne, 16 March 1939), p.1 
35 See, for instance, The Argus, (Melbourne, 21 March 1939), p.1 
36 NAA A2694 Vo1.19, Part II, Cabinet Minutes, 22 March 1939 
37 NAA A981(4) /Ger /83 /Part 2 /German Foreign Policy /Inskip to Dominion Prime Ministers, 21 
March 1939 
38 See, for instance, The Argus, (Melbourne, 22 March 1939), p.1 
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own.25 Italian forces therefore occupied Albania on Good Friday, 7 April 1939.26 As a 
consequence, the British cabinet decided, as Duncan reported to Lyons on 12 April 1939, 
that `it was urgent we made clear that any interference with Greece or Turkey would not be 
tolerated.'27 The French had become equally determined on a guarantee for Romania, to 
which the British also subscribed rather than let a division appear between the two western 
powers.28 As Donald Cameron Watt has pointed out, western strategy had descended into 
confusion.29 Rather than the originally contemplated system of mutually supportive 
diplomatic arrangements, Britain and France had created a set of trilateral pacts, where each 
beneficiary no longer had any incentive to extend their obligations to their counterparts in 
the other agreements. With this development, attempts to build a `peace front' effectively 
ground to a halt. Desultory talks took place with the Yugoslays, to little overall effect.3° 
Hungarian and Bulgarian territorial claims on their neighbours, together with Hungary's 
adherence to the Anti -Comintern Pact, made them difficult negotiating partners. The `peace 
front' was, for all practical purposes, dead. 
Australia 
In Australia, cabinet was meeting as German troops marched into Czecho- Slovakia.31 News 
of the capitulation had been spread across the front pages of the press that morning, opposite 
details of the resignation of Bob Menzies, the Attorney- Genera1.32 The minutes indicate 
ministers in fact spent the day clearing the backlog of issues that had built up during the 
deadlock over National Insurance, whose resolution had triggered the latter event.33 
Although matters covered included items such as a report on recruitment, these were long- 
standing questions, rather than evidence of a spontaneous reaction to events in Europe. There 
does not appear to have been any formal discussion of the international situation at this 
point. Of more import was the decision to establish a committee to consider the 
amalgamation of the administrations of the Australian territory of Papua with that of the 
former German colony of New Guinea. While, again, this was a question which had been 
25 Watt, How War Came, p.209. The Italian action in Albania was counter- productive in this regard. 
For instance, Te Water, the South African High Commissioner in London, linked it to the Anglo- 
Polish agreement, thereby depicting Italy as effectively acting in the German interest, rather than 
demonstrating its independence from Germany, as Ciano intended. See, NASA SAB PM 1/20/1, 
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involved no commitment in advance to necessarily resist German expansion.46 He was also 
pessimistic about Romania's prospects, believing that it would eventually succumb to the 
usual German methods, when the west was distracted elsewhere. He emphasised the 
importance of Poland in London's plans, noting their reluctance to commit themselves, but 
repeating the British view that they would fight for their independence. He was concerned 
about Italian claims against France, but drew comfort from Mussolini's speech, which he 
believed indicated that Italy had no desire to precipitate a crisis on its own account, and that 
current Italian disenchantment with the Germans would prevent them doing so at Germany's 
behest. Hughes was uncharacteristically cautious about proposals from Britain's ambassador 
in Japan for a more assertive stance against the Japanese, including the despatch of a naval 
force to Singapore, suggesting that Canberra should seek more information, before deciding 
whether to support or oppose these. 
The following day, 29 March, cabinet met again. This time the minutes show the hawks 
succeeded in persuading their colleagues that the national register should be made 
compulsory rather than voluntary, indicating concern about the international situation 
remained high.47 There were, however, still limits to the steps Australia was prepared to take 
at this point. Brigadier Street, the Minister for Defence, expressed concern that the 
Australian delegation to the forthcoming Pacific Defence Conference had been given too 
broad a remit, and successfully persuaded his colleagues to limit the delegates' authority to 
matters bf their own professional competence, rather than issues with broader policy 
implications. A cable was accordingly sent to Wellington by Lyons advising that the 
Australians had been instructed to confine themselves to the military aspect of contributing 
to imperial defence, after having provided for regional security; arrangements for the 
exchange of information on defence matters, rather than the actual co- ordination of policy as 
originally specified; and to confine the discussion of the economic aspects of the conduct of 
war to its implications for shipping only.48 He continued that the first two matters belonged 
to the political arena which was the domain of governments and unfortunately ministerial 
attendance was impossible in view of the commencement of the forthcoming Parliamentary 
session on 19 April. The last was simply too complex and involved for discussion in its 
entirety at the present time. Even at this time, it was preferable these matters were not 
discussed, than that they were discussed by the wrong people, or that Canberra should have 
to take the necessary steps to ensure the right people were there. 
46 NAA A981(4) /Exte 184 /External Affairs Department: Cabinet Statements/International Situation, 
28 March 1939, p.1 
47 NAA A2694 Vo1.19, Part II, Cabinet Minutes, 29 March 1939 
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In addition, at its 29 March meeting, cabinet considered the agenda for the upcoming 
Premiers' Conference, the first since the abortive attempt to co- ordinate state and federal 
defence and development policy.49 This was due to meet that Friday, 31 March. Page was 
very much the driving force behind the government's strategy on this issue. In January, he 
had therefore dismissed a Military Board report into state co- operation with the defence 
department as inadequate, because `it is obvious that the whole question of future industrial 
development and location of industries and their strategic value never entered their heads.'5° 
He had managed to persuade the Prime Minister to let him head up a cabinet sub -committee 
to consider the issue.51 He had despaired of obtaining voluntary state collaboration with his 
plans after the meeting of 21 October and so had recommended that Canberra impose co- 
operation on the states through the appointment of a `Co- ordination Czar', who was to be 
given the authority to compel the states to work together with the national government.52 A 
decision on this was still pending and at the 29 March cabinet, Page revisited his arguments 
in favour in a five page proposal.53 In the end, however, cabinet would decide to proceed 
with not one but two appointees, one for works and one for supply and development.54 The 
conference itself met in a changed atmosphere from the one five months previously. This 
time, meeting in the knowledge of Britain's guarantee to Poland, there could be no question 
of the continuing seriousness of the international situation, and the state premiers 
accordingly now offered no resistance to Canberra's proposals.55 
As seen in chapter one, Lyons's sudden death on Friday 7 April only exacerbated the 
divisions within the Australian governing coalition. In the short term, he was succeeded by 
Page, while the larger U.A.P. arranged to elect a new leader, who would then take over the 
government in the longer term. Understandably enough, the concurrent Italian action in 
Albania was overshadowed by the domestic considerations arising from the unexpected 
death of a serving prime minister and there appears to have been no cabinet discussion of the 
invasion according to the minutes of their meeting on 7 April.56 Cabinet next met in 
Melbourne on 14 April, in the wake of the guarantees to Greece and Romania, and agreed a 
49 See Chapter Two, above. 
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statement for the press on the international situations' This indicated that they felt `no 
immediate anxiety.' Ministers were relaxed enough `to disperse for the weekend.' Page, 
however, did go to Canberra, `so that he could keep in touch with the situation.' Ministers 
would also remain on call in case of need. These reassurances aside, the statement was 
vintage Hughes. The Minister for External Affairs described conditions as `grave, but not 
critical.' He noted that Germany and Italy had both publicly denied having any plans for 
further aggressive moves, and that the western powers and their allies certainly had no such 
designs. He could not, however, pass up the opportunity for pouring further scorn on the 
dictators' trustworthiness: `unfortunately, however, events of the last few months have 
convinced statesmen that words, most solemn protestations, pacts and agreements count for 
nothing.' He returned to his most fundamental belief: only one thing counted, `force 
resolutely arrayed to resist aggression.' This, he rather over -optimistically indicated, was 
what Britain was doing with its policy of guarantees to potential victims of aggression. He 
claimed to detect signs that this was already working in the dictators' words, by `reading 
between the lines.' This would lead, not to peace by acquiescence, `but peace with security.' 
Mussolini, for instance, had now reassured Lord Halifax he had no aggressive intentions 
toward Greece. Characteristically, however, Hughes ended on an ominous note. The Italian 
dictator's actions to date had been fundamentally irreconcilable with the Anglo- Italian 
Agreement and Europe itself was `strewn with tinder heaps from the east to the west.' The 
international situation's defining feature was its instability. 
Cabinet met again on the following Monday. External affairs were again discussed and the 
minutes show it was agreed that Hughes and the Treasurer, Casey, draw up a White Paper on 
international relations.58 In fact, by the time it was prepared Casey's name had been dropped 
and the contents appeared to be more in line with the views of the Minister for External 
Affairs. 59 It acknowledged the revolutionary nature of the latest transformation in British 
foreign policy, but insisted on the continuity in purpose behind it. Appeasement had required 
`a corresponding contribution from the other side.' This had not been forthcoming and 
consequently a new policy with the same objective had become necessary. It argued German 
actions since September increasingly indicated an intention to dominate the world through 
the threat of force, citing Kristallnacht's demonstration of how entrenched extremism was in 
Berlin; the accelerated pace of German rearmament; and the consequent economic 
S7 Ibid., 14 April 1939; for the substance of this statement, see, for instance, The Sydney Morning 
Herald, (Sydney), 15 April 1939, p.11 
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distortions powering hegemonic tendencies in Germany's external commercial 
arrangements. Italy had only added to the tension with its claims on France and build -up of 
troops in Africa. The public solidarity demonstrated by the western powers had, however, 
rallied international confidence. German moves in Czecho -Slovakia and Italian ones in 
Albania had, however, thrown Europe into further disarray. In its continuing quest to 
preserve peace, Britain, together with France, had therefore embarked on the creation of an 
anti -aggression coalition and, in the face of reported immediate threats to their security, had 
in the meantime guaranteed Poland, Romania and Greece as interim measures until this bloc 
could be properly established. Australia fully supported this as its interests were bound up 
with Britain's not just in the Far and Near East and the Mediterranean, but also in Europe. 
Equally, as a small and vulnerable nation, Australia had an interest in preserving itself 
against domination by the threat of force. 
Hughes had been able to use the events of March and April to assert his control over 
external affairs policy as never before. The cabinet doves, led by Lyons were placed on the 
back foot by Prague and Memel. They also succumbed to the necessity of endorsing the new, 
assertive British policy, lest they allow any distance to appear between London and 
Canberra. In the circumstances, it was only a matter of time before the hawks succeeded in 
converting the proposed register of national manpower from a voluntary to a compulsory 
one. Lyons's death, as the Italians marched into Albania, left the doves leaderless as well as 
rudderléss. Under Page, Hughes had even greater freedom. Having conceded war was not 
immediately imminent, he took the opportunity to disparage the dictators' credibility and to 
promote his fundamental belief that force needed to be met with force. Page did impose 
Casey, the leading remaining dove, on Hughes, in a bid to temper down the White Paper to 
be produced on external affairs, but this does not appear to have worked. Casey's name does 
not appear and the contents were typical of Hughes, condemning the dictators and building 
British efforts up into much more than they actually were. Casey's support for appeasement 
had been largely motivated by loyalty to Lyons and the desire to obtain his endorsement in 
the succession stakes. With the latter gone, the Treasurer was free to follow his own, more 
hawkish instincts.ó0 He was also intensely involved in the intrigues following Lyons's death 
and therefore had little time to master external affairs as well. Hughes was likewise actively 
conspiring to divert the succession in his interests, but external affairs was his portfolio, so 
he did not need extra time to bring himself up to speed with the issues. His dominance was 
not, however, to last. Having been elected leader of the U.A.P. on 18 April, Menzies was 
60 See Chapter One, above. 
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determined to remove his rivals from positions of importance, so Casey was relegated from 
the Treasury to the newly created, and politically peripheral, Ministry of Supply, while 
Hughes was reduced to Attorney -General, with the largely cosmetic office of Deputy Prime 
Minister as a sop. Sir Henry Gullett was the new Minister for External Affairs and, as the 
British High Commissioner put it, `no one listens to Gullett.'61 Politically, Menzies might 
have to accept the continuance of his rivals in cabinet, but he intended to make sure his was 
the dominant voice in international relations. 
South Africa 
In South Africa, Hertzog had publicly paraded his faith in an enduring peace in Europe as 
late as Friday, 10 March, while Smuts, had, in contrast, remained overcome by pessimism.62 
The latter wrote to Margaret Gillett on 17 March that Prague had confirmed his worst fears 
even faster than he had expected.63 He continued that Hertzog and Chamberlain's optimistic 
belief in an enduring European peace based on a position of strength had been completely 
discredited by the latest of Hitler's `stunning blows.' Chamberlain's reaction had been 
`feeble.' Prophetically, Smuts expected Italy now to make the next move, although after the 
Spanish victory, as Mussolini `would not be satisfied to be a mere onlooker while Germany 
swallows all the feast in Central Europe.' However, Smuts could not bring himself to accept 
that force had to be `the last word on our side too.' Te Water was likewise pessimistic, 
reporting to Hertzog on 16 March that public opinion in Britain had `hardened almost 
overnight.'" He continued that he anticipated a chorus of pacificatory public statements but 
reiterated that the pace of armaments continued to be the true gauge of international tension. 
Hertzog reverted to silence. The apparent threat to Romania, London's canvassing of other 
capitals in response to this and the disappointing outcome to that process produced no 
reaction.65 On Tuesday, 21 March, Inskip advised dominion Prime Ministers that the British 
government had decided to approach the French, Polish and Russian governments with the 
proposal that the four publicly declare that, in the event of another act of aggression, they 
would consult each other as to how to react.66 This was too much for Te Water and, the same 
G1 TNA DO 35 121/46 Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, British High Commissioner in Canberra, to Inskip, 19 
June 1939 
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day, sought his chief's intervention, asking `cannot our voice be raised against what surely 
can only be described as the defeatist policies at present governing situation.'67 This had the 
desired effect. On 23 March, Hertzog sent Te Water a message for delivery to the British 
government, urging them not to abandon appeasement. 68 The South African Prime Minister, 
drawing on a warning from Dr. Gie, also expressed the hope that the proposed four power 
declaration would not amount to the encirclement of Germany, as this would mean war, `not 
because Germany necessarily wants war, but because such policy of encirclement cannot be 
taken by her as meaning anything else.'69 The General reinforced this message with the 
words `that Germany would be entitled to so interpret such a policy, I do not think anyone 
can doubt.' Rather desperately, he warned that this would throw the responsibility for any 
such conflict onto Britain and her allies and would cost them the goodwill that they had 
gained as a result of Hitler's treatment of Czecho -Slovakia. Hertzog concluded ominously 
`in the Union of South Africa, the results of such policy will be decidedly most regrettable.' 
Chamberlain, however, successfully reassured Te Water that this was not what was intended, 
which the latter duly reported to his chief on 24 March.70 
The same day, Gie reported to his government on the German view, which he feared might 
be overlooked, `as intense indignation regarding the incorporation of Czecho- Slovakia is so 
widespread and so understandable.'71 Gie took Hitler and the dynamic character of National 
Socialism as given, but argued the regime also feared being encircled and subjected to a 
blockade, and was therefore obsessed with external criticism of, and counter -measures to, its 
actions. Berlin's response to this perceived vulnerability was to engage in a "` Drang nach 
Osten.'" Public opinion supported Hitler over this policy's most recent manifestation in the 
Prague episode, but was somewhat subdued on account of the British reaction; nevertheless, 
there was widespread resentment, not least because of its perceived hypocrisy, about the 
latter's interference in Germany's eastern 'lebensraum."' The unstated implication was that 
Germany should continue to be treated with understanding, whether in spite of, or because 
of, their appalling behaviour. 
Back home, also on 23 March, Hertzog strove for unity, stating in the House, even as Hitler 
seized Memel; that `our relations with all other nations were still friendly and peaceful, and 
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that it would be best to remember we still had no enemy.'72 Ostensibly this remark favoured 
the Afrikaner predilection for neutrality by reminding the public that, as yet, South Africa 
had no casus belli with anyone. Anglophones could scarcely object to this, however, as 
Britain had yet to go beyond a proposal to bind themselves to consult with other parties in 
the face of fresh aggression. The use of the word `still', as the Cape Times pointed out, also 
implied this might not always be the case. Hertzog even went on to declare that `the moment 
might undoubtedly arise when South Africa would feel herself involved.' Again, although 
seeming to appeal to Anglophones, this actually reached out to both sections. The phrasing 
was conditional, so Afrikaners could take comfort from the idea that this might never 
actually come to fruition. Hertzog had to be circumspect in what he said in order to keep all 
his supporters in line. 
Smuts writing to his friend Margaret Gillett the following day, 24 March, had no need to 
concern himself with unity. Nor was he much troubled by Hitler's acquisition of Memel, 
although he expressed sympathy for European alarm at the episode.73 The South African 
Deputy Prime Minister remained fixated on Italy and Italian involvement in Spain. He 
expected, quite correctly as it turned out, that Mussolini would soon have to make a move as 
`surely he cannot remain naked and hungry while his partner has this gargantuan feast. [sic]' 
His instincts, however, wrongly led him to surmise that this would be focused on Spain, 
leading him to once again condemn what he saw as the supine inaction of the western 
powers in the face of blatant German and Italian intervention there. 
The weekend remained quiet and it was not until Tuesday, 28 March, that Whitehall 
completely shared its anxieties about German intentions with the dominions, in a cable 
which predicted the Germans would first absorb Poland and Romania, before, their rear 
secured, turning on the western powers.74 Two days later Inskip advised the dominion prime 
ministers of Chamberlain's intention to guarantee Poland.75 Also that day in Berlin, Dr. Gie 
prepared a report for the Union government on the crisis, which he arranged to have sent to 
London for onward transmission for security reasons.76 In a covering letter to Te Water he 
considered that his analysis had been `completely frank, perhaps too frank.' He concluded 
`things look bad.' 
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His report was openly critical of Hitler. Gie deemed the latter's actions had revealed the 
scope of the problem, as without warning Europe might find itself landed in a war and there 
was nothing South Africa could do about it. The German leader had violated his own tenet of 
racial purity and revealed other peoples as potential victims of his restless ambition. Having 
denounced Hitler, Gie then started to backtrack. Firstly, he stressed the mystical and 
legalistic aspects to the seizure of Prague, creating the impression that there might, after all, 
be some self -imposed limits to Hitler's appetite. Secondly, Gie focused his concern on 
London and one man in particular, Halifax. That this man was British Foreign Secretary at 
this time was `n tragedie' [a tragedy]. His lack of pragmatism evidenced in his moral 
sermonising and premature talk of a Russian agreement had set Britain on a collision course 
with Germany. Hitler's previous successes, together with Halifax's failed alliance proposal 
and British reluctance to adopt conscription, had combined to create a dangerous prospect, 
where Germany had become incapable of moderation, whether confronted with either checks 
or successes. If the German leader was bent on early hostilities, it was because he had 
become convinced war was inevitable and wished to take advantage of the current German 
lead in armaments. Gie would not welcome German rule over South Africa but he could not 
understand why Britain was not prepared to leave Germany a free hand in the East, unless 
they were bent on a preventative war, in which case others had the right to look to their own 
interests. Gie's message remained the same as previously, that Britain should continue to 
treat Germany sympathetically in the interests of peace and, ultimately, South African unity. 
Te Water reassured Gie on the question of his frankness that his despatches from Berlin 
`were most illuminating and will be so to General Hertzog, too.'77 In his own covering letter 
to the South African Prime Minister, the High Commissioner in London largely agreed with 
Gie's views.78 However, he thought the new direction in British foreign policy was as much 
Chamberlain's doing as it was Halifax's. He was also markedly more sympathetic to the 
British position, remarking `I confess to finding it extremely difficult to conceive of any 
other action than that taken by Great Britain to meet German action.' However, `nothing 
could be more dangerous than the present situation.' He was therefore urging London not to 
allow the situation to spiral out of control: `the pacific intentions of this country must, I 
believe, be demonstrated by some action which will give Germany and Italy a chance to 
prove theirs.' His suggestion was that Chamberlain should offer Germany and Italy a non- 
aggression pact at the point when the peace front came together. He described the mood in 
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Parliament and the country as settled, after the agony of indecision which had been faced, 
and warned bleakly: `if Germany takes action again, it will be the end. There will be war.' 
On the eve of Mussolini's march into Albania, Smuts wrote again to Margaret Gillett.79 The 
revolutionary nature of Chamberlain's guarantee to Poland had shocked Smuts and his 
colleagues; it `has simply made us gasp.' Firstly, there was alarm at how the volatile German 
regime would react to this attempt to check their aggressive march. Secondly, he worried 
what effect this latest move would have on the future of the Commonwealth. The dangers 
were `obvious.' Smuts feared that Chamberlain's action would only magnify the centrifugal 
forces pulling the British `family of nations' in different directions. He remained deeply 
pessimistic about the prospects for peace, writing to his friend again on 8 April, how `our 
frail barque is tossing on the heaving waters of unprovoked aggression.'80 He worried that 
Albania would only be the first of Mussolini's moves, as `it is too small a beginning to 
satisfy so great a greed.' 
This latest aggression, occurring as it did on Good Friday, caused considerable confusion. 
On Tuesday 11 April, Te Water reported to Hertzog that the situation had `been too fluid for 
a High Commissioners' meeting over the Easter weekend.'81 One was summoned the next 
day, and immediately afterwards the South African informed his government of what had 
transpired there. 82 He had found British denials that Italian action had been in response to 
the signature of the Anglo- Polish Agreement the previous week unconvincing. He reported 
the good news that Mussolini appeared anxious not to burn his bridges, however, and that 
British reaction was being minimised for pragmatic reasons. He also reported that the 
proposed guarantee to Greece was to be on similar lines to the Polish one. The decision to 
likewise guarantee Romania was not known at that point. 
The same day, Hertzog refused the Opposition a debate in Parliament on the international 
situation, stating in the House, `it would be unwise for members to discuss matters about 
which they knew nothing, and which did not concern them.'83 Actually, as Dr. Malan 
retorted, it was to avoid exposing the divisions in his party.84 Sir William Clark, the British 
High Commissioner, concurred with this latter view in his report to London on 13 April.85 
Nevertheless, Clark detected a significant shift in Hertzog's thinking. He related that Hertzog 
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had told him: `how opinion had been largely sympathetic to Germany after the Treaty of 
Versailles, how it was shaken by the September affair and how the last attack on 
Czechoslovakia was bringing the conviction that Hitler's real aim was world domination.' 
Sir, William felt Hertzog was actually describing his own journey rather than that of public 
opinion. Hertzog had even gone so far as to say `if Hitler launched another of his attacks, 
conversion of public opinion in South Africa would be complete and people would realise 
that they had no option but to range themselves on our side in the event of war.' 
The guarantees to Romania and Greece were not the last word on the repercussions from 
Prague as far as Pretoria was concerned. According to Pirow in Hertzog, Smuts had told the 
Prime Minister that there were German plans afoot to stage a rising in South West -Africa on 
Hitler's birthday.86 Smuts confirmed this in a letter of 18 April to Margaret Gillett: `we have 
had warnings from various reliable sources that we may expect sudden trouble in S.W. 
Africa.'ß7 The police were therefore taken under direct South African control and 
reinforcements despatched from the Union.88 Hertzog was as intent as Smuts on not 
surrendering South -West Africa and gave the move his full backing in Parliament.89 The 
Prime Minister justified the Union takeover of the police in South West Africa by reference 
to Axis moves in Europe. The march into Prague cast long shadows. 
By this point, Smuts appeared convinced that war was coming, having written in his letter to 
Margaret Gillett on 18 April: `I believe the stage is set for a world conflict and the Dictators 
are determined to go forward.'90 Smuts continued that he was writing just before going to a 
meeting at Groote Schuur [the Prime Minister's residence] to discuss `the war situation.' 
While Smuts did not indicate what had occurred there, there was no repetition of the 
reservations he had expressed over the guarantee to Poland endangering the relationship of 
Britain and the dominions. Indeed, he freely used the words `we' and `our' when talking of 
the Commonwealth, as for instance in the remark: `if we are not extra careful, the result may 
be that a sudden attack is made on Suez and Egypt, with very serious dangers to one of our 
86 Pirow, Hertzog, pp.242 -3 Pirow implies Smuts fabricated the threat to create an incident that would 
harden Afrikaner opinion against Germany. No evidence of such a plot emerged after the police were 
despatched to Windhoek, so this may be true, but Hertzog's acquiescence in the despatch of police 
reinforcements, and his subsequent support for the takeover of the local police by South Africa would 
suggest either that he displayed an uncharacteristic lack of interest in the issue, or that he was in the 
know. Certainly, the measures had the beneficial side -effect of publicly demonstrating the 
government's commitment to maintaining control over South -West Africa, which would have 
supplied sufficient motive for both generals. 
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principal lines of communication.' All of which seemed entirely consistent with what 
Hertzog had told Sir William Clark. Superficially, the United Party appeared to have 
overcome its internal divisions and looked as if it was ready to commit itself to a war at 
Britain's side against aggression, even if it was not ready to go public with this decision. 
The key to this apparent unity was the continuing mutual interest of Hertzog and Smuts in 
preserving their `Fusion' experiment.91 Both of them had sunk too much into this to readily 
abandon it. Immediately prior to Prague, Hertzog was publicly upbeat, while Smuts was 
privately pessimistic about the prospects for peace, but did not mean that either of them had 
shifted in their commitment to fusing the English and Afrikaner communities into one. 
Hitler's subsequent move into Prague and the British response to it severely increased 
international tension, and thereby strained party unity, but without providing an opening for 
the South Africans to influence. London's proposal for a mutual public commitment to even 
just consult in the event of fresh aggression, however, was a step too far. There was a danger 
this would lead the Germans to conclude they were being `encircled', driving them to lash 
out in an act of desperation, thereby threatening the South African government's unity. 
Hertzog would not enter such a war and this would split his party, ending the `Fusion' 
experiment in which Smuts, as well as the Prime Minister, had invested so much. Hertzog 
therefore spoke for his colleague too, when he pushed the British not to close the door on 
negotiations with Germany in his message of 24 March. Similarly, Smuts also spoke for 
Hertzog, when he told Margaret Gillett on 6 April of South African shock at the Polish 
guarantee and expressed concern at its implications for the future of the Commonwealth. The 
Italian invasion of Albania changed all this. It appeared the Axis were working in collusion, 
which drew in South African interests, constituting a threat to `our' lines of communication 
through the Mediterranean and Suez. Hertzog and Smuts were also united on retaining South 
Africa's mandate over South -West Africa, and the former therefore backed the latter in his 
moves to strengthen the hands of the Union's authorities there. The continuing fragility of 
this public unity, however, can be discerned from the Prime Minister's refusal to grant the 
Opposition a debate on the international situation, as this could expose how divided his party 
remained. Even his government's unity on the issue remained limited, agreed on attempting 
to prevent an outbreak of war, but only in accord thereafter if the Axis were acting in unison. 
91 
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Canada 
According to his diary, Mackenzie King spent the period of 11 - 14 March preoccupied with 
trying to extend his prospective role in the forthcoming royal tour of North America, and 
therefore took no account of the initial cable from London, on Saturday 11 March, warning 
of the impending crisis.92 He did not give any attention to Czecho -Slovakia until 15 March, 
when Hitler was in Prague. The Canadian leader recorded his immediate reaction to the 
actual invasion in his diary as being that the `war scare' of the preceding months had in fact 
been a carefully planned diversion, meant to distract attention from what was actually 
intended 93 Prague only reinforced the personal significance of Hitler in Mackenzie King's 
worldview. He continued `it would almost seem as if Hitler had had a charmed life.' The 
German leader was `a man of destiny, if ever there was one.' Given Mackenzie King's belief 
in the active intervention of spiritual forces in worldly affairs and the value of personal 
contact in political matters, the importance of maintaining a dialogue with the German leader 
was inescapable. This did not mean that the Canadian endorsed Hitler and his acts; as he 
went on to argue instead that Gandhi would have greater long -term influence. Nevertheless, 
Mackenzie King was not yet ready to abandon appeasement, despite German aggression, as 
`anything, however, is better than war.' 
Chamberlain's Birmingham speech on Friday, 17 March brought home the seriousness of 
the situation. Mackenzie King noted in his journal that the British Prime Minister's line on 
Hitler had changed, both due to the breach of faith involved in taking Prague, and the 
ambition implied in the subjugation of non- Germans.94 Chamberlain's enumeration of the 
assets Germany had acquired in so doing filled the Canadian leader with gloom. What really 
horrified him, however, was the British leader's remark that he would not give up liberty to 
obtain peace and that `he felt that the Dominions [sic] were behind Britain in this.' The 
problem for the Canadian Prime Minister was the mention of the dominions. As far as 
Mackenzie King was concerned, this `immediately raises the most difficult question with 
which we are faced in Parliament.' The `jingoes' would pull him in one way and the 
Quebecois in another, threatening the country's unity. 
It was not until the morning of Monday, 20 March, that the Prime Minister turned to 
drafting a statement to be made that afternoon on Canada's position. He felt this was 
necessary after Chamberlain's speech, noting in his diary that the public rightly expected 
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him `to display solidarity with the other democracies in countering aggression and attempts 
to dominate `the world by force.'95 However, he remained concerned by the implications 
that Chamberlain's remark about dominion support for Britain had created and, hence, was 
anxious to avoid `any blank cheque to any Administration in Britain to involve us in war 
anywhere the British Government might wish to participate in conflict.' He remained 
ambivalent about Hitler, feeling the latter's word could no longer be trusted, but seemingly 
more concerned that the volatility of the Balkan region might now unleash an uncontrollable 
chain reaction, as in 1914. This was only reinforced by the news from London that Britain 
was surveying European capitals about Romania, which drew forth the comment `what a 
hideous business that Europe should be again at the verge of war over trouble in these 
Balkan areas.' He was clearly apprehensive about how cabinet would receive his statement 
on international relations and recorded his determination `to stand by this point of view, 
above outlined, regardless of consequences.' 
He need not have worried. Very much to his surprise, he found his cabinet, including 
Lapointe, were in broad agreement with him. As has been seen, Mackenzie King's 
Quebecois lieutenant had previously acted as a brake on the Prime Minister's participationist 
tendencies. Lapointe had clearly softened his former stance, however, as the only objections 
raised at the meeting were that Mackenzie King's statement did not go far enough and the 
Minister of Justice even agreed later to the insertion of a sentence `concerning the menace to 
the Commonwealth from an unprovoked attack on London.' The following day, as 
Mackenzie King confided in his diary, Lapointe again showed his change of heart by 
admitting that, although the stance would be unpopular in Quebec, `it could not be helped.'96 
The Prime Minister could therefore now look forward to taking a united government along 
with him. 
Campbell reported to London on 21 March, that Mackenzie King had mentioned in passing 
in the House as part of his statement on international affairs that his government was ready 
to enter into `consultation with the United Kingdom.'97 That the Canadian Prime Minister 
did not attach any particular significance to this remark can be deduced from its absence 
from his diary; either in the section where he enumerated the points he needed to include in 
his speech, or in the section covering the discussion of the statement in cabinet.98 It was of 
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great significance, however, to Whitehall, where the Canadian Prime Minister's view had 
long been held to be the polar opposite. In March 1938, for instance, the then Dominions 
Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, had advised that: `any suggestion on our part that we had 
"consulted ", or intended to "consult" with the dominions would call forth some sort of 
rejoinder from him.'99 Already sensitive to this issue, Sir Gerald Campbell cabled the 
Dominions Office on 21 March delicately implying that there might be consequences for 
remarks now made by Lord Halifax in the House of Lords that London was already in 
'close and practical consultation" with the Dominions.' 100 Whitehall responded the 
following day that, if asked, Sir Gerald should reply that London was committed to keeping 
dominion governments fully informed and they were free to provide comments if they 
wished to do so, which was what had been meant by "'consultation. '"101 The Dominions 
Office remained intrigued by Mackenzie King's remarks, however, and Campbell was 
therefore also instructed to enquire what, if anything, the Canadian leader had meant by 
them. 
Sir Gerald would not get the opportunity to do so until Friday, 24 March. In the interim, 
Hitler had swallowed Memel, which inspired the comment in Mackenzie King's diary: `I 
hate the thought of great Powers being brought into wars over wretched little states.' 102 The 
Canadian Prime Minister went on that he much preferred the situation where `four men in 
one place had everything in their own hands.' He believed the current state of affairs was 
much more volatile than the previous September, as an outbreak in any remote location 
might draw in all the countries of Europe; a concern he repeated to his party's caucus on 23 
March.103 The following day, 24 March, he recorded how his anxieties about the European 
situation were only reinforced by news of resolutions in the Ontario and Quebec parliaments, 
respectively pushing Ottawa in favour of unconditional participation and neutrality in any 
war, in the day's diary entry.104 This led him to conclude gloomily that `the country is 
becoming roused.' European problems were now overtly encroaching on the domestic 
harmony by which he set such store. 
With this in mind, the Prime Minister met the British High Commissioner later that day, 
recording the proceedings in his diary. As instructed and without explicitly referring to Lord 
Halifax, Sir Gerald explained to the Canadian leader that the British government considered 
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all messages amounted to consultation, as dominion governments were welcome to express 
their opinions, if they chose to do so, on the matters raised in such communications. In fact, 
Mackenzie King does not appear to have been at all perturbed by the British Foreign 
Secretary's observations, neither directly raising them in this encounter, nor commenting on 
them at the time in his diary.105 Instead he used the meeting with Campbell to set out how he 
wished to see the system working: firstly, he wished all important communications to be 
delivered directly from government to government and not via High Commissioners; 
secondly, that if London wished to consult Ottawa on a particular issue, it should say so 
explicitly; and thirdly that Whitehall should give prior notice of this and any other sensitive 
matter via Sir Gerald, so that the Canadian government would have the opportunity of 
advising against their formal despatch, in case they were controversial, or likely to be 
refused. This did indeed represent something of an advance from the Prime Minister's 
former opposition to consultation under any circumstances, but it was evident he was still 
uncomfortable with the concept. In particular, he insisted the question of a military alliance 
would be `embarrassing.' With Ontario and Quebec already roused, the last thing the 
Canadian leader wanted was to receive a question, where every potential answer could only 
exacerbate domestic divisions. 
The following day, he confided in his diary that that morning he had had `a very distinct 
vision of a number of children who were sliding up and down the slope of a roof.'106 Some 
came close to the edge, but none fell off. He proceeded to analyse this episode in some 
detail. At first he felt that the vision was suggestive of danger, but did not feel able to link it 
to any specific threat. Later, in conversation `quite involuntarily there came to my lips the 
expression that the nations were like children sliding on a roof.' He decided that this was 
what his vision had represented and that it showed that nothing particularly terrible was 
about to happen, at least for the moment. France and Italy were so close to each other that 
war would inevitably mean their mutual destruction, `and that, they will not wish to do.' He 
also felt the French would be held back by their relative weakness vis -à -vis Germany. He did 
not, however, mention any constraints which might apply in the case of the latter. The 
understanding appeared to be that peace was only threatened by the spectre of French 
resistance to German demands and, so long as this did not materialise, war could continue to 
be avoided. Appeasement therefore remained very much alive and well, at least in his head. 
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Over the weekend and the following week he worked on a second statement on international 
affairs, to be delivered on 30 March. His diary reveals how domestic tensions mounted as he 
worked on it: Manion, the Opposition leader played to the Quebecois gallery by repudiating 
conscription on behalf of the Conservatives; the resolution on participation moved through 
the Quebec legislature and students from Laval University organised a demonstration against 
conscription.107 The Canadian Prime Minister duly made his statement on the 301h, and Sir 
Gerald Campbell reported on its contents for London's benefit in his despatch home of 31 
March.108 Firstly, Mackenzie King had reviewed the events of the previous year, defending 
his silence in September, paying tribute to Chamberlain's efforts to preserve peace and 
condemning recent German activity. He had declared the impossibility of making binding 
commitments, pointing out that the situation was constantly changing and insisting that any 
decision would have to take a number of factors into view; Canada's growing sense of 
identity and her own interests, her position on the North American continent and consequent 
relationship with the United States (although any suggestion of Pan- American union was 
premature) and her ties with Britain. He had returned to Sir Wilfrid Laurier's remark about 
Canada being liable to attack when Britain was engaged in war; explaining this did not mean 
automatic participation, but that an attack on Britain would inevitably endanger Canada. He 
had wished to avoid misleading an aggressor into thinking Canada would never fight through 
premature talk of neutrality. He had referred to the need to co- ordinate activity with others, 
but had given the necessary pledge on conscription, assuring his audience that his 
government considered it neither essential nor effective to compel men to serve overseas. 
Writing in his diary afterwards, the Prime Minister felt both that his audience had been 
appreciative and that he had performed well, although he conceded that the subsequent 
speech by Manion, the Leader of the Opposition might well play better with the public.109 He 
consoled himself that at least it indicated that the political nation was largely united with 
regard to the current international position. 
That evening, the cable from London announcing the British government's decision to 
guarantee Poland, subject to consultation with Paris and Warsaw, but not the dominions, 
arrived. The primary Canadian reaction to this slight was relief. Mackenzie King disliked the 
measure itself, describing it in his diary as yet another example of `the sort of bungling way 
the situation has been handled by England in the last few days.' 110 He continued that it, `I 
know, will antagonize Hitler tremendously.' The Canadian was also uncertain of its deterrent 
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effect, `after Britain has failed to get other smaller states into line, and has hummed and 
hawed with Russia.' The next day's entry noted his view that `a conditional declaration of 
war was made certainly without anything in the nature of consultation with Canada or any of 
the dominions." His personal reaction was that: `I am mighty glad that my speech was 
made yesterday before this particular declaration was made.' He did not, therefore, seek to 
retract anything that he had said; he was merely thankful he had said it before the message 
was received. Nor was there any record in his diary of an attempt at cabinet that day to rein 
in Lapointe, who was due to speak in the afternoon.12 
Lapointe in fact delivered a rousing speech largely directed at the Quebecois, as Sir Gerald 
Campbell dutifully reported to London on 2 April.13 The Minister for Justice asked 
rhetorically if any could deny the Prime Minister's view that if bombs were falling on 
London, public opinion would overwhelmingly demand intervention; demanding if they 
wished to repudiate Canada's contractual obligations in connection with shipping; and 
inquiring whether the reliance on the protection of allies did not involve a commensurate 
obligation to assist such allies in their time of need. Mackenzie King acknowledged in his 
diary that Lapointe had made the better speech, now regretted that he himself had not been 
more forthright in his support of Britain, but consoled himself that by each making the 
speech they had: `we have built a substantial support for Canadian unity.' 14 The Canadian 
Prime Minister continued to be supportive of Britain and enjoy the newly won support of 
Lapointe in so doing. 
Mackenzie King's belief in the stance he had adopted grew over the period leading up to 
Easter, judging by his diary entries. Hitler's speech at Wilhelmshaven on 1 S` April brought 
the Prime Minister little comfort, but he continued to believe war could be avoided in 
1939.15 He felt vindicated, despite the Anglophone press criticism, in not giving an 
unconditional pledge to Britain, when news came in that the Poles were proving recalcitrant 
over expanding their arrangement into a broader anti- aggression pact: `now comes word that 
Poland herself will not stand with Britain, that she prefers to be with Germany and does not 
thank us for our offers to fight for her.' 16 On Wednesday, 5 April, he had a vision of Hitler 
being pursued as a fugitive, and interpreted this as meaning that the German leader had, 
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against his wishes, been driven from his true purpose, `to help the people.' 117 Mackenzie 
King felt this vision to be important: `there is, I think, significance in the clear vision as I 
saw him, and as he passed closely by me this morning.' He was condemnatory of Italy's 
action against Albania, but did not seem particularly perturbed by it: `these gangsters intend 
to extend their territory, I think they are better left alone, with internal problems, etc., than to 
precipitate a world war.' His diary entry for the Monday revealed him as being more 
concerned by `the linking up of Eng. with Greece, Romania, etc.' This reflected what he 
most feared; that `some untoward act between Balkan States which might precipitate an 
immediate move that will quickly draw others into the conflict.' 
The following day, his diary indicates he took Manion, the Leader of the Opposition, into 
his confidence. "g The Prime Minister was careful to point out the press had already covered 
all the significant issues and, particularly, `that we had just been kept informed, and not 
consulted, and as usual, informed of what had taken place rather than of what was to be 
said.' By doing this, he again emphasised that his government retained its freedom from any 
moral or other commitments on British policy, before Parliament had had a chance to vote 
on the matter. News of the guarantee to Greece the same day led him to conclude in his 
diary: `a complete change of attitude and means now that further aggression on the part of 
Hitler and Mussolini will certainly mean a European war.' However, he maintained the great 
danger was not aggression by the dictators, but the Balkan states provoking a general war 
through some `flare -up.' The next day, the dominions were informed that France intended to 
include Romania in the guarantees and that, in the interests of presenting a united front, the 
United Kingdom would follow suit.' 19 By this stage the Prime Minister admitted to his diary 
that he was more concerned than he had ever been.120 He feared the extent to which Britain 
had exposed itself by giving guarantees to Greece, Poland and Romania, without obtaining 
any assurances from Turkey or Russia. Likewise, he bemoaned the lack of commitment to 
collective security displayed by the eastern European states. The one redeeming feature he 
could see was that Chamberlain had not broken with the Italians, even though the Canadian 
leader recognised their untrustworthiness. 
Mackenzie King did not want war, but was committed to supporting Britain if it came to 
pass. He disliked the `peace front', but also its lack of success, as both left the situation more 
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dangerous in his opinion. He would have preferred to continue with appeasement, as he felt 
this provided the best chance of maintaining peace, even if not for `the wretched little states 
in the Balkans.' 121 This preference was only reinforced by the reassurance he found in his 
visions, which he believed were a direct result of active spiritual intervention in his life. He 
remained uncomfortable with more mundane consultation, however, in case this led to him 
incurring a commitment which would later prove embarrassing, and, in this context, he was 
relieved that the lack of prior discussion allowed him to distance himself from the Polish 
guarantee, which he strongly disliked. He was also keen, in conversation with Manion, to 
distance himself from British decision -making in the wake of Albania, even if this was 
slightly stretching the truth. In spite of this he remained determined to back Britain if peace 
failed, and continued with his efforts to prepare the country for the eventuality of war. The 
increased chance of this occurring and involving Canada, with the attendant risk of isolation 
for Quebec, also convinced Lapointe of the necessity of rallying his people behind 
participation, leading him to reverse his stance and fully support the Prime Minister's efforts. 
In spite of Mackenzie King's continuing, if frail, hopes for peace, the events of March and 
April had left the Canadian government more convinced than ever of the risk of war, and 
more united than before in their readiness to face it. 
New Zealand 
The New Zealand government cabled London with its views on 21 March in response to the 
previous day's news that Britain had rejected Russia's proposal for a conference, which had 
been leaked to the press.122 This was not at all to Wellington's liking, and they therefore 
cabled London in the hope that `a further expression of their views might not be without its 
use.' 123 By this time, Prague had been occupied; the supposed threat to Romania had 
emerged, leading to London's disappointing survey of European capitals and its consequent 
proposal to the Poles, Soviets and French that they together make a public commitment to 
mutually consult in the event of any further aggression.124 The Savage government reiterated 
in their cable to London their conviction that a conference should be called to deal with the 
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international situation and would have liked one which had `the widest possible sphere and 
with the widest possible agenda.'125 By ruling nothing out, such a conference would have the 
scope to deal with all the issues that were causing international tension `and of attempting 
the removal, if they can be removed, of the legitimate grievances that admittedly exist.' The 
last point shows the distance that existed between them and other anti -appeasers, such as 
Billy Hughes in Australia, who steadfastly refused to accept any justification for the 
complaints of the dissatisfied powers. Even after Prague, New Zealand was still prepared to 
recognise that some complaints were genuine and ought to be resolved. What had changed 
was the insertion of the caveat `if they can be removed.' This indicated a concern, not 
previously expressed, that the current power structures in the aggressor states might be so 
entrenched and intransigent that resolution of grievances might no longer be possible. 126 
Nonetheless, Wellington still considered it worthwhile to remind London of their previous 
proposals for an all- encompassing conference. 
The New Zealand government were, however prepared to concede in their cable that, for 
this, `the time might not be opportune.'127 They instead suggested a conference be 
summoned `for those nations which are opposed to aggression and which are now seeing 
danger to themselves more clearly than ever before.' This was clearly unlikely to be able to 
remove the remaining `legitimate grievances.' This might therefore seem like dogmatic 
adherence to the idea of having a conference for the sake of having a conference, but it 
would have the added advantage of reaching out to the Soviets. New Zealand had always 
favoured collective security and had only reverted to undiluted dependence on Britain with 
its demise, so there was no harm, from their point of view, in building as broad a support as 
possible for resistance to aggression. Snubbing Moscow's suggestion was unlikely to 
achieve that. Similarly, they likewise drew attention to the opportunity they saw for greater 
co- operation with the United States which they also urged the British government `to use 
their utmost endeavours to achieve.' 
Finally the New Zealand government pledged their full support for Britain in the event of 
war `in defence of decency of [sic] international life and traditions upon which British 
Commonwealth has been built.' This was more than a cosmetic gesture. It undoubtedly 
reflected the consensus in New Zealand public life that the public would demand immediate 
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participation in the event of war. It might also be expected that such a commitment would 
give greater weight to the concerns of the government making it. It equally drew attention to 
the common values which underpinned the relationship between Britain and the dominions, 
creating an image of solidarity, which, if sufficiently subtly done, could just be of benefit to 
a government which was well aware that, in only a matter of weeks, it would have to go cap 
in hand to London for the funds necessary to maintain itself. 
This created some difficulty for the Dominions Office. Caught between Whitehall 
expectations of automatic dominion participation in the event of war and dominion 
sensitivity over their sovereignty on the other, they had no desire to needlessly antagonise a 
government who was evidently so co- operative on the subject.128 Relations with New 
Zealand were already sufficiently fraught over the financial issue.129 Nonetheless, they were 
also aware how unwelcome the proposals contained in the cable were. Chamberlain had no 
desire for a conference and on 31 March Inskip informed Sir Harry Batterbee, the newly 
arrived British High Commissioner in New Zealand, of his fears the Savage government did 
not understand `how exceedingly cautious it is necessary to be in any action designed to 
encourage United States co- operation.'130 Ideally, the Dominions Office response should 
satisfy the rest of Whitehall by steering New Zealand away from its contentious proposals 
without actually ruffling any feathers in Wellington. This would require consultation with 
other departments as well as meticulous attention on their own part, as the mandarins duly 
noted.131 As such, an immediate response was out of the question, but equally no useful 
purpose would be served by risking offence through appearing to ignore the suggestions. A 
holding telegram was therefore sent the same day thanking Wellington profusely for their 
pledge of loyalty and assuring them that their proposals would receive `our early and most 
careful consideration.' 132 
This was not, however, enough for Savage. In a rather forlorn attempt to further pressure 
London into adopting his advice, he went public with it in an interview the following day. 133 
Somewhat disingenuously he professed a reluctance to involve himself in the European 
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situation and revisited the reasons he had given for adopting a similar stance the previous 
September, during the Sudeten crisis. He maintained his government's lack of intimate 
knowledge of the people, places and issues involved, together with their remoteness from the 
epicentre, barred them from lecturing London on the steps the latter should be taking. Savage 
also sought to calm public opinion. He therefore reassured his fellow- citizens that London 
had kept Wellington up to date with developments and deprecated the need to confirm the 
country's loyalty, but nonetheless affirmed that `when Britain is in trouble, we are in 
trouble.' Like their counterparts in Canberra, the government saw no reason for an early 
summoning of Parliament. This would probably meet for its first session since the General 
Election of the previous 15 October, `about the end of June.' Then, despite having just 
explained why his government was unwilling to advise London on the course of action it 
should adopt, he nevertheless publicly called on Britain to summon a conference to resolve 
the issues dividing the world. He argued such a `combined action [sic] essential to settle the 
economic differences which are among the primary causes of wars.' Rather inconsistently, 
considering its proposed remit to tackle the matters separating the world, invitations to the 
conference were to be issued to `peace - loving nations.' Savage went on to argue, however, 
that if this initiative was instigated by the British Commonwealth, it would be `difficult for 
any nation to stand out.' 
Jordan did not actually communicate with his government until 24 March and then by letter, 
rather than cable, so there would have been some delay in the receipt of this missive.134 This 
was the letter in which Jordan first referred to the cable which had triggered the `war scare' 
discussed in the previous chapter. In the interim between Savage's remarks quoted in the 
New Zealand Herald, discussed above, and this letter, the Germans had also seized Memel, 
but Jordan made no reference to that. He did, however, cover other aspects of the 
contemporary international situation. Firstly he refused to accept that there had been any 
fundamental alteration in British policy: `the position at the present time is very little 
different from what it has been for almost the whole of the time I have been in England.' He 
did acknowledge that `during the last few weeks there has been something of a change.' This 
did involve the adoption of something resembling collective security, but which would not 
involve the League of Nations and it was this which was of fundamental importance to the 
New Zealand High Commissioner, who complained: `and I asked whether this matter was to 
be emphasised at the League, but I am given no encouragement in that direction.' He 
reported the threat to Romania, but acknowledged this was now discounted and that, in any 
134 NANZ PM/16/1939+ Correspondence /Jordan to Savage, 24 March 1939 
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case, `if Roumania [sic] is occupied Britain will not take the initiative in resisting 
occupation.' Jordan then rather paradoxically wrote up the relatively modest British efforts 
as `a pact to resist aggression.' In fact all that had been done at this point was to firstly 
survey European capitals as to their reaction in the case of an actual threat to Romania, and 
then a proposal had been made to Paris, Warsaw and Moscow that all four countries should 
publicly commit to consult in the case of further aggression, which fell somewhat short of 
Jordan's description. Nonetheless, he was correct in his assessment of the difficulties that 
would be caused by Russian involvement. He reported these countries felt `that if Russia is 
admitted to their country, even to defend it, it is very unlikely they would afterwards be 
inclined to leave.' He also noted they felt the same way about entering into arrangements 
with Germany. With the detachment of an outsider, the New Zealand High Commissioner 
considered the resulting position to be `most interesting.' He also reassured his government 
that the United States was now prepared to supply the democratic countries with arms and 
ammunitions, so long as these were paid for in cash, and there were even hopes that the 
Neutrality Act would be amended to permit participation in the event of a European conflict. 
The prospects for the British Empire were less happy, however. There was considerable 
uncertainty about Canada and South Africa seemed to be steering for neutrality. 
Three days later, on the 27 March, Batterbee contacted his government. He did not think the 
New Zealand Government viewed the international situation sufficiently practically yet, 
reporting that `ministers are beginning to get very worried here, but in a rather academic 
way.' 135 The following Thursday, 30 March, London advised Wellington about the proposed 
guarantee to Poland, confirming this as definite the next day. Also on 31 March, they replied 
to the proposals that Savage had originally made on the 21 sl 136 They firstly tried to make 
themselves seem as open as possible by declaring `we should welcome the maximum 
amount of co- operation from all powers.' Unfortunately, however, `there is real difficulty, at 
the moment at any rate, in trying to arrange for any form of general conference.' The 
Scandinavian states had indicated their preference for neutrality and some of Germany's 
closer neighbours were understandably concerned not to be seen to be closely involved in 
any steps taken to deter aggression, therefore London had decided to approach `in the first 
instance only a limited number of European Governments.' These were also `the more 
important governments.' Nonetheless, they reassured New Zealand, `we should not hesitate 
to adopt the procedure of a conference if it proved to be the best way of dealing with the 
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situation.' The language employed was significant, softening the blow of the refusal and 
appearing to leave open the option of a reconsideration of the matter at a later date, if 
circumstances changed. This was in spite of Chamberlain's actual dislike of conferences, 
which continued unabated.137 London also confirmed that `we are keeping in very close 
touch with the United States Government.'138 Again, this had the advantage of sounding 
comforting, while actually committing the British to nothing. The Dominions Office was not, 
however, prepared to leave the contentious issue of involvement with the United States in 
this state, instead choosing to handle the matter discreetly the same day. Rather than put their 
objections to Savage's suggestion in writing, they cabled Batterbee asking him to informally 
emphasise to the Prime Minister the necessity for extreme caution in dealing with 
America.139 Wellington did not push either matter further at this stage and seemed satisfied 
with regard to the Polish Guarantee; with Berendsen informing Batterbee (which the latter 
duly relayed to London) that Savage `agreed the time had come to take a stand while 
thinking it regrettable that a stand had not been made in relation to Czechoslovakia.''4° 
As in Australia, the Good Friday invasion of Albania came at an inopportune time for the 
government. In New Zealand, this was because it coincided with the annual party conference 
on Easter Monday, rather than the death of their leader, as in Canberra.141 This was of 
particular significance this year because of the continuing `Jack Lee Affair.' It will be 
remembered that, after the General Election on 15 October, Lee had managed on 3 
November to persuade Caucus to wrest control of cabinet appointments from the Prime 
Minister and that the latter had refused to accept this.142 The National Executive had 
subsequently imposed a compromise whereby Caucus would elect the cabinet after a general 
election, but the party leader would retain control of appointments in the interim.143 This left 
Savage in control for the moment, but ultimately satisfied neither party. In the interim, Lee 
had allowed his vigorous criticisms of Savage, Nash and Fraser to become public knowledge 
through publication of the `Lee Letter'; a savage attack on the government and its policies.144 
Such disloyalty could not be ignored, and the triumvirate therefore sought to have Lee 
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censured at conference.145 In the end this happened, but he rationalised this setback away.146 
This was helped by conference's inability to be any more decisive than the National 
Executive had been previously. Having censured Lee, delegates subsequently elected him to 
the National Executive, thereby avoiding any opportunity to provide a clear -cut resolution to 
the crisis.147 Consequently, the poison lingered on and would only be finally lanced with 
Lee's expulsion from the party at the behest of the terminally ill Savage in 1940.148 It is 
therefore unsurprising that the cables from London, between 10 - 13 April, advising that the 
British cabinet was considering its reaction to Albania and then the decisions to guarantee 
Greece and Romania, elicited no response. 
The subsequent Friday, 14 April, the long- awaited Pacific Defence Conference opened in 
Wellington.149 Despite the tensions that had emerged between New Zealand and Australia 
over its scope, Savage reported to Galway that agreement had been reached on the 
demarcation of responsibilities as well as a common approach towards the United States.'5° 
The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff had identified Fiji, then undefended, as Japan's most likely 
target in the first instance, which was of particular importance to Wellington, as this was 
within air range of Auckland. The Chiefs of Staff therefore recommended its reinforcement, 
which the conference concurred in.151 The former had also appealed to their government's 
enlightened self -interest in their report on the British Committee of Imperial Defence's 
`Paper on Imperial Defence, with special reference to New Zealand,' `as our ability 
and willingness to co- operate on land or in the air in the defence of the Empire may prove in 
the end the most effective measure we can take for own security.' 152 Consequently, they 
urged their masters to, `within the financial resources of the country, do even more than at 
present contemplated.' The reference to finances was important as it will be recalled that the 
country's sterling funds had fallen to crisis point, while a number of government loans were 
also due for renewal in 1939.153 Jordan's reports on the prospects for the satisfactory 
resolution of these two issues had been anything but optimistic, but Walter Nash, was due to 
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travel to London to arrange fresh funding for the government. The measures proposed by the 
Chiefs of Staff were certainly not costless, including the adoption of responsibility for an 
existing cruiser, the training of pilots and the manufacture of their aircraft, as Savage noted 
in his account for the Governor- General.154 He continued that in fact the conference had 
subsequently recommended that New Zealand agree to the maintenance of not just an 
additional cruiser, but two escort vessels as well, which Savage asked Galway to inform 
London it could not accept `until the position as to sterling funds has been clarified as the 
result of the Hon. Mr. Nash's discussions when in England.' Likewise the acceptance of the 
recommendations regarding pilots and aircraft were `subject to sterling funds for this sum 
being available.' The New Zealand government's pressing financial situation was evidently 
never far from their thoughts. 
The New Zealand delegation produced a paper for the conference, which assumed the 
Italians would sever the Mediterranean cable on the outbreak of war, leaving the Pacific 
cable, which passed through Fanning Island, as the only means of rapid communication 
between London and the Pacific dominions.155 It was therefore anticipated that this would be 
a high priority for Japanese forces in the event of hostilities. However, due to the anticipated 
shortage of escorts, it was not expected that the island could be garrisoned after the outbreak 
of war, so forces would have to be despatched during peacetime. Wellington agreed to 
garrison the island for the British. 
New Zealand's preoccupation with their domestic difficulties helps explain their relative 
lack of engagement, either with the Dominions Office or New Zealand House, unless the 
potential existed to divert British policy into a more palatable direction. The guarantees to 
Poland, and later to Greece and Romania, therefore passed largely unremarked, despite the 
revolutionary change in policy they signified, as Wellington agreed with them. The rejection 
of the Russian proposal for a conference was a different matter, however, and inspired not 
just a cable to London, but also an attempt to pressure Chamberlain into changing his stance 
through use of the press. Although New Zealand remained broadly supportive of Britain, it 
was therefore willing and capable of attempting to change British policy when it considered 
the situation warranted this. 
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In Australia, the dictators' aggression had allowed Billy Hughes to enjoy a swan song as 
Minister for External Affairs. Page, the deputy Prime Minister and leader of the Country 
Party, had also been able to use this to push the Premiers' Conference into accepting his 
views on industrial development and planning, which they had previously opposed. This 
state of affairs was brought to an end with the replacement of Lyons by Menzies on the 
former's death. Menzies was an unabashed empire loyalist and, unlike his pacifist 
predecessor, favoured compulsory military service. He was determined to exercise full 
authority over external relations and therefore removed the troublesome Hughes from his 
post, recompensing the latter with the largely meaningless office of Deputy Prime Minister. 
He might have stamped his authority on foreign affairs more vigorously than Lyons, but the 
new Prime Minister's position was even more precarious than the former's had been. 
Menzies's backing for compulsory military training did not sit well with his opt -out from 
serving on the western front during the First World War. His loyalty to his former leader was 
open to question, which normally would not have mattered, but he had felt compelled to 
retain the services of his former rivals Casey and Hughes in cabinet, albeit in less prominent 
roles, and they resented him for it, making cabinet deliberations difficult. Worse, Page had 
turned against Menzies, ostensibly over his military record and the loyalty issue, and took 
the Country Party out of government, leaving the new Prime Minister as head of a minority 
government which was not even the largest party in Parliament. He could only continue in 
office through the support of Page, who clearly loathed him. Government in Australia ended 
April considerably weaker than it had begun March, particularly over external affairs due to 
its entanglement with the compulsory military training question. 
In South Africa, a precarious consensus seemed to endure among the ruling party. Its basis, 
however, appeared to have been altered out of all recognition by the dictators' actions. Both 
Hertzog and Smuts remained committed to the Fusion experiment, but the former had never 
overcome the sense of rejection he had suffered from the defection of Dr. Malan and his 
followers, at the time of the merger of the National and South Africa parties in 1934, and he 
remained extraordinarily sensitive to any charges that he had `sold out' from that quarter. 
The idea of leading South Africa into an `English' war was therefore anathema to him. As 
far as he was concerned South Africa had no interests in Eastern Europe and he was not 
prepared to participate in resistance to German expansion there. Smuts, having agreed to the 
Neutrality Pact in September, trailed along unhappily in his wake. The latter had never 
believed war would break out over the Sudeten question, but since January had come to see 
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it as increasingly inevitable. Hertzog was aware that the Neutrality Pact could not entirely 
solve his party's difficulties over participation and was therefore anxious to prevent the 
question arising. 
Like Chamberlain, he seems to have been initially unsure how to react to the German 
seizure of Prague, reverting to an enigmatic silence. His High Commissioner in London's 
desperate appeal for an intervention to dissuade the British from committing themselves in 
eastern Europe drew forth a characteristically robust response, questioning whether the 
decidedly modest British proposal for consultation amounted to encirclement, and warning 
how provocative this would appear in both Germany and South Africa. The British mollified 
him that they had not ruled out a peaceful solution and would make an appropriate gesture 
when the circumstances were right, but their subsequent rush to guarantee Poland astounded 
the South Africans, and pushed them in the direction of neutrality. Italy's occupation of 
Albania transformed the situation. It appeared that the Axis were acting in conjunction with 
each other, which threatened `our' communications through the Suez Canal as far as the 
Union were concerned. The government could unite around this as a legitimate South 
African interest, leading to a much more co- operative attitude as far as the British were 
concerned. As this new spirit of co- operation was based on the faulty premise of Axis co- 
ordination, it was largely illusory, however. The governing party's own unity was equally 
precarious, depending, as it did, on the avoidance of a war with Germany alone over Eastern 
European issues. 
In contrast, the New Zealand government remained broadly supportive of Britain. They had 
little alternative. Their strategic review, conducted in the wake of Munich, conceded that 
their ideal of collective security through the League of Nations was dead, at least for the time 
being, and that they would have to depend instead on Britain's dubious dedication to the 
Singapore strategy for the foreseeable future. Their financial difficulties would also require 
sympathetic treatment from London, while the `Jack Lee Affair' provided ample distraction 
from events abroad they could neither control nor influence. Nonetheless, they were capable 
of intervening when London moved in a direction which they did not like. Questions over 
the dependability of Britain's commitment to Singapore made it desirable that as broad a 
basis of support as possible was achieved for British policy. They therefore suggested greater 
engagement with the United States in view of what appeared to be a firmer stance in 
Washington. What really perturbed them, however, was the British rejection of the Soviet 
proposal for a conference. Not only did they cable London directly, the Prime Minister also 
publicly called on Britain in the press to instigate a conference, a step he noticeably did not 
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take with his American proposal. Their support for the Soviet proposal appeared to be 
somewhat confused, however. It is clear that they in fact supported a general conference 
which would involve all the world's powers and address all outstanding grievances, not one 
which was restricted to considering resistance to aggression involving only `the peace- loving 
nations.' Antagonising the Soviets, by rejecting their proposal outright, might, however, lead 
to Moscow's disengagement from the problem of the aggressor states, narrowing the basis of 
support available for dealing with the issue. This was not to be welcomed and the Savage 
government therefore supported the idea of such a conference, even if it did not appear 
capable of delivering the objects they required of it. 
Among the dominions, the most significant repercussion arising from the seizure of Prague 
was undoubtedly in Canada. Here, Mackenzie King's Quebecois lieutenant, Ernest Lapointe, 
had, up to this point, steadfastly opposed each and every measure the Prime Minister had put 
forward to prepare Canadian public opinion for war. He had feared the impact any such steps 
would have on the Liberal Party vote in his province. This remained an overriding concern 
so long as he believed war was unlikely; however, Hitler's action changed this. It now 
seemed much more likely that war would break out in circumstances where Anglophone 
opinion would sweep the country into participation, regardless of Quebec. If his province 
held out against participation in this situation, it risked losing all the advantages he had won 
for it during his long partnership with Mackenzie King. In order to forestall this eventuality, 
Quebecois opinion would have to be reconciled to the prospect of war. Lapointe therefore 
offered no criticism of the Prime Minister's statements on foreign affairs, even agreeing to 
the toughening of their wording. It was also important to assuage opinion in the province by 
ruling out conscription in advance which the Canadian leader did on 30 March. Mackenzie 
King was not, however, in a position to inspire the Quebecois and this task fell to Lapointe 
himself in a rousing speech on 31 March. It is telling that this was delivered after the 
guarantee to Poland had been issued, showing that, however unwelcome this measure might 
be in itself, it did not affect the underlying reality that war was now more likely and opinion 
in Quebec still needed to be persuaded to reconcile itself to Anglophone thinking on the 
subject, since the concession over conscription had been granted. The Prime Minister may 
have liked neither the `peace front' nor its failure, and was certainly as hostile to consultation 
as ever, but he at least could now look forward to leading a united government into whatever 
might befall. It was scant consolation. 
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6: END -GAME: 
THE SOVIETS, DANZIG AND THE CORRIDOR 
While the outlines of the conflict that would break out on 1 September 1939 can certainly be 
discerned with hindsight from the end of April 1939, war, as Richard Overy points out, was 
certainly not yet inevitable.' The diplomatic arrangements concluded in the last chapter left 
two separate strands unresolved: the role the Soviet Union was to play; and how the 
interconnected questions of Danzig and the Polish Corridor were to be settled. Stalin 
certainly did not play the part assigned him by the western powers. Negotiations with the 
Soviets had been initiated on 2151 March 1939, when it had appeared Romanian 
independence might be under threat from Germany.2 Poland had, however, refused to accept 
any Russian involvement, but this had not been the end of the matter, as London still 
considered Moscow might have a role to play, as Inskip put it in a cable to the dominion 
leaders on 21 March, `in the most convenient form.'3 Stirling summarised the progress of 
negotiations since then for Canberra on 4 August, noting that an impasse had been reached 
over the definition of `indirect aggression.'4 He characterised the Russian position as wishing 
to protect themselves against the situation where a neighbouring incumbent government was 
induced to invite an anti -Soviet presence within its borders, in much the same way as the 
Czechs had behaved in requesting the Germans march into Prague. Such concerns might 
appear reasonable, but, unfortunately, it had not proved possible to devise a formula which 
would not also permit the Soviets to claim provocation in circumstances allowing them, 
dragging Paris and London in their wake, to declare open season on their neighbours (in the 
way they would later in 1939 - 1940). Although they professed a belief in Soviet sincerity, 
Stirling noted, such a proposal was unacceptable to the British side. It was decided that it 
would be undesirable to postpone military discussions further pending political agreement, 
and Britain and France accordingly despatched missions to Moscow, as Inskip advised the 
dominion leaders on 25 July, but these did not arrive until 11 August.5 This endeavour was 
then cut short by the signature of the Nazi- Soviet Non -Aggression Pact of 24 August 1939.6 
I R. Overy, 1939: Countdown to War, (London, 2010), p. 16. 
2 NAA A981(4) /Ger /83 /Part 2 /German Foreign Policy /Inskip to Dominion Prime Ministers, 21 March 
1939 
3 Watt, How War Came, pp. 176 & 179; NAA A981(4) /GER 67 Part I /Germany - Relations with 
Poland, Inskip to dominion Prime Ministers, 21 March 1939. 
4 NAA A981(4) /GREA 8 PART 5 /Stirling to Canberra, 9 August 1939. 
SNAA A981(4) /GREA 8 PART 5 /Inskip to Menzies, 25 July 1939; Watt, How War Came, p. 450. 
6 Overy, Countdown, p. 14. 
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In the interim, neither the Poles nor the Germans had displayed much interest in 
negotiations to resolve the differences between them, despite British endeavours to persuade 
the two sides to talk to each other.' Germany had initially sought the return of Danzig and an 
extraterritorial `corridor across the Corridor.'$ In contrast, the Poles had been reported (in a 
cable from London to dominion leaders on 29 March) to be prepared to agree to some 
concessions on Danzig's status, but not its actual return to Germany, and unwilling to 
contemplate the infringement of their sovereignty inherent in Germany's demand for 
extraterritorial transit rights, although they might agree to the waiving of `formalities.'9 The 
Molotov -Ribbentrop Pact prompted a last flurry of diplomatic activity, with Britain trying to 
induce direct German- Polish negotiations, and Germany trying to drive a wedge between 
Poland and the western powers. As part of this, on 29 August, Hitler insisted Warsaw 
despatch a plenipotentiary with full powers to negotiate within twenty -four hours, the 
intention being to break off negotiations on 31 August, throwing the blame on the Poles, in 
time for invasion on 1 September.1' When no envoy was forthcoming on 30 August, the 
Germans produced a list of demands for propaganda purposes, which Ribbentrop insisted 
had lapsed due to the Poles' lack of co- operation." Despite efforts to involve the Polish 
Ambassador in Berlin in negotiations with the Germans on 31 August, no meaningful 
discussions took place (or could have taken place, given Nazi intentions), and Hitler 
commenced hostilities in the early hours of 1 September.12 After an initial delay due to 
French military imperatives, Britain and France duly fulfilled their obligations under their 
guarantee to Poland, by declaring war on Germany on 3 September. 
The dominions were, naturally enough, not left untouched by developments in Europe. On 
21 July, Mackenzie King confided in his diary that he had at long last received a reply to his 
1 February letter to Hitler» This inspired the Canadian leader to once more involve himself 
in attempts at personal mediation to ease international tension. In South Africa, Hitler's 
violent resolution of the stand -off with Poland on 1 September tore apart the consensus 
' See, for instance, LAC, EA/RG25 /VoL 725/74 -3, Inskip to dominion Prime Ministers, 8, 15 & 19 
August 1939 
8 
A. Hitler as cited in NASA, SAB /BTS /1/4/12 /German Foreign Policy, Gie to Hertzog, 29 April 1939 
9 LAC, EA/RG25Nol. 725/74 -3, Inskip to dominion Prime Ministers, 29 March 1939. 
10 LAC, EA/RG25NoL 725/74 -4, Inskip to dominion Prime Ministers, 29 August 1939; naturally, 
neither the British nor the dominions were aware of German intent at this point, for evidence of this, 
see, for instance, Watt, How War Came, p. 508. 
11 Kershaw, Nemesis, p. 220. 
12 Overy, Countdown, pp. 62 -65. 
13 King, Diary, 21 July 1939, p. 11. 
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which had held the Fusion regime together, leading to what became known as the Neutrality 
Crisis. Finally, the dominions faced the prospect of how, as well as if, they would enter the 
war which had broken out in Europe. 
Flirting with the Soviets 
As previously seen, Mackenzie King had been unhappy that Britain had become involved in 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. This was partly because he considered splitting Europe 
into ideological camps would only exacerbate tensions, as he noted in his diary on 21 
March.14 However, he not only regretted this creation of a `democratic front' on the grounds 
it might be provocative, his diary for the preceding day revealed he also objected to Russia's 
inclusion in it on the grounds the latter was not a proper democracy.15 As always, however, it 
was the Quebec dimension which lay at the root of Mackenzie King's thinking. In his 24 
March report to London, Sir Gerald Campbell recounted a conversation with the Canadian 
Prime Minister where the latter had 
expressed regret that it should apparently have become necessary for the 
United Kingdom to associate herself with the U.S.S.R. From the 
Canadian point of view, particularly that of French Canadians and other 
Roman Catholic communities that association would still be regarded as 
very unfortunate.16 
It was their aversion to communism, and the difficulty which this might cause him, that lay 
at the heart of the matter. In contrast, the South Africans were primarily concerned with the 
practical consequences of any deal with the Soviets, rather than any direct effect it might 
have on domestic politics. General Hertzog, had instructed Te Water in his 22 March cable, 
to warn Britain that the `encirclement' of Germany would lead inexorably to a war, which 
the western powers would ultimately be held responsible for.17 Next, Dr. Gie placed the 
prospect of an agreement with Moscow in this framework, cautioning Pretoria on 15 April 
that: `perhaps the gravest danger in the situation is an Anglo- Russian Pact the conclusion of 
which might lead Hitler to overcome his last scruples against taking a step which will lead to 
war.' 18 Hertzog repeated this view to Te Water on 21 April, asking the latter to bring this to 
London's attention, while expressing the hope that Britain would not do anything irrevocably 
to commit itself to the Russian side as this would be `calculated to cause maximum friction 
" Ibid., 21 March 1939, p. 3. 
15 Ibid., 20 March 1939, p. 6. 
16 TNA, DO/35/576/706/l 18 /Cable from High Commissioner, Ottawa to Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs, 24 March 1939 
17 NASA, SAB/PM/1 /20 /1 /UK Foreign Policy, Hertzog to Te Water, 22 March 1939 
18 NASA, SAB /BTS /1/4/12 /German Foreign Policy, Gie to Hertzog, 15 April 1939. 
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with Dictator states.'19 It was war that would present the Union with insurmountable 
domestic difficulty, not a distant association with godless communism. Australia was 
similarly pragmatic. They disliked the idea of a world -wide agreement with Russia as this 
would increase the risk of conflict with Japan. On 22 May, Menzies, the new Australian 
Prime Minister, accordingly instructed Bruce, his High Commissioner in London, to inform 
the British government that `we attach great importance to preserving friendship with Japan, 
and would therefore be unhappy about any Russian agreement about the Far East.'20 It might 
be thought New Zealand would share this concern, but they were, in fact, the most 
ambivalent of the dominions towards relations with Moscow. Jordan, their High 
Commissioner in London, was certainly in favour of Russian involvement as he indicated to 
Wellington on 27 Apri1.21 The triumvirate in Wellington, however, had only achieved power 
through successfully competing against communism for the working -class vote. Fraser, in 
particular, seems to have been a fervent anti -communist in the domestic context.22 
Nevertheless, with respect to external affairs, they appear to have been particularly 
concerned that the world's most important left -wing power should not be excluded from any 
steps taken to prevent further aggression.23 
To the extent that they had not already done so, however, the dominions reconciled 
themselves to the desirability of reaching an agreement with the Russians. Even Mackenzie 
King, while continuing to express his discomfiture that Britain had ever become involved 
with Moscow in the first place, recognised in his diary on 30 March that Russia's absence 
from the `peace front' undermined the latter's potential deterrent effect on Hitler.24 New 
Zealand, on the other hand, considered an agreement with Russia to be, in Savage's message 
to Inskip on 12 May, 'essential.'25 The New Zealand Prime Minister further expressed his 
government's concern at the lack of progress and the length of time being taken, letting it be 
known via Sir Harry Batterbee on 25 May that these delays left Wellington `very 
disturbed.'26 Batterbee added the New Zealand government felt that all possible steps should 
be taken to resolve the impasse. Jordan likewise informed Inskip, at a meeting of the latter 
with the dominion High Commissioners in London on 23 May, that Wellington felt Russian 
involvement to be imperative, because of the assistance Moscow could provide in the event 
19 NASA, SAB /PM/1 /20 /1 /U. K. Foreign Policy, Hertzogto Te Water, 21 April 1939. 
20 NAA A981/4 /GREA 8 PART 4 /Great Britain - Foreign Policy, Menzies to Bruce, 22 May 1939. 
21 NANZ, PM/16 /Fraser, Jordan & Savage Correspondence: 39 +, Jordan to Savage, 27 April 1939. 
22 Sinclair, Nash, p. 148. 
23 See previous chapter. 
24 King, Diary, 30 March 1939, p. 3. 
25 TNA, DO 114/98 /Correspondence March - September 1939, Savage to Inskip, 12 May 1939. 
26 'bid., Sir Harry Batterbee, British High Commissioner in New Zealand, to Inskip, 23 May 1939. 
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of war.27 In Australia, Menzies also felt that an agreement with Russia was required to give 
substance to the arrangements with Poland, Turkey and Romania as he had explained in his 
cable to Bruce on 22 May 28 He added that: `short of a positive demand to expand the 
agreement to the Far East, we do not think the negotiations [with the U. S. S. R.] should be 
allowed to fail.' Even the South Africans only sought to limit the terms and nature of any 
arrangement which might be reached, rather than prevent it altogether. Smuts may have been 
rather isolated in believing, as he confided to Margaret Gillett on 8 August `if the Russian 
Treaty is not carried through, there will be war this summer.'29 Nevertheless, even Hertzog 
only tried to persuade the British to restrict any agreement reached, seeking to persuade them 
via Te Water `that no obligations should be entered into with Russia which may hereafter 
preclude such consideration and negotiation in the interests of future peace.'30 These 
instructions to Te Water also contained the concession with regard to the actual terms 
proposed by Moscow; that their consequences `His Majesty's Government in Great Britain 
will know much better than we here.' Taken together with the concerns noted in the 
paragraph above, it is evident the primary South African aim was damage limitation. While 
he would have liked to argue against any involvement with Russia at all, Hertzog appears to 
have recognised that this was a lost cause. His argument in favour of a limited agreement 
used points which might have been constructed into such a case, but fell short of actually 
trying to do so. It seemed that the logic of the situation was driving London into some kind 
of pact with Moscow, so that the best he could hope for in the circumstances, was to 
persuade the British not to agree to anything that would irretrievably prevent a resumption of 
appeasement at a later date. 
Mackenzie King's reaction to the news of the Molotov -Ribbentrop pact was one of relief, 
noting in his diary on 22 August that `1 have never trusted the Russians.'31 He had some 
sympathy with their action, however, after the way they had been slighted by Britain and 
France: `nor have I altogether blamed them after the way they were side tracked by England 
and the pressure put on France to abandon her ally.' He reflected that it was better that this 
should happen now, rather than after war had broken out. He also felt `the danger of world 
war had been reduced a thousand fold.' The western powers would have to back down over 
Poland and bow to Hitler's terms, which he admitted would `be hard for Britain and France 
27 TNA, DO 121 /5 /Meetings between the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and Dominion High 
Commissioners, Minutes, 23 May 1939. 
28 NAA A981/4 /GREA 8 PART 4 /Great Britain - Foreign Policy, Menzies to Bruce, 22 May 1939. 
29 NASA, Smuts Papers (Al), Vol. 246, Smuts to Margaret Gillett, 8 August 1939. 
3° NASA, SAB /PM/1 /20 /l /U. K. Foreign Policy, Hertzog to Te Water, 21 April 1939. 
31 King, Diary, 22 August 1939, p. 1. 
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to accept, but anything is better than destruction by war.' If Hitler sought world domination, 
this would be his time to strike, but `I have never believed this was his aim.' Two days later 
his diary revealed his attitude had hardened towards the Soviets, however, as he now felt 
they had been `playing the most treacherous game that has every [sic] been played, I believe, 
by any nation.'32 
Hertzog in South Africa likewise believed the Nazi- Soviet pact created an opportunity to 
launch a new diplomatic initiative. He cabled Te Water on 26 August, instructing him to 
urge the British government that `everything should be done to convert the present danger 
into opportunity for a comprehensive settlement.'33 The agreement had left the Poles in a 
most vulnerable position, so they were more likely to be susceptible to pressure by `every 
legitimate means' to be `helpful.' Moderation could, in any case, secure their position as 
advantageously as possible. Hertzog saw an opportunity for a wider settlement of 
outstanding grievances and believed `this seems also to be the underlying idea of Hitler's 
offer.' He appealed for `a coming together of Germany and Poland with such other parties as 
may be advisable to settle Danzig and Corridor question to be followed thereafter by wider 
European discussions between the powers concerned.' 
In Australia, Menzies greeted the news with the public statement `the whole British world 
will face the news with calm and the increased determination of complete unity.'34 Bruce, 
however, was of one mind with Mackenzie King and Hertzog in seeing the pact as almost a 
last chance to reach an accommodation with Hitler. He therefore urged Menzies to use his 
influence on London to pursue any available opportunities for a diplomatic solution: `I think 
a cable from you to Prime Minister stressing this [necessity of exploring every avenue to 
keep door to negotiation open] would be of great value.'35 Apparently Menzies disagreed, as 
he did not take this opportunity to intervene. In New Zealand the cabinet concealed its 
disappointment at the failure of negotiations, with both the government and opposition 
taking the opening offered by the Budget debate in the House of Representatives to affirm 
the unity of the country and its solidarity with Britain in the event of war.36 
32 Ibid., 24 August 1939, p. 2. 
33 NASA, SAB /BTS /1/4/12 /German Foreign Policy, Hertzog to Te Water, 26 August 1939. 
34 
R. G. Menzies as cited in TNA, DO 114/98 /Correspondence March - September 1939, Sir Geoffrey 
Whiskard, British High Commissioner in Australia to Inskip, 23 August 1939. 
35 NAA, A981/4 /GER 19 PART 2 ATTACHMANT (sic) A/Germany. Administration and 
Government 11, Bruce to Menzies, 23 August 1939. 
36 TNA, DO 114/98 /Correspondence March - September 1939, Sir Harry Batterbee, British High 
Commissioner in New Zealand to Inskip, 23 August 1939. 
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Perspectives on Poland 
Dr. Gie, the South African Minister in Berlin, elaborated his views on Poland to Te Water in 
a letter of 3 May 1939, describing the coastal area as far as Memel as `ancient German land', 
whose return was "inevitable" as well as `just and right.,37 He also displayed a touching faith 
in the power of German public opinion in the Third Reich, claiming that Hitler could not 
give up Germany's claim as `his people would not allow him to do so.' He conceded that it 
might be `difficult for the English to realise all this,' but that `they should read German 
history.' He also concluded that `Hitler does not want to plunge his people into war' and 
describing him as `being aware that his annexation of the land of the Czechs has profoundly 
shocked British public opinion.' This was another reason he was willing to wait was to let 
them get over this. Gie urged that nothing should be done that would indicate that Hitler's 
opponents would not eventually give way over Danzig and the Corridor. In the meantime, he 
remained cautiously optimistic: `we cannot believe that Britain and France will allow Poland 
to provoke a European war over Danzig and the Corridor, but knowing something of the 
present mentality of the Poles, we are not quite sure.' Gie insisted that the question `can we 
trust Hitler ?' was less important than `can we understand him ?' for the British, as 
understanding him would allow London to appreciate that his ambitions were both limited 
and compatible with British interests. Gie reiterated that `Hitler wants peace and his 
territorial programme in Europe is indeed limited to the acquisition of Danzig and its 
northern part of the Corridor,' and that, when he had achieved this, Europe could look 
forward to peace for a long time to come. Gie made a final appeal: `surely it is worthwhile, 
even for those who may doubt my assurance, to play this last card of confidence in the Great 
Game of Peace, in which all will be the winners.' He added a postscript that he had spoken 
to many Germans including moderates, who were astonished at both the moderation of 
Hitler's offer and the Poles' rejection of it, and who believed that such generosity should not 
be repeated. With Te Water, he was, of course, preaching to the converted, and the latter was 
sufficiently impressed by Gie's analysis to pass it on to the British, apparently with 
Hertzog's blessing. Smuts was similarly unimpressed with the Polish viewpoint, writing to 
Margaret Gillett on 10 June: `I don't like the Danzig business. We have a very bad case there 
and Hitler knows ít.'38 He continued to feel this, confiding in her as late as 28 August, that 
`with us there is no enthusiasm for Poland, still less for Danzig and the Corridor.'39 
Nonetheless, he had by then come out against neutrality, contrasting his position with 
37 TNA, DO/35/540/C87/43/Gie to Te Water, 3 May 1939 
38 NASA, Smuts Papers (Al), VoL 246, Smuts to M. C. Gillett, 10 June 1939. 
39 /bird, 28 August 1939. 
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Hertzog's to her: `and on the other side (which happens to be my own) there is the difficulty 
in understanding how in the long run we could possibly keep out of the fight, and how we 
could do so now consistently with our honour and vital interests.' He further noted, `A great 
storm is therefore brewing here too. I had to face it 25 years ago and never thought of having 
it all over again.' 
In contrast to the South Africans, Sir Cecil Day reported to Wellington on 22 May that 
Warsaw had a strong case.40 As regards the Corridor, Poles rejected this term with its 
implicit assumption that the region was an artificial `outlet to the sea' imposed on Germany. 
Instead they saw the area as Pomorze, `ethnographically and historically a Polish province.' 
He also argued that if the Germans militarised Danzig, the way they had done so to Memel 
since the latter's incorporation on 23 March 1939, then they would `acquire a stranglehold 
on the Corridor and Gdynia [Poland's only major Port] will finally become untenable.' In 
contrast, as thing stood, Warsaw held the initiative, with Germany being unable to rapidly 
bring force to bear, while the Poles could launch a pre -emptive action to `occupy Danzig in a 
few hours.' He further contended that Polish rights in Danzig were important 
psychologically as `a symbol of their national existence.' Abandoning these risked internal 
instability and anti -German incidents on a scale likely to provoke Nazi intervention, thus 
increasing, rather than reducing, the danger of European conflict. He considered Warsaw 
might ignore a unilateral declaration of adhesion to the Reich by the Danzig Senate, so long 
as this was not backed up by any attempt to interfere with Polish officials or property in the 
Free City. Otherwise it was likely such a step would be met with force. He judged German 
intentions were to neutralise and perhaps destroy Poland. There was no justification for 
Hitler's demands: he had ignored self- determination over Prague and so had no right to 
claim it for Danzig now; while existing transit arrangements across the Corridor had worked 
quite satisfactorily since 1934. Mistreatment of minorities undoubtedly occurred in both 
countries, but this was a long- standing issue which did not justify confrontation at this 
critical juncture. The issue had, however, escalated beyond a mere border dispute, becoming 
`a test case, and the stakes may not be lower than the German attempt at domination of 
Eastern Europe.' 
The Australians were rather less robust in their backing for Poland. As has already been 
seen, Bruce, Canberra's representative in London, saw the Nazi -Soviet Pact as an 
opportunity to stave off war by pressurising the Poles to come to an accommodation with 
40 NANZ, EA/276/2/1 /Danzig: External Relations with Germany, Extracts from Sir Cecil Day's 
Notes, 22 May 1939, p. 2. 
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Germany. Bob Menzies, the Prime Minister, however, while also in favour of a peaceful 
solution, was equally anxious that there should be no new Munich. Thus on 18 August 1939, 
he had cabled Chamberlain urging `that efforts should be made to ensure Poland adopts a 
reasonable and restrained attitude.'41 Indeed, such a conciliatory stance should not be 
confined to Poland: `no nation should ignore real efforts at settlement because of false 
notions of prestige.' While this seemed to be somewhat suggestive of appeasement, the 
Australian Prime Minster tempered his advice with a fairly forceful caveat: `nevertheless, I 
strongly hold the view that pressure on Poland should not be carried to a point which might 
awaken in Hitler's mind any thoughts that the Anglo -French guarantee to Poland in the event 
of aggression was in the least doubt of fulfilment.' He was convinced any such display of 
weakness would be fatal: `that would in my mind certainly lead to German aggression and 
war.' Australia therefore not only accepted that there were limits to the influence that should 
be exerted on Poland, but German aggression was now definitely to be met by war. On 27 
August Menzies intervened again, cabling Chamberlain that Germany's proposals should be 
treated with a good deal of scepticism, `having regard to past experience.'42 In particular, 
there should be no hint that Britain might abandon Poland `as this would not only be a 
breach of guarantee, but disastrous in South East Europe.' Hitler needed to be clearly 
informed that there was no question of London going back on its word to Poland. It should 
also be made clear to him, however, that Britain had no fixed view on the ultimate status of 
Danzig and the Corridor as such, and was quite prepared to see the question resolved by 
peaceful negotiation between Germany and Poland. There was, indeed, no obstacle to a 
general settlement between the powers, which would have the happy consequence of ending 
the ruinous arms race that threatened all their economic prosperity. This goodwill towards 
Germany should not, however, be confused with a lack of will to resist any fresh aggression 
that might occur. Menzies was equally clear that negotiations should not leave Poland in the 
situation Czecho -Slovakia had found herself in. He suggested another summit, but this time 
on neutral territory. In conclusion, he claimed to see real progress in Hitler's responses to the 
British messages since the Nazi- Soviet Pact. On 2 September, he sent a final cable.43 His 
attitude had clearly hardened. While Australia did not regard Danzig and the Corridor worth 
41 NAA, CP /290 /6 /BUNDLE 1 /4A/International Situation 1939 Personal Exchanges between Prime 
Minister Great Britain and Prime Minister Australia, Menzies to Chamberlain, 18 August 1939. 
42 ¡bid.,, Menzies to Chamberlain, 27 August 1939. 
43 This was still 1 September in Europe. Although hostilities had broken out between Germany and 
Poland, Menzies appears unaware of this. This is perhaps unsurprising, as the cable appears to have 
been sent shortly after midnight (Chamberlain's response was received at 12.52 a.m. Australian time 
on 2 September), and the news was still being treated as `unconfirmed' in London. To add to the 
difficulty, communication was via the Department of External Affairs in Canberra, but Menzies 
himself was in Melbourne, see NAA, A2697, Vol. 2, Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 2 September 1939. 
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a war in and of themselves, `we do attach great importance to protecting Poland against 
being weakened and subsequently destroyed.' In his view, `this would begin a process the 
end of which cannot be seen, but which we believe would be deplorable.' Nevertheless, 
Germany's proposals appeared to be reasonable, and `any point blank refusal on the part of 
Poland might very well adversely affect public opinion even here.' Significantly, Menzies 
was not arguing for their acceptance, only that they should not be dismissed out of hand, so 
that Poland was not left in the position of appearing unreasonable. 
Notwithstanding his continuing commitment to support Britain over German aggression, 
Mackenzie King had, from the outset, disliked the British guarantee to Poland almost as 
much as their negotiations with the Soviets. He recognised in his diary on 30 March that it 
amounted to `an ultimatum on the part of Britain and France to Germany to tell her she has 
gone as far as she is going to be permitted to go.'44 As previously seen, he doubted its 
deterrence value and feared its potentially provocative impact on the volatile Hitler.45 All 
this had left the Canadian leader deeply pessimistic, noting in his diary on 30 March: 
`undoubtedly, this is as critical a stage as has yet been reached.'46 He continued this entry 
with his suspicions about Polish intentions, fearing that they were just using the western 
powers to secure the best deal possible from Germany, before abandoning their erstwhile 
partners: `Poland, moreover, is, I fear not a country to be trusted.' Germany's location meant 
that Warsaw was bound to be more susceptible to influence from Berlin than London or 
Paris: `she [Poland] is more likely to regard her proximity with Germany to cause her to 
throw in her lot with that country as against France and Britain.' The latter, having 
confronted Germany on Poland's behalf in the expectation that Berlin would at least be 
facing the dreaded war on two fronts, would instead be abandoned to oppose Hitler alone: 
`more or less out on a limb.' His ultimate fear was that this would happen during war -time: 
`should she prove treacherous, it might mean an appalling situation in Europe.' If he had to 
be tied to anywhere in eastern Europe, he would have preferred Prague to Warsaw, writing in 
his diary the following day: `the Czechs, so far as I am led to believe, are infinitely more 
reliable than the Poles.'47 
When he heard that Poland had refused to extend its obligations to the rest of the `peace 
front' for fear of antagonising Germany, he took this as evidence his assessment had been 
right, entering in his diary on 4 April: `now word comes that Poland herself will not stand 
44 King, Diary, 30 March 1939, p. 3. 
45 See previous chapter. 
46 King, Diary, 30 March 1939, p. 3. 
47 Ibid., 31 March 1939, p. 2. 
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with Britain, that she prefers to be with Germany, and does not thank us for our offers to 
fight for her.'48 He also felt this vindicated his refusal to gant London `a blank cheque,' of 
Canadian support in any circumstances: 
if anything could show more completely the wisdom of what I said on 
Thursday last [his statement on external affairs in Parliament, where he 
had avoided committing Canada to automatic participation in the event 
of war], and the utter folly of following British Governments regardless 
of what their policy might be, this surely does. 
His suspicions of Polish intentions also quickly resurfaced, leading him to note: `As Handy 
[his private secretary, who typed up his diary] has just remarked, Poland might have been 
treacherous if something had started. This clearly is so, and Heaven knows where the British 
Empire would have landed had such been the case.' 
His opinion of the Polish guarantee did not improve as time wore on. In his diary, he 
described complaining on 28 April to Campbell that he could not understand British policy 
with regard to Poland and Romania, entering into negotiations `without knowing where they 
were going to lead her, or how they were going to conclude.'49 Bad as things were, he sensed 
a deterioration in the position on 16 August. That day a despatch arrived advising that Hitler 
had warned Poland that if there was an `incident' he would attack forthwith, which inspired 
the diary entry that this `brings the world nearer war, I think, than it has been at any time 
since Munich.'50 As previously seen, news of the Nazi- Soviet Non -Aggression Pact actually 
brought him relief from this unbearable anxiety: surely now London would give way and 
there would be peace after all. When news came through on 22 August, however, that the 
British government had repeated its pledges to Poland and would put a Defence Act before 
Parliament on the 20, he confided in his journal his feeling: 
that England had closed the door pretty effectively to the chance of a retreat. I 
questioned in my mind the wisdom of taking such tremendous risks over some [sic] 
small an issue as Danzig. I cannot get out of my mind the blundering there has been 
in England's foreign policy all along the way.51 
The German invasion of Poland on 1 September did not significantly alter Mackenzie King's 
views. He continued to wish that the Poles had been more flexible, as `everything looked so 
near a settlement.'52 Nevertheless, he clung to the hope that `we might still be saved from the 
appalling situation of England and France getting into the war.' The following day, he 
48/bid, 4 April 1939, p. 2. 
49/bid, 25 April 1939, p. 4. 
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persisted in blaming the Poles for not negotiating, but was now also inclined to pass some 
blame London's way for leading them on, and even to accept that Hitler, all along, `really 
had conquest in view.'53 He continued to maintain, however, that it would be better to give in 
to German terms, however harsh these might be, than to permit `the war to run on.' Even 
after he had successfully brought Canada into a war to resist German aggression against 
Poland, he remained unconvinced of the merits of the Allied cause, writing in his diary on 10 
September: `how criminally foolish those in authority in Britain and France have been in not 
getting down long before this, being prepared to give something in the way of concession to 
Germany which would have avoided this terrible war.'54 
Mackenzie King and the Personal Touch 
Personal contacts were always of critical significance to Mackenzie King. In July, Hitler 
finally responded to the letter the Canadian Prime Minister had sent him with such high 
hopes on 1 February.55 As he recounted it in a letter to Chamberlain on 24 July, the 
Führer's response had been passed on orally by Dr. Windels, the German Consul in Ottawa 
three days previously, on Friday, 21 July 1939.S6 In this reply, Hitler had invited twelve 
Canadians to visit Germany for three weeks at Hitler's expense. Far from being slighted by 
such offhand treatment, Mackenzie King was delighted with the form of the reply: noting in 
his diary that night, that it was `to make clear no binding or official character, tho' paving 
the way to both.57 His account continued with him telling Windels that he wished to go 
himself, feeling `in my inner mind that in all probability the letter or rather the reply was 
meant to open the way to this.' The one complication he foresaw was that he wished to hold 
a general election and he did not wish to embroil the visit in controversy of a party political 
nature. He confided in his diary his belief ̀ that "forces unseen" - loved ones in the beyond 
- were working out these plans.' He decided that he should contact Chamberlain, and 
further fantasised that this might lead to a royal visit to Germany, where he could 
accompany Their Majesties as Minister in Attendance, as he had done to the United States. 
He duly sent a private and confidential letter to Chamberlain on 24 July, requesting that the 
contents be kept between themselves as much as possible, reminding the latter of the 
Canadian leader's visit to Hitler at Berchtesgaden in 1937, and asking advice as to how to 
53 1bid, 2 September 1939, p. 2. 
54 ¡bid, 10 September 1939, p. 4. 
55 See Chapter 4. 
56 TNA, DO /121 /63 /Correspondence between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (Mr. Neville 
Chamberlain) and the Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. Mackenzie King) - Possible visit by Canadians 
to Germany, Mackenzie King to Chamberlain, 24 July 1939, pp. 4 - 6. 
57 King, Diary, 21 July 1939. 
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respond to the offer, although he did not mention his plans to go himself.58 In his diary the 
next day, Mackenzie King hoped this communication would open `a way to effective 
conciliation.'59 Chamberlain's response was sent en clair on 7 August.60 He suggested that 
the offer should be accepted as soon as possible, that (for unspecified reasons) October 
would be preferable, that too much should not be expected from this gesture, but that if it 
went ahead, perhaps he could give some further advice as to how the party could achieve 
the maximum benefit from the occasion. Mackenzie King again saw this as deeply 
significant, describing himself in his diary for 10 August as being `struck at once by the fact 
that this came on the 20t11 Anniversary of the day I was chosen leader of the party.'61 His 
diary further reveals that, having discussed the matter with Lapointe the following day, he 
decided that the invitation should be accepted, but chose November rather than October, to 
make sure the prospective election would be over. 62 The same entry indicates he lost no 
time in informing Windels of this, and that the Canadian leader reaffirmed that he would 
wish to lead the party himself. He then advised Chamberlain of what he had done, but 
again, not his own proposed participation, in a secret telegram of 16 August.63 
This was not Mackenzie King's only attempt at personal intervention over the course of the 
summer. With the signing of the Nazi- Soviet Non -Aggression Pact, he described in his 
diary for 25 August how he was again moved to send another personal message to Hitler.64 
Lapointe concurred, but other members of cabinet were less impressed. However with his 
deputy's backing the Canadian leader felt able to overrule them. Having decided to send 
messages to both Germany and Italy, he was then persuaded by Dr. Windels to extend one 
to Poland as well, in order to appear more impartial. He took the opportunity to remind Dr. 
Windels of their conversation in February, where he had said that Canada would stand by 
Britain in circumstances such as these and confirmed this continued to be the government's 
position.65 Later, working out the times in his diary, he convinced himself that his message 
58 TNA, DO /121 /63 /Correspondence between the Prime Minister of the 
Chamberlain) and the Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. Mackenzie King) 
to Germany, Mackenzie King to Chamberlain, 24 July 1939, pp. 1 - 9. 
59King, Diary, 25 July 1939, p. 3. 
60 TNA, DO /121 /63 /Correspondence between the Prime Minister of the 
Chamberlain) and the Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. Mackenzie King) 
to Germany, Chamberlain to Mackenzie King, 7 August 1939. 
61 King, Diary, 10 August 1939, p. 3. 
62 ¡bid, 11 August 1939, p. 7. 
63 TNA, DO /121 /63 /Correspondence between the Prime Minister of the 
Chamberlain) and the Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. Mackenzie King) 
to Germany, Mackenzie King to Chamberlain, 16 August 1939. 
64 King, Diary, 25 August 1939, p. 3. 
65For their previous conversation, see Ch. 5, above. 
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could have arrived in time to have played a part in Hitler's decision to cancel his orders to 
attack Poland on 26 August: 
it is interesting that it [Mackenzie King's message] reached there 
[Germany] before the time at which the change was made in Hitler's 
plans. It is quite conceivable that it might have come into Von 
Ribbentrop's hands and that he, with his associations with Canada in 
mind, may have had something to with bringing it to the Feuhrer's [sic] 
attention at night.66 
At this point he also recorded his idea of having the King and Queen make an appeal to 
Hitler as well and how he had cabled Chamberlain and Massey to this effect. When he had 
informed the Governor -General of what he had done, the latter had `thought it right for 
Canada to advise the King.' This somewhat surprising statement from an unashamed 
imperialist was perhaps less so for one in favour of a Scottish Parliament.67 Mackenzie King 
had not actually done this, instead, as he noted in his diary, framing it `as a suggestion for 
the British government.'68 He now seemed to rather regret this, although he consoled 
himself that `it was a preparing of the ground.' Neither of them seemed to consider what the 
consequences would have been, of the King receiving advice from his ministers as King of 
Canada, which was incompatible with the advice that he was receiving from his ministers as 
King of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as would have been the case. No doubt it would 
have been a case of `one monarch being responsible to two parliaments, and tending to 
follow the dictates of the larger.'G9 However, the Canadian leader's diary for 27 August 
indicates that while apparently appreciative, Chamberlain did not think the proposal viable 
at that point.70 Mackenzie King still allowed himself to believe that his interventions might 
be of some personal significance as well, hoping in his journal the following day that `Hitler 
may agree to or suggest me as one of a tribunal or body to which some matters may be 
referred for adjustment :71 On 29 August, the Canadian leader finally drew his personal 
interventions to a close, by confirming to the German Consul that, in the circumstances, the 
proposed German trip would have to be put on hold for the present, scrupulously recording 
this decision in his diary.72 
66 King, Diary, 26 August 1939, p. 2. 
67 John M. MacKenzie, `Essay and Reflection: On Scotland and the Empire 
History Review, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Nov., 1993), p. 737. 
68 King, Diary, 26 August 1939, p.5. 
69 John M. MacKenzie's characterisation of one of the principal difficulties 
such as T. C. Smout and Bruce Lenman in having a single monarch govern 
prior to the Act of Union in MacKenzie, `Essay and Reflection', p. 728. 
70King, Diary, 27 August 1939, p. 3. 
71 Ibid., 28 August 1939, p. 1. 
72 ¡bid, 29 August 1939, pp. 2 - 3. 
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Scotland and England 
The Neutrality Crisis 
On 13 September Sir William Clark sat down to write a report for Anthony Eden, the new 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in London on the crisis that had erupted in South 
Africa as a result of the outbreak of war in Europe. 73 He explained that Smuts and Hertzog 
had not communicated since Parliament had broken up in June, as the latter had retired to his 
farm in the country to nurse his wife. Thereafter he had only been in touch with Pirow who 
had paid him a brief (undated) visit prior to 26 August, when the Prime Minister had 
returned to Pretoria. Clark advised that this return had been prompted by the necessity of 
extending the life of the Senate, which was about to expire, so that Parliament could remain 
in being, in case of need, while crisis conditions persisted in Europe. Unbeknownst to the 
High Commissioner, while there, Hertzog had received a desperate appeal from Te Water to 
intercede with London in what the latter felt might well prove to be the last opportunity to 
prevent a slide into war.74 As this was the last thing he wanted, the Prime Minister had 
accordingly dashed off a plea to London to press Poland `to be helpful in arriving at solution 
of Danzig and Corridor question.'75 Clark again took up the tale with Hertzog's departure 
from Pretoria, describing how he spent the next six days motoring down to Capetown, 
arriving on 1 September, by which stage it was apparent both that war was at hand and the 
consensus that had prevailed in the government at the end of April no longer obtained. 76 
The day Hertzog arrived in Capetown, Te Water informed the South African leader that 
Britain was about to ask Hitler to withdraw from Poland, that this would amount to an 
ultimatum, and that `it can be accepted for practical purposes that Great Britain will be at 
war with Germany on its receipt, which will be shortly after 5 p.m. this afternoon.'77 The 
same day, a cable from London advised Hertzog that the British Ambassador in Rome `has 
received official and most secret assurance from Ciano that Italy will not fight against this 
country or France.'78 Hertzog's preferred policy of preventing war had therefore been 
superseded by events and the threat of a co- ordinated Axis bid to dominate the world, which 
had seemed so imminent in April, had also now clearly receded into the background. In the 
circumstances, as he told Clark (who duly included it in his report to Eden), he saw no South 
African interest in Danzig and the Corridor, any more than he had in the Sudetenland the 
73 UCT, Sir William Clark Papers (BC81), D60, Clark to Eden, 13 September 1939, p. 13. 
74 NASA, SAB /BTS /1/4/12 /German Foreign Policy, Te Water to Hertzog, 25 August, 1939, p. 3. 
751bid., Hertzog to Te Water, 26 August 1939. 
76 UCT, Sir William Clark Papers (BC81), D60, Clark to Eden, 13 September 1939, p. 2. 
77 NASA, SABBTS /1/4/12 /German Foreign Policy, Te Water to Hertzog, 1 September, 1939. 
78 NASA, SAB /BTS /1/4/12 /German Foreign Policy, Inskip to Hertzog, 1 September 1939. 
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previous year. 79 He accordingly reverted to his less favoured option, a policy of neutrality; in 
order, as he saw it, to preserve the Union's status as a sovereign, independent entity. His 
deputy, Smuts, however, had formed a different view of South African interests, overcoming 
his dislike of the Polish guarantee and overlooking the reduced Axis threat implied by Italy's 
flight into neutrality, to support the Union's participation in war with Germany, making a 
collision virtually inevitable. 
A suggestion that the Union could remain neutral while severing relations with Germany, 
failed to provide a policy the cabinet could unite around.S0 On Saturday, 2 September, as 
Clark recounted in his report to London, he had cabled Chamberlain, in response to an 
enquiry from Smuts, to ask the British Prime Minister to send Hertzog a personal message in 
the hope that this might save the situation.81 The report continued that, the following day, 
cabinet carried on its discussions in an effort to find a way out of the deadlock. The High 
Commissioner also made a point of seeing the Governor -General, Sir Patrick Duncan, whom 
he encouraged in his view that granting Hertzog a dissolution of Parliament, if the Prime 
Minister suffered a defeat in the House of Assembly, while most likely constitutionally 
correct, would not be `in the public interest.' Hertzog anyway seemed to anticipate at worst a 
small victory, which would leave him without a working majority, in which case Sir Patrick 
could see no way to refuse him a dissolution. In this, Clark, as he admitted, was reluctantly 
forced to agree. 
The High Commissioner recounted that he was unable to deliver Chamberlain's message to 
Hertzog until the morning of Monday, 4 September, when it failed to move the South 
African from his position that this war was not his country's concern, although he was more 
than happy to give Britain `the most favourable treatment possible within the limits of 
neutrality.' The Prime Minister thereafter went to a fmal cabinet meeting and then on to the 
House to propose his neutrality resolution. There, in Clark's view, Hertzog made two fatal 
errors in speaking in Afrikaans and defending Hitler, which would both have helped to drive 
the undecided into the Smuts camp. The High Commissioner contrasted this with the other 
side's behaviour, where, although the Afrikaner Smuts spoke in English, his seconder, the 
Anglophone Chief Whip, Colonel Collins, spoke in Afrikaans, demonstrating their side's 
respect for both traditions. According to Clark, considerable lobbying went on behind the 
scenes, and Smuts's supporters became concerned at the success the Hertzogites were having 
79 UCT, Sir William Clark Papers (BC81), D60, Clark to Eden, 13 September 1939, p. 6. 
80 NASA, Te Water Papers (A78), Vol.13 /Correspondence / Te Water to Hertzog, 1 September 1939; 
Oswald Pirow, Hertzog, p. 246. 
81 UCT, Sir William Clark Papers (BC81), D60, Clark to Eden, 13 September 1939. 
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in persuading waverers that if the neutrality proposition was lost, the Prime Minister would 
simply obtain a dissolution from Duncan. The electoral system favoured Afrikaners, meaning 
that would -be opponents, even if they won the debate in the House, would face another risk 
of losing their privileges as members of the ruling party, and possibly their seats as we11.82 
Clark reported how he was able to arrest this development, when approached by one of 
Smuts's proxies, by confirming there would be no dissolution if the Prime Minister was 
defeated.83 In the event Smuts won the division with a majority of thirteen. 
Hertzog then saw the Governor -General, advising him, as expected, to dissolve Parliament, 
according to Duncan's private record of the crisis.84 The latter's response was that an 
election risked domestic instability, and that the policy the government had taken to the 
people in the last one was that Parliament would decide. Parliament had now decided and if 
Smuts could form a government, then there was no good reason to go to the country again. 
Hertzog, who seems to have been deflated by his unexpected defeat, did not even argue the 
point that constitutionally he had a right to have his advice accepted and took his leave. 
Smuts thereafter confirmed to Duncan that he could form a government and the Prime 
Minister accordingly resigned the following morning, 5 September, to be succeeded by his 
former deputy the next day. 
Epilogue 
The dominions each managed to find a different way to enter the war. Australia followed the 
doctrine of the indivisibility of the Crown, which held that if the King was at war on behalf 
of one of his dominions, then he had to be at war on behalf of all of them. Menzies therefore 
simply announced over the radio that `in consequence of a persistence by Germany in her 
invasion of Poland, Great Britain has declared war on her and that, as a result, Australia is 
also at war.'85 In Wellington, the government heard the news of the outbreak of war over the 
radio, as a communications gridlock in London delayed the transmission of the relevant 
82 See Chapter One, above. 
83 UCT, Sir William Clark Papers (BC81), D60, Clark to Eden, 13 September 1939.. 
84 UCT, Sir Patrick Duncan Papers (BC294), J2, Sir Patrick Duncan `Untitled Memorandum ctd.', 4 
September 1939, p. 3. 
85 National Film and Sound Archive Online, `Declaration of War Speech by the Rt. Hon. R. G. 
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cables.86 Cabinet and the leading civil servants had met from 11 p.m. local time to declare 
war, backdating it to coincide with Britain's, then seeking Parliamentary endorsement for 
their action afterwards.87 In South Africa, Parliament had divided over the issue, bringing 
down the sitting Prime Minister in the process; and his successor now advised the Governor - 
General to declare war on behalf of the King, which Duncan duly did on 6 September 
1939.88 In Canada, the government proclaimed a state of `apprehended war' on 1 September, 
which they backdated to 25 August, because, according to the Prime Minister's diary, this 
was when they had `decided to purchase aeroplanes, and made other appropriations under G. 
G.'s warrants.'89 Mackenzie King then described how Parliament was summoned for 7 
September at his behest, to demonstrate Canada's independence in entering the war.90 The 
Prime Minister also obtained cabinet's approval for having the King make the declaration, 
rather than the Governor -General as had happened in the other dominions.91 He recounted in 
his journal, how on 9 September, after a two day debate, Parliament approved the 
government's policy that Canada should declare war, but it was not until the following day, 
Sunday, 10 September, that the King's signature could be obtained.92 The differences might 
be cosmetic, but, rather than being evidence of the solidarity of the British Commonwealth, 
the dominions' entry into the war actually showed the diverging nature of its major 
components. 
86 NLNZ, Bassett Papers 2000 -94 -02 /interview of Sir Alister McIntosh by Mark King 12 September 
1978, p. 35 
87 ¡bid, p. 5. 
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CONCLUSION 
New Zealand was forced to abandon its `moral foreign policy' and commitment to 
collective security, after the Munich Settlement finally destroyed what small hope had 
remained for these. Wellington was instead forced to rely on British power to supplement 
their own meagre forces. Culturally, the country had also long displayed a close affinity with 
the British. Their dependency was compounded by economic factors: the dominion's 
overseas trade was overwhelmingly committed to British markets, and, even more 
importantly, the government was reliant on British goodwill to obtain the finance necessary 
to fund its flagship welfare reforms. It therefore had little scope to take an independent line 
in foreign policy between Munich and the outbreak of war. The Munich settlement itself, by 
failing to dispel international tensions, only exacerbated this tendency. Wellington sought 
quietly to strengthen their defences, reach out to Britain and Australia through the proposed 
Pacific Defence conference, and affirm their claim to their mandate over Western Samoa, 
while minimising their acceptance of external obligations. Kristallnacht confirmed New 
Zealand in its existing commitment to defence and disapproval of the Nazi regime, but failed 
to inspire a relaxation of immigration controls, with the result that shamefully few refugees 
were accepted in the wake of the pogrom. The `war scare' of January - March 1939 found 
the government distracted by its domestic difficulties and with few options for intervention, 
with the consequence it did little beyond continuing with the measures already initiated. 
Similarly, Hitler's seizure of the remainder of Czecho- Slovakia inspired no comment. It was 
only when London subsequently dismissed Moscow's proposal for a conference that 
Wellington felt obliged to act. The actual meeting suggested bore no resemblance to the type 
of gathering that the New Zealand government had previously put forward, and still clearly 
remained committed to. Nevertheless, in line with their predilection for collective security, 
they plainly wished to see as broad a base as possible for any anti -aggression front that could 
be arranged. They therefore tried to push the British into rethinking their decision on the 
Soviet scheme, and also into involving the United States more directly. They welcomed the 
Polish guarantee (although with the caveat that they felt more should have been done for 
Czechoslovakia), but felt this made it even more necessary that Russian assistance be 
obtained. When the unthinkable happened, and the Soviets instead reached an agreement 
with the Nazis, Wellington took the opportunity to reaffirm its solidarity with London. 
Sentiment, security, economics, and a lack of viable alternatives rendered this their only 
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option. When war came, the government took the decision to declare war, backdating it to 
coincide with Britain's, and seeking Parliamentary approval for their action afterwards. 
In Australia, the leadership issue coloured their response to European developments. As 
long as Joe Lyons, with his pacifist inclinations, was in power, he would act as a brake on 
any warlike tendencies. New Zealand's proposal for a Pacific Defence Conference therefore 
met an unenthusiastic response. Billy Hughes, the bellicose Minister for External Affairs, 
however, strongly asserted the dominion's commitment to its mandate over New Guinea, 
and Lyons's deputy, Page, in line with his own agenda, was, however, able to use the 
continuing sense of insecurity in the wake of Munich to persuade the Prime Minister to adopt 
centralised planning to improve security, which would have the side - effect of benefiting 
Page's supporters. This latter endeavour foundered on the states' intransigence at the 
Premiers' conference on 21 October 1938. Canberra remained committed to improving its 
defences, however, boosting the militia to 75,000 and ordering a squadron of seaplanes for 
reconnaissance of the country's northern shores. Kristallnacht inspired immediate revulsion, 
in the same way as in the other dominions, but also did not change attitudes, either with 
regard to refugees or external relations. As in New Zealand, the government was immersed 
in its own internal difficulties at the time of the `war scare.' Nonetheless, Billy Hughes, lost 
no opportunity to assert the gravity of the situation, thereby boosting his portfolio's stature, 
and, by extension, his own. Internally matters came to a head with the resignation of Bob 
Menzies, the Attorney -General, citing concerns with defence as well as national insurance as 
reasons for so doing, while Hitler marched into Prague. The British High Commissioner, 
who knew Menzies well, was convinced, however, that these were just pretexts and that the 
Attorney -General had been merely looking for an excuse to openly break with Lyons in 
pursuit of the leadership. Hughes, benefiting from his increased stature, acquired Menzies's 
portfolio as well as his own, and was able to use the increased international tension to push 
the cabinet in a more hawkish direction. Naturally, he welcomed the British government's 
new policy after Prague, although he was inclined to read rather more into it than was 
actually intended. Page also benefited from Hitler's move as the states were no longer 
prepared to stand in the way of the Deputy Prime Minister's plans at the Premier's 
conference of 31 March 1939. Lyons's sudden death as the Italians seized Albania only 
strengthened Hughes's hand, but this was a temporary victory, as, despite a creditable 
showing, he came second to Menzies in the resulting leadership contest. 
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Menzies was determined to have his own man in charge of foreign policy, and, in 
consolation for taking the external affairs portfolio from him, promoted Hughes to Deputy 
Prime Minister. The leadership issue remained unresolved, however. Hughes, Casey, and 
most importantly Page remained unreconciled to Menzies's leadership. Page took his party 
out of coalition, citing the new Prime Minister's war record and his treatment of Lyons, 
leaving Menzies to head a minority administration. While domestically weak, in external 
relations Menzies had moved away from the appeasement he had adopted over the 
Sudetenland in 1938. While his harder line can be traced to his strategy over the leadership, 
Prague can only have confirmed him in this stance. He favoured an agreement with the 
Soviets, but only in Europe, in case it drove the Japanese further into the arms of the Axis. 
He was also adamant that there should be no new Munich over Poland, even if he suggested 
the Poles should endeavour not to appear inflexible for the sake of public opinion. Like New 
Zealand, sentiment, security, and economics mandated participation when war came. While 
Menzies recognised this, and that appeasement's time was past, he was in the awkward 
position of heading a minority administration dependent on the support of Page, who hated 
him, and with a questionable war record behind him. Fortunately for the Prime Minister, 
invoking the indivisibility of the crown meant he would not have to meet Parliament until the 
country was already at war. This meant any pre- existing appetite for asking awkward 
questions about Menzies's fitness to lead Australia in a time of conflict, was likely to be 
drowned in a wave of patriotic fervour. 
General Hertzog had two overriding objectives: to make clear his country's independent 
sovereignty; and, if at all possible, to preserve his partnership with English South Africa as 
well. Participating in a war simply because Britain was, would invalidate the first, but failure 
to do so would jeopardise the second. Hertzog therefore sought to do whatever he could to 
prevent the British falling into war, and, if this failed, to take what steps he could to alleviate 
the negative consequences of neutrality. In his view, supporters followed their leader, so as 
tensions had mounted in Europe, he had presented General Smuts, the de facto leader of 
English South Africa, with a virtual ultimatum in the form of the Neutrality Pact in 
September 1938. Outmanoeuvred, Smuts had been faced with either committing himself to 
accepting neutrality in advance over eastern Europe or breaking the Fusion regime over the 
issue. Smuts had not believed war over the Sudetenland was justified, but more importantly 
he had not believed it would happen, and so he had accepted Hertzog's proposal. The 
Munich settlement had prevented this from being put to the test. 
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The settlement had not, however, convinced the South Africans peace had been firmly re- 
established and they continued to strengthen their defences, while seeking a way to buy off 
any residual German interest in South-West Africa. Kristallnacht briefly united the 
government in indignation against Germany, but as elsewhere this did not translate into 
practical assistance for the refugees created by the pogrom, although the Minister of 
Defence, Oswald Pirow, tried to no avail to strike a headline -stealing deal with Hitler over 
the Jews, during his visit to Europe. In the New Year, Smuts had reversed his views on the 
probability of war, although his conviction that it would erupt out of Mussolini's ambitions 
in the Spanish Civil War would prove to be quite incorrect. Despite his later claim that it was 
Prague which convinced him that Hitler needed to be stopped, at the time he remained much 
more concerned about what would happen in Iberia. At the same time, Hertzog, in line with 
his aim of keeping Britain out of war, tried to persuade London to give Germany another 
final chance. Both he and Smuts were shocked by Britain's guarantee to Poland, which made 
war much more likely and therefore threatened the cohesion of the Fusion regime. Mussolini 
rescued their consensus temporarily by invading Albania, thus making it look like the Axis 
were acting in unison. This brought the danger sufficiently close to home to constitute a 
threat to South African interests from both Hertzog's and Smuts's points of view. Once 
negotiations with Russia commenced, both appear to have accepted it was preferable these 
reach a successful conclusion, although Hertzog urged that this should then be seen as an 
opportunity to once more reach out to Germany. When instead the Soviets signed an 
agreement with Germany, he likewise tried to persuade the British this provided a chance to 
seek an accommodation with Hitler. 
Neither he nor Smuts had any enthusiasm for the arrangements with Poland. Therefore, 
when the Prime Minister learned that Germany had attacked Poland and that Italy was going 
to be neutral, he sought to keep his country out of the war. Smuts, however, believed South 
Africa's future lay as an integral part of the Commonwealth, a destiny from which neutrality 
would sunder her. He had only agreed to the Neutrality Pact because he could not then 
believe that the European powers would go to war. He had since become convinced 
otherwise. Hitler's march into Prague now provided him with a pretext for changing his 
stance, even though it had not much mattered to him at the time. Once hostilities started, he 
was as determined on participation as Hertzog was on neutrality. In Parliament, the Prime 
Minister's hubris in speaking in Afrikaans and defending Hitler undoubtedly alienated 
waverers who might have been tempted to support him, and he lost the vote. His past 
eagerness to have a `South African' as Governor -General, then proved his undoing. He had 
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chosen Sir Patrick Duncan, a politician who had spent his entire career promoting the Anglo- 
South African connection, in an attempt to reconcile the English community to this 
development. Like Smuts, although Sir Patrick disliked the Polish connection, he felt the 
Union's future lay with the British Commonwealth, and therefore had a very different 
conception as to where `the public interest' rested to Hertzog. This was unlike the more 
traditional kind of Governor -General, who had only a transient connection with his dominion 
and an absolute priority of keeping the office out of politics. Duncan was, however, prepared 
to court controversy in the service of the greater good. Hence, when the Prime Minister 
approached Duncan to dissolve Parliament, his request was refused, and he was replaced by 
Smuts, who proceeded to take South Africa into the war. Hertzog's most visible success 
came back to haunt him in the end. 
In Canada, the Munich Agreement had convinced Mackenzie King that a new era of peace 
had dawned. While having no mandates to reaffirm, or not reaffirm, their claim to govern, 
the Canadians did overturn a resolution to order additional planes, making them the only 
dominion to rescind a defence measure in the aftermath of the crisis. Despite acknowledging 
a debt to the Czechs over the Sudetenland, Ottawa like the other dominions, simply 
displayed self - interest in its dealings with Prague. It did admit the Sudeten Aryan German 
Democrats, but only once it had decided these refugees would make a positive contribution 
to their adopted country, not because it was under any moral obligation to do so. 
Surprisingly, Kristallnacht did have a much greater impact here than elsewhere. This did not 
relate to the treatment of refugees, as, although the quixotic Mackenzie King wanted to adopt 
a more generous policy for the admission of Jews in the immediate aftermath of the pogrom, 
his commitment to this was gradually ground down by his colleagues. The pogrom did, 
however, shatter his belief that Munich had firmly cemented peace. Canada looked again to 
its defensive arrangements and started to rearm. Mackenzie King also sought to 
psychologically prepare the country for a possible war, and, as part of this, repeated his 
predecessor Sir Wilfrid Laurier's 1910 remark that `when England is at war, Canada is at 
war.' This drew much criticism both from officials at the Department of External Affairs and 
from Quebec. Mackenzie King was deeply sensitive to such expressions of disapproval, and 
therefore leaped on the reports causing `the war scare' as vindication of what he had said. 
Like Smuts, he had already been pessimistic, these reports had not caused his pessimism. 
However, unlike Smuts, he rapidly recovered his optimism and instead developed an abiding 
scepticism about the reliability of the British Foreign Office. He was not particularly 
distressed or concerned by the seizure of Prague, but nonetheless recognised war remained a 
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possibility, and continued to attempt to ready the people for it. He was horrified by British 
engagement with the countries of eastern Europe. Far from wanting consultation, he was 
relieved not to have been consulted on this. He also disliked involvement with Russia both 
because he thought it would increase tension, and because of how it would play in Quebec, 
but equally feared that, once negotiations had been embarked on, their failure would only 
make matters worse. He was, nevertheless, relieved by the Nazi- Soviet Pact, believing that 
Britain would now have to come to a settlement with Germany, albeit on Hitler's terms. He 
had never liked the Polish connection and continued to rail against them, even after he had 
led his country into war on their behalf. 
The political consensus was that if war came, Anglophone popular opinion would sweep the 
country into participation, regardless of what the politicians wished. Mackenzie King had, in 
any case, no such inclination. He convinced himself that he would be embarking on a war for 
freedom, which it would be shameful to avoid. This seems to be a remarkable piece of self - 
deception. Whenever an opportunity presented itself to make a stand for freedom, whether 
over the Sudetenland , Prague, or Poland, Mackenzie King was steadfast in his support of 
appeasement, reasoning that it was better to sacrifice these unknown people in faraway lands 
than risk war. He was only determined on participation when it was Britain that was 
involved in defence of freedom. Nor, to complicate matters, was he always motivated by 
British involvement alone, on the contrary, he was determined to avoid writing `a blank 
cheque' which any British administration could draw on, regardless of circumstances. He 
was only interested in wars when it appeared Britain would be involved, and her freedom, 
not freedom generally, would be at stake. He advocated appeasement over the Sudetenland 
and Poland, because British freedom was not at stake, but when Britain did, or seemed likely 
to, take up arms, he was wholehearted in his support, because then her liberty did appear at 
risk. Allowing himself to admit that would, however, have involved acknowledging he had 
more in common with `jingoes and Tories' than he cared to recognise, so he took refuge in 
his self -depiction of the defence of freedom. In parallel with this self -deception was 
Mackenzie King's messianic belief that he had been selected by supernatural powers to bring 
about peace. Thus, he congratulated himself that he had brought about the Munich 
Agreement through his personal relationships with Chamberlain and Hitler. He also 
persuaded himself that a personal letter to Hitler during `the war scare,' recalling their 
meeting in 1937, would make a significant contribution to the easing of international tension. 
Despite taking nearly six months to arrive, Hitler's reply, inviting twelve Canadians to visit 
Germany, merely confirmed the Canadian leader in the belief that he had been selected to 
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play a special part, and he determined to lead the party itself. Only the outbreak of hostilities 
prevented him from going. Moreover, following the Nazi- Soviet pact, he felt inspired to 
write to first Hitler, then Mussolini, and finally the Polish president in a bid to avert war, 
persuading himself that his message might well have been behind Hitler's decision to call off 
the invasion of Poland scheduled for 26 August, because Ribbentrop, with his Canadian 
connections, would have brought it to the Führer's attention. His suggestion that the King 
and Queen should make an appeal to Hitler fortunately went to Chamberlain, rather than the 
Palace, thus preventing a constitutional crisis at the worst possible time. Despite his ability 
for self -deception and flights of fancy, Mackenzie King seems to have had an unconscious 
survival instinct, which prevented him from taking these too far. However, he rationalised it, 
he believed Canada's participation to be necessary, and when war broke out, there was no 
question what his response would be, however much he deplored its necessity. 
Ernest Lapointe's thinking was less convoluted, but had more practical significance. He saw 
everything through the prism of Quebec. Like Smuts, he had never believed the Sudetenland 
would lead to war, and so had sought to restrain his quixotic leader from making any rash 
commitments which would fare badly in the province. Quebec's latent anti -Semitism 
coloured his reaction to Kristallnacht, leading him to argue against more generous treatment 
of the refugees streaming from Germany. He was as sceptical about `the war scare' as he had 
been about the Sudetenland , and sought to combine with Dr. Skelton, the isolationist 
permanent head of the Department of External Affairs, to hold Mackenzie King back and 
encourage him in his doubts about the dire reports from London. Prague changed all this. 
Lapointe could now see that war was a distinct possibility. He accepted that popular 
sentiment in Anglophone Canada made participation mandatory, and that if Quebec objected, 
Quebec would be swept aside, and all he had striven for would be lost. He also accepted that 
public opinion in his province needed to be prepared for this eventuality. Therefore, even 
knowing about the Polish guarantee, he delivered a rousing speech on 31 March 1939, 
waking his fellow Quebecois to this prospect. Thereafter, he only balked once at the prospect 
of broadcasting on 3 September 1939, about Canada's position, complaining that his people 
would come to see him as the voice of war, and even then, he allowed himself to be talked 
round, as Mackenzie King noted in his diary.' Lapointe's change of heart did not make the 
difference between Canadian participation or not, but it did ensure that Canada's entry would 
be a smooth ride. He prepared his province's public opinion, ensured cabinet opposition was 
insignificant, and provided the Prime Minister with much needed psychological support. 
'King, Diary, 3 September 1939, p. 2. 
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Sentiment, security and economics undoubtedly played their part in the dominions' 
perception of European events. Patriotic feeling, apart from among the Afrikaner and 
Quebecois communities, still bound the dominions to Britain. Australia and New Zealand 
still depended on Britain's Singapore strategy to protect them from Japan; South Africa 
relied on British command of the seas to protect their trade and their mandate over South - 
West Africa; while even Canada depended on British influence to offset that of its over - 
mighty neighbour to the south. Economically, they all continued to be tied to the British 
market. Domestic difficulties in Australia and New Zealand, as well as the racial tensions in 
Canada and South Africa, referred to above, also played a part in forming views of Europe. 
Nonetheless, events in Europe themselves had a significant impact on dominion thinking 
between 1 October 1938 and 11 September 1939. Munich led Canada to believe that a new 
era of peace had dawned, but failed to convince Australia and South Africa, while it pushed 
New Zealand into shelving its `moral foreign policy.' Kristallnacht forced Canada to think 
again and confirmed the others in their scepticism. `The war scare' temporarily boosted the 
hawkish tendency among the dominion leaderships, but in the longer term encouraged 
doubts as to London's judgement, except for General Smuts, as the episode confirmed him in 
the pessimism he already felt at the impending end to the Spanish Civil War. The `March 
into Prague' convinced Ernest Lapointe that war could no longer be discounted, leading him 
to reverse his stance on preparing Canada for this eventuality, and ensuring that Canada's 
entry would be much easier than would have otherwise been the case. The guarantees pleased 
only New Zealand and Billy Hughes in Australia, who would soon be shunted sideways in a 
cabinet reshuffle. The Canadians and South Africans feared they merely made war more 
likely, threatening the latter's domestic unity in the process. Albania, however, seemed to 
imply a global Axis threat, which temporarily restored the Union's fragile consensus. Anglo- 
Soviet talks initially only drew an enthusiastic response from Wellington, with the others 
reluctantly falling into line later, out of fear that failure would simply increase the risk of 
hostilities. Nevertheless, the Nazi- Soviet Pact struck Ottawa and Pretoria, but not Canberra 
and Wellington, as creating an opportunity for the British to reach out to Germany. When 
hostilities broke out, the news of Italian neutrality tore apart the unity of the Fusion regime in 
South Africa. Hertzog was convinced the Union's interests demanded neutrality, while Smuts 
held the contrary view, leading the latter to overthrow the former. The others each found their 
own way to enter the war. The distant drums of Europe had played their part in bringing 
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Appendix 
Dramatis Personae, 1 October 1938 - 1 1 September 1939 
Germany 
D Members of the Nazi regime 
Adolf Hitler - German Dictator 
Joachim von Ribbentrop - German Foreign Minister, loathed, and loathed by 
Herman Goering - held many offices under the Nazi regime. Among the most 
significant for this thesis were the posts of Minister of Aviation, Minister of 
Economics and Head of the Organisation for the Four Year Plan, loathed, and 
loathed by 
Dr. Joseph Goebbels - Minister for Propaganda and Public Enlightenment. His 
attempt to curry favour with Hitler through Kristallnacht (in the wake of his fall 
from grace through his affair with the Czech actress Lida Baarova) may have 
succeeded in its aim, but ratcheted up international tension in a way which was 
felt even as far afield as the dominions. 
Dr. Hjalmar Schact, former Minister of Economics in the Nazi government, at 
the beginning of this thesis he remained President of the Reichsbank. Widely 
viewed as a stabilising element in the regime, his dismissal from the latter post 
on 19 January 1939 would contribute significantly to the sense of crisis which 
developed towards the end of that month 
D Members of the Diplomatic Corps 
Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador to Germany. Dying of cancer, 
Henderson is now widely seen as having been prepared to concede too much in 
his desire to achieve a stable arrangement between Britain and Germany. 
Dr. Stefanus Gie, simultaneously South African Minister to Germany and 
Sweden, largely based in Berlin. Considered himself to be `of one mind' with 
Henderson during the Sudeten Crisis. 
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 Britain 
Members of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
Neville Chamberlain, First Lord of the Treasury 
Edward Wood, Earl of Halifax, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
Edward Stanley, Lord Stanley, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to 16 
October 1938 
Malcolm MacDonald, Secretary of State for the Colonies, Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs 31 October 1938 - 29 January 1939 
Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister for Co- Ordination of Defence to 29 January 1939, 
subsequently Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 29 January -3 September 
1939, thereafter Lord High Chancellor 3 September 1939 - 12 May 1940 
Members of Parliament 
Anthony Eden, formerly Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he had resigned 
from the government over differences with Chamberlain over foreign policy and 
remained an influential focus for dissident opinion in this period 
Leo Amery, formerly Secretary of State for Colonial and Dominion Affairs in 
the 1920s, he had presided over the department's division into separate colonial 
and dominion ministries. Despite having apparently concealed his partly Jewish 
heritage, he was a staunch opponent of appeasement and advocate of 
rearmament, while continuing to interest himself in imperial matters (including 
corresponding with Smuts in South Africa). 
Winston Churchill, the most influential of the dissidents, any suggestion of his 
return to office was likely to be taken as signifying the final abandonment of any 
attempt to seek a rapprochement with Germany. 
> Dominion Representatives in London 
Stanley Bruce, previously prime minister of Australia in the 1920s, by 1 October 
1938 Australian High Commissioner in London. He approved of Chamberlain's 
efforts to appease Hitler during the Sudeten Crisis, and was prepared to support 
the British guarantee of rump Czechoslovakia. He would return to Canberra in 
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the (northern hemisphere) winter of 1938 -39 ostensibly for consultations about 
the international situation, but actually about the possibility of him succeeding 
Joe Lyons as his country's leader once more. 
John Duncan, Official Secretary at the Australian High Commission in London, 
and Acting Australian High Commissioner in Bruce's absence. 
Alfred Stirling, Australian Liaison Officer in London. Formerly Bob Menzies's 
secretary, Stirling was embedded in the British Civil Service and provided a 
more direct (if lower level) channel of communication between London and 
Canberra than that provided through the Dominions Office and Australia House. 
Vincent Massey, Canadian High Commissioner in London, appears to have been 
discreetly anti -Semitic and was a staunch approver of appeasement. In any case, 
his hands were largely tied by Mackenzie King, the Canadian prime minister, 
who only reluctantly conceded Massey could attend meetings at the Dominions 
Office with the other High Commissioners during the Sudeten Crisis, while 
remaining adamant that he had no authority to speak on behalf of his 
government. 
L. B. `Mike' Pearson, Secretary at the Canadian High Commission and future 
Prime Minister of Canada. In response to the swell in the number of refugees 
arising out of Munich and Kristallnacht, he would seek to promote Canadian 
interests by advocating the immigration of refugees with skills and resources 
likely to be of benefit to their hosts. 
Bill Jordan, New Zealand High Commissioner in London. Given the office to 
get him out of the way, Jordan displayed a nauseating obsequiousness towards 
his superiors combined with a ruthless bullying of those unfortunate enough to 
be subordinated to him. Jordan spent most of the Sudeten Crisis in Geneva on 
League of Nations business. He remained ideologically convinced that 
international tensions were the result of stock market interests and instinctively 
distrustful of the Conservative Party and all its works. However, having been 
subjected to much criticism in the New Zealand press for advocating a foreign 
policy at odds with the British government the previous year, and with a general 
election looming back home, he seems to have reined in his instincts to provide 
much in the way of critical comment on British policy. 
Sandford, Jordan's stand -in at the High Commissioners' meetings in London. 
Sandford was extremely reticent during the Sudeten Crisis, probably out of a 
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combination of his relatively junior status combined with a healthy fear of his 
unreasonably difficult boss. 
Sir Cecil Day, New Zealand Liaison Officer. Formerly the Governor -General's 
secretary in Wellington, he was the counterpart to Australia's Stirling, providing 
a direct channel of communication from Whitehall departments to Wellington 
which cut out the Dominions Office and New Zealand House. 
Charles to Water, South African High Commissioner in London. A devoted 
follower of General Hertzog, the South African prime minister, to Water had 
strongly advocated appeasement in the interest of his country and party's unity 
during the Sudeten Crisis. 
Australia 
D Members of His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia 
Joe Lyons, prime minister and leader of the United Australia Party (UAP) until 
his sudden death on 7 April 1939. Pacifist in sympathy and worn out by the 
stress of trying to keep his cabinet together, Lyons appeared to be seeking a 
dignified exit from the political scene. 
Sir Earle Page, deputy prime minister to 7 April 1939, prime minister 7 April - 
26 April 1939, minister for commerce, minister for health (both to 26 April 
1939) and leader of the Country Party. 
Robert Menzies (UAP), Attorney -General and Minister for Industry to 14 March 
1939, Prime Minister from 26 April 1939 through the outbreak of war. Clever, 
intensely ambitious and extremely talented at making enemies, he remained a 
divisive figure both before and after becoming prime minister. 
Richard Casey (UAP), Treasurer to 26 April 1939, thereafter Minister for 
Supply and Development. A protégée of Bruce, the former prime minister and 
current High Commissioner in London, he had seemed the natural successor to 
Lyons, but his responsibility for the abandoned National Insurance legislation 
and his subsequent intrigues for the return of his mentor fatally handicapped his 
candidature. He remained bitter about his defeat and unsupportive of Menzies's 
leadership in cabinet. 
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 Billy Hughes (UAP), Minister for External Affairs to 26 April 1939, Attorney 
General from 14 March 1939, Menzies also made him deputy leader of the UAP. 
Already in his 70s, Hughes had previously been prime minister and had signed 
the Treaty of Versailles for Australia in that capacity. Passionate and combative, 
he saw no reason why he should not lead his country again despite being at odds 
with most of his colleagues over his opposition to appeasement, and was 
prepared to do whatever it took to make this happen. He would lead his party 
once more (when he was 79) after Menzies was ousted in 1941, but would never 
be prime minister again. 
Harold Thorby (Country Party), Minister for Defence to November 1938, 
Minister for Works and Civil Aviation from November 1938 to 26 April 1942. 
Thorby was a natural fall guy for all the perceived shortcomings in defence. 
Lacking any military experience, his membership of the Country Party denied 
him the immunity that the UAP dominated press seemed to extend to members 
of that party. Accordingly, when Lyons reshuffled his cabinet in November 
1938, Thorby was moved sideways to make way for Geoffrey Street, who as a 
former Brigadier and member of the UAP, lacked the political weaknesses of his 
predecessor in what had become a very sensitive post. 
Brigadier Geoffrey Street (UAP), Minister for Defence from November 1938. 
Sir Henry Gullett (UAP), Minister for External Affairs from 26 April 1939. `No 
one pays any attention to Gullett' as Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, British High 
Commissioner in Canberra would have it, but Gullett had been an inveterate 
backbench critic of Lyons on National Insurance and trade policy. 
> His Majesty's Loyal Opposition 
John Curtin, Leader of the Labor Party, personally friendly with Menzies, this 
did not prevent him from seeking to exploit the latter's perceived weakness on 
military matters. Heading a party divided between socially conservative Irish 
Catholics and Left -wing radicals, Curtin was scarcely in a much stronger 
position, and sensibly chose to focus his attacks on demanding that Australian 
preparations should be confined to the defence of Australia, rather than incurring 
Imperial burdens, as this was an issue on which both wings of his party could be 
expected to agree. 
241 
 Diplomatic representatives 
Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, British High Commissioner in Canberra, friendly with 
both Lyons and Menzies, Whiskard was able to gain considerable insight into 
the inner workings of both their cabinets 
Civil Servants 
Colonel H. V. Hodgson, Permanent Secretary of the Department for External 
Affairs, having established `The Permanent Bases of Australian External Policy' 
for Prime Minister Joe Lyons, Hodgson was easily as influential as, although 
considerably less well -known than, Carl August Berendsen his counterpart in 
New Zealand. 
Frederick Shedden, Permanent Secretary of the Department of Defence, 
nicknamed `the pocket Hankey' for his aping of Sir Maurice Hankey, the former 
British Cabinet Secretary and Secretary of the Committee for Imperial Defence. 
Members of the State Governments 
New South Wales 
Bertram Stevens (UAP), Premier of New South Wales (NSW) to 5 August 1939. 
Stevens was widely seen as one of the candidates to replace Lyons as 
Commonwealth Prime Minister. Stevens strongly supported deficit financing 
which brought him into conflict with the fiscally orthodox Lyons government. 
However, his deputy, Spooner resigned in July 1939 over an attempt to cut the 
deficit, and brought forward a confidence motion which Stevens lost by two 
votes. Spooner failed to benefit from this, however, as Stevens was replaced as 
Premier by his Treasurer, Alexander Mair. 
Eric Spooner (UAP), NSW Minister for Public Works and Local Government to 
21 July 1939, and Deputy Leader of the NSW Parliamentary UAP to August 
1939. 
Michael Bruxner (Country Party), NSW Deputy Premier and Minister for 
Transport. He disliked and distrusted Spooner, effectively blocking him from 
taking the premiership after the fall of Stevens. 
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 Alexander Mair (UAP), NSW Treasurer, Premier from 5 August 1939. During 
1939, Mair would propose cutting the deficit the coalition government in NSW 
was incurring, which would lead him into conflict with Spooner, whose portfolio 
of public works was the source of much of the deficit. When Spooner attempted 
to reverse the government's new fiscal policy through a confidence motion he 
brought down Stevens, but was unable to win Bruxner's support. As this would 
have meant ending the coalition, and the NSW UAP was not prepared to tolerate 
such a development, Mair was able to establish himself as premier, despite it 
having been his policy which had just been defeated. 
Victoria 
Albert Dunstan (Country Party), Victorian Premier and Treasurer, was head of a 
minority administration dependent on Labor support. 
Queensland 
William Forgan Smith (Labor), Queensland Premier. A pragmatic socialist who, 
despite his Presbyterian background, allowed the impression to be created that 
the Queensland Labor Party was the Catholic Church at politics, he remained a 
determined advocate of states' rights and would eventually resign at what he saw 
as the over -centralising tendencies of Curtin's wartime Labor administration in 
Canberra. 
Frank Cooper, Queensland Treasurer. A loyal servant of Forgan Smith, he would 
ultimately succeed him as Premier on 16 September 1942, after which he would 
be equally supportive of Curtin, despite his predecessor's difficulties with the 
latter's centralising tendencies. 
> South Australia 
Richard Butler (Liberal and Country League), South Australian Premier, the son 
of a former premier of South Australia, Butler was determined to attract industry 
to South Australia. Having failed to win a majority in the April 1938 elections, 
he continued in office with the support of independents, but would be persuaded 
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to unsuccessfully attempt to break into federal politics in November of that year, 
which marked the end of his political career. 
> Western Australia 
Michael Troy (Labor), Deputy Premier and Minister for Lands and Immigration, 
Western Australia had unsuccessfully attempted to secede in 1933, and Troy 
appeared very sensitive that Western Australian interests might be subordinated 
to those of more powerful states in conferences between the central and state 
governments. 
Tasmania 
Albert Ogilvie (Labor), Premier to his sudden death on 10 June 1939, favoured 
radical financial policies in contrast to the orthodox Lyons administration in 
Canberra. 
E. J. Ogilvie (Labor), Attorney- General and Minister for Education, Fisheries 
and Game, brother to the Premier, E. J. Ogilvie strongly advanced the interests 
of his own portfolios. 
Edward Dwyer -Gray (Labor), Treasurer and Deputy Premier to 10 June 1939, 
Premier from 10 June 1939 after Ogilvie's sudden death, in agreement with 
Robert Cosgrove who became Treasurer, before they exchanged offices on I S 
December 1939. Dwyer -Gray deliberately cultivated a reputation for fiscal 
competence, although there is considerable suggestion he was in fact heavily 
reliant on the capability of his advisors rather than any particular abilities of his 
own. 
Canada 
> Members of His Majesty's Government in Canada 
William Lyon Mackenzie King (Liberal), Prime Minister and Minister for 
External Affairs, Mackenzie King was primarily motivated by a desire to 
maintain Canadian unity, which he saw as principally threatened by separatist 
tendencies among the Quebecois. He hoped to reconcile the latter through a 
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policy of generous treatment, but was hampered by his inability to speak French 
and empathise with their socially conservative Catholicism. He therefore relied 
heavily on his long -term political partner, Ernest Lapointe, a Francophone 
Catholic from Quebec, to mediate Quebecois concerns. 
Ernest Lapointe (Liberal), Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, 
Lapointe loyally supported Mackenzie King in return for the latter's prioritising 
of Francophone Quebec's interests. 
Charles Dunning (Liberal), Minister of Finance, a former rival of Mackenzie 
King's for the party leadership, Dunning was now seriously ill and would 
permanently retire from politics in September 1939. He therefore played much 
less part in political matters than his counterparts in the other dominions. 
Ian Mackenzie (Liberal), Minister of Defence, Mackenzie did not give the 
impression of being on top of his portfolio, fumbling in cabinet and admitting he 
did not know which members of his department he could trust. Typically, 
Mackenzie King was scathing of the minister's abilities in private, but saw no 
need to replace him with someone more competent, despite the increasing 
importance of the role in a period of escalating international tensions. 
Thomas Crerar, Minister of Mines and Resources, with ultimate responsibility 
for immigration. 
Charles `Chubby' Power (Liberal), Postmaster -General, an Anglophone member 
of cabinet from Quebec, Mackenzie King consistently favoured Lapointe's 
views over Power's, even when Power had just come from Quebec and Lapointe 
was in Geneva, far removed from any access to Quebecois opinion in the 
volatile conditions prevailing at the climax of the Sudeten crisis. 
> Civil Servants 
Dr. O. D. Skelton, Permanent Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, a 
convinced isolationist, Skelton was nonetheless very sympathetic to the plight of 
refugees and argued that they should not be deported into danger simply because 
they had lied to enter Canada. 
Hume Wrong, Canadian Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations, an 
isolationist like Skelton, he was the author of a number of internal memoranda 
arguing this point, and represented Canada at the intergovernmental conference 
on refugees held at Evian 6 - 15 July 1938. 
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 Loring Christie, Legal Counsellor at the Department of External Affairs, from 
1939, replaced Sir Herbert Marler as Canadian Envoy Extraordinary and 
Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States, like Skelton and Wrong, Christie 
was the author of a number of internal isolationist tracts. 
James Gibson, Department of External Affairs Officer 
Frederick Blair, Director of Immigration, Ministry of Mines and Resources, 
Blair seems to have been tainted with the fashionable anti -Semitism 
characteristic of the times, but it was his dedicated bureaucratic empire -building, 
leading to an insistence on pedantic compliance with all the minute requirements 
of immigration that inhibited the immigration not just of Jewish, but Polish and 
Spanish refugees during this period. 
Arnold Heeney, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, on becoming 
Secretary to the Cabinet in 1940, he introduced a system of minute -taking to 
their deliberations. 
> Diplomatic Representatives 
Sir Gerald Campbell, British High Commissioner to Canada 
Dr. Erich Windels, German Consul -General 
> Members of the State Governments 
> Alberta 
William `Bible Bill' Aberhart (Social Credit Party of Alberta), Premier of 
Alberta, exceeded his government's constitutional powers by attempting to take 
control of the banks and press in his province in 1937, thereby trespassing on 
Ottawa's territory. Despite Aberhart's overwhelming popularity in Alberta, 
Mackenzie King had no qualms in contesting the legislation before the Supreme 
Court of Canada and subsequently the Privy Council, thereby showing that it 
was only the Quebecois he feared to confront. 
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> Quebec 
Maurice Duplessis (Unione Nationale), Premier of Quebec, also exceeded his 
government's authority in 1 937, by passing the so- called `Padlock Law', which, 
among other measures, permitted the authorities to lock premises against their 
owners if they had been used to spread communist propaganda. Despite the 
law's blatant illegality and violation of liberal principles, Mackenzie King made 
no attempt to contest it out of fear of the reaction of the Quebecois to such a 
step, in marked contrast to his treatment of the Albertan legislation. 
> Ontario 
Mitchell Hepburn (Liberal), Premier of Ontario, encouraged by his electoral 
success in Ontario, Hepburn schemed with Duplessis of Quebec against 
Mackenzie King, an intrigue which ultimately brought about Hepburn's 
downfall, but not before Mackenzie King had devoted much time and effort to 
countering Hepburn's threat to the prime minister's control of his party at the 
federal level. 
New Zealand 
> Members of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand 
`The Triumvirate' 
Michael Joseph `Joe' Savage (Labour), Prime Minister and Minister of External 
Affairs, dying of cancer, Savage, in conjunction with his two colleagues, was 
desperate to secure the re- election of his government, the stability of its finances, 
and the implementation of its flagship social security policy. 
Peter Fraser (Labour), Deputy Prime Minister, held a number of other portfolios, 
most importantly those of Justice, Health and Education, leaving him `the 
natural successor' when Savage finally succumbed to his illness in 1940. 
Walter Nash (Labour), Minister of Finance and Customs, dominated the finance 
function and had overall responsibility for immigration. 
`The Others' 
Fred Jones (Labour), Minister for Defence, Defence was a sensitive issue as the 
triumvirate had all opposed the Great War (and Fraser had been imprisoned for 
247 
sedition) so they allocated it to Jones, whose lack of military experience and 
personal pliability meant he would not use his position to embarrass them. 
John `Jack' Lee (Labour), Minister for Housing, an aggressive and radical MP 
from the left of the party, Lee would mount a bid to take control of the party, for 
personal and ideological reasons, after the October 1938 General Election 
(which Labour won) that would only end with his expulsion from the party in 
1940. 
Mark Fagan, Minister without Portfolio and Acting Minister of Customs in 1939 
while Nash was overseas, Fagan shared responsibility with the latter for 
immigration. 
> Diplomatic Representatives 
Lord Galway, the Governor -General, who uniquely acted as the representative of 
the King and the British government until the appointment of Sir Harry 
Batterbee as the first British High Commissioner to New Zealand in April, 1939. 
Sir Harry Batterbee, formerly number two in the Dominions Office, from April 
1939 British High Commissioner in Wellington 
> Civil Servants 
Carl August Berendsen, permanent head of the Prime Minister's Office and the 
Department for External Affairs, presumed author of New Zealand's `Moral 
Foreign Policy' in favour of collective security and against aggression, he was a 
natural conservative who fundamentally disagreed with his masters except over 
external affairs. He worshipped Savage but had a famously poor relationship 
with Fraser. 
Alister McIntosh, his assistant 
Dr. W. B. Sutch, economist, adviser to Walter Nash, the member of the 
triumvirate most closely associated with finance and immigration 
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> Other 
The Right Rev. Cecil Arthur Cherrington, Bishop of Waikato, advocated the 
invitation of Japanese settlers to assist in the development of an 'under- 
populated' New Zealand in the late 1930s. 
South Africa 
> Members of His Majesty's Government in the Union of South Africa 
General J. Barry M. Hertzog (former National Party wing of the United Party), 
Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs, a natural autocrat whose 
determination was only stiffened by opposition, Hertzog's obsessive anxieties 
about the Afrikaners, coupled with his inability to empathise with the English, 
unintentionally undermined the fusion of the two communities that he sought to 
achieve. 
General Jan C. Smuts (former South Africa Party wing of the United Party), 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Justice, as passionate about `Fusion' as 
Hertzog, Smuts had the difficult task of trying to mitigate the most insensitive of 
Hertzog's impositions on the English while striving to convince his increasingly 
sceptical followers that the benefits of co- operation still outweighed the 
disadvantages. That his relative success to date in this latter task only convinced 
Hertzog and his followers that Smuts would always deliver the English for them, 
simply rendered the prime minister more intransigent, thereby worsening 
Smuts's position. 
Oswald Pirow (former National Party wing of the United Party), Minister of 
Defence and Railways, the son of a German missionary, Pirow would attempt to 
use this connection to pull off a spectacular diplomatic coup when visiting 
Europe in November 1938, possibly with a view to establishing himself as the 
obvious successor to the two aging generals who presided over the United Party. 
Nicolaas Havenga (former National Party wing of the United Party), Minister of 
Finance, displayed little interest in external affairs except to dutifully support 
Hertzog's position to others. 
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D Members of Parliament 
Dr. Daniel Malan (Purified' National Party), Leader of the main opposition 
party, Malan had defected from Hertzog's National Party when the latter had 
merged with Smuts's South Africa Party. Hertzog bitterly resented this 
challenge to his status as `the Father of Afrikanerdom.' This led him to obsess 
about how any measure would play with the purified nationalists whose support 
he had lost, rather than with the English supporters he had gained, as a result of 
the merger, which tactless behaviour tended to exacerbate tensions within the 
(not very) United Party. 
Colonel Charles Stallard (Dominion Party), had lost his seat and seen his party 
virtually wiped out in the April 1938 election. While this did not stop him 
indomitably asserting his position, realistically he had to wait for better times. 
Diplomatic Representatives 
Sir William Clark, British High Commissioner for South Africa and the 
Protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, formerly British 
High Commissioner in Canada from 1928 -34. 
Dr. Rudolph Leitner, German Consul -General 
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